

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
<small>Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.</small>				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE 2.Dec.99		3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED DISSERTATION
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE INTERAGENCY CONFLICT AND UNITED STATES INTERVENTION POLICY: TOWARD A BUREAUCRATIC MODEL OF CONFLICT TERMINATION				5. FUNDING NUMBERS
6. AUTHOR(S) CAPT RAST VICKI J				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) THE DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE AFIT/CIA, BLDG 125 2950 P STREET WPAFB OH 45433				10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER FY99-428
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES				
12a. DISTRIBUTION AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Unlimited distribution In Accordance With AFI 35-205/AFIT Sup 1				12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)				
<div style="font-size: 2em; font-weight: bold;">19991213 006</div>				
14. SUBJECT TERMS				15. NUMBER OF PAGES 849
				16. PRICE CODE
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT		18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE		19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT
				20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 3

INTERAGENCY CONFLICT AND UNITED STATES INTERVENTION
POLICY: TOWARD A BUREAUCRATIC MODEL OF
CONFLICT TERMINATION

by

Vicki J. Rast

A Dissertation Submitted to the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution
of
George Mason University
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree
of
Doctor of Philosophy
Conflict Analysis and Resolution

Committee:

Committee
Paul Duckman
Harry A. Weaver
Harold F. Horner
Paul Duckman
Sandra Childs

Co-chair

Co-chair

Doctoral Coordinator

Institute Director

Date:

7th May 1999

Spring Semester 1999
George Mason University
Fairfax, VA

Interagency Conflict and United States Intervention Policy: Toward a
Bureaucratic Model of Conflict Termination

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree
of Doctor of Philosophy at George Mason University

By

Vicki J. Rast
Master in Public Administration
Troy State University, 1992
Bachelor of Science
United States Air Force Academy, 1988

Directors:

Christopher R. Mitchell, Professor
Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution

And

Daniel Druckman, Professor
Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution

Spring Semester 1999
Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution
George Mason University
Fairfax, Virginia

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For all who have dedicated their lives to the pursuit of peace...
especially those who have made the ultimate sacrifice.

Where there is no vision, the people perish.

Proverbs 29:18 (KJV)

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Perhaps more than most, this dissertation truly represents a team effort. While the words representing the ideas captured within this research remain those of the author — as do the errors of omission and commission — many individuals made this product a reality. My deepest appreciation goes first to the 135 participants who shared their lives with me by providing their perspectives on the ways Washington really makes policy (see Appendix A): Save their dedication and commitment to service, there would be no dissertation. Without exception, each of these professionals treated me as their colleague and spoke candidly in an effort to help me understand the policy-making process. I hope the conclusions presented here do justice to their ideas and to their continued commitment to establishing the conditions for peace around the world. While the remaining individuals to whom I owe a debt of gratitude did not provide views on policy-making, they played a more crucial role in the overall development of this work.

Many people encouraged me and provided intellectual stimulation throughout my graduate program as I developed this project. Others offered conceptual critiques, created networking opportunities, provided resources,

rendered feedback on preliminary conclusions, served as outside readers, and contributed limitless support for this research (and me personally) in many untold ways — all played pivotal roles at crucial points, making this intellectual conception a reality. In recognition of the roles these individuals played, I would like to thank everyone who in some fashion shaped this research. It is to these friends and colleagues that I owe the greatest appreciation and admiration for their willingness to make a positive difference in my life: Frank Blechman, Mary Lynn Boland, Gen. Charles G. Boyd, Esther Brimmer, Maj. Gen. John W. Brooks, Carolyn Brown, George Brown, Tenniell Brown, Kathi Burton, Gen. Michael P. C. Carns, Nike Carstarphen, Brig. Gen. (P) George Casey, Jr., Nancy Cecatiello, Sandy Cheldelin, Secretary Richard Cheney, David S.C. Chu, Andrew & Caryn Collier, Maureen Connors, Maria J.E. Copson-Niecko, Jock Covey, Ivo Daalder, the entire Department of State Press Office, Marjorie Druckman, Lynda Dunn, Nancy Bearg Dyke, Gen. Ralph E. Eberhart, the Fenwick Library Staff, Gen. Ronald R. Fogleman, Mindy Ford, Sharon Forrest, Amb. Chas. Freeman, Amb. Peter Galbraith, Amb. Robert Gallucci, Sheila Goode, Dr. Jamie Grimes, Laura Hall, Morton Halperin, John Hammang, Landon Hancock, Col. Ann Harrell, Len Hawley, Mary Hildebrand, Jane Holl, Diane Hrabak, my colleagues at the Institute, Charles Jefferson, Brig. Gen. Charles Jiggetts, Harold Johnson, Jane Johnson, Gen. George Joulwan, Sandy Kaisler, Col. Greg Kaufmann, Sandy Kelso, Amb. Robert Kimmitt, Amb. Jacques Paul Klein, Dr. David Klink,

Anthony Lake, Mariann Laue, Deborah Lobato, Jan Lodal, Dean Longo, James Lucas, "Bear" McConnell, Robert Montgomery, Brig. Gen. T. Michael Moseley, Susan Allen Nan, Col. Gary L. North, Amb. Robert Oakley, Kathleen Owen, Amb. Roberts Owen, Florence Parrish St. John, Patricia Payne, Dottie Peratt, Col. David Petraeus, Roman Popadiuk, Libby Powell, Patricia Prinz, Diane Putney, Julie Reside, Condoleezza Rice, Anne Richard, Stephen Rosenfeld, Richard Rubenstein, Nell Rutherford, Kori Schake, Mara Lyn Schoeny, Yvonne Schilz, Aric Schwan, Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Rebecca Sewall, Gen. & Mrs. John Shalikashvili, Ilana Shapiro, Maj. Gen. John Shaud, Col. Jimmie Simmons, Bill Smullen, Cecile St. Julien, Capt. Greg Steele, James Swigert, Rob Taylor, Barb Thompson, Paula Thornhill, Gwenyth Todd, Col. James Toth, Alan van Egmond, Peter Walsh, Wallace Warfield, Lois Weiss, Alan Whittaker, Lynn Williams, Thomas Wilson, John Windmueller, Gail Wojtowicz, Amb. Paul Wolfowitz, Susan Woodward, Judith Yaphe, and several "nameless" individuals who preferred to remain anonymous and are therefore not listed as research participants. While these individuals helped me at every turn in the research process, I would be remiss should I fail to identify four additional groups who have been with me since the beginning.

First, I remain deeply indebted to the United States Air Force and the Air University for providing me the chance to expand my perspective, my potential, and my horizons. On a very personal level, John Warden, Larry Weaver, and

Ronald Mitchell created this opportunity to broaden my mind, my understanding, and my life. Without their vision, my George Mason experience would never have become a reality. I thank them first as my professional mentors; secondly, as my friends. Another individual entered both categories upon my arrival to Washington—Alan Gropman. Dr. Gropman took me under his wing immediately, providing access to critical resources, shaping my intellect, and networking me with “all the right people.” He served as my safety net and confidant, encouraging me through it all! I appreciate the relationships I have shared with each of these professionals—thank you!

Next, I am indebted to the members of my dissertation committee. These four men remained dedicated to my intellectual development throughout this process. While each played a different role, they collectively provided the vision, guidance, and encouragement that transformed a 8-page concept proposal into the volume before you. I am particularly indebted to Dr. Christopher Mitchell for his creativity and for providing the nurturing environment that convinced me this work *could* be done, especially under extremely restrictive working conditions. Dr. Daniel Druckman provided the methodological rigor this research required—I remain grateful to him for enhancing my capacity to frame complex problems from multiple perspectives. Dr. Harold Gortner (and his wife Sylvia) provided the glue that held me together throughout this process, keeping me sane and focused—a debt I will never live long enough to repay. Finally, not

only did Dr. Larry Weaver help create this educational opportunity, he also encouraged me at every step in the process and convinced me this research *should* be done. These individuals remain primarily responsible for the product you are reviewing. While the conclusions and opinions are mine alone, this work is the manifestation of their collective inspiration, intellectual expenditure, and unyielding dedication to both this field and me. Two other individuals dedicated significant portions of their lives to helping make this research a reality.

Tracy Ann Breneman and Larissa Fast stood by me from my very first day at the Institute. Serving as steadfast colleagues and friends throughout the last three years, they came through for me at the end of this long journey, editing the final manuscript. Again, while the errors contained within this volume are mine alone, their commitment to excellence shows through this product. I remain indebted to them for many things—I could not have completed this research without them! Finally, my family played a special role in supporting this research.

To my family I owe...everything! My family (especially my parents and best friends, Charles and Marlene Besecker) provides a nurturing environment that continues to embrace me with love. The lessons they taught me long ago enabled me to complete this endeavor—to them, I remain eternally grateful. And, last on this list but *first in my life* is my husband, Marcus Rast. His unassailable devotion helped me maintain my relationship with God and enabled me to put everything

in His hands during these three trial-filled years. Marcus also served as my research assistant, proofreader, caretaker...and supported me in ways too numerous to mention here. Absent his unconditional love and self-less dedication, this project would still be on the drawing board. Thank you for making my dream a reality honey — *you complete me and I will always love you!*

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

ACDA	Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
COA	Course of Action
CS	Chief of Staff (White House, unless otherwise indicated)
DC	Deputies Committee (of the NSC; NSC/DC)
DCI	Director of Central Intelligence
DoD	Department of Defense
DoS	Department of State
ENO	Enticing Opportunity Model
ENT	Entrapment Model
EOP	Executive Office of the President
GAO	Government Accounting Office
HS	Hurting Stalemate
IMC	Imminent Mutual Catastrophe
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
NCA	National Command Authorities
NEC	National Economic Council
NEO	Noncombatant Evacuation Operation
NSA	National Security Agency
NSC	National Security Council
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
PC	Principals Committee (of the NSC; NSC/PC)
PCC	Policy Coordinating Committees (of the NSC; NSC/PCC)
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SECST	Secretary of State
USAF	United States Air Force
USIA	United States Information Agency
VP	Vice President

ABSTRACT

INTERAGENCY CONFLICT AND UNITED STATES INTERVENTION POLICY: TOWARD A BUREAUCRATIC MODEL OF CONFLICT TERMINATION

Vicki J. Rast, Ph.D.

George Mason University, 1999

Dissertation Directors: Dr. Christopher R. Mitchell and Dr. Daniel Druckman

The purpose of this study is to examine the sources of interagency conflicts within the United States government's decision-making processes in cases of coercive intervention (such as the second Persian Gulf War and Bosnia), and the manner in which such conflicts affect policies regarding termination, and hence, withdrawal.

Applying Rational Choice Theory as the accepted premise for foreign and national security policy-making, this work argues that decision-makers do not make choices as a unitary actor. Allison's and Halperin's ideas provide the foundation for identifying the players and contextual factors that bound decision-making. The framework developed includes six interrelated signed digraph models to operationalize the theoretical perspectives guiding the

research. Using a complementary multi-method approach, the study collects and analyzes quantitative and qualitative data from informed respondents. The quantitative analysis illuminates relationships that affect interagency conflict. The qualitative research identifies themes that respondents perceived as most important in the development of interagency conflict and termination policy. These seven macro and their supporting micro themes are then organized in terms of their capacity to influence the ways in which (1) *dynamic themes* influence interagency dynamics; (2) *contextual elements* framing the policy process shape interagency dynamics and substantive outcomes; and (3) *crosscutting effects* influence both dynamic themes and contextual elements. The themes are then used to investigate the development of termination policy in two historical cases, the Persian Gulf and Bosnia.

The nature of the gap between diplomats and warfighters is found to dominate an interagency process likely to produce a policy bringing about *war termination* in the form of a cease-fire. However, it almost inevitably fails to achieve *conflict termination* in the form of sustainable peace. This outcome results largely from interagency conflict that emanates from five key factors: (1) defects in leadership, (2) the absence of strategic vision, (3) dissimilar organization cultures, (4) disparate worldviews (i.e., divergent political ideologies and philosophies regarding the use of force), and (5) the absence of an integrated interagency planning mechanism to conduct ongoing crisis analysis and option

generation. These factors impede the effective development of crisis analysis, end state vision, termination criteria, and termination strategy.

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION: FRAMING THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

If the decision to end a war were simply to spring from a rational calculation about gains and losses for the nation as a whole, it should be no harder to get out of a war than to get into one.

—Fred Charles Iklé

OVERVIEW

As the global web of international relations becomes increasingly more complex, any government acting as a “third party”¹ will continually face challenges that require the development of intervention and conflict termination strategies. Yet, researchers and practitioners have performed little critical analysis regarding the intraparty dynamics that shape third party intervention. This work demonstrates that an abundance of research regarding intraparty and group dynamics is found within organization theory (Gortner, Mahler, and Nicholson 1989; Shafritz and Ott 1987), organizational and group behavior (Ott

¹ Young’s definition of the third party intermediary is contrasted with the third party intervenor to make the point that the government acting as the third party is not completely disinterested in the activities of the intervention, but rather, has a direct interest in the intervention’s likely outcome.

1989a, 1989b; Schein 1987, 1989, 1992), and group dynamics literatures. While these fields have dominated the development of our understanding of group behavior, none adequately addresses the internal relationships that structure the third party intervention. Conversely, the field of conflict resolution embodies an extensive literature regarding third party intervention, albeit from foci which do not specifically evaluate the relationship between intraparty dynamics and intervention policy development. As such, the analysis of the relationship between the internal decision-making processes and conflict termination presents a significant void. This research attempts to fill that void by critically analyzing the potential influence intraparty conflict within a third party has on an intervening party's capacity to develop a national policy that includes (a) a desired end state, (b) conflict termination criteria, and (c) a strategy to bring about conflict termination for complex international crises. To frame this research, this chapter develops the purpose of the research, provides an introduction to the theoretical frameworks used to design the research problem, identifies the research questions, and begins to outline the research design.

PURPOSE

This research develops a bureaucratic model of conflict termination by addressing the ways in which the U.S., as a third party which formulates strategy within a politicized bureaucratic environment, develops intervention policy and,

more specifically, conflict termination policy. To do so, it investigates the relationship between the bureaucratic decision-making process, the U.S. policy-making process, and conflict termination (see figures 1.1 and 1.2). Let us explain each in turn.

Figure 1.1 focuses the nature of the research by depicting the idea that international crises include parties in conflict—adversaries and stakeholders. These stakeholders include allies or partners and the U.S. government. The circle around the U.S. government illustrates that the research recognizes the influence of the other actors on policy development, but indicates that this work focuses specifically upon the U.S. government policy process in “virtual” isolation. Chapter 4 details this perspective further as it specifically identifies the actors within the policy process. This figure likewise communicates that the crisis is the catalyst for policy development, and hence, intraparty conflict across the agencies within the policy process. In this manner, figure 1.1. identifies the unit of analysis for this research at a very macro level. Likewise, figure 1.2 addresses the nature of the policy-making process.

Since this work addresses crisis policy making, figure 1.2 portrays the “Crisis Policy Cycle.” Once a crisis requires the attention of the U.S. government,² the

² As explained in the section on “crisis analysis” in chapter 13, crisis definition is a crucial element in the policy-making process. At this juncture it is important to note that this diagram assumes the U.S. government has made the initial decision to begin an analysis process.




Figure 1.1. Crisis: Catalyst for Policy Development




Figure 1.2. Crisis Policy Cycle

policy process (i.e., the interagency process) begins analyzing and formulating a strategy to address the crisis. Depicted via figure 1.3 later in this chapter, this process involves myriad actors—official and unofficial. These decision-makers then generate an interagency policy that delineates the official government position on the crisis. The question for this crisis policy cycle then becomes, if the policy achieves conflict termination, does it lead to a better state of peace (i.e., a sustainable peace) or does this policy becomes the catalyst for continued or future conflict? In this manner, this figure introduces the major foci of the research.

In the end, this approach investigates I. William Zartman's (1977) question regarding the potential efficacy of negotiation as a decision-making process. In so doing, it bridges the existing gaps between bureaucratic politics, decision theory, negotiation, and conflict resolution literatures. If third party intervention is to prove successful for the long-term, this critical *lacuna* must be addressed. In an attempt to frame this problem, this work employs a conceptual framework based upon theories that illuminate bureaucratic politics models of decision-making, negotiation, and conflict termination. Before outlining this conceptual framework, a few assumptions require explanation as the genesis for this work.

Assumptions – The Confluence of Academic & Professional Experience

A long-time student of organizational dynamics and international relations, the conceptual framework for this research emerged from the systematic reflections on the national security process and the dynamics I believed characterized the policy process in action. Thus, the confluence of my academic and professional experience generated crucial assumptions and defined the boundaries that framed this inquiry (Strauss and Corbin 1990). Through a recursive process of brainstorming and intense literature reviews, I identified key factors (i.e., the six core factors) that appeared generally to affect the interagency community's capacity to think about and act upon conflict termination issues as part of the larger intervention policy development effort. In this way, my academic background and professional experience merged to create the conceptual framework guiding the research. The specifics of those overlapping experience bases help illuminate the underlying assumptions framing this research.

Prior academic knowledge in the area of organization theory and group dynamics enabled me to recognize that complex group decisions are not the product of a Rational Actor Model – at least not one applied in pure form. Years of professional experience reinforced this academic judgment, prompting me to seek a more robust explanation for group choice in situations where extensive

loss of life is all too often becoming a more frequent reality. This professional experience led me to believe that when aspects of policy formulation prove effective, it is too often the result of "having the right person, in the right place, at the right time." The increasingly complex nature of social conflict requires the U.S. government to institutionalize methods of understanding regarding the interagency process and its development of national security policy. Since the desired end state should serve as the guiding light for conflict termination and intervention policy development, questions regarding this end state must be addressed before decisions are taken to commit the U.S. to any form of intervention—economic, political, or military. In the final analysis, it is this push toward "asking the right questions" that ultimately stimulated my interest in pursuing this research problem. In fact, this research sets out to identify the factors that frame the interagency process dynamic—those that both enhance and impede the actors' capacity to recognize the questions that need addressing as well as their inability to set aside their institutional interests in search of an "overall" best course of action, instead of those framed as a result of bureaucratic interests. From this perspective, let me begin by defining the critical terms as they apply to this research.

CRITICAL TERMS

The complexity of a project such as this requires that its most critical terms be clearly identified at the outset of the design's conceptual development. To that end, five critical concepts require attention at this juncture to clarify their use within this work. These terms are *conflict*, *conflict termination*, *conflict termination policy*, *third party*, and *negotiation*; each is addressed in turn.

Conflict

Providing a literature review of the myriad interpretations and meanings of the term *conflict* based upon specific contextual application, as well as those conceptions found throughout generic theory, would prove to be a dissertation in and of itself. For this work, however, the term refers to the "*perceived divergence of interest, or a belief that the parties' current aspirations cannot be achieved simultaneously*" (Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim 1994, 5; italics in original). Within the context of this research, this means that parties will be in conflict when they disagree on the crisis' desired end state, conflict termination criteria, and strategy to achieve conflict termination. This conceptualization becomes clearer as it is applied throughout this work.

Conflict Termination

As one may expect, based upon the range of definitions for conflict, conflict termination holds vastly different meanings for many theorists and practitioners.

One of the most prominent debates within the field concerns whether conflict termination is a point in time (i.e., such as when a cease-fire, truce, or surrender occurs) or, taking a more expansive perspective, whether it actually encompasses the process whereby hostilities are brought to an end (i.e., including those activities that typify most post-hostilities phases, such as reconstitution of the battlefield, nation-building, and social reconstruction). While chapter 3 discusses these perspectives in more depth, it is important to recognize that for the purposes of this research the concept of conflict termination here is very specific.

Conflict termination is taken normally to refer to the cessation of organized hostilities (i.e., violence that is part of a conflicting party's strategy to bring about change coercively). In this usage, conflict termination makes no explicit attempt to remedy the underlying causes and conditions of the conflict toward lasting conflict resolution. Absent an intentional effort to address such underlying causes and conditions for conflict, termination can at best hope to achieve an end (at least temporarily) to the violence that makes conflict a harmful social dynamic. To this end, however, conflict termination is merely a matter of ending violence although it may well serve as a necessary, yet not sufficient, precondition for peace (Kriesberg 1992). With this caveat in mind, it is necessary to discuss termination policy's three components as explored throughout this research.

Conflict Termination Policy

Extending beyond a static definition of conflict termination, *conflict termination policy* refers to three specific components of the policy-making process (i.e., the development of the desired end state, conflict termination criteria, and the strategy to achieve conflict termination). Let me begin with the desired end state.

In the first instance, the *desired end state* refers to the vision the U.S. National Command Authorities (NCA) have for the situation in the post-intervention era. Specifically, it refers to the conditions the intervention is designed to bring about, politically, economically, militarily, and socially³ as a result of the conflict termination policy designed to end hostilities. It serves as the “destination” to which the policy is designed to take the parties (including the U.S. government). In this sense, then, this goes well beyond simple cessation of hostilities. The development of a desired end state necessitates the selection of conflict termination criteria.

The second aspect of conflict termination policy, as it applies throughout this

³ Joint Pub 3-07: *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War* (JCS 1995, GL-3), defines the *end state* as “What the National Command Authorities want the situation to be when operations conclude—both military operations, as well as those where the military is in support of other instruments of national power.” Note that this work expands the definition to include specifically the political, economic, and social conditions that exist in the post-hostilities period, in addition to the military conditions. While Joint Doctrine’s definition does not preclude the inclusion of these factors, planners must make each explicit to ensure the policy develop process considers these factors.

research, pertains to the termination objectives the third party identifies as milestones that, when achieved, indicate that the conflict is terminated.

Terminated, in this sense, refers to the objectively measurable indicators that demonstrate that conflicting parties are no longer involved in overt organized and centrally directed fighting. *Termination criteria* serve as the “roadmap” that guide the intervenors and parties in conflict toward their destination—these criteria signal whether the intervention is headed in the right direction. It is critical to note here that the development of such criteria *may not* be related to bringing about a permanent end to hostilities, and do not serve as an evaluation of “success.” Rather, the existence of conflict termination criteria serves as an important indicator of the nature of the decision-making process from which they emerged. Chapters 2 and 4, respectively, develop the conditions for the “rational actor” and “bureaucratic politics” decision-making models as the processes by which policy-makers develop these criteria. The discussion surrounding those processes illuminates this aspect of conflict termination policy.

Finally, this research explores the interagency process as the method by which the third party intervenor develops the *strategy* designed to achieve conflict termination. In this way, it distinguishes between the ends (i.e., the destination as mapped by the termination criteria) and the means (i.e., the “vehicle” — the strategy to arrive at the desired destination).

By reviewing these three perspectives, one can readily see the integrative connection across them. Specifically, the desired end state should shape the conflict termination criteria; together, these should shape the strategy designed to achieve conflict termination as the result of third party intervention.

Third Party Intervention

Given the scope of this work, and the growing understanding regarding the forms of third party intervention, a broad discussion of this term is not required. Within this work *third party* refers to the U.S. government in its entirety. Hence, while the government is not a "unitary actor" during the policy development phase, once decision-makers formulate the intervention policy, the U.S. government is considered a unitary actor as third party intervenor. It is in this manner that this research explores the role of intraparty conflict (i.e., within and across the agencies of the U.S. government; throughout the remainder of this work, such conflict is labeled "interagency" conflict) upon third party intervention.

Negotiation

As with the foregoing critical term, *negotiation* can be conceptualized along various dimensions, including its paradigmatic components of bargaining and problem-solving (Hopmann 1995). While this study does not focus specifically upon either, the concept is invoked here to help differentiate between modes of

decision-making as an inherent part of the policy development process. Hence, its meaning and relevance for this work must be outlined to set the stage for the discussion and research that follow.

Once again invoking the work of Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim (1994), we find that negotiation can be seen as "a form of conflict behavior" or a process "seeking to resolve the divergence of interest by means of some form of interaction (typically the verbal exchange of offers) between the parties" (256). This latter perspective prompted this researcher to frame this intraparty conflict problem in the form of a negotiation. Specifically, the process by which conflict termination policy is made is deemed to be a negotiation process located within a particular political environment. In this way, the definition of negotiation for this study bears close resemblance to the incremental-bargaining processes of Harold Gortner, Julianne Mahler, and Jeanne Bell Nicholson (1997), but departs from it insofar as the focus is not on conflict resolution (as they purport). Rather, this work invokes the concept of negotiation to enable the reader to conceptualize the interplay of the actors within the interagency process during policy development efforts.

As applied in this work, "negotiation" differentiates between "rational actor" and bureaucratic decision-making processes. If policy-makers admit to using a negotiation process when formulating intervention policy, this admission will sustain the fundamental assumption of this research: The conflict termination policy development process (including the desired end state, termination criteria,

and strategy) employs the Bureaucratic Politics Model – not the Rational Actor Model – of decision-making.

With a more focused perspective regarding the applied meanings of conflict, conflict termination, third party intervention, and negotiation, we can begin to develop a conceptual framework that identifies the relevant parameters of this study. As this research develops, the discussion revisits these terms (in conjunction with others) to ensure their application remains consistent while identifying the ways in which these definitions limited the scope of this work.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

As a first step, this research looks at two aspects of the decision-making process and links them to the desired intervention outcome, conflict termination. First, it explores the U.S. government's policy-making process by identifying the sources of potential intraparty conflict within the bureaucratic decision-making arena. In so doing, it investigates the effects of choices that underpin strategy development, and traces those effects to the U.S. government's development of conflict termination policy for its interventions into the second Persian Gulf War⁴ and the crisis in Bosnia. Once the process has been analyzed, the factors most

⁴ The "first Persian Gulf War" is a label that refers to the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). Therefore, "second Persian Gulf War" denotes the 1990-1991 crisis in the Persian Gulf involving President Saddam Hussein and the U.S.-led coalition. Throughout the remainder of this text, "Persian Gulf War" and "Gulf War" refer to the latter crisis, not the former, unless otherwise indicated.

influential in developing the process outcome (i.e., the intervention policy and termination strategy) must be identified and relationally mapped to discern their potential influence on the conflict termination policy development process. A brief explanation of intraparty negotiation as a decision-making process outlines more effectively the linkages within this conceptual framework.

Interagency Decision-Making via a Negotiation Process

Zartman (1977) maintains that negotiation represents a mode of decision-making and can be used to reconcile two (or more) conflicting points of view into a single decision (see also Gortner, Mahler, and Nicholson 1997). In light of this perspective, the decision-making process necessarily involves some aspect of negotiation within a bounded context. Within the U.S. national policy-making environment, the bureaucratic model of decision-making provides the overarching contextual parameters, while intraparty multilateral negotiation provides the mechanism for policy development. In light of this perspective, any attempt to evaluate the effects of intraparty conflict upon policy development must identify the crucial elements of the bureaucratic environment and the application of the Bureaucratic Politics Model of decision-making, as well as the nature of the multilateral negotiation between relevant actors.

*The Model and Its Environment: The Bureaucratic versus
Rational Actor Approach*

The fields of public administration and organization theory have gone to great lengths to develop our understanding of the nature of bureaucracy. From the earliest descriptive works of Max Weber through the efforts of James March and Herbert Simon (1978), the bureaucratic environment has been described as one of unrivaled complexity. Important for this study, however, are the specific contextual factors that shape the application of the bureaucratic decision-making model within the U.S. government.

The foregoing description of the political environment illustrates the necessity of considering the influence contextual factors have upon the selection of a theoretical frame for decision-making. When looking at U.S. security policy development, one can readily see that the context necessitates the application of a model that captures the true nature of the process as it is actually conducted. This research assumes the most relevant model is the Bureaucratic Politics Model (Allison 1971; Boschi and Cerqueira 1978; Bowey 1972; Jain 1974; Robins 1983; Thomas 1981; Ugalde 1973). To validate its selection, a brief comparison of the two models is required.

The bureaucratic decision-making process (discussed at length in chapter 4) recognizes that government is comprised of multiple actors with various degrees and sources of power (Allison 1971; Boschi and Cerqueira 1978; O'Loughlin 1990;

Sabrosky, Thompson, and McPherson 1982). These differences operate within a framework of sometimes-competing ideologies and policy preferences. John Spanier and Eric Uslaner contend that "policy-making in these circumstances involves attempts to reconcile the policy preferences of the various 'players' with their different perceptions and interests" (Spanier and Uslaner 1974, 105; see also Bloomfield 1982). Through a process of compromise and mutual adjustment (*ibid.*), the relevant actors make decisions that integrate (to a varying degree) their conflicting policy preferences, irrespective of the policy's ability to maximize the intervention's potential effectiveness. This aspect of policy development is seen normally in the second approach, the development of policy according to the Rational Actor Model.

The Rational Actor Model focuses upon the development of policies that can effectively achieve a stated purpose (Allison 1971; Halperin et al. 1974). In this sense, the government is viewed as a unitary actor (Bloomfield 1982; Spanier and Uslaner 1974), an assumption which most probably accounts for its dominance in the study of international relations and policy development. Specifically, Spanier and Uslaner (1974) posit this model

assumes that decision-makers will (1) select the objectives and values that a given policy is supposed to achieve and maximize; (2) consider the various alternative means to achieve these purposes; (3) calculate the likely consequences of each alternative course; and (4) choose the course most likely to attain the objectives originally selected (103).

This brief description of the two dominant decision-making frameworks highlights the disagreement that exists regarding their historical and prospective applications. Despite ideas to the contrary (Pillar 1983; Spanier and Uslaner 1974), this research hypothesizes that the bureaucratic approach can best be used to describe more comprehensively the development of interventionist policies in times of crises. The complexity of the overall decision-making approach has obscured recognition of this bureaucratic approach. Specifically, the type of *process* enjoined to generate policy decisions (i.e., the bureaucratic model as the framework for decision-making) has been confused with process *outcomes* (i.e., the policy objectives and strategies that parallel the framework of the Rational Actor Model approach as outlined above by Spanier and Uslaner).

The Environment: Myriad Actors Complicate the Process

The theory that undergirds our understanding of the bureaucratic model does indeed recognize the dynamics between the relevant actors. It does not provide, however, keen insight into the process used to frame those interactions within the governmental infrastructure. To develop such insight, we must recognize that the decisions that result from the application of this model emerge as the product of an extremely complex multilateral negotiation. As such, we must first have an understanding of the relevant actors before we can actually attempt to

analyze the process itself. Let us begin with an outline of these actors before beginning our discussion of the negotiation process.

The Actors

Identifying the relevant actors in a situation as complex as the U.S. national security policy-making process presents a formidable task. For the purposes of this exploration, the research analyzes three aggregates: official decision-makers, influential actors, and contextual factors. Depicted in figure 1.3, the paragraphs that follow the illustration describe these actors.⁵

The official decision-makers. Official decision-makers are those actors who are involved in the formal decision-making process by virtue of their governmental position. Included in the formulation of national security policy are the National Security Council (NSC) and the U.S. Congress. The National Security Act of 1947 created the NSC

to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other Departments and agencies of the government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security (US 1948).

Since its purpose includes providing advice on issues that span the domestic to international arenas, its membership includes the highest-level decision-makers

⁵ This depiction represents this author's view of the static process based upon the structural relations prescribed by U.S. statutes (regarding official decision-makers) and a priori assumptions (regarding all other actors and contextual factors).




Figure 1.3. NSC Policy-Making Structure: Decision-Making as Negotiation

within national government. Specifically, the NSC is comprised of the president, the vice president, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense.⁶ While other actors shape the overall decision-making process within the NSC, at this juncture it is sufficient to introduce the primary actors and to note that the agency sprang from the recognition that the security policy process needed institutionalization in the wake of the World War II experience. However, the NSC does not operate as the sole decision-making agency – the U.S. Congress plays as significant a role in policy development.

The U.S. Congress influences the policy process on myriad levels. For the purposes of this analysis, however, two emerge as preeminent: the power to declare war and, conversely, the capacity to enact legislation limiting the use of force. First, and perhaps most fundamentally, the Congress is the only branch of government authorized to declare war by virtue of the powers prescribed by the U.S. Constitution, Article 1, Section 8 (US 1995). It is important to recognize that the president serves as the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, but he does not have the authority to “make war.” The ambiguity surrounding the practical interpretation of the relationship between making war and serving as the individual responsible for all military conduct created a practical relationship

⁶ Chapter 4 discusses additional members, including the statutory and special advisors. This section only familiarizes the reader with the two primary actors and their bases of authority.

devoid of its theoretical basis. In other words, throughout history the executive operated at the margins regarding Constitutional interpretation and his congressional critics have claimed that the executive had usurped congressional power regarding the use of force. This realization, coupled with an increasing desire to reassert itself on the national level, pushed the Congress to use its second source of power, the ability to legislate the activity of the use of force. Specifically, the statute of import is the 1973 War Powers Resolution.

Donald Snow and Eugene Brown (1994) contend the War Powers legislation "represented a dramatic milestone in the reassertion of congressional prerogatives in international affairs" (157). In its present form, it requires the president to interact with the Congress in three ways. First, the president must "consult with Congress before committing armed forces to hostilities" (*ibid.*, 163). As demonstrated since its adoption, significant ambiguity continues to shape the practice of this requirement. In an effort to clarify any potential misunderstanding of the consultation requirement, the Congress included a reporting provision to augment the consultation role.

Second, the president must

report to Congress within 48 hours any time U.S. armed forces are dispatched (1) "into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances," (2) into foreign territory while "equipped for combat," or (3) "in numbers which substantially enlarge United States Armed Forces equipped for combat already located in a foreign nation" (*ibid.*).

As with the first provision, both the president and the Congress have interpreted this requirement in various ways, and hence, it acts as an elastic barrier in the bureaucratic decision-making process. While the first two requirements necessitate that the Congress remains an active player in the security policy arena, it is the third legal tenet that becomes of particular import for this study.

The most controversial component of the War Powers Resolution is Section 5, the provision outlining the termination of hostilities and the withdrawal of U.S. personnel (*ibid.*). If the first two control measures proved insufficient for providing express legislative approval regarding the development and implementation of foreign policy, this provision would correct the shortfall in two ways. First, while the president maintains the latitude to employ force as the Commander-in-Chief, he can do so only for a period of 60 days. If at the end of the 60-day window⁷ the Congress has not declared war, or has not explicitly authorized the continued deployment (either by a continuing resolution or by explicitly extending presidential authority for a specified period), the president is without legal authority to continue the deployment (*ibid.*). Congressional inaction requires the president to withdraw deployed forces. What is most important here is the implication that there is an explicit requirement for the

⁷ Note that a 30-day extension is provided for the safe withdrawal and redeployment of troops. Thus, the president is actually granted a total of 90 days within which to secure congressional support for his actions.

development of a termination plan (and hence, an exit strategy) in cases where the Congress *has not* declared war. The significance of this requirement will be made evident throughout the analysis of the relationship between the third party's policy development process and its ability to terminate conflict.

While the NSC (namely, the president, vice president, and Secretaries of State and Defense) and the Congress emerge as the sole "official players" within the policy development arena, they operate with a bureaucratic environment which encompasses many unofficial actors. These actors at times play a significant role in framing critical issues.

The influential actors. The contextual environment that bounds the policy-making arena remains rich with actors who are able to influence the process in myriad ways. Whether framing the critical issues, providing information to the other actors (both official and unofficial), or possessing the ability to influence individual decision-makers, these actors can individually and collectively exert enormous pressures upon the bureaucratic process. In fact, it is the very nature of the bureaucratic process that provides these actors leverage at the highest levels of government. These actors can be categorized according to their relative positions within the global arena as having influence along a shifting continuum, ranging from major to peripheral effects. For the purposes of this research, those with a major influence are regarded as Track I agencies (i.e., those official government agencies, beyond those previously mentioned as official decision-

makers, that exert pressure upon the NSC – the Cabinet-level Departments). Those having a peripheral influence on the official policy process are classified as Track II agencies (i.e., nongovernmental organizations, private-voluntary organizations, the media, academic institutions, etc.).⁸ Identifying all of these Track II actors as they relate to a specific crisis situation would prove a virtually impossible task. However, for the purposes of this research four dominant a priori actors emerge as preeminent: the media, think tanks, “expert” advisers, and the public.

Up to this point we can begin to see the nature of the multilateral negotiation taking shape as the policy preferences (i.e., political choices) of these actors conflict with one another within a complex web of intricate relationships. These two aggregates (i.e., the official decision-makers and influential actors) certainly have the capacity to incorporate vast numbers of independent actors who are recognized as the dominant players within the interagency process.⁹ However, room must be created for those elements not considered traditional players within an otherwise personified process.

The contextual factors. Looking beyond those identified as traditional decision-makers, one could necessarily include inanimate policies or goals as

⁸ For an in-depth explanation of the multiple “Tracks” that influence policy-making, see Diamond and McDonald’s (1996) *Multi-track Diplomacy: A Systems Approach to Peace*.

⁹ Snow and Brown (1994) advise that this is the label given to the overall policy coordination process. Throughout this research, it applies to the U.S. government interagency process.

conditions that influence the bureaucratic decision-making process. For example, economic development, a factor encompassing a multifaceted yet non-aggregated membership, could be considered as a contextual element with an inordinate capacity to shape foreign and security policy decisions. As such, it must be considered along with other relevant contextual factors when analyzing the overall policy-making process. For the purposes of this research, great care must be taken to identify these components through an inductive process to ensure they are revealed in light of their relationship to the process as a whole.

With an understanding of the players, we can now begin to outline the second major component of this level of the study by developing a joint understanding of the multilateral negotiation process.

The Process

One of the most richly developed components of the broader conflict resolution literature is that surrounding negotiation. In looking to the theoretical literature that frames the study of negotiation, particularly fitting for this research may be the policy analysis approach. This perspective "views negotiation as a learning process in which the parties react to each other's concession behavior" (Zartman 1977, 625; see also Pillar 1983). Whether this perspective serves as the theoretical frame for the analysis of this policy-making

process remains to be seen, but it does begin to shed light on one way in which we can frame the overall process.

The richness of the literature presents a significant, yet pleasant problem, in that it addresses myriad dimensions of negotiation processes, structures, and outcomes. Some of the more relevant categories of literature include: negotiating behaviors (Friedman and Jacka 1975; Pruitt 1981, 1991; Pruitt and Carnevale 1993; Wall 1985; Zartman 1991); factors shaping negotiation (Druckman 1994, 1995; Elgstrom 1994; Janosik 1987; Levy 1993; Parnell and Kedia 1996; Rubin and Zartman 1995; Turner 1982); the relationship between process and outcomes (Bilmes 1994; Druckman and Mahoney 1977; Gerhart 1976; Mitchell 1991a; Zartman 1991, 1993); and the sustainability of outcomes based upon process. Yet, as deep as this understanding is, it has been developed by looking primarily at the interactions that occur between two actors. For specific examples of bilateral negotiation processes see Beriker and Druckman (1996), Bruszt and Horvath (1990), Elgstrom (1990), Kaufmann (1993), and Robinson (1980). Additionally, while a scant literature does address multilateral negotiation (Golich 1991; Heckscher 1986; Vayrynen 1991), it rarely incorporates a robust understanding of the process' relationship to conflict termination or resolution. As a result, Zartman (1977) calls for research to increase our understanding of the dynamics of this complex negotiation process.

While this research examines bureaucratic decision-making by framing the process in terms of a multilateral negotiation, the specific elements (i.e., conditions and indicators) of analysis have not yet been determined beyond the dependent conceptual focus (i.e., conflict termination policy). The research identifies the independent and intervening factors as a result of the literature review and this researcher's initial expectations (see chapter 5). With this caveat in mind, it is important to recognize that the research does not take the form of a "purely inductive" inquiry, but instead explores several relationships of particular interest.

First, this analysis strives to develop an understanding of the role philosophy and ideology play in shaping the organizational attitudes (i.e., as one component of organizational culture) of those agencies involved in the negotiation process. Relatedly, how does this attitudinal perspective shape the specific behaviors of the individual negotiators once embroiled in the policy negotiation? As a second area of inquiry, the research examines the influence organizational culture (Druckman 1997) has upon negotiating behaviors of the principals,¹⁰ as well as the other agencies involved in the negotiation. Specifically, how do the principals view themselves and how does that perspective shape their images of the

¹⁰ "Principals" refers to those members of the NSC who are voting decision-makers (e.g., the president, vice president, Secretaries of State and Defense) and statutory advisors (e.g., the Director of Central Intelligence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff). Chapter 4 explains these actors in detail.

outgroup? What roles do organizational cultures play in sustaining perceptions of an in-group/out-group dynamic? What overall influence does this dynamic have upon the multilateral process? Third, the research investigates the relationship between the context of a crisis and the development of the interagency negotiation process. In other words, does the nature of the crisis itself shape the roles played by the principals? How does it frame their analysis processes and negotiating behaviors?

This overview by no means identifies every aspect of the negotiation process this research intends to explore. It does, however, provide a starting point that, when taken in conjunction with an extensive literature review, identifies elements which can be operationalized, measured, and analyzed in light of the specific aspects of the policy-making process. Once explored, this work evaluates the policy outcome in light of its ability to achieve conflict termination.

Conflict Termination: The Efficacy of the Policy-Making Process

While the notion of the termination of conflict is not new, it remains a relatively understudied concept. Much of what has been written looks to cost-benefit modeling as a prominent answer to the question of why conflicts end (see Bade 1994; Engelbrecht 1992; Mitchell 1991b). Those perspectives contain significant variation surrounding other critical matters including whether the termination addressed the conflict's underlying causes, the anticipated (or real)

duration of the termination, and the conditions that produced the actual termination (e.g., assimilation, compromise settlement, expulsion or coerced containment, or extinction¹¹). Much like the notion of leadership, it has sometimes been epitomized as the "I'll know it when I see it" phenomenon.

Within the complex conflict systems that normally characterize international conflict, this "know it when I see it" phenomenon results largely from the level of control the bureaucracy undeniably exercises when making such determinations. As a result, an actor's definition of conflict termination emanates from the official position one occupies within the decision-making process. Further, this position is framed and constantly reframed by the theoretical perspective that shapes the attitudes and behaviors the position demands *at that moment*. Hence, it is hypothesized that the factors governing one's ability to negotiate successfully within the bureaucratic model *shape* one's perspective regarding the conditions necessary to terminate conflict successfully. While this is an interesting prospect, and one this research hopes to develop further, a growing interest in the concept of conflict termination has generated multiple, sometimes conflicting, perspectives. Let me take a moment to survey a few of the various perspectives.

This literature surveyed in chapter 3, "Conflict Termination," outlines the

¹¹ Paul Seabury and Angelo Codevilla (1989) use these frames to describe war termination in terms of three forms of peace: peace of cultural conquest, peace of the prison, and peace of the dead.

most prominent ideas regarding conflict termination, including the ideas of: Allotey (1995); Cimbala (1986, 1987, 1988, 1992); Cimbala and Dunn (1987); Clarke (1992a, 1992b); Coser (1961); Estes (1973); Johnson (1994); Mitchell (1981, 1983, 1991b); Rampy (1992); Toth (1978); and Wojdakowski (1993). From the sheer number of authors listed here, even without the details at this juncture the reader can easily surmise that multiple perspectives on conflict termination ultimately reflect different approaches to understanding this critical aspect of conflict dynamics.

One prominent perspective is that of Richard Barringer (1972). Partially invoked in the earlier section that discussed "critical terms," Barringer defines termination in a limited sense as the

(posthostilities) phase, in which organized hostilities are terminated by all parties to the dispute, although the dispute is as yet unresolved and is perceived in military terms by at least one party and could generate renewed hostilities either immediately or after a prolonged period of cease-fire and renewed preparations for combat (*ibid.*, 20).

In evaluating this perspective, one immediately recognizes that conflict termination focuses upon instances of war. Yet, war is a specific form of interaction that exists within the broader conflict spectrum. Hence, this definition represents an appropriate starting point for this work and remains valid as we investigate the influence of intraparty conflict on conflict termination policy.

Highlighted earlier, the critical focus of this research is multifaceted. First, it explores the ways in which intraparty conflict within the U.S. government bureaucracy influences the development of conflict termination policy. As such, it analyzes the bureaucracy's ability to develop a desired end state, conflict termination criteria, and a strategy through a multilateral negotiation based upon the Bureaucratic Politics Model of decision-making. Second, using comparative methodology, it analyzes conflict termination policy (i.e., the development of its three component parts) in light of two case studies (that is, the second Persian Gulf War and Bosnia). In doing so, it explores the relationship between interagency conflict (as it shapes policy-making) and the U.S. government's capacity, as third party intervenor, to develop policy (with a particular focus on criteria generation) toward the effective termination of international crises as a step toward sustainable peace.

The outcome of the multilateral negotiation constitutes a policy directive that should, by all intents and purposes, be focused on reestablishing peace¹² through terminating the conflict. An inherent assumption for this (or any) intervention strategy is that it should achieve its stated objectives through the most expedient and least costly means available. Hence, we again see the influence of the Rational Actor Model as it is applied to the *outcome* of the process. Thus, the first

¹² In this instance, peace is defined as the absence of violent conflict.

level of analysis focuses specifically upon the dynamics of the policy process intended to produce a conflict termination strategy. It explores the role interagency decision-making negotiations and interagency conflict play in defining conflict termination and while identifying and selecting termination criteria. Relatedly, it investigates the intervenor's mechanisms for evaluating the efficacy of the conflict termination criteria, as well as its criteria for evaluating the sustainability of conflict termination. It also hopes to identify the actors who, throughout the multilateral negotiation, have a dominant influence on developing the decisions that frame conflict termination, while illuminating the reasons for their dominance. Taken together, this perspective serves as the bridge for the final aim of this research—conceptualizing a new theoretical model of conflict termination policy development within a bureaucratic politicized arena. In other words, this second thrust attempts to bridge the gap between the theoretical aspects of an intervention policy that focuses on conflict termination and its practical ability to develop conflict termination criteria in light of the real-world context framing the conflict system and policy choices.

In summary, this research analyzes the influence intraparty conflict has upon a third party intervenor's capacity to develop termination policy (namely, the desired end state, termination criteria, and strategy) that could effectively terminate international conflict. It is important to note that the emphasis here is on the dynamics of the *policy-making process* as they shape termination policy, not

the actual achievement of a "successful" termination "on the ground."¹³ The research approaches its self-identified challenge by examining the relationship between the nature and level of intraparty conflict and the party's capacity to produce conflict termination policy. It does so through a two-level approach. First, it views the policy-making process as a multilateral negotiation involving three primary aggregates: official decision-makers, influential actors, and contextual factors. Looking through the bureaucratic politics lens, it analyzes the relationship between this multilateral negotiation process and the generation of termination policy that can *potentially* achieve effective conflict termination on the ground. As an initial step in enhancing our understanding of the relationship between these critical factors, it analyzes the theoretical and practical aspects of the conflict termination policy development process (i.e., negotiation set within a context of interagency conflict) that produce conflict within the U.S. government bureaucracy. Probing deeper, it assesses the intervention policy-making process by identifying the ways in which the decision-making process frames specific aspects of termination policy (namely, the desired end state, termination criteria, and termination strategy) in light of their potential to "terminate" conflict when considering the causes and conditions that promoted the original conflict. In so

¹³ Although a noble goal and worthy endeavor, this research makes *no attempt* to evaluate the termination policy itself relative to the myriad conditions that impact policy implementation once the physical intervention has occurred and the fog and friction that accompany such actions impinge upon the "best laid plans of mice and men."

doing, the research explores the relationship between intra-third party conflict and conflict termination policy development to produce a model of conflict termination that can more effectively describe the bureaucratic third party intervention strategy development process. While the foregoing discussion highlighted a few of the research questions, a brief introduction to the broader spectrum is now warranted.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

Noted throughout this text, the macro-level question the research explores addresses the effect of intraparty (hereafter, interagency) conflict upon the development of conflict termination policy. The following questions provide an overview of the research subject as a whole.

- 1) What factors exacerbate, intensify, or create interagency conflict within the U.S. government during the development of conflict termination policy?
- 2) How does "decision-making by negotiation" shape policy choices within the U.S. government crisis policy-making arena?
- 3) In what ways does interagency conflict influence the U.S. government's capacity to develop conflict termination policy for international conflicts?

The research will shed light on these issues by illuminating the effect the policy-makers' visions for the desired end state, criteria selection, and termination strategy had upon conflict termination policy development in the (a) Persian Gulf and (b) Bosnia. By focusing on these three questions and

exploring the critical linkages they pose, this work strives to enhance our understanding of the relationship between the policy-making process and the factors that enhance or impede the development of conflict termination policy. In the end, the new conceptual model the research produces frames these patterns of association in a fashion that can be tested through subsequent empirical analysis to establish causal relationships across multiple factors. With this in mind, let me begin to outline the research strategy.

RESEARCH DESIGN

A research problem of this magnitude requires the development of a discriminating conceptual framework and a rigorous methodological approach. While both components are described in detail in the methodology segment of this work (see chapter 5), a brief overview at this juncture provides insight into the strategy this research employs.

Noted through figures 1.1 and 1.2, this research focuses specifically upon the U.S. government's interagency policy process. Highlighted in chapter 4, the international context and allied countries influence U.S. policy formulation. However, this work does not analyze their influence, save the acknowledgement that they help shape the policy development context. Therefore, we must recognize that allied nations greatly affect all three dimensions of conflict

termination policy development. However, the focal point of this research begins with figure 1.3, NSC Policy-Making Structure: Decision-Making as Negotiation.

The complex set of interrelations depicted in figure 1.3 is further refined in chapter 4 by providing an overview of each of the actors in the policy process. At this juncture, the researcher's assumptions and hypotheses begin to be articulated as a bridge toward constructing the methodology that guides this work. Once the players in the process are introduced, this work employs a multi-method approach to (1) hypothesize and later test relationships across six core factors based upon the author's academic and professional experience (see figures 5.1-5.9) and (2) gather data from key and knowledgeable informants within the U.S. policy-making process through interviews employing survey questionnaires and open-ended questions. The survey questionnaire serves as the quantitative collection method; the open-ended questions, the qualitative data collection method. These techniques provide latitude for emergent themes to crystallize based upon the research participants' interagency policy-making experience (see the "Research Questions," previous section, this chapter).

Analyzing the interagency process dynamics, correlational analysis of the data gathered via the survey tests the hypothesized relationships across the indicators (i.e., the dimensions) within each core factor. This approach determines which of the hypothesized relationships are significant while allowing the data to identify emergent relationships this work's conceptual framework did not hypothesize.

These findings are then reanalyzed in the light of qualitative data collected from informants within the U.S. government to arrive at a case analysis relating the effects of interagency conflict to conflict termination policy development for the Persian Gulf War and Bosnia (chapter 13). To provide an additional measure of structure to this approach, a brief overview of the subsequent chapters is now appropriate.

OUTLINE OF THE STUDY

Following the conceptualization of the research problem in this chapter, chapter 2 develops the theoretical underpinning of the most dominant approach to decision-making, Rational Choice Theory. Showing how this theory informed the development of the Rational Actor Model, this segment simultaneously critiques this approach, demonstrating its inability to effectively account for all dimensions of decision-making, whether at the individual or group level. However, as noted in chapter 3, despite these "recognized" shortcomings, this theoretical perspective informs the accepted conflict termination models that guide our discourse and policy process. Arguing that a more complex understanding of group choice is required, chapter 4 begins constructing a new comprehension of decision-making within a highly politicized, bureaucratic environment. Building upon the works of Graham Allison (1971, 1989) and Morton Halperin (Halperin et al. 1974), it begins to frame the policy-making

environment by identifying the relevant national security policy actors. Extending this bridge, chapter 5 details the conceptualization of the research problem and its requisite formalization through the creation of multiple signed digraph models that hypothesize relations regarding interagency dynamics. In preparation for this quantitative analysis, chapter 6 discusses the quantitative data collection and analysis method, as well as the data limitations. Chapter 7 details the quantitative analysis using Spearman rank-order correlation coefficients to depict the statistically significant relationships via six modified signed digraph models. This discussion details the confirmed relationships, unsupported hypotheses, and emergent findings. Chapter 8 extends the quantitative analysis by identifying the similarities and differences across three demographic classifications – Executive Departments, levels within the interagency process, and historical case specificity. This analysis serves as the organizing rationale for the qualitative analysis. Chapter 9 frames the qualitative analysis by surveying the data collection and analysis procedures in preparation for the analysis of emergent themes discussed in chapters 10 through 12. To demonstrate the effects of interagency conflict upon conflict termination policy development, chapter 13 applies the quantitative and qualitative findings to two historical cases. By using the Persian Gulf War and the Bosnia Crisis as examples, this chapter illuminates the ways in which interagency conflict influenced the development of crisis analysis, the vision for the desired end state, termination

criteria, and termination strategy. Finally, the concluding chapter summarizes this work by specifically addressing the three research questions. Chapter 14 also discusses the implications of these findings, proposing an analytical framework that future researchers and practitioners can employ to derive estimates of interagency conflict. Through such an analytical process, professionals can dampen interagency conflict's harmful effects on conflict termination policy development within a group decision-making environment. In this manner, the research develops a general theory for interagency conflict that analysts can apply across all group decision-making contexts, irrespective of actor- or issue-specificity.

The foregoing is definitely an oversimplification of the methodology the research employs—the nature of this oversimplification is made apparent in chapter 5—as well as the nature of the theoretical and practical issues it discusses. However, this overview does provide a window into the overarching approach this work employs. The findings of this research will have far-reaching implications for the ways in which future generations conceptualize conflict termination policy development. As such, a brief discussion of the research implications is now appropriate.

RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS

The analysis performed by this research should begin to bridge the gaps among several fragmented theoretical perspectives regarding the influence intraparty conflict has upon an intervenor's decision-making process when involved in a protracted and violent conflict, specifically the ability to develop conflict termination policy for international crises. In so doing it integrates major concepts from several fields into one interdisciplinary approach to a major problem facing the continually developing field of conflict resolution. Unlike prior research, it has the potential to explore deeply and describe richly the ways in which decisions made within a bureaucratic environment through the process of multilateral negotiation frame the U.S. government's ability to terminate international conflict in light of the real-world conditions that shape conflict systems. Given the assumption that the U.S. will most assuredly retain its role as a leader among third party intervenors, the results of this study could potentially provide the basis for future doctrinal or structural changes across the U.S. government's interagency process. It may also, for the first time, identify the potential influence that bureaucratic decision-making has upon the U.S. government's ability to act as a lead agent in global social change as the outcome of third party interventions should lead to the creation of a better state of peace (Liddell Hart 1954; see also Iklé 1991). In related fashion, the study begins to

address questions regarding the policy development process' potential to shape, either positively or negatively, the conflict situation. By extension, it may identify the most effective process for developing conflict termination strategy and its critical indicators of likely effectiveness. Consequently, it has the potential to address the influence decision-making by negotiation has upon the creation of policy that supports the public interest (Young 1972). Most importantly, this study helps develop a more thorough understanding of the process used to develop conflict termination policy. The results may in fact move us one step closer to achieving conflict resolution in situations of deep-rooted, protracted social conflict (Kriesberg 1992). Let us begin this process by exploring the most dominant theoretical conception of decision-making, Rational Choice Theory.

CHAPTER 2

RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY: IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP CHOICE

Policymaking is...a process of "conflict and consensus building."

—Graham T. Allison,
The Essence of Decision

OVERVIEW

In an effort to begin to assess the effects of interagency conflict on the development of conflict termination policy within the U.S. government, this chapter explores the dominant theoretical perspective that shapes our — *and their* — understanding of the ways in which individuals and groups make decisions. Assuming the delimiter between classes of decision theory is defined by the unit of analysis upon which the theory focuses, the research begins by discussing Rational Choice Theory as it shapes the Rational Actor Model of decision-making. After highlighting its origins and major assumptions, this work critiques those assumptions to demonstrate their lack of generalizability for unitary actor (i.e., individual) decision-making processes and outcomes. It then pushes the assumptions further, illuminating the failure of the Rational Actor

Model to account for the effects of the group dynamic that shapes collective decision-making. In examining the interaction across members of groups, this work argues that collective value dissensus, social interaction and organizational culture, and the cumulative effects of cognitive framing severely limit the Rational Actor Model's ability to describe group decision-making processes, as well as predict their resultant outcomes. In the final analysis, identification of the players, a description of the dynamic process, and the inability of actors to select universally consistent decision criteria based upon the rational conception of utility or preference orderings illustrate that group decision processes are fundamentally different from those of the unitary actor. Consequently, the Rational Actor Model is found unfit for application to collective decision-making processes. With this in mind, the shortcomings of the Rational Actor Model emphasize the need for an alternative, more realistic model of decision-making as part of a model of conflict termination policy processes.

INTRODUCTION TO DECISION-MAKING

An extensive and continually expanding body of literature attempts to describe, explain, and predict the various ways in which individuals and groups make decisions. This research spans multiple fields, including "communication, economics, engineering, management, political science, psychology, social psychology, and sociology" (Hirokawa and Johnston 1989, 500). Increasingly,

interest in the ways individuals and groups make decisions has begun to pervade the Conflict Resolution Field and its corresponding literature. An understanding of decision-making processes holds import for all levels of conflict analysis, but is particularly critical when the decisions that are made and efforts to implement those policies have an overarching influence upon defining our very existence – socially, politically, economically, and militarily.

Collectively, these multi-disciplinary inquiries and their resultant findings highlight theoretical understandings that have now become widely accepted rationales for human choice behavior. The ensuing literature surveys two that hold significant import for the conflict termination policy development process – Rational Choice Theory (this chapter) and the Bureaucratic Politics Model (see chapter 4) of decision-making. Despite ideas to the contrary (Pillar 1983; Spanier and Uslaner 1974), this research suggests that the bureaucratic approach best describes the development of interventionist policies in times of crises, including elements of conflict termination. The complexity of the decision-making process has obscured the application of this bureaucratic approach. To this end, the type of *process* enjoined to generate policy decisions (i.e., the bureaucratic model as the framework for decision-making) has been confused with process *outcomes* (i.e., the policy vision, objectives, and strategies that parallel the framework of the rational actor approach as outlined above by Spanier and Uslaner). Before delving into these specific models, it is necessary to provide a brief theoretical

rationale to explain the selection of these two models as those that provide the framework used by (most) decision-makers.¹

DECISION-MAKING APPROACHES: UNITS OF ANALYSIS AS DELIMITERS

Perspectives on the study of decision-making have been captured by five dominant schools of thought (Keen and Morton 1978): Rational Choice Theory, the "individual differences perspective" (ibid., 63), satisficing, the organizational (or structural) approach, and the bureaucratic politics approach.² A critical component of these approaches is their focus on differing units of analysis: They examine either individual or group decision-making.

Focusing on the unit of analysis as the crucial delimiter, this research maintains that approaches to decision-making realistically fall into one of two perspectives contingent upon their focus on unitary actor or group processes. In this manner, studies of choice naturally relate to either the behavioralist (i.e., individualist) or the organizational (i.e., group) paradigm (Fischhoff, Goitein,

¹ For purposes of editorial consistency, the terms decision-maker and decision-making are consistently hyphenated throughout this text, even in quotations where the original authors have spelled them as "decision maker" and "decision making." To enhance readability, these editorial changes are made without the use of "sic."

² Various authors classify these categories differently, based primarily upon personal preferences and educational perspectives. For a slightly different taxonomy, see Gortner, Mahler, and Nicholson (1997), Harrison and Phillips (1991), and Nutt (1981).

and Shapira 1983; Weick 1982; Zey 1992a; Zey 1992c). All others emerge as natural extensions of these two categorizations.³

Concentrating on the issue under investigation within this research, this author contends that decisions surrounding U.S. foreign policy – termination policy in particular – are not made according to a static Rational Actor Model, but are the result of a dynamic Bureaucratic Politics Model. In other words, policy-makers may *theoretically* aspire to uphold the tenets of rationality when facing a foreign policy dilemma, but they *practically* employ the strategies and tactics dictated by their political environment. This perspective presents significant theoretical and practical challenges when translating individual, Rational Actor Model prescriptions into group or organizational, bureaucratic policy process outcomes.

In light of this tentative assumption, each of these perspectives must be discussed to understand their potential relationship to the development of conflict termination policy. What follows is an overview of the origins and assumptions of the Rational Actor Model and its underlying theory, Rational Choice Theory. Once outlined, the assumptions are then critiqued to reveal the

³ From this perspective, the Rational Actor Model serves as the macro-theory for Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Levy 1997), Satisficing (March and Shapira 1992), and Incrementalism (Forester 1984; Lindblom 1959). Although the Organizational Model (Allison 1971; Cyert and March 1963) paralleled the development of the Bureaucratic Politics Model (Allison 1971; Cyert and March 1963; Hilsman 1967), because it is a multiple-actor model this author classifies it with the Bureaucratic Politics Model as a framework for group decision-making.

model's inherent flaws as a preliminary bridge toward developing an argument that demonstrates Rational Choice Theory's inapplicability for group decision-making. This perspective on group decision-making is explored further to stress the Rational Actor Model's inability to enhance our understanding of collective choice processes and outcomes. Noting the influence of these limitations, the research proposes the Bureaucratic Politics Model as a viable alternative to Rational Choice Theory in an effort to describe and explain the influence group-specific phenomena have upon collective decision-making. Finally, an argument is advanced concerning the need to undertake research that focuses upon the contextual elements that affect conflict termination policy-making within the U.S. government. Let us begin this journey with a discussion and critique of the classic model, that of the Rational Actor.

RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY

Known more broadly by its conceptualization as the Rational Actor Model, Rational Choice Theory remains the dominant theory of human decision-making across many of the social sciences (Ulen 1990). Despite the ongoing and multifaceted criticism this perspective has endured, Jack Levy, a preeminent political scientist, contends that "rational choice has become the most influential paradigm in international relations and political science over the last decade" (Levy 1997, 87). Given that this approach is seen as one of the most influential,

we must look deeper into its origins to comprehend fully the rationale behind its conception and application.

Origins of the Classic Decision Theory Model

The theory of rational choice is one of the oldest and best-developed theories of choice (see Arrow 1992; Chan 1979; Cyert and March 1992; Gortner, Mahler, and Nicholson 1997; Jungermann 1983; Keen and Morton 1978; Levy 1997; Schelling 1984; Simon 1979). Within the field of economics, in particular, it has served as a foundational concept for understanding individual, or unitary actor, decision-making (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944), or at least has become the standard by which actual decisions can be evaluated. By focusing on the logic of optimal choice (*ibid.*), the rational perspective attempts to prescribe the normative ways in which people *should* make decisions when operating within the guidelines of individual self-interest. Within this paradigm, individuals strive to maximize their personal utility.⁴ Relatedly, organizations strive to maximize their profits (Koopman and Pool 1991; Mansfield 1994; Schelling 1984). It is this

⁴ Utility is a construct based upon the technical creation of "indifference curves" (i.e., the calculated measure of "the locus of points representing market baskets among which the consumer is indifferent" (Mansfield 1994, 63). In this manner, utility is defined within classic microeconomics as "the level of enjoyment or preferences attached by [a] consumer to this market basket" (*ibid.*, 67). In this sense, the "consumer" is the individual decision-maker and the "market basket" represents the alternative choice. While an understanding of these concepts remains critical to grasping the full complexity of Rational Choice Theory, their complete explanation here would require a separate chapter. For an explanation of these ideas refer to Mansfield (1994), especially chapters 3 and 4.

self-interested, profit-maximizing perspective that undergirds the entire basis for the rational approach. To understand the ways in which this perspective shapes decision-making, we must explore its assumptions as they relate to its motivations for selection.

Assumptions – A Normative Basis for Unitary-Actor Decisions

Ideas regarding utility and profit-maximization for individuals and organizations are based upon the ability to compute mathematically subjective expected-utility (SEU; Fischhoff, Goitein, and Shapira 1983; Levy 1997; Scholz 1983a; Scholz 1983b; Ulen 1990).⁵ In lay terms, SEU models imply an acute ability to calculate, or, as in Game Theory, to order preferences for outcomes based upon (a) *probabilities* for a particular course of action, prospects which are then treated as being individually subjective, and (b) *worth*, an economic measure of individual utility (Fischhoff, Goitein, and Shapira 1983).⁶ Such computations require decision contexts to conform to the following assumptions: (1) the decision-maker knows his or her goals, (2) unlimited and complete information is available, (3) no cognitive limitations constrain the decision-maker, (4) no

⁵ Others cite "Bayes' Rule" as the basis for Rational Choice Theory (Black 1985; Jungermann 1983). While an in-depth or comparative discussion of this foundational theory in relation to SEU model is beyond the scope of this work, suffice it to say they both refer to the maximization of individual utility.

⁶ Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman (1981) have conducted experiments that have called the SEU approach into question. Discussed in more length in the ensuing subsection that illuminates the limitations of Rational Choice Theory, these authors identify *heuristics* that serve as "rules of thumb," mechanisms via which individuals make decisions by means other than the rational actor approach.

limitations exist regarding time or costs, and (5) the decision-maker possesses the capacity to quantify the alternatives – in terms of value and risk separately – in such a way that one dominates all others (Black 1980; Cyert, Simon, and Trow 1956; Keen and Morton 1978; Koopman and Pool 1991; Simon 1979; Ulen 1990; Zey 1992b). Applied to unitary actor decision-making, Michael Nicholson insists that

the basic principle of rationality which is assumed is that the actor has a clear idea of what he (or she) wants, and pursues it in the most efficient way possible. In effect rationality is defined as efficiency.... [Because] it is possible for the decision-taker to formulate what he wants...preferences between alternatives are expressible in a clear-cut way and remain relatively constant over time (Nicholson 1991, 58).

These assumptions are erroneously extended to the organization so that groups are treated as unitary actors much in the same way the Rational Actor Model deals with individuals. Hence, George Huber posits that Rational Choice Theory “suggests that *organizational decisions are consequences of organizational units using information in an intendedly rational manner to make choices on behalf of the organization*” (Huber 1982, 254; italics in original).

On the surface, the assumptions that undergird the “rational actor” approach appear logically consistent. Indeed, they descriptively would be *rational* except for one macro-level contextual factor: Humans, while operating alone or as members of groups, *rarely, if ever*, possess the capacity to fulfill the strict requirements of this prescriptive theory. More specifically, the assumptions that

place boundaries upon this type of decision-making activity ensure that people can never fully operationalize the conceptual paradigm. This factor is repeatedly pointed out by critics in their in-depth discussion of the Rational Actor Model's limiting factors.

Limitations of the Rational Choice Approach

The literature critiquing Rational Choice Theory is as multi-disciplinary as the various individuals and organizations that have attempted to discover prescriptive *and* descriptive approaches to unitary actor and collective choice (see, for example, Black 1985; Ferejohn and Satz 1995; Friedman 1996; Green and Shapiro 1994; Hoos 1974; Jungermann 1983; McGowan 1976; Monroe 1991; Pescosolido 1992; Samuelson 1996; Schön and Rein 1994; Simon 1979; Thalos 1997; Zey 1992b). Given this research's focus on the impact of interagency conflict on the development of conflict termination policy, it is imperative to identify the critiques that relate directly to the assumptions of the model itself since this author believes that even if individuals aspire to make rational decisions, they consistently cannot because of innate human factors (Janis 1989; Ulen 1990; Zey 1992a, 1992b). Further, it is important to recall that international relations scholars, as well as the populace in general, commonly believe that the U.S. government makes foreign policy decisions via the Rational Actor Model (Pillar 1983; Spanier and Uslaner 1974). Hence, assessing the model's

assumptions in light of the two units of analysis will prove illuminating, demonstrating that humans cannot effectively employ Rational Choice Theory at either the individual or group level. Let me begin by presenting the critique that targets Rational Choice Theory when applied at the individual level.

Individuals as Aspiring Rational Actors

Putting aside for the moment the idea that people could indeed purposefully choose to act in a manner that is not rational (Jungermann 1983), by examining the assumptions of Rational Choice Theory independently of one another we can begin to see why this approach is fundamentally flawed as a descriptive explanation for human behavior. It can, therefore, serve only as a normative model (Zey 1992b). Taking each assumption in turn, let me begin with the ideas surrounding individual goals.

"Decision-Makers Know Their Goals"

More than the other assumptions, this proposition seems to stand as a sound axiom of individual choice. Indeed, an individual may know one's goals at a specific point in time. Rational Choice Theory, however, presumes that these goals are static over time (Brennan 1992) or for some period. Further, it implies that an individual possesses the ability, again through SEU modeling, to clearly differentiate and prioritize these goals. These available choices then become "preference orderings" (discussed in greater depth as the fifth assumption)

which can then be easily prioritized with no external influence. In turn, these preference orderings represent the relative "... 'value' or 'utility' of alternative sets of consequences" (Allison 1971, 29; see also Ulen 1990). Subscription to this process infers that individuals have the innate ability to establish quantifiable "utility" functions for every aspect of their lives — and that these functions are "complete, transitive, and stable" (Ulen 1990, 177; see also Mansfield 1994).

It is more than ironic that Rational Choice Theory would be based upon the macro-level assumption that these utility functions could be comparatively measured across different individuals since the basis of expected-utility within microeconomics accepts that utility functions across independent individuals possess no comparative property.⁷ Further, it is critical to note, as Geoffrey Brennan points out, that not all desired goals are *desirable* — the ends for a rational actor, based upon the premise of individual utility maximization, may not be normatively "good" in all cases (Brennan 1992, 59). In this sense, one could posit that Saddam Hussein's actions to invade Kuwait proved rational based upon his

⁷ Edwin Mansfield (1994) readily admits that individuals assign different values to different "market baskets." In this manner, then, individuals prefer one choice to another based upon factors that remain specific to the particular individual. To illustrate, Mansfield points out that an "alcoholic will sometimes trade a valuable item like a watch for an extra drink of whiskey, whereas the president of the Temperance Union will not give a cent for an extra (presumably the first) dose of Demon Rum" (ibid., 68). Hence, different individuals assign different value to particular choice alternatives.

individual utility function.⁸ However, the Kuwaitis would retort that his invasion proved normatively "bad" – both for them and those who subscribe to the provisions of international law and ideas regarding national sovereignty (not to mention human rights ideals), and, eventually, to Hussein himself.

In light of the above analysis regarding the foundational assumption of Rational Choice Theory and its parent field, microeconomics, the use of the term "irrational" to describe human behavior that does not comport with the preference orderings and utility functions of the "evaluating" individual is theoretically inappropriate in all situations given the basis of Rational Choice Theory itself (see Black 1985). The above example involving Hussein's invasion of Kuwait, limited as it is, demonstrates that one's assessment of rationality is bound contextually. This problem is exponentially magnified when placed within the framework of the remaining assumptions, tenets that in many ways are related in synergistic ways to magnify the inability of Rational Choice Theory to serve as a predictive theory of human choice.

⁸ A territorial dispute extending from the 1913 British-Ottoman "Draft Convention on the Persian Gulf Area," Iraq attempted to incorporate Kuwait in both 1938 and 1963. Although attempts proved unsuccessful, they provided precedent for Hussein's 1990 actions (Freedman and Karsh 1993).

"Unlimited and Complete Information"

Information search remains a critical, fundamental element of the decision-making process (Anderson 1975; Bunn 1977; Coplin 1971; Hermann 1971; Koopman and Pool 1991; Lasswell 1956; March and Shapira 1992; Quade 1964; Ulen 1990). Under the rubric of Rational Choice Theory, the individual has the capacity (in terms of time and resources) to access all sources of information and should, therefore, obtain complete information regarding the current situation under decision. However, one's ability to access and process information is limited by multiple, sometimes interrelated, factors.

Brennan (1992) recognizes that Rational Choice Theory demands optimal information gathering and optimal information use. However, questions emerge regarding the meaning of *optimal* as applied to decision-making. Does optimal refer primarily to the robustness of the information-gathering effort and then to its interpretation and application? In this fashion, a linear process is implied, one that compartmentalizes information until *all relevant* information is known. This notion leads to related challenges on many levels: (a) can individuals effectively compartmentalize information; (b) who identifies the criteria for an exhaustive search (Gortner, Mahler, and Nicholson 1989); (c) who shapes the criteria for relevancy – and perhaps more importantly, irrelevancy – and are these criteria inflexible over time (ibid.); (d) is there an inherent distinction between knowing

all information and having the capacity to *use* it in some meaningful way – what are the criteria for *meaningful* in this sense? Obviously, this line of reasoning can transform itself into an infinitely circular process. It does highlight, however, a major flaw intrinsic to the Rational Choice Theory approach. Other concerns emerge regarding this tenet as well, foremost among them relate to compartmentalization, “new” information, and the practical impediments to human prescience and omnipresence.

If an individual were able to compartmentalize effectively gathered information, what effect would exposure to new information have upon such distillation? While not addressed within Rational Choice Theory, an individual employing this model in its classic form would be compelled to create sub-processes to manage, interpret, and apply this new information based upon the pre-existing cognitive map that resulted from the initial information search. Taking this argument a step further, one would have to presume that the presence of new information would potentially alter one’s utility functions and, subsequently, one’s preference orderings. This being the case, the underlying premise of preference stability is no longer valid.

Relatedly, significant criticisms emerge when assessing the individual’s independent ability to know everything and to foresee accurately all of the possible consequences of his or her choice. Obviously, individuals possess neither of these capabilities with 100 percent accuracy. Choices inherently

involve risk to self and others, and therefore, require the individual to order his or her preferences accordingly. As a counter argument, if one could know all possible consequences of one's choice, and discovered that the selection of the option that maximized individual utility would most certainly have a catastrophic impact upon others, would one pursue that course of action? This situation illuminates another of Brennan's (1992) critiques in that not all human behavior is so narrowly self-interested. From the evaluative perspective, would one's actions in the hypothetical given above be deemed *rational* in light of the broader negative outcome? In considering this dilemma, reconsider the Iraq-Kuwait example broached earlier. These theoretical stipulations are constrained by the more practical considerations of information search and processing, including, but not limited to, the three remaining limitations surrounding cognitive and resource constraints as well as one's capacity to quantify alternatives based upon personal goals.

"No Cognitive Limitations"

The ability to know and use all information (or even *any* information) is directly conditioned by the human capacity to process data and formulate meaningful information. Such processing is affected by an individual's "cognitive imperfections" (Ulen 1990, 175). In his critique on Rational Choice Theory, Thomas Ulen defines a cognitive imperfection as "any property of the

mind that causes an individual decision-maker to make less than optimal decisions or choices" (ibid.). Ulen breaks these imperfections into two classes — hardware problems (i.e., those related to the physiological structuration of the brain) and software problems (i.e., those related to an individual's lack of learning or an insufficient experience base). Acting independently or in tandem, these cognitive imperfections limit an individual's competency to rationally process information toward the creation of utility maximizing preference orderings. These cognitive imperfections limit information processing along several dimensions (Simon 1979). For our purposes, two emerge as particularly important since they have relevance for both individual and group decision-making. These two psychological processes are cognitive dissonance and the application of judgmental heuristics; each will be briefly discussed in turn.

Cognitive dissonance. Leon Festinger (1957) developed cognitive dissonance theory to help explain the psychological and motivational effects of an individual experiencing two cognitive phenomena that did not fit together. "In general," says Festinger, "two cognitions are dissonant with each other if, considering these two cognitions alone, the obverse of one follows from the other" (Festinger 1989, 74). Festinger pushes the potential impact of such dissonance further, insisting that an individual will take positive action to reconcile the differing cognitions to alleviate psychological (and perhaps physical) stress. Ulen maintains this theory holds import for Rational Choice Theory in that it may

negatively influence an individual's ability to create and sustain "stable, well-ordered preferences" (Ulen 1990, 178). In this case, Festinger's "positive action" occurs when an individual discounts stress-inducing data in favor of alternative information sets that do not create psychological discomfort. Hence, cognitive dissonance can serve as a screening mechanism whereby individuals unconsciously degrade their ability to access and process all information (assuming, of course, limitless information could indeed ever become a practical reality). This phenomenon is related to the second critical process, the application of judgmental heuristics.

Heuristics. The development and maturation of judgmental heuristics are commonly accredited to Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman (1974, 1981; see also Tversky and Wakker 1995). Authorities within cognitive psychology and other disciplines continue to develop a more incontrovertible explanation for the application of heuristics (see, for example, Allison, Worth, and King 1990; Berk, Hughson, and Vandezande 1996; Fischhoff, Goitein, and Shapira 1983; Keen and Morton 1978; March and Shapira 1992; Scholz 1983a; Ulen 1990; van de Vall 1975; Zox 1977). Known in lay terms as "rules of thumb," the application of heuristics indicates that individuals do not comply in all instances with the assumptions of Rational Choice Theory in that their "internal logic bears little resemblance to the rules of probability" (Fischhoff, Goitein, and Shapira 1983, 196). Instead, they rely upon their ability to recall information from memory along three

interrelated dimensions: (1) availability, (2) representativeness, and (3) anchoring and adjustment. These dimensions ultimately affect one's capacity to process information. Beginning with availability, each of these requires a brief overview to demonstrate their impact upon information processing.

The *availability* heuristic relates to one's recall or memory capacity in that frequency and probability (in the form of recency or familiarity) bias one's perception of current events (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). In this fashion, individuals allow issues that are preeminent in their memories to dominate their decoding of real-time experience. Ulen cites as one example the tendency of people to believe that New York City experiences more murders than suicides each year when in fact the opposite is true. He contends this phenomenon is "explainable by the fact that murders receive much more publicity than do suicides and are, therefore, much more in people's memory than is information about suicide" (Ulen 1990, 182). Additionally, past events that are more salient than current events can cause an individual to perceive that one's immediate experience mirrors a prior event (Tversky and Kahneman 1974; Zey 1992b). In actuality, the significance of the past event, as it resonates with a present situation, overpowers an individual's current context, causing the person to distort reality retrospectively *toward* the prior experience. In the final analysis, salience can have the impact of limiting an individual's ability to process information based upon the current situation, thereby delimiting one's feasible

courses of action when making a choice based upon the present situation and its future consequences.

Closely related to the phenomenon of salience is that of *representativeness*. According to Mary Zey, representativeness causes people to "act as if stereotypes are more common than they actually are" (Zey 1992b, 17). In this manner, individuals classify information based upon its similarity with past information and its relevant category (this too relates back to the compartmentalization discussion presented earlier). The inherent danger of this heuristic as it relates to decision-making, or any other human activity for that matter, is that such compartmentalization may *cause* individuals to overlook the anomalous properties of data that necessitate further inquiry or multiple categorization: Note the connection with stereotyping processes. Taken together, these elements influence the selection of one's anchoring point as well as the ability to adjust this referent once it has been identified.

As with the foregoing heuristics, the selection of one's *anchoring point* remains contingent upon an individual's ability to gather and process information. In essence, an anchoring point is an individual's initial impression of a situation (Ulen 1990). This initial value may emerge as a component of problem formulation, or "it may be the result of a partial computation. In either case, adjustments are typically insufficient...[because] different starting points yield different estimates, which are biased toward the initial values" (Tversky and

Kahneman 1974, 1128). Therefore, any *adjustment* made in connection with a less than optimal starting point, especially in the absence of information that realigns the anchoring point, will most probably lead to a skewed outcome over successive iterations of information processing. Pushing this idea a step further, this assumes one knows the optimal starting point or even that one exists – but does it? Multidimensional cognitive processes, anchoring and adjustment simultaneously influence the previous heuristics in that the salience of a particular anchoring point can further distort availability and representativeness by excluding *known* relevant information.⁹

The foregoing overview of two of an individual's potential cognitive limitations, whether manifest as "hardware" or "software" problems, indicates that there are instances wherein one may not act rationally according to the precepts of Rational Choice Theory. Instead, cognitive dissonance and judgmental heuristics, in concert with various other bias-generating mechanisms, limit a person's ability to gather and process information. While these represent a

⁹Tversky and Kahneman (1974) demonstrate this potential via their "wheel of fortune" experiment. They asked students to estimate the percentage of African nations who were members of the United Nations by spinning a wheel (marked with numbers from 0 to 100) and then deciding if the actual membership percentage was higher or lower than that displayed on the wheel. Next, they asked the students to provide numerical estimates for their percentages. The most interesting result of this experiment emerged as the median estimate for those who got a "10" on the wheel was 25; for those with a "65," the median estimate was 65 percent. Obviously, the numbers on the wheel had no relationship to the actual percentage of African nations who were members of the UN. Instead, the subjects allowed the combined effect of judgmental heuristics to influence their decisions (ibid.; see also Ulen 1990).

few of the internal constraints on the individual, external factors further curb one's ability to employ the Rational Actor Model.

"No Resource Constraints"

Only within a utopian world could one operate inside a boundless, infinitely limitless environment. Since such a world does not exist, decision-makers must adapt their information gathering and processing efforts to the contextual bounds that define their operational parameters. This said, individuals typically face multiple, interrelated resource constraints including those related to time restrictions and financial standing. Let me briefly highlight each, beginning with the most "fixed" of all constraints, time.

Unlike most other aspects of human existence (e.g., power, financial prowess, material possessions, or opportunity) time stands alone as a fixed quantity – there are only 24 hours in each day and the clock cannot be turned backward, or indeed, halted to *create* more time. While deadlines can be extended to allow an individual additional time to make a choice, one's ability to prevent other activities from impinging upon that extension remains severely limited by the complexities of the world within which we now live. When looking at the foreign policy development process, this axiom becomes more than problematic. As evidenced by the nightly newscasts, it often appears that a temporary "stay" in one area provides an opening for an emergency in another. Yet, the classic

Rational Actor Model presumes that time does not create internal (or external) pressures that drive an individual toward a particular course of action. Rather, the choice is made based upon personal utility maximization — irrespective of other factors such as time constraints. Practical experience, however, teaches us that time is indeed a limited commodity and, as such, must be used judiciously when making decisions. Note also the argument that time is also a cost, one calculated in terms of dollars as well as opportunity costs. Consequently, a corollary factor paralleling the limits of time is one's financial resource base.

Most individuals live within a bounded financial world, one wherein subjective measures of utility (ironically) appropriately serve as the basis for purely economic decisions (Levy 1992). Hence, if an individual gains more pleasure from reading as opposed to watching a movie, all other things being equal, a person who acts "rationally" would purchase a book in place of attending the theater. In this sense, it *may* be that Rational Choice Theory can begin to predict decision outcomes if all other theoretical precepts endure. However, Rational Choice Theory holds that individuals are fully able to maximize utility without considering the realistic bounds of their financially constrained world. In this manner, the individual is not forced to choose particular courses of action due to the lack of resources. Nor is the individual's ability to gather and process information limited in any way because of impending, perhaps escalating, costs.

Clearly, propositions suggesting that time and cost constraints are "non-issues" within the realm of decision-making remain invalid. As we attempt to apply theory to practice, we quickly realize that personal, repetitive experience dictates that neither represents unlimited factors. Further, continuous experience demonstrates that these are identified before many other limiting factors as restrictions on choice, particularly when the "feasibility" test is applied to particular courses of action to "cut away" options that are too costly (in terms of time and/or money). The foregoing factors synergistically interact to hinder the actor's capacity to prioritize alternatives based upon computable numerical weights.

"Capacity to Quantify Alternatives"

Proceeding from the perspective that an individual is able to quantifiably assess or, at least, to order consistently every aspect of his or her life presents a challenge even for the most mathematically-inclined, not to mention those who possess an average (or below) capacity to handle complex mathematical formulae. In light of the foregoing discussion, it appears that one's capacity to formulate equations to compute utility is not the major limiting factor of the "rational actor" approach. In situations where individuals are not mathematically gifted, it does, however, influence one's decision-making process by increasing the likelihood that an individual who is deficient in computational

ability will rely more heavily upon judgmental heuristics and a limited information search to craft alternative choices. Herbert Simon captures the essence of the problem in his critique of Rational Choice Theory:

In the real world we usually do not have a choice between satisfactory and optimal solutions, for we only rarely have a method of finding the optimum.... We cannot, within practicable computational limits, generate all the admissible alternatives and compare their relative merits. Nor can we recognize the best alternative, even if we are fortunate enough to generate it early, until we have seen all of them. We satisfice by looking for alternatives in such a way that we can generally find an acceptable one after only moderate search (Simon 1969, 64).

This perspective serves as the basis for Simon's *satisficing* model of decision-making (March and Simon 1958). Harold Gortner, Julianne Mahler, and Jeanne Bell Nicholson contend "satisficing takes the perspective of a single decision-maker or a unified group and holds that the first alternative encountered that meets or exceeds the decision-maker's minimum expectations or demands will be chosen" (Gortner, Mahler, and Nicholson 1989, 258; see also Hickson 1987; Janis and Mann 1977; Jungermann 1983; Keen and Morton 1978; March and Shapira 1992). Inherent in Simon's critique are implicit references that weaken two other assumptions of Rational Choice Theory, specifically information search and resource constraints.

Simon's reference to a moderate search indicates that time and resource constraints (namely, financial costs) naturally limit the extent of one's information search. Discussed at great length earlier within the former section on

resource constraints, such limitations force individuals to establish and prioritize criteria that prevent them from conducting exhaustive searches. Others support this position as well, stating that it would be impractical to conduct such a comprehensive search (Allison 1971; Lindblom 1959; Staw 1977). Helmut Jungermann insists that

with finite time and resources available, it is not rational to spend infinite effort on the exploration of all potential consequences of all options. Rather, the decision costs are weighted against the potential benefits resulting from the application of a decision strategy, and this may lead to violations of SEU model rationality (Jungermann 1983, 71).

Consequently, when measured against the opportunity costs of time and money, an exhaustive search can deplete resources that could be used to analyze other issues, making such frivolous behavior less than rational. One final, related critique that relates to an individual's ability to compute quantifiable measures for alternatives is highlighted in the work of John O'Neill.

Highlighted to a lesser extent earlier, O'Neill (1996) posits that this assumption implies that individuals have no differences in preference orderings and that their measures of subjective expected-utility are ubiquitously identical. It follows, then, that this assumption requires a "single unit of measurement, capable of ranking all objects and states of affairs from 'best' to 'worst'...it requires even more: a common unit of value of which the best option will possess the greatest amount" (ibid., 98). He takes the argument further, stating that

"there has to be a particular single property that all objects and states of affairs possess, and that this property is considered to be the source of their value" (ibid.). In developing this idea of "value-monism," O'Neill is suggesting that Rational Choice Theory prescribes that all aspects of life can be compared across a single scale. Consequently, earning a dollar, buying a house, giving birth to a child, saving another person's life, and dying *should* all, according to the premise put forth by Rational Choice Theory, possess some "single property" that enables a decision-maker to rank order them in a mutually exclusive fashion along a single continuum. Experience teaches us that not all objects or states of affairs possess an inherent exchange component wherein one can be substituted for another. Referring back to the examples offered earlier, one can more than reasonably say that the intrinsic values associated with earning a dollar versus that of saving another's life are so qualitatively different that placing them along a single continuum would appear nonrational at best, ludicrous at worst. In this manner, O'Neill contends some values are not "reducible to others, nor to some other common value...there is no privileged canonical description for the purpose of an *overarching* evaluation which could rank all such areas against each other" (ibid., 100).

Collectively, the limitations of the Rational Choice Theory assumptions quickly lead one to see that the "rational actor" approach to decision-making can serve only as a normative guide for individual decision-making. One has to ask,

however, if this can ever occur in reality if humans simply do not, because they cannot, follow the Rational Actor Model rules. Surely, the important thing is to find out – empirically – how they *do* choose. Extending the predictive or descriptive capacity of such a model beyond its normative potential obscures the true nature of the process by which individuals make decisions. As critical as this discussion has been regarding Rational Choice Theory's application to individual choice, the variation between units of analysis makes this critique more exacting when the model is applied at the group level.

GROUPS AS "LESS THAN RATIONAL" ACTORS

The elements of the critique presented above apply to the group decision-maker (Zey 1992c) as well as the individual: After all, groups are composed of two or more individuals. When approaching the nature of decision-making in linear fashion, one could accept the premise of image theory as well, noting that decision-making begins with the individual and then progresses to a broader context as individuals within a group make decisions and then work with their colleagues to develop a group decision (Beach et al. 1992). It is this process of integrating several independent choices toward "one" group decision that further undermines the application of Rational Choice Theory to the group decision-making process. The group process is far from linear, but is instead a complex, multi-layered, and dynamic interaction across multiple individuals.

Specifically, the nature of *group dynamics* reinforces the Rational Choice Theory limitations that apply to the individual, giving them the potential to have a multiplier effect at the group level. That said, the properties of groups must be highlighted to demonstrate that Rational Choice Theory is also inherently flawed when applied to decision-makers who are not unitary actors. By their very nature, groups are not unitary actors. However, this mistaken assumption has served as the basis for the ongoing application of Rational Choice Theory to organizations and groups. Let me begin by outlining a few of the basic differences between individuals and groups. While these are not necessarily the classic divisions highlighted across the organization theory or organizational behavior disciplines (see, for example, Hirokawa and Johnston 1989), they capture the essence of the variance between individuals and groups that makes the application of Rational Choice Theory inappropriate within any collective choice setting.

Collective Value Dissensus: A Mandate for Intragroup Negotiation

Zey is correct in her assessment that "value is subjective because it is defined as individual preferences and therefore varies from individual to individual" (Zey 1992b, 17). The subjectivity of values produces goals that represent the desires and needs of the individual (see Janis 1989). A challenge emerges within the group setting when these differing values and goals are encoded across

diverse individual cognitive maps, mappings which produce different interpretations even though actors experience events at the same time, within the same contextual environment (Chan 1979; see also Handel 1977; Neustadt 1980; Russett 1969; Shapiro and Bonham 1973). Taken within the setting of group decision-making, divergent cognitive maps which are based upon asymmetric values may create intragroup conflict surrounding problem definition, information search, course of action development, and selection of alternatives, that is, the actual decision outcome itself. Further, decision-makers may hold differing opinions regarding "appropriate implementation strategies" (Rosenthal and Kousmin 1997, 285). The process by which some form of consensus is reached is one of the defining factors of group decision-making (Morley 1992). This process has to be one of negotiation and intra-organizational bargaining (Eden 1992).

Pushing this idea further, Zey highlights Anselm Strauss's (1978) work on negotiation, in conjunction with Samuel Bacharach and Edward Lawler's (1980) research on power within organizations, to illustrate that decisions made within a group setting are shaped by a process of exchange over time.¹⁰ James March and Zur Shapira (1992) contend that the nature of this exchange synergistically

¹⁰ For a broader review of the literature on negotiation and bargaining as it applies to decision-making, see Breslin and Rubin (1993), Cross (1978), Donohue et al. (1991), Thompson, Peterson, and Brodt (1996), and Zartman (1993).

ensures that organizational decisions are not congruous with those made by any one individual, and indeed, choices may reflect little semblance of the well-ordered preference and utility functions demanded by Rational Choice Theory. In this manner, we see that group decision-making may have the propensity to depart from a utility maximization focus should the negotiation process facilitate an exchange wherein individuals move from their initial individual choices toward a more agreeable—yet not necessarily utility or profit-maximizing—alternative course of action.

Recognizing that individuals within groups possess values, goals, and ideas that vary across each person, one begins to see that decisions made within the group setting represent a different type of outcome. This consensually developed “political resultant” (Allison 1971, 162) is influenced in many ways since it represents the negotiated choice of a bargaining process that is shaped by an organizational dynamic bounded by interdependence and social learning (Molnar 1978).

Social Interaction & Organizational Culture

A second major difference between individual and group decision strategies emanates from the idea that the process is indeed a negotiation.¹¹ Unlike purely

¹¹ This premise could easily be seen in the reverse as well: Social interaction across multiple organizational actors causes individuals to engage in a negotiation process as a means to make decisions (see, for example, Zartman 1977).

rational unitary actor decision-making, the negotiation process is a social interaction characterized by the interdependence of actors who have some commitment to one another as well as the organization itself. These commitments are defined by the values and symbols that define the organization's culture (Pescosolido 1992).

The work of Mariam Thalos critiques rational decision theory through the lens of the social interactionist. In an insightful philosophical approach, Thalos debunks the perspective that "rational decision-makers are autonomous entities—answering only to their own beliefs and desires" (Thalos 1997, 287). In their empirical study on the structure and content of human decision-making, Scott Allison, Anna Marie Jordan, and Carole Yeatts (1992) corroborate Thalos' ideas. These researchers discovered that group decision-making is indeed a *social process*, one that involves other people either directly or indirectly (see also Richards 1990). This connection with others can de-emphasize the desire for individuals within groups to maximize their individual utility as their more salient goal shifts toward maintaining social relationships in the face of hard choices and ongoing interdependence. Yet, the idea of maintaining relationships is not the only contextual bound on individual choice. Depending upon one's superordinate goals, loyalty to the organization may supercede interpersonal allegiance as an actor strives to maintain cognitive congruence with the demands of the organizational environment.

Studies within the fields of management, psychology, organizational behavior, and related disciplines have gone to great lengths to explain and predict the influence that organizational culture can have upon human behavior (see, for example, Chatman and Barsade 1995; Druckman 1997; Morrill 1989; Pettigrew 1979; Schein 1987, 1992). The "property of groups of people and not individuals," Daniel Druckman insists organizational cultures influence the attitudes, emotions, and behaviors of members through indirect, often implicit, means (Druckman 1997, 96; see also Scott 1997).¹² While the "precise linkages between culture and performance have not been documented" (*ibid.*), experience and observation lead us to believe that organizational culture does indeed play a pivotal role in shaping collective decision processes through the accepted structuration of the group's social milieu, including its organizational structure, informal processes, and norms (Beach et al. 1992; Bettenhausen and Murnighan 1985). From this perspective, an awareness of organizational culture can facilitate understanding "subcultural dynamics within organizations" (Schein 1992, xii). Such understanding should enhance our ability to comprehend more keenly the nature of "decision-making as negotiation" within groups as it occurs across intraorganizational coalitions that are based upon previously formed and newly developing subcultures. Much of the literature is beginning to identify social

¹² For an excellent treatment on the affective-motive component of values as they relate to decision-making, see Amitai Etzioni (1992).

learning as one of the most important processes that impacts human behavior (Avital and Jablonka 1994; Goyal and Janssen 1996; Grusec 1992; Harrison and McIntosh 1992; Nakazawa et al. 1988; Okey 1992; Zagumny 1993). While not fully developed as yet, the influence social learning has upon shaping organizational cultures and their subcultures, as well as the decision-making processes they employ, is beginning to receive heightened attention. Indeed, as Craig Thomas indicates, social learning shapes the sustainability and durability of organizational culture as

the members of an epistemic community have similar normative values, believe in the same causal relationships, and have a common methodology for validating knowledge, all of which shape their formulation of best management practices (Thomas 1997, 222).¹³

In light of March and Simon's proposition that "decision-making is an arena for symbolic action" (March and Shapira 1992, 289), one can begin to see the confluence of values, goals, and organizational culture as it potentially affects

¹³ Peter Haas defines an epistemic community as "a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area. Although an epistemic community may consist of professionals from a variety of disciplines and backgrounds, they have (1) a shared set of normative and principled beliefs, which provide a value-based rationale for the social action of community members; (2) shared causal beliefs, which are derived from their analysis of practices leading or contributing to a central set of problems in their domain and which then serve as the basis for elucidating the multiple linkages between possible policy actions and desired outcomes; (3) shared notions of validity – that is, intersubjective, internally defined criteria for weighing and validating knowledge in the domain of their expertise; and (4) a common policy enterprise – that is, a set of common practices associated with a set of problems to which their professional competence is directed, presumably out of the conviction that human welfare will be enhanced as a consequence" (Haas 1992, 3).

decision-making processes within complex groups. Within an organizational context, utility-maximizing precepts may fall short of meeting the individual's or group's need to negotiate a compromise choice. Ironically, Kenneth Arrow attempts to validate the tenets of Rational Choice Theory within this setting by insisting that rationality is a useful concept only if grounded within the "social context within which it is embedded" (Arrow 1992, 63). He would, therefore, agree with the findings of Allison and others. Yet, in light of the requirements of Rational Choice Theory, this form of agreement serves as a confirmation of the inability of individuals to act in a purely rational fashion at any point in time—humans can never escape the social contexts that frame their sense of reality, and, therefore, their choice of preference. Indeed, it is the process of cognitive framing that shapes human perceptions of the problem—perceptions that enable them to act "rationally" within this frame—and the potential courses of action they can employ to create a positive solution. Consequently, the research surrounding cognitive framing accentuates one of the most critical deficiencies of the "rational actor" approach.

Framing—Reference Points, Risk, and Preference Orderings

Perhaps more than any other phenomenon, the act of framing a situation, both consciously and unconsciously, establishes the starting point for all decision-making activities and continuously shapes the process throughout its

entirety. In their seminal work on framing decisions and the psychology of choice, Tversky and Kahneman conclude that "the framing of an action sometimes affects the actual experience of its outcomes" (Tversky and Kahneman 1981, 458). Beach et al. (1992) cite two schools of thought as the basis for current ideas regarding framing. First, they identify the sociological and social psychological stream, referring specifically to the works of G. Bateson (1972) and Erving Goffman (1974). They critique this perspective by stating that it is overly broad because it takes account of the "actor's perception of both the social context and its social demands" (Beach et al. 1992, 180). As the second stream, these authors identify the cognitive psychological and decision research arenas. Highlighting the efforts of M. Minsky (1968), E. B. Hunt (1975), and Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Beach et al. posit that this approach is overly narrow, "concentrating on the ways in which specific characteristics of problems influence how they are interpreted by the problem solver and how these interpretations determine the means by which he or she attempts to solve the problems" (Beach et al. 1992, 180). Whether one adopts the perspective of the sociologist or the cognitive psychologist, the effects of framing affect decision-making in at least three fundamental and interrelated ways as it influences the selection of reference points, attitudes toward risk, and the ordering of preferences.

Relying heavily upon the research of Tversky and Kahneman, Levy points out that the idea of "reference dependence is particularly important because people treat gains and losses differently – they overvalue losses relative to comparable gains" (Levy 1992, 89).¹⁴ Levy indicates that individuals are customarily "risk-averse with respect to gains and risk-acceptant with respect to losses" (ibid., 90; see also Tversky and Kahneman 1981, 1991; Tversky and Wakker 1995) and would therefore order preferences taking risk factors into account. As a natural extension, then,

the asymmetry of gains and losses and the role of the reference point in defining these distinct domains, the identification, or *framing*, of the reference point can have a critical effect on choice. A change in frame can result in a change in preferences (*preference reversal*) even if the values and probabilities associated with outcomes remain the same (Levy 1992, 90).

Noting that people perceive a difference in potential outcomes based upon the way in which risk is framed, Levy uses an example of a medical treatment to make his point, saying, "it makes a difference whether a particular treatment has a 90 percent survival rate or a 10 percent mortality rate" (Levy 1992, 90).¹⁵

¹⁴ Although he is specifically addressing reference dependence as the central assumption of prospect theory, Levy's idea is logically applicable because prospect theory is a refinement of Rational Choice Theory under conditions of a boundedly-rational unitary actor (Levy 1997).

¹⁵ Levy cites empirical evidence to support his position, calling attention to the laboratory experiments of Camerer (1995), Grether and Plott (1979), Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Roth (1995), Slovic and Lichtenstein (1983), Tversky and Kahneman (1986), and Tversky, Slovic, and Kahneman (1990).

The critical connection between the framing of reference points, risk, and preferences is best captured in the work of March and Shapira's postulate that "rational models see decisions as being made by the evaluation of alternatives in terms of their future consequences for prior preferences" (March and Shapira 1992, 274). Based upon the research presented herein, one could reasonably predict that the framing of a decision issue in parallel with a reference point entailing high risk—ranked as the most rational choice according to preference orderings—would most likely be disregarded in favor of one with reduced anticipated risk. In so doing, the decision-maker would act in a non-utility-maximizing fashion, thereby failing to uphold the requirements of Rational Choice Theory. Alternatively, the decision-maker could reframe the situation, an act that would also violate Rational Choice Theory since efforts to do so would necessarily presuppose a limited information search in the face of increased risk.

In looking at the aggregative effect of the challenges inherent to issue framing at the group level, it quickly becomes apparent that situations requiring collective decisions within any group or organizational setting comprised of multiple individuals require the development of a negotiated consensual choice. This course of action will be shaped by intraorganizational factors such as group dynamics, social interaction, and organizational culture. The synergistic effect of these group processes require decision analysts to look beyond Rational Choice Theory toward alternative approaches that enables groups to accurately predict

choices based upon effective descriptions and inclusive explanations of human behavior within a collective.

RATIONALE FOR ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES: PEOPLE
DO NOT ALWAYS MAKE RATIONAL CHOICES¹⁶

The vast majority of the literature cited as evidence of the foregoing critique of Rational Choice Theory indicates that the theory's precepts fail to provide an accurate description or explanation of human choice behavior while acting as an individual or group decision-maker. This author then moved that critique to focus specifically upon the unit of analysis issue, making a case that groups do not act as unitary actors within the decision process (Allison 1971). Rather, they must manage through some interactive process the development of a decision alternative that adequately incorporates the attitudinal and behavioral dynamics that are specific to groups. In particular, this process must create consensus within an environment that is rife with value conflicts that recurrently manifest themselves at the interpersonal and intergroup levels within a single organization. Further, ongoing social interaction and the parameters of the organization's culture mandate conformity to decision rules and behavioral guidelines, factors that further impede both the individual's and the group's ability to conform to every tenet of Rational Choice Theory. Finally, the process

¹⁶ Adapted from Mary Zey's proposition, "Humans do not always make rational choices" (Zey 1992b, 17).

of framing, and its relationship with reference points, risk orientations, and preference orderings, becomes problematic within the group setting wherein multiple "frames" must be integrated toward a prioritized group utility function. Indeed, Thomas Schelling argues that "in a collectivity there is no unanimous preference" and hence, "'rational decision' has to be replaced with something like collective choice" (Schelling 1984, 93).

Indeed, it is the refinement of our understanding regarding Schelling's notion of collective choice that this research pursues. Before developing such an argument through the lens of the Bureaucratic Politics Model, there is much utility to be gained by surveying the conflict termination precepts and models that dominate our current understanding. To this end, the ensuing chapter highlights the works of the more generally accepted theorists and practitioners as they have informed the development of conflict termination modeling.

CHAPTER 3

CONFLICT TERMINATION: RATIONAL ACTOR MODELS DOMINATE CONTEMPORARY THEORY

It is always easy to begin a war, but very difficult to stop one, since its beginning and end are not under control of the same man.

—Sallust

OVERVIEW

This chapter identifies the misconceptions commonly held (across the military community in particular) that “conflict termination” equates to conflict resolution and, hence, to peace. As its primary focus, it demonstrates that currently accepted models of termination rely almost exclusively upon the Rational Actor Model of decision-making and its assumptions regarding unitary actors and quantifiable utility functions.¹ This approach is critiqued for its inability to account for the influence of emotive and psychological factors that are not quantifiably calculable, and thus not included as part of the Rational Actor Model approach. Further, these models attempt to predict the point at

¹ For a compendium of resources related to ending war in general, see Pickus and Woito (1970).

which hostilities will end, but fail to link this point to the more important process that attempts to move parties in conflict toward sustainable resolution.

The alternative approaches of Mitchell are examined in an effort to illuminate the inherent dangers of the "rational actor" approach (i.e., the Entrapment Model) as well as inability of the Rational Actor Model to account for forward-looking leaders who are able to step away from utility calculations toward a broader understanding of future gains (i.e., the Enticing Opportunity Model). Finally, an ultimate critique of the Rational Actor Model is offered via Mitchell's work as intraparty fractionation and its resultant influence upon conflict termination decision-making demonstrate the "rational actor" approaches' ultimate failure to include the effects of group dynamics upon termination decisions. This critique serves as the impetus for future research toward developing a Bureaucratic Politics Model of Conflict Termination, a process that begins with chapter 4 of this research.

INTRODUCTION

Penned well over twenty years ago, Fred Iklé's dictum regarding the nature of war termination and rational calculations continues to confound those who become embroiled in conflict.² Although Iklé sees war as a particular form of

² Recall from chapter 1, Iklé says, "If the decision to end a war were simply to spring from a rational calculation about gains and losses for the nation as a whole, it should be no harder to get out of a war than to get into one" (Iklé 1991, 16).

discord, his words hold true for the broader spectrum of conflict as well. Hence, they remain valid for those who attempt to initiate conflict termination processes.³

As its principal focus, this chapter highlights the conflict termination models that dominate our thinking.⁴ Based fundamentally upon Rational Choice Theory and its Rational Actor Model of decision-making outlined in the previous chapter, these approaches focus upon themes surrounding utility maximization and preference ordering. Consequently, this work accents the Rational Actor Model's assumptions to provide a context for discussing the conflict termination models related to this theoretical perspective. While these models arguably have the potential to inform termination at all social levels, this research concentrates specifically upon cases wherein state actors must think about conflict termination. Therefore, the emphasis herein is upon non-unitary actor-based conflict termination. Once outlined, this chapter analyzes these models to reveal

³ This author recognizes that the debate surrounding the relationship between "war" and "conflict" has not been fully resolved. For an interesting discussion of this issue, see Coser (1961), Holsti (1966), Rapoport (1960), and Wright (1965). However, because a vast majority of the work regarding termination has been accomplished with a specific focus on war, *and* because this author believes war is a specific type of activity within the broader spectrum of conflict, the premise supported by this note holds for the purposes of this particular work.

⁴ It is worth noting at the outset that this work is not about the techniques or methods by which conflicts end, for example, negotiated settlements, capitulation, unconditional surrender, truce, armistice, or treaty. For discussions of that aspect of conflict termination, see Carroll (1969), Cimbala and Dunn (1987), Iklé (1964), Pillar (1983), Seabury and Codevilla (1989), and Wallenstein and Sollenberg (1996). Rather, concerned models identify the factors that the dominant parties' decisions to pursue those methods of conflict termination.

their inability to capture the dynamic nature of the process. In so doing, the critique provides an opening for alternative approaches, the "Entrapment Model" and the "Enticing Opportunity Model" (Mitchell 1995). Before we can begin discussing models of conflict termination, however, we have to define the concept to ground the discussion that follows.

CONFLICT TERMINATION: POINTS OR PROCESSES?

One of the most important aspects to have in mind before analyzing the models that guide our understanding of conflict termination processes is to define first what we mean by *conflict termination*. It is imperative to recognize that, in contrast to the widely accepted viewpoint, *this work views conflict termination as a process and not merely as the cessation of hostilities* (see also Handel 1978). This perspective is sometimes misconstrued, however, as many who are thinking and writing about this topic, particularly those within the U.S. Armed Forces, use the term with a focus on the point in time at which active hostilities cease. More critically, however, this group uses conflict termination erroneously to equate cessation of hostilities with conflict resolution and peace (see, for example, Allotey 1995; Estes 1973; Rios 1993; Strednansky 1996). Given that the utility of both perspectives remains limited – the first fails to provide an answer to questions regarding what follows the cessation of hostilities; the second, is clearly misleading, theoretically and practically – a more advantageous

perspective is one that views conflict termination as a bridge toward a "better state of peace" (Liddell Hart 1954, 338) in terms of creating a more stable environment. In this way, "conflict termination" is seen as part of an integrated process toward sustainable conflict resolution. Other scholars and practitioners do understand that the distinction is more than a nuance. Highlighted below, their ideas capture the essence of this dynamic process.

Leading thinkers who regard conflict termination as a process include Stephen J. Cimbala, Christopher R. Mitchell, and, from the U.S. military perspective, Michael Rampy. Cimbala makes a the distinction between termination point and process clear in his study on war, stating that

... termination implies something specific about the ending of war. Termination is the result of intention to limit the scope or duration of the war because that limitation accomplishes some desirable policy objective....terminating a war rather than ending it results in some trade-offs which might not appeal to all belligerents.... Termination...thus implies something premeditated, although perhaps flexibly adapted to time and circumstances (Cimbala 1987, 2).

The salient point here is that when viewed as part of a decision-making process, conflict termination requires an active decision, or, as a minimum, a series of (limited) decisions, on the part of the belligerents (see also Coser 1961; Mitchell 1981; Schneider 1987). Mitchell pushes this idea further in his study of international conflict.

Stating that conflict termination is a process relevant to all social levels, Christopher Mitchell defines the process as "a matter of at least one party in conflict determining to abandon coercive behavior and adopt some form of settlement strategy, through concessions and conciliation" (Mitchell 1981, 165). As part of sustainable conflict termination, this process has as its objective the "*termination* of both parties' conflict behaviour [*sic*] and the development of a compromise solution involving an abandonment of some goals underlying the original conflict situation" (ibid.). Mitchell contends the process is far from linear and is complicated by myriad factors, including (a) views of relative positions and future prospects, (b) calculations of relevant costs/benefits in light of probable compromise solutions, (c) the dilemma of the entrapment mentality wherein costs are viewed as investments in success, (d) the role of overall or marginal costs/benefits, and (e) doubts regarding the stability of the parties' goal preferences over time (Mitchell 1981, 194). By highlighting these points, Mitchell argues that a process must be actualized to address unresolved issues from a relational perspective, that of the parties in conflict. In this manner, he clearly identifies the fact that the post-hostilities environment necessitates that a conflict termination process be one that addresses these (and other) issues in order to sustain non-violent relations. Viewing the process from a military perspective, Michael Rampy provides insight into the practical aspects of termination planning.

Writing to inform military practitioners concerning the relationship between conflict termination and post-conflict activities, Rampy contends "conflict termination is, in large measure, an intellectual process that couples the ends and means at hand with the circumstances of conflict" (Rampy 1992, 51). He connects to both Cimbala's and Mitchell's ideas, noting that the most likely post-conflict activities involve

political, economic, socio-psychological and military activities that support conflict termination...[including] security measures, intelligence, civil affairs, humanitarian assistance, nation assistance, force redeployment, and other activities (ibid., 53).

Hence, he recognizes that a process must be in place to address many of the ongoing issues that serve as the basis of the conflict, in conjunction with those that have emerged as a result of the conflict dynamic.

Together, these authors represent the maturation of the conceptualization of conflict termination as a process, one that regards the broader termination of conflict as an affair encompassing various activities both before and after the actual cessation of hostilities. Cimbala insists that the termination of conflict is by all measures intentional, and hence requires a decision to act. In turn, Mitchell shifts our thinking from the decision point to the factors that influence conflict termination decisions, factors that require an ongoing process to manage outstanding conflictual issues. Finally, Rampy highlights the nature of the ongoing process by identifying some of the activities that conflict termination

processes should include in the post-hostilities period. Since conflict termination necessitates that an individual or group make a conscious decision – or again, several such decisions, some of which may be to abandon the attempt at a non-coercive settlement – to pursue de-escalation toward the cessation of hostilities as a step toward a less violent coexistence, if not peace and conflict resolution, the theoretical foundation for such a decision must be explored. To date, the literature on this subject focuses almost exclusively upon Rational Choice Theory as it frames the Rational Actor Model. Consequently, this perspective requires elucidation before describing the models themselves.

MODELS OF CONFLICT TERMINATION: BUILT UPON A RATIONAL ACTOR APPROACH

Captured in-depth through the previous chapter, Rational Choice Theory remains one of the most notable theories of choice. Noted earlier, by focusing on the logic of optimal choice, the rational perspective attempts to prescribe the normative ways in which people *should* make decisions when operating within the guidelines of individual self-interest. Within this paradigm, individuals strive to maximize their personal utility; relatedly, organizations strive to maximize their profits (Koopman and Pool 1991; Mansfield 1994; Schelling 1984). It is this self-interested, profit-maximizing perspective that undergirds the “rational actor” approach. This research has already outlined the assumptions of this

approach (see discussion beginning on page 49) and has outlined their shortcomings as regards the actualities of group and individual decision-making.

Streams of Rationality – Measures of Utility Cast in Cost-Benefit Analyses

The Rational Actor Model perspective contends that the value of termination models rests with their ability to predict the most likely points wherein the cessation of hostility provides an opportunity for the post-conflict activities Rampy identified as critical components of conflict termination. These models provide the basis for the cessation of hostilities phase of the conflict termination process but *do not* speak to the broader process as outlined in the previous definition of conflict termination. This serves as an overarching critique of all Rational Actor Models of conflict termination. Nonetheless, they have the potential, at least theoretically, to identify the point of cease-fire wherein the follow-on phases of the broader conflict termination process can begin and are therefore of great import to the conflict theorist.

The classic Rational Actor Models of conflict termination distinguish the factors most often identified as those that have an impact upon a party's decision to stop fighting. These factors relate directly to quantifiable measures of utility, calculating utility functions that reflect a cost-benefit ratio regarding gains and losses, as well as the costs and benefits of continued struggle. The ensuing discussion highlights the most prominent Rational Actor Model approaches that

have framed our understanding of conflict termination to date, including those of Donald Wittman, I. William Zartman, William O. Staudenmaier, Bruce B. G. Clarke, and Christopher Mitchell (his individual ideas as well as those presented with Michael Nicholson). Let us begin with the most technical of these approaches, that of Donald Wittman.

Wittman: The Zero-Sum, Rational Model

As with most of these theorists, Wittman (1979) employs the tenets of the Rational Actor Model to create a mathematically rational model of conflict termination. He assumes that "unless both sides believe that they can be made better off by settlement, the war will continue" (ibid., 759), and thus views the parties in conflict as unitary actors who can accurately and independently measure utility. By extension, this measurement becomes a zero-sum utility factor in that the utilities of both actors embroiled in conflict add to an absolute "1." In this manner, an increase in utility for one party necessitates a comparable decrease for the other, ensuring that unconditional surrender ultimately maximizes the utility for one side (i.e., the "victor") while simultaneously minimizing it for the other (i.e., the "loser").

Using technical equations and economic utility-maximizing graphs, Wittman claims the factors that hold greatest import for his model remain the traditional Rational Actor Model principles. Specifically, they are the costs of war (namely,

military and political – but since the military costs are more visible, he opts to focus on those in terms of logistical resources, manpower, etc.), the probability of winning, the present value of future outcomes, and the joint probability of winning. Treating war and peace as alternative means to national ends, Wittman suggests that it takes two sides to end a war. Through his model, he concludes that “a reduction of hostilities,” that is, the costs suffered by continuing, “may reduce the probability of a settlement taking place and thus prolong the war” and that “increasing the probability of winning may not increase the probability of a settlement” (ibid., 760).

While Wittman admits that information is seldom perfect or complete and that perceptual bias can affect assessments of power and, hence, decisions to discontinue conflict behaviors, he discounts the impact of these factors throughout his analysis. Further, because he focuses upon the unitary actor as decision-maker, his work meets his personal goal of “logical clarity” (ibid., 745) at the expense of reliability and realism. These errors in approach, compounded by his failure to consider the non-quantifiable aspects of psychology and emotion that condition a party’s *will* to fight, erode the predictive value of his utility-based model. This critique moves us toward the works of I. William Zartman, a theorist who relies upon perceptions of utility at the margin while simultaneously assuming stable utility functions.

Zartman: Hurting Stalemate & Imminent Mutual Catastrophe

Zartman's (1989) work represents measures of utility *at the margin* within the Rational Actor Model approach because his focus on a party's motivation to continue the conflict is based upon the continuation's ability to harm one or both (i.e., a *mutually* hurting stalemate) of the conflicting parties. In this way, the cost-benefit aspect of utility maximization dictates that the costs of continuing the conflict far outweigh the benefits that will likely accrue. While Zartman intends his models to be taken in tandem, this text invokes Mitchell's (1995) approach, separating them to identify their most salient aspects. Let us begin with the hurting stalemate (HS) and then transition to the imminent mutual catastrophe (IMC) approach.

The HS model presupposes that parties in conflict *can* reach a point wherein an extended period of costly action in the face of little measurable progress compels them to consider other alternatives, that of discontinuing the conflict preeminent among them. As with similar "rational actor" approaches, this framework assumes that parties have the capacity to identify their costs (of quitting as well as continuing) and that their preference orderings clearly dictate that they should terminate the conflict. It further assumes, without clearly identifying the relevant factors, that parties will exhaust their capacity to continue and will therefore stop fighting, a perspective shared by many

analysts.⁵ It also assumes that, while costs remain high, the perceived probability of (eventually) winning diminishes considerably. On the whole, Zartman's HS approach shares flaws similar to Wittman's model in that he fails to account for the psychological aspects of conflict and therefore underestimates a party's capacity to find the *means* to fight if the *will* remains strong. In this fashion, the *will* to fight can often eclipse the lack of capacity, forcing people to find alternative tools of violence and thereby fulfilling the axiom that "desperate times call for desperate measures." The HS model also suffers from the Rational Actor Model fallacy that rational calculations regarding costs and benefits can be definitively made within highly charged emotional environments. This leads to Zartman's corollary approach, the IMC.

The IMC cannot be detached easily from the HS in that parties must presciently foresee an impending disaster that is inseparably connected to their continued participation in the conflict. In this fashion, Zartman intended that both parties be locked in a costly, painful stalemate (i.e., HS) with a looming disaster on the horizon (i.e., IMC). Simply stated, this perspective assumes that anticipated costs for both (or all) parties in conflict increase suddenly and sharply. This disaster could manifest in terms of costs or their perceived

⁵ Jane Holl, Executive Director of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, shared this perspective with our research group at the Air Command and Staff College, noting that the party's lack of capacity to carry on the conflict may cause it to terminate its involvement (Allotey 1995, 15). Engelbrecht (1992) echoes this perspective.

opportunity for success (i.e., "victory") could drastically decline as a result of continuation. Since this approach remains interlocked with the first, the critique of the HS holds for the IMC as well, with particular emphasis on the parties' inability to have complete and accurate information regarding future events.

These models (i.e., Wittman's and Zartman's) collectively shaped the thinking of those in the academic community regarding conflict termination.

Unfortunately, neither their strengths nor limitations had noticeable impact on developing the thinking of U.S. military professionals. As representative of the military's views, the ensuing discussion highlights the ideas of William O. Staudenmaier, Bruce B. G. Clarke, Joseph Engelbrecht, and Sam Allotey et al. Let us begin with the least complex of all of these, William Staudenmaier's model.

Staudenmaier: The Strategic-Rational Conflict Model

Writing "under the influence of" the nuclear era, Staudenmaier presents a model with two basic dimensions—one strategic and one rational.⁶ Framed via figure 3.1 as a simple input-throughput-output diagram (Staudenmaier 1987, 17), he contends his systems model captures conflict termination decision-making under the assumption of bounded rationality (see Simon 1976).

⁶ The *strategic* aspect of this model stems from the fact that it "relates to identifying national interests, setting national objectives, and deciding issues of peace and war" (Staudenmaier 1987, 16). The *rational* aspect is discussed within the text above.




Figure 3.1. Staudenmaier's Strategic-Rational Conflict Model

Returning to the underlying assumptions of "rationality" he claims the Rational Actor Model approach remains important based upon its ability to enable decision-makers to predict outcomes, and therefore, to manipulate and control strategy (Staudenmaier 1987, 18). Its supposed predictive value and its reliance upon bounded rationality places this framework within the Rational Actor Model category of conflict termination models.

This approach, as Staudenmaier advises, is overwrought with flaws as one considers the inherent shortcomings of the Rational Actor Model assumptions when applied to the policy-making process: Decisions to start or stop wars are not taken by unitary actors within the bureaucratic policy arena (see also Iklé 1991), perfect information does not exist, and there is no effective means to compare costs and benefits across dissimilar courses of action. This approach simultaneously suffers the error committed by many military thinkers—that of

equating conflict termination to final conflict resolution. In spite of these flaws, he maintains his approach is effective when making conflict termination decisions since it provides a means to integrate thoughts regarding the use of force, the selection of a strategy to achieve national objectives, and the decision to "end or continue" the conflict (Staudenmaier 1987, 27). Despite these errors in framing, in the final analysis Staudenmaier maintains that decisions for "conflict resolution" result from the comparison of costs (along social, economic, military, and political dimensions) to the value of political objectives.

Clarke: A Rational Model of Incompatible Objectives

Clarke's model (see figure 3.2) "focuses on a rational-actor model in an attempt to explain the theory involved in conflict termination" (Clarke 1992, 33). He cautions, however, that the process remains embedded within a political context that plays a significant role in shaping decisions. This said, in his construction of "victory" criteria at the political level Clarke brings the full focus back to cost-benefit comparisons and utility maximization functions, stating that victory results when the opponent changes his objectives to coincide or parallel those of his adversary (see also Rampy 1992). In this manner, as long as one can continue to prosecute the effort with an advantageous cost-benefit ratio, the conflict will continue. Clarke states:




Figure 3.2. Clarke's Model of U.S. Policy Preferences and Activities Toward Conflict

The primary cause of transition between phases of a dispute...is the changing of initial objectives (ends). This change can result from a cost/benefit analysis that indicates that the objective is not worth the price, a change in the external environment, partial or total achievement of the objective, or other situations that reduce or increase how tightly held the objectives are. *This is the key!* The ability to change objectives of one's opponent is thus the main element that causes transition from one phase to another and thus to successful termination of a conflict (Clarke 1992, 8).

In this manner, Clarke invokes the traditional ideas of the Rational Actor Model and its focus upon measurable, quantifiably comparable utility functions. This approach causes him to create a linear model that begins and ends with a "dispute" phase, the second of which assumes that conflict termination on favorable terms leads to settlement, and by inference, conflict resolution.

However, it also only considers the cost-imposing means of making the other side change its calculus. Unfortunately, he would not be the last military thinker to present ideas regarding the Rational Actor Model of conflict termination. The most recent military theorist to do so is Joseph Engelbrecht.

Engelbrecht: When a State Stops Fighting

In his Ph.D. dissertation, Engelbrecht (1992) cites several reasons states stop fighting. Following in the footsteps of the Rational Actor Model for the first two, he identifies four theoretical explanations for war termination: (1) winners and losers, (2) cost-benefit ratio, (3) leadership change, and (4) psychological move toward a second order paradigm. While the first may seem an obvious approach

to conflict termination—in that someone decides to stop based upon a logistical lack of capacity to continue—the second, the cost-benefit ratio, again plays a significant part by enabling the parties to calculate the futility of continuing. As with the foregoing approaches, this form of calculation is clearly subject to the same critique. His ideas spark interest, however, as he transitions to his third and fourth theoretical perspectives.

Asserting that a change in leadership—primarily *from* a hawkish, war-prone leadership, *to* an authority that is more dovish, or in favor of peace—suggests that factors other than rational calculations have the potential to bring about the cessation of hostilities and act as the genesis of a termination process leading toward final conflict resolution. This transition provides opportunities for new leaders to step away from the policies of those who “took” the party to war, creating the necessary space for fresh and innovative perspectives toward peaceful coexistence, if not complete conflict resolution. This marks the beginning of recognition that the emotive, psychological, and political aspects of conflict play a significant role in generating conflict termination (see also Allotey 1995; Iklé 1991). His fourth factor, the emergence of a second order change, makes the ultimate break with the Rational Actor Model’s ideas toward a more inclusive perspective of the “whole person concept” and its influence on bringing about conflict termination.

Citing the work of Paul Watzlawick, John H. Weakland, and Richard Fisch (1974), Engelbrecht contends leaders may perceive that continued conflictual behaviors threaten principles of superordinate national importance. Accordingly, one party perceives the other possesses the capacity to impose a value-threatening change upon the system, having clearly detrimental effects for the internal order. Hence, "at some point the leaders realize the attempted solution (the war itself) becomes the problem...[and] they see war termination as a necessary part of a future policy aimed at protecting this value" (Engelbrecht 1992, 36-37). As an example of this theory in practice, Engelbrecht cites the Japanese Emperor's decision to surrender in 1945. He contends the Emperor reframed the decision to surrender based upon critical threats to the institution of the Emperor and the Japanese nation, the national polity: "Future resistance meant that these values were most certainly in jeopardy. The only promise of saving these values lay in giving up all capability to defend them. The Emperor made the decision" (ibid., 121). Engelbrecht's ideas, in concert with others, served as the basis for one of the most comprehensive works on conflict termination to date, that of Allotey et al.

Allotey et al.: Conflict Resolution Framework

Employing the ideas of classic thinkers presented thus far, Allotey et al. develop a dynamic, open systems conflict resolution framework that combines

the elements of the Rational Actor Model with the less quantifiable elements of psychology and emotion (see figure 3.3). Based diagrammatically upon the work of Richard Barringer (1972), this approach unwittingly combines the ideas of all the foregoing theorists into a *Realpolitik*, power-based model with the *potential* for other factors to influence the transition between conflict phases.⁷ However, it is critical to note that this approach recognizes that war termination does not necessarily equate to conflict termination. These authors assert that terminating conflict entails more than a cease-fire or armistice: It requires the creation of a vision of the desired end state that serves as a bridge toward peace.

In fact, they contend that

stopping the fighting is only half the challenge. To prevent the reintroduction of hostilities and achieve a lasting peace, states need to continue working toward resolving conflict.... The major difficulties in resolving a dispute lie in the ability to fulfill the conditions for settlement, the psychological implications of war and the nature of the conflict (Allotey 1995, 22).

While their ideas are correct in this sense, their tendency to fall back to power-politics with the victor dictating the terms of peace based upon the instruments of power causes me to classify their approach as that of the Rational Actor Model. These authors recognize that bureaucratic processes and individual interests frame conflict termination decisions, yet their model fails to account for

⁷ I say "unwittingly" here because the authors of this model do not cite the theorists identified as the classic thinkers within this work. However, as I reviewed Allotey et al.'s work, it became clear that their ideas did indeed pervade this model.




Figure 3.3. Allotey et al.'s Conflict Resolution Framework

these factors. Instead, it relies upon classic utility comparisons across the economic, political, and military instruments of power (denoted in figure 3.3 as "E," "P," and "M," respectively) as the basis for termination decisions. As a heuristic depiction of conflict phasing for power-based conflicts, this model is of some utility; as a viable model of conflict termination, it requires the inclusion of non-quantifiable factors, influences recognized by the authors but currently omitted from this framework.

Of all of the approaches outlined in this work thus far, Engelbrecht's and Allotey et al.'s provide the greatest opportunity for factors other than the Rational Actor Model's cost-benefit utility maximization approach to affect conflict termination. Their approaches, however, provide no viable method to account for these influences upon the Rational Actor Model approach.

Summary – Premise and Critique

The foregoing text presented the dominant models of conflict termination that shape current theory and practice in international relations. Based upon the Rational Actor Model and its assumptions of unitary actor decision-making involving preference orderings and utility functions, these approaches fail to capture the dynamic nature of conflict termination processes for myriad reasons. The critiques highlighted herein relate primarily to the invalid assumption of the unitary actor (see also Sigal 1988), the foundational tenet of Rational Choice

Theory. Further, where appropriate this author noted that the Rational Actor Model approaches discount the influence of emotive, psychological, and political factors, variables that cannot be overlooked as part of the cost-benefit analysis if the models are to have predictive, descriptive, and explanatory value.⁸ The most visible move away from the purist application of Rational Actor Model tenets to conflict termination is identified through the work of Mitchell (and Mitchell and Nicholson). Highlighting the fallacy of the unitary actor approach, Mitchell (1981) identifies the need to examine conflict termination decision-making processes in their real context—a dynamic group process that cannot be described simply by applying Rational Actor Model principles. This discussion provides an additional opening for two existing models that are not based purely upon the Rational Actor Model. Both reflect the efforts of Mitchell and present alternatives to the foregoing Rational Actor Models.

ALTERNATIVES: MITCHELL LOOKS BEYOND RATIONAL ACTOR MODEL APPROACHES

In the early 1980s, Mitchell began to move the theoretical foundation of conflict termination away from its classical foundation of Rational Choice Theory, and to explore the interagency dynamics that negate a party's ability to

⁸ It is critical to note, however, that the Rational Actor Model may incorporate these factors as influences that change the elements in "subjective expected utility" calculations. However, empirical evidence of such an approach is missing within the current classical literature.

employ the Rational Actor Model as a basis for choice. While his original work remains predominately framed by utility functions and cost-benefit analyses, he adds a level of complexity by introducing the idea that parties in conflict are not unitary actors. Rather, intraparty cleavages shape their capacity to perform the cost-benefit analyses and utility calculations demanded by the Rational Actor Model (see also Lee 1988; Oberst 1992; Sigal 1988). Before discussing this innovative work, two models in their own way demand mention. These models, extensions of Rational Actor Models, highlight the inherent dangers of the "rational actor" approach at both ends of the conflict spectrum—escalation and resolution.

Dialectical Implications: The ENT and ENO Models

Two existing models—the Entrapment Model (ENT) and the Enticing Opportunity Model (ENO)—move away from the underlying principles of the Rational Actor Model, but only slightly. Since they do present alternative perspectives on termination, this work briefly discusses their relevance as a bridge toward future research. Let me begin with the least understood of the two, the ENT.

Mitchell's ENT represents a paradoxical approach to conflict termination, one that could ultimately result in conflict escalation. Based upon the premise that the cost-benefit analysis is biased because previous costs have been transformed

into investments toward future victory, the ENT perspective highlights the fact that when faced with verifiable information dictating the need for termination (namely, as a means of self-preservation – much like Engelbrecht's second order change), parties will continue to struggle. In this manner, cognitive processes inhibit the parties' abilities to recognize that a distorted sense of impending victory has skewed their perspectives regarding their utility maximizing functions. This model asserts that psychological and emotive factors play a role in framing parties' perspectives regarding costs and benefits, as well as investments and probabilities surrounding victory. As Mitchell asserts, the ENT model is not as *irrational* as one may think since non-calculable factors shape decision-makers' perspectives of preference orderings and utility functions. It is this idea that gives way to Mitchell's final model, the ENO.

According to Mitchell (1996), the ENO takes a more optimistic view of leaders' capacities to look forward toward positive futures as opposed to becoming entrapped in past or current experiences. Used to create the basis of *ripeness* (i.e., the conditions wherein parties are more receptive to conflict resolution), this model presumes that parties can learn to embrace positive alternatives while letting go of their emotional and psychological commitments to prior sacrifices (in stark contrast to the ENT model). Because the reframing involved with embracing alternatives will most likely include emotive and psychological factors that the Rational Actor Model cannot effectively quantify,

this model represents a positive move away from the classical conflict termination models. This incremental step, a move that parallels Engelbrecht's work, is not enough, however. Future research must endeavor to capture the complexities of the decision-making process in conjunction with the contextual factors that frame the parties' willingness to end their violent behavior and begin a conflict termination process toward peace.

Rational Models & Interagency Fractionation

In his 1981 work, *The Structure of International Conflict*, Mitchell contends that decisions regarding conflict termination involve calculations concerning (a) the *benefits* to be gained by continuing as compared with settling, and (b) the *costs* incurred through continuing as compared with terminating should the conflict end in compromise (Mitchell 1981). He notes, however, that these calculations do not conform to the strictest rules of the Rational Actor Model. Specifically, ambiguity of estimates, personal and political factors, and asymmetric evaluations of relative position vis-à-vis the other party shapes their determinations (ibid., 172). Further, parties in conflict must disaggregate these cost-benefit calculations due to interagency fractionation since "costs and benefits are likely to be unevenly distributed and result in divergent views about the value of continuing or compromising" (ibid., 185).

Extending this idea together with Michael Nicholson, Mitchell contends that "different preference orderings or utility functions *within* parties in conflict can have a major impact in determining when a war will end and when a peace settlement will finally be agreed upon" (Mitchell and Nicholson 1983, 515). It is important to note the crucial inference that signifies the shift occurs as a discontinuity within a process regarding conflict termination: Parties in conflict are no longer perceived as unitary actors with the capacity to fulfill the requirements of the Rational Actor Model. Consequently, the Rational Actor Model can no longer serve as the basis for valid conflict termination modeling in cases where groups, not individuals, make termination decisions. Yet, these authors do not discount the value of calculating preference orderings and utility functions. Rather, they call for the development of logical processes whereby the preferences of the multiple individuals and factions can be amalgamated into some useful indicator of a party's collective will to engage in a conflict termination process. This change serves as the motive for future conflict termination process research.

LEAPING BEYOND RATIONAL ACTOR MODELS

Some modern theory thus recognizes that the decision-makers charged with taking decisions regarding conflict termination in no way mirror unitary actors (Allison 1971; Iklé 1991; Mitchell 1981; Mitchell and Nicholson 1983; Rosenthal

and Kousmin 1997). Rather, the politicized environments within which they operate during times of peace as well as conflict shape those who make decisions toward termination. With this understanding in the forefront of our minds,

Mitchell insists we must

apply some form of Bureaucratic Politics approach to terminating conflict, to abandon restrictive and often misleading assumptions about common goals and single, shared preference orderings within a party in conflict, and to concentrate on intraparty cleavages and their effects on bringing conflicts to an end (Mitchell 1981, 186).

Mitchell's dictum serves as the basis for future research toward developing a model of conflict termination that realistically incorporates the intraparty or group dynamics (i.e., interagency dynamics in the case of the U.S. government policy-making process) inherent to the decision-making process. In so doing, this future research must overcome the faults of the Rational Actor Model as described within this text: It cannot view parties in conflict as unitary actors who rely upon quantifiable utility functions that communicate single preference orderings in the face of incomplete information, dynamic goals (see also Seabury and Codevilla 1989), and resource constraints. Realistic termination models must accept that decisions are taken within highly politicized environments shaped more by the negotiation process than the determination of a "rational actor" outcome. Grounding this perspective in the idea *that conflict termination is a process, not just the cessation of hostilities*, future research must capture the three

essential components of conflict termination policy – the vision for the desired end state, the conflict termination criteria, and the strategy to achieve conflict termination as a bridge toward conflict resolution (Kriesberg 1992).

The remainder of this work, therefore, will attempt to reframe the ways we *think about* conflict termination by making our analyses more inclusive and realistic via the application of the Bureaucratic Politics Model to the development of conflict termination policy. In light of the endemic limitations of Rational Choice Theory (presented in chapter 2) and the Rational Actor Model (this chapter) as a framework for adequately explaining decision-making at the group level, this author turned to the Bureaucratic Politics Model as a theoretical precept to overcome the deficiencies of Rational Choice Theory. The next chapter outlines the Bureaucratic Politics Model as presented by Graham Allison's (1971) classic work, *The Essence of Decision*, and then provides a brief rationale for its applicability in the development of conflict termination policy.

CHAPTER 4

BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS MODEL: FORMULATION OF "REAL-WORLD"
NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

OVERVIEW

The foregoing chapters critiqued Rational Choice Theory for its inability to describe accurately the true nature of group decision-making processes. Similarly, chapter 3 demonstrated that the dominant models of conflict termination are based almost exclusively upon this flawed understanding. The discussion from this point forward begins to broaden our understanding of national security policy-making and group choice by building the foundation upon which the remainder of this research is based. Beginning with a discussion of Graham Allison's Bureaucratic Politics Model, this chapter proceeds to identify the actors involved in real-world national security decision-making processes. By highlighting assumptions regarding these actors' shared images and organizational interests (Halperin et al. 1974), the chapter provides the theoretical bridge toward the operationalization of the modern policy-making process—a process that can be explored and evaluated in terms of the

assumptions and hypotheses undergirding this work. To begin this journey, let us use Allison's theory to highlight the considerations this conceptual framework must take into account.

INTRODUCTION TO ALLISON'S APPROACH

The overarching perspective that frames the Bureaucratic Politics Model is that

government decisions are made and government actions emerge neither as the calculated choice of a unified group, nor as a formal summary of leaders' preferences...[within a context of] inordinate uncertainty about what must be done, the necessity that something be done, and the crucial consequences of whatever is done (Allison 1989, 124).

Under the assumptions of this approach, many actors shape decisions through a continuously dynamic bargaining process that is shaped by multiple factors and myriad actors. Allison captures the essence of this process as he contrasts it with Rational Choice Theory:

In contrast with [the Rational Actor Paradigm], the Governmental (or Bureaucratic) Politics Model sees no unitary actor but rather many actors as players — players who focus not on a single strategic issue but on many diverse intra-national problems as well; players who act in terms of no consistent set of strategic objectives but rather according to various conceptions of national, organizational, and personal goals; players who make government decisions not by a single, rational choice but by the pulling and hauling that is politics (Allison 1971, 144).

To be an effective "player" within this arena, Allison contends it is necessary to identify the relevant players who are engaged in the "pulling and hauling"

(Halperin et al. 1974, 312), determining how that dynamic shapes the larger bureaucratic arena. This perspective maintains that decision-making is a political process that exhibits three dominant characteristics:

(1) "a diversity of goals and values that must be reconciled before a decision can be reached"; (2) "the presence of competing clusters of people within the main group who are identified with each of the alternative goals and policies"; (3) "the relative power of these different groups of people included is as relevant to the final decision as the appeal of goals they seek or the cogency and wisdom of their arguments" (Allison 1971, 157).¹

At the risk of reiterating Allison verbatim,² the propositions of this model must be outlined to illuminate the differences between the rational and bureaucratic approaches. By casting such light, the relevance of the Bureaucratic Politics Model in developing conflict termination policy will be displayed in full view.

Propositions of Bureaucratic Politics Model: The Defining Characteristics of Group Decision-Making

Allison defines the outcome of the governmental decision process as a "political resultant." Referenced earlier within this work, he characterizes decision outcomes as such by saying they are *resultants* due to the fact that they emerge from the decision-making process not as a chosen solution, but rather, as

¹ The quotations within this passage highlight the fact that Allison borrowed these characteristics from Roger Hilsman (1967). Allison indicates that Hilsman first formulated a Governmental Politics Model based upon the works of Almond, Lindblom, and Dahl (Allison 1971, 157).

² The major precepts of this model can be repackaged only in limited ways. As a result, I retain the original efficacy of the model by presenting the paradigm here as Allison presented it in its original form.

the product of "compromise, conflict, and confusion [among] officials with diverse interests and unequal influence" (ibid., 162). These resultants are *political* because the process that produced the outcome is "best characterized as bargaining along regularized channels among individuals of the government" (ibid.). In this way, an explanation of this model must include an outline of the players, process, and product, Allison's *political resultant*.

Identifying the Players: Structure, "Stands," & Power

In contrast to the Rational Actor Model, the Bureaucratic Politics Model makes conclusive identification of the relevant players much more problematic. Rational Choice Theory presupposes that each individual remains a viable actor in accordance with his or her ability to fulfill the requirements of the model. The Bureaucratic Politics Model invokes a broader, more realistic perspective, designating the players as those "whose interests and actions have an important effect on the government's decisions and actions" (ibid., 164). Hence, virtually anyone can become a player in the decision-making process. There are, however, a few parameters that define one's ability to influence the process: The first is governmental structure.

The structure of the bureaucracy itself serves to identify the formal and informal players within the governmental decision-making process. The *formal* players are those who hold positions that mandate participation based upon

structural or legal requirements (West 1997). In this fashion, the President of the United States is compelled to act as a player within the "national security policy game" as a result of structural position (i.e., as the Commander-in-Chief and chief executive of the U.S.) and legally (i.e., as a result of the National Security Act of 1947). Those requirements aside, however, the president would naturally have the ability to affect governmental decisions through other means and, therefore, would be considered an *informal* actor in the absence of his formal status. The structure of the position relates directly to the second defining factor, the "stand" actors take within the decision-making process.

Employing the aphorism "Where you stand depends on where you sit," Allison (1989, 125) identifies four factors that shape the perceptions and interests that fashion an actor's perspective on policy issues (see also West 1997). The analysis presented earlier (i.e., the critique of Rational Choice Theory that focused upon collective value dissensus, social interaction and organizational culture, and the pivotal influence of framing) remains particularly salient here. Analysts must recognize that actors maintain their respective parochial priorities and perceptions of the issue, multi-layered and interwoven goals and interests, diverse frames that delineate risk and opportunity as they relate to stakes in the game. Further, they experience deadlines that often exacerbate conflicting, competing, and threatening perspectives regarding the issues, that is, what Allison notes as "faces of issues" (Allison 1971, 178). Taken in conjunction with

the previously identified structural parameters, the development of the actor's stand regarding a particular issue identifies its position and attitude toward both the decision-making process and its outcome. This "position and attitude" component of the Bureaucratic Politics Model is directly linked to an actor's ability to exercise (or not) power within the governmental arena.

The most significant characteristic that identifies the players is their power to influence government decisions and actions. While an extensive body of literature surrounds this concept (see, for example, Bacharach and Lawler 1980; Breslin and Rubin 1993; Jervis, Lebow, and Stein 1989; Koopman and Pool 1991; Mintzberg 1987; Pfeffer 1987; Sarkesian 1995; Zartman 1993), Allison maintains that power is "an elusive blend of at least three elements: bargaining advantages, skill and will in using bargaining advantages, and other players' perceptions of the first two ingredients" (Allison 1971, 168). He provides an informative description of the potential sources of power as it stems from structural position, personal relations, and charisma. In the final analysis, however, he argues that much of an actor's power emanates from his or her ability to demonstrate expertise, control information, access other players, and affect the objectives of the other players in the game (i.e., an actor's negotiating skill). It is the exercise of this power, based upon the structural position and stand that an actor takes regarding a decision issue, which shapes the Bureaucratic Politics Model's form.

*Dynamic Process: Action-Channels, Rules
of the Game, & Environment*

This work, as well as those of others, characterized the process of group decision-making as a dynamic negotiation and bargaining process. Within the context of governmental policy-making, Allison captures the nature of this process by describing the way the political game is constructed in terms of action-channels, rules of the game, and the environment within which decisions are made (see also Halperin et al. 1974).

Social interaction, much like formal negotiation, is not chaotic. Within the decision-making process social interaction takes the form of

bargaining games [that] are neither random nor haphazard. The individuals whose stands and moves count are the players whose positions hook them on to the action-channels. An action-channel is a regularized means of taking governmental action on a specific kind of issue (Allison 1971, 170).

As an example, the War Powers Resolution establishes an action-channel regarding the Commander-in-Chief's ability to commit troops to combat-prone situations. It prescribes the players (i.e., the president and the Congress), their stands (i.e., limiting presidential authority while providing congressional oversight of the use of force), and is systematized based upon its legal status. Because this action-channel is more institutionalized than others, it structures the nature of bargaining and negotiation within the political game by pre-selecting the major players, determining their points of entry, and distributing the

particular advantages and disadvantages of the game across the players (*ibid.*).

The rules of the game further reinforce these action-channels.

Adopting the metaphor of "rules of the game" (*ibid.*; see also Halperin et al. 1974, 104) further enhances our understanding of the fundamental nature of this bargaining process. It essentially remains a contest wherein actors compete *against* one another to reinforce or enhance their overall standing within the government bureaucracy. Noted earlier, actors bargain based upon independent priorities, goals, interests, perceptions, and stands. The parameters that define the acceptable rules of engagement within this bargaining process emerge as the product of Constitutional requirements, "statutes, court interpretations, executive orders, conventions, and even culture" (Allison 1971, 170). These rules have three measurable effects on the game:

First, rules establish the positions, the paths by which men gain access to positions, the power of each position, the action-channel. Second, rules constrict the range of governmental decisions and actions that are acceptable....Third, rules sanction moves of some kinds—bargaining, coalitions, persuasion, deceit, bluff, and threat—while making other moves illegal, immoral, ungentlemanly, or inappropriate (*ibid.*, 170-171).

Irrespective of their source, however, their combined effect is one of defining the ways in which the actors interrelate with one another within the decision-making arena. In turn, the environment within which the actors reside shapes these rules.

The contextual environment of bureaucratic decision-making has been characterized as one circumscribed by uncertainty, necessity, and risk. While

these represent the macro-level factors, the environment's micro-level aspects complexify the group dynamic in ways that invigorate the validity of the earlier critique of Rational Choice Theory. Allison argues that the pace, structure, law, and reward of the game interact with uncertainty, necessity, and risk to create a competitive group dynamic that forces "advocates to fight for outcomes...players come to fight to 'make government do what is right'" (ibid., 172). In this fashion, we see the synthesis of all that has been presented — individuals as members of groups engage in a negotiation process characterized by competitive bargaining in hopes of developing a decision outcome that best represents their individual priorities, goals, and interests. In concluding this discussion, let us quickly consider the decision process outcome, or the policy alternatives that emerge.

*Product: Policy Alternatives – Criteria Selections
and Preference Orderings*

Decision-makers may select alternatives irrespective of the central issue under consideration due to the nature of a process that produces *political resultants*. These political resultants emerge as the outcome of a political bargaining process. Allison contends

The decisions and actions of governments are intranational political resultants: *resultants* in the sense that what happens is not chosen as a solution to a problem but rather results from compromise, conflict, and confusion of officials with diverse interests and unequal influence; *political* in the sense that the activity from which

decisions and actions emerge is best characterized as bargaining along regularized channels among individual members of the government. Following Wittgenstein's employment of the concept of a "game," national behavior in international affairs can be conceived of as something that emerges from intricate and subtle, simultaneous, overlapping games among players located in positions in a government. The hierarchical arrangement of these players constitutes the government (ibid., 162).

Accordingly, the actors' parochial interests always frame the political resultant.

An essential challenge in analyzing the policy-making process is determining the criteria and preference orderings of these actors.

As a facet of the Bureaucratic Politics Model, the criteria and preference orderings for individual and collective decision-makers acting within the U.S. bureaucracy remain fluid over time and issue context. Closely related to this fluidity, Irving Janis (1989) identifies cognitive, affiliative, and egocentric constraints that frame a decision-maker's criteria and preference orderings (as well as the remainder of the process).³ These constraints make rational identification of decision criteria and preference orderings problematic since the salience of one or more can overshadow the actor's ability (consciously or otherwise) to formulate rational policy according to Rational Choice Theory.

³ Janis lists these constraints as follows: *cognitive*—limited time, multiple tasks, perceived limitations of resources for information search and processing, complexity of issues, ideological commitments, and perceived lack of dependable knowledge; *affiliative*—need to maintain power, status, compensation, and social support, and the need for acceptability of new policy within the organization; and *egocentric* (or self-serving and emotive)—strong personal motive (e.g., greed, desire for fame), arousal of an emotional need (e.g., anger or elation), and emotional stress of decisional conflict (Janis 1989, 149).

Therefore, we can conclude that the Bureaucratic Politics Model accounts for these constraints by accepting their influence as part of the political game.

We must recognize, however, that the confluence of the political game's elements has consequences. Within the context of the universal social order, the policy-maker's ability to meet the needs of every individual or group through the bureaucratic process is severely limited and usually impossible. This critique holds for the Rational Actor Model as well since, as Zey contends, people have sets of values that are independent—and sometimes mutually exclusive—of other individuals. Through this comparative approach, then, we must recognize that while the Bureaucratic Politics Model provides a much richer description of group decision-making processes, it too fails to present a universal remedy for enigmatic decision-making dilemmas in that it proves unable to predict process outcomes. It falls short, however, because decision analysts have not yet matured our understanding of this approach in ways that distance the model's strengths from its inherent weaknesses. With this in mind, the limitations of the Bureaucratic Politics Model must be addressed.

The Bureaucratic Politics Model's Limitations Demand Further Research

Models are comprehensible representations of a "number of assumptions from which conclusions—or predictions—are deduced...[wherein the] purpose of a model is to make predictions concerning phenomena in the real world, and

in many respects the most important test of a model is how well it predicts these phenomena" (Mansfield 1994, 16-17). The Bureaucratic Politics Model *predicts* that the governmental decision-making process remains bound contextually and that the process outcome will not reflect a utility or profit-maximizing approach to human choice. While some would argue that its application is limited due to its inability to *predict* specific outcomes (the supposed strength of the "rational actor" approach), its value rests with its ability to describe, explain, and predict the *nature of the policy-making process*, and therefore, shed light on the *shape of the most likely outcome*. In spite of its theoretical prowess, its greatest deficiency is that the process itself remains contextually bound, a factor that limits the model's predictive value. The recognition of this deficiency commands researchers to "shift the emphasis from models which are individualistic and economic to models which are social and contextual" (Morley, Webb, and Stephenson 1988, 118).

U.S. GOVERNMENT DECISION-MAKING—TOWARD THE DEVELOPMENT OF A BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS MODEL OF CONFLICT TERMINATION

Previous chapters described the nature of Rational Choice Theory as it frames the Rational Actor Model of decision-making. They identified the origins and assumptions of the approach, claiming that the limitations of this model are inseparably related to its faulty assumptions. The critique of those assumptions demonstrated that individuals would consistently prove unable to uphold the

tenets of the framework because people inherently lack the ability to make utility-maximizing choices in every aspect of their lives. Instead, dynamic goals and preferences, cognitive limitations, resource constraints, and the inability to assign a quantifiable value to each alternative constrain the decision-maker's ability to act according to the tenets of prescriptive Rational Choice Theory.

The research discussed the fallacies of the unitary actor approach within the context of group decision-making, arguing that the limitations that applied to the individual actor held equally for the group decision-maker, but were magnified in light of ever-present group dynamics. Furthermore, the nature and intensity of the group dynamic that permeate the non-unitary actor generates additional elements that negate the group's ability to conduct a utility or profit-maximizing process. While not an exhaustive list, this author highlighted (1) collective value dissensus within the intragroup negotiation, (2) dynamic, interdependent social interaction and organizational culture, and (3) the framing of choice (including the selection of reference points, risk orientation, and preference orderings) as additional constraints on the potential validity of the Rational Actor Model. Recognizing that people do not always make rational choices, this author turned to the Bureaucratic Politics Model to explain the true nature of decision-making within the federal government.

Using Allison's work as a baseline, I outlined the defining characteristics of the model in terms of the players, the process, and the product (i.e., the policy

alternatives). Noting that this approach more realistically captures the decision-making process within the government, the research contends its strength rests with its ability to effectively describe, explain, and predict the nature of the policy-making process in light of specific contextual factors. Its greatest deficiency, however, remains its inability to predict the content of policy decisions. This limitation is based upon a general application of the model with little regard for specific, bounded policy problems.

Using this limitation to guide future research, analysts and theoreticians should reexamine the Bureaucratic Politics Model by grounding it within a specific issue context. The remainder of this work conducts such research by exploring the nature of the conflict termination policy development process in two cases, the Persian Gulf War and Bosnia. This examination sheds light upon the ways in which interagency conflict—a natural consequence of group decision-making according to the Bureaucratic Politics Model—shapes the policy-making process. Further, it illuminates the differences between unitary actor and group decision-making processes, bolstering our understanding of the impact these differences have upon our ability to refine conflict theory in light of these dissimilar units of analysis. As a result, this research should strengthen our ability to make better-informed choices in the face of increasing complexity, risk, and uncertainty.

In the final analysis, despite assumptions to the contrary, the U.S. government is not a unitary actor (Halperin et al. 1974; Rosenthal and Kousmin 1997). Christopher Mitchell and Michael Nicholson assert that "different preference orderings or utility functions *within* parties in conflict can have a major impact in determining when a [conflict] will end and when a peace settlement will finally be agreed upon" (Mitchell and Nicholson 1983, 515). Discovering that the bulk of the conflict termination research has been conducted almost exclusively from the rational actor perspective presents an opportunity for innovative exploration and explanation (see, for example, Allotey 1995; Clarke 1992a, 1992b; Coser 1961; Mitchell 1991; Wittman 1979). While some of these authors address alternative approaches, a more robust group decision-making or bureaucratic model of conflict termination currently does not exist. Consequently, existing research does not address the impact that interagency decision-making conflict can have upon conflict termination policy development in terms of framing the desired end state, selecting conflict termination criteria, and developing the strategy to achieve conflict termination toward a sustainable peace. To achieve better states of peace (Liddell Hart 1954) through third party intervention, we must improve our understanding of the ways in which group decision-making influences conflict termination policy development. As demonstrated by the work of Mitchell and Nicholson (1983), intraparty conflict (i.e., interagency conflict in this case) can have a debilitating effect upon the

decision to end conflict and pursue sustainable peace. The research that follows this theoretical overview of decision-making intends to help identify the factors that influence the generation of interagency conflict during the development of termination policy. Refocusing attention on factors that affect bureaucratic decision-making surrounding this issue, the ensuing chapter operationalizes the factors affecting policy development in detail. Before beginning that discussion, however, it is necessary to clarify the aspects of the policy-making environment this research explores.

NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY-MAKING: THE BUREAUCRACY DEFINED

As explained in chapter 1, the research contends that national security policy-making occurs within a highly politicized, bureaucratic context. Accordingly, it assumes that national leaders make national security policy through a process of decision-making by negotiation. Hence, the underlying assumptions of this work parallel those of Allison in that decision-making itself is a political process involving differences, negotiation, compromise, and consensus building. For the purposes of this research, the specifics of the U.S. government policy-making arena must now be outlined.⁴ It is important to note, however, that the players in

⁴ It is important to recognize that this research deals directly with the perceptions of key policy-makers from various agencies across the U.S. government "interagency process." Hence, while this research refers to the "State Department," "Defense Department," and "National Security Council," these organizations are "agencies" within the "interagency process."

this process — as well as their objectives — may not be as clearly discernable as one might presume. It is equally critical to note that the discussion that follows is intended merely as a survey of these actors and their positions and should not be interpreted as the definitive perspective on either. Rather, the descriptions contained herein orient the reader toward the underlying assumptions of the research. In that sense, what follows is very much an a priori description of the relevant actors based upon this author's professional and academic knowledge. With this caveat in mind, there is utility in addressing the two most obvious participants in the national security policy process prior to delving into the specific classifications the research employs to explore the interagency process. Thus, let us begin with an overview of the actors *perceived* to be responsible for conflict termination policy development — the National Security Council and the Congress. As a refresher to help identify the actors within the decision-making process, figure 1.3 is reproduced here as figure 4.1.

The primary actors are those decision-makers who are involved in the formal decision-making process because of their government positions. Highlighted earlier, the National Security Council⁵ and the Congress seemingly serve as the two dominant figures in the national security process. The National Security Council is charged with developing a national security policy that, when linked

⁵ Referring to the formal, statutory body that consists of the president, vice president, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense.




Figure 4.1. NSC Policy-Making Structure: Decision-Making as Negotiation

to domestic policy (e.g., economic policy, social programs, etc.), will ensure the security of the nation. Interestingly, however, the U.S. Constitution provides the Congress the power to “make war” as well as the power to commit troops to known hostile activities abroad (US 1995). This authority provides the Congress an open door to national security policy formulation on myriad levels, but perhaps most influential is the role the Congress plays in budgetary matters—controlling the funding for security policy at all levels (e.g., Department budgets, UN contributions, and continuing appropriations bills for troop deployments). This, in conjunction with their capacity to hold the Commander-in-Chief in check through the War Powers Resolution, ensures the Congress remains as a player in the policy-making process. However, as figure 4.1 clearly illustrates, the National Security Council and the Congress are not the only primary players in this complex decision process. Because the responsibility for national security policy is split between two branches of government—the Executive and the Legislative—and because others have a direct impact on both of these agencies, the tensions surrounding the policy process create a dynamic wherein decision-making by negotiation becomes the daily reality.

With this understanding in mind, the discussion that follows outlines each of the players identified in figure 4.1 in terms of its respective role. It is at this point that Morton Halperin’s (Halperin et al. 1974) work on *Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy* pushes Allison’s ideas in a more useful direction. By discussing the

bureaucratic process in terms of the players' respective "shared images" and "organizational interests," Halperin begins to frame the nature of U.S. government Departments, highlighting the fissures between the players and the disjunctures in the process.

In conjunction with Halperin, Allison notes that the players in the bureaucratic process are identifiable because of the power they brandish in the decision-making arena. To analyze the development of a specific aspect of intervention policy, we must have a clear understanding of the individuals, organizations, and contextual factors that influence the development of national security policy beyond the cursory perspective presented above. Alluded to earlier, these four categories of influence are the (1) official actors, (2) quasi-official actors, (3) influential actors, and (4) contextual factors. To illustrate further the conceptualization of the research problem, these participants must be identified and discussed in an effort to demonstrate the utility of the research approach that undergirds this work. Hence, the discussion that follows is an *a priori* depiction of the national security policy-making process as outlined in figure 4.1. In keeping with the conceptual framework for this work, official actors, quasi-official actors, influential actors, and contextual factors are provided as conceptual categorizations for analysis. The following discussion addresses each of these players in turn.

Official Actors: The Formal U.S. Government Structure

In creating the National Security Council, the Congress identified the four individuals *most* responsible for the development of national security policy. These four — the president, vice president, and Secretaries of State and Defense — are the “official actors.” This circle has been expanded to include two statutory advisors — the Director of Central Intelligence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The images these six individuals hold regarding intervention, as shaped by their organizational interests, may or may not be defined according to the tenets of Rational Choice Theory. It is critical to note that their individual historical experience, in conjunction with real-world factors, shapes their personal and professional perspectives. It is also likely that the historical experiences will differ greatly across these six critical actors, causing them to make salient some aspects of the conflict while down-playing the importance or relevance of others. Consequently, these individuals frame crises in different ways, leading them to develop multiple courses of action for dealing with the problem. In this fashion, these players may enjoy a few overlapping shared images, but the likelihood of them being an exact match is minimal. Taken in concert with striking organizational interests, these dissimilar shared images influence the individuals’ collective capacity to develop conflict termination

policy. Let us begin this discussion of official actors with the officer ultimately responsible for national security and conflict termination policy, the president.

The President: Commander-in-Chief and Chief Executive Officer

Few would argue that anyone involved in the policy process has a more difficult path to transverse than does the President of the United States. Serving both as the Commander-in-Chief of the world's most powerful military and chief executive officer of the world's remaining superpower, this individual must balance foreign and domestic policy requirements in a very complex, integrated world, one within which they are becoming virtually inseparable (especially in terms of economic policy and international relations). While these responsibilities and challenges are multi-faceted – noting that their discussion here is well beyond the scope of this work – it is critical to recognize that the president must be concerned with maintaining a domestic policy that sustains international prowess, while ensuring that foreign policy does not overextend the capacity of the nation to continue to prosper at home. In today's increasingly interdependent network of monetary and security issues, the impression that "politics stops at the water's edge"⁶ is no longer valid. Indeed, one only needs to observe the effects of international economic market volatility for a short period

⁶ This quotation has currency across the U.S. government so its original source remains a bit obscure. However, Arthur Vandenburg is recognized as espousing this philosophy after World War II, the concept being rooted in Wilson and Lansing's ideas during World War I.

to realize that the lines separating domestic and foreign affairs issues are becoming increasingly blurred, or, arguably, that they no longer exist in any real sense. It is within this environment that the president must not only develop a coherent vision for foreign and domestic policy, but must do so while being influenced by myriad actors with institutionalized shared images that create cleavages within the interagency process. Returning to figure 4.1, the president serves as the linchpin of that policy process.

The president must integrate the disparate ideas of the formal policy establishment (i.e., the official actors and advisors inside the circle who influence his decisions as Commander-in-Chief) and those of the policy environment *en toto* (i.e., those actors outside the official circle who mold his policy choices as the nation's chief executive officer). In this fashion, the pulling and hauling (Halperin et al. 1974) of the political environment makes the president's position less clearly defined than those held by others in the process. Yet, the president ultimately remains responsible for the formulation of national security policy and, by extension, conflict termination policy.

The highest-level decision-makers' experiences in World War II identified the need for a more institutionalized process. As a result, the National Security Act of 1947 created the National Security Council (NSC; i.e., the formalized body of four) to aid the president in the decision-making process (JCS 1996). The Department of Defense Joint Publications capture the relationship as follows:

The NSC advises and assists the President in integrating all aspects of national security policy – domestic, foreign, military, intelligence, and economic. Together with supporting interagency working groups, high-level steering groups, executive committees, and task forces, the National Security Council System provides the foundation for interagency coordination in the development and implementation of national security policy (JCS 1996, vi-vii).

Recognizing the relationship across the players as a “National Security Council System” demands we examine the role of the remaining actors in any discussion of group decision-making. It is to the stands of these remaining three statutory actors that we now turn in an attempt to understand the fissures between players in the policy process. After a brief discussion of these individuals, a broad overview of the remaining “quasi-official” actors included inside the circle of figure 4.1 illustrate the dynamic and complex nature of the formalized process before transitioning to the “influential actors” (i.e., those outside the circle in figure 4.1) who characterize the more interdependent nature of the interagency process.

*Three Remaining NSC Actors: The Vice President
and the Secretaries of State and Defense*

It is probably more difficult to capture the true essence of the vice president and his impact upon policy development than it is to describe any other actor's individual role. After all, the vice president is the only person in government who cannot be removed (except “for cause” through a Constitutional process) and who is not responsible to anyone *within* government. While he is elected as

the president's running mate, as a point of fact he does not "work" for the president: The vice president works for the American people. This perspective does not mean to intimate that the president and vice president have mutually exclusive agendas, but it does prompt questions regarding his role in the policy process. Indeed, the vice president shares the fundamental images of the president – and, more importantly, their political party – or he would not be the nation's second-ranking executive. Perhaps more specifically, however, this issue raises the question regarding the vice president's ability to influence the national security policy process in an observably tangible manner. This question does not share, however, the same salience when discussing the final two actors, the Secretaries of State and Defense.

In large measure the hypothesized relationship between the Departments of State and Defense served as the genesis for this research. Charged with the responsibilities of "preventive diplomacy" and "national defense," the Secretaries of State and Defense augment the president and the vice president as statutory players in the national security process. On the one hand, the Secretary of State is the president's principal foreign policy advisor (State 1997b). On the other, the Secretary of Defense serves with the president as a statutory partner in the "National Command Authorities" (JCS 1996, GL-10). These roles create loyalties to the president, loyalties that sometimes compete with their roles as secretaries of their respective Departments. This said, while a president hopes

Cabinet officers support *his* policy, these individuals may have a tendency to elevate institutional loyalties above presidential desires (Halperin et al. 1974).

It is the power of these institutional loyalties that creates interagency conflict as the U.S. government attempts to develop conflict termination policy. Allison's aphorism, "Where you stand depends on where you sit" (Allison 1971, 176) aptly captures this interagency gap, a gap that enables the U.S. government to develop two opposing halves of an intervention bridge that fail to effectively join in the middle. For the purposes of this research, three disjunctures stand out as particularly important: philosophical and ideological differences, organizational culture, and operational responsibility. Let us begin with philosophical or ideological differences.

State Department personnel frame their role in terms of "preventive diplomacy" — diplomats are on the ground year-round to fulfill the National Security Strategy's fundamental premise of "engagement" (White House 1998). Consequently, these foreign affairs advisors may tend to be more *idealistic* in their outlook toward the U.S. government's capacity to resolve disputes short of conflict (i.e., open, organized violent interaction on the part of parties engaged in hostilities). This perspective prompts them to frame crises quite differently from the Defense Department. Defense personnel, because they envision their role in terms of "national defense," may tend to be more *realistic* in their perspective on the use of force to resolve conflict. In other words, State may tend to believe that

U.S. diplomacy can have a positive affect on warring parties short the use of force. Conversely, Defense may believe that some conflicts cannot be resolved without the use of force (at least as a measure to separate the warring factions). Philosophical or ideological perspectives are not the only institutional fissure between these two primary entities: Organizational culture also emerges as a potential breach.

The State Department's culture differs greatly from that of Defense. While the most obvious difference to an outsider is the structure of the organizations (i.e., State resembles a matrix organization with multiples points of overlap; Defense is a very hierarchical organization with little overlap and clearly defined lines of responsibility), the mode of professional interaction and communication flows directly from each organization's structure and its internal leadership. As one example, almost everyone at State refers to everyone else by their first names: Ambassador Robert Gelbard is known as "Bob" to almost everyone within the building. Only at the very highest levels, Secretary of State for instance, are titles used – both in private and in public. This practice contrasts sharply with that of Defense. There, military titles in the form of "ranks" clearly define professional and, more often than not, personal interactions. Hence, the military adage, "salute smartly and carry on" leaves little room for continued public disagreement once the senior official renders his or her judgment. In this manner, positions establish boundaries for interaction and serve as metrics for assigning

responsibility and accountability. Conversely, State's apparent lack of an institutional hierarchy makes them *appear* as if officials are less responsible on the individual level: Who is accountable for decisions within State? How does one know who is responsible? It is this foundational question of responsibility that draws the most definitive line between the two Departments.

Closely related to philosophical or ideological perspectives and organizational cultures, the idea of personal and professional responsibility looms large when one evaluates the institutional interests of the respective Departments and their secretaries. While one would hope that both State and Defense would share an equal vision of responsibility for conflict intervention practices, history reflects that the Defense Department shoulders the majority of the burden in practice. Hence, while State may be equally committed to being held accountable, the scale of intervention operations involving military presence overshadows State's ultimate accountability. In fact, when viewed in terms of mission, State may view military presence as an indisputable sign that they have failed — preventive diplomacy faltered and the military had to be called in to restore some level of civility that diplomacy could not. Hence, they may operate in ways that arrest military participation until the conflict reaches a point wherein the risk for military personnel is heightened as a consequence of delaying military action. Incidentally, this perspective may be shared by Defense, but in the reverse: The diplomats failed so now "we" have to go clean up their

mess, but they have put us at risk by delaying our entry.⁷ This form of entry puts lives at stake in large numbers—commanders feel a personal sense of responsibility for taking decisions that risk the lives of American military personnel. Noting that both State and Defense have an official voice through their respective secretaries (and with the additional voice of the Chairman on behalf of Defense), we must note that the sitting Ambassador and regional military commander in chief play a role in the development of policy as well. This situation is particularly important if the individual is a close friend of the president and is a political appointee to that post because of that relationship.

Taken together, these three aspects of the respective Departments create an interagency dynamic based upon dissimilar institutionalized shared images. State's internal shared image of idealism, a more flattened organization, and a lower degree of operational responsibility contrasts with Defense's shared image of realism, organizational hierarchy, and a maximum degree of operational responsibility. This chasm between State and Defense does not represent the only fissure across the interagency process. Two additional official actors have the

⁷ Throughout this research, this perspective reflected Defense personnel views on Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs). Defense personnel cited several examples wherein State failed to understand the practical requirements of positioning forces in an effort to evacuate U.S. Embassy personnel when crises escalated to a level wherein evacuation was required. Over time, these types of interactions polarize relations between the Departments, creating tension as State wants the evacuation to happen "now" because their people face imminent danger (including the possibility of death) and Defense responds that it needs more time to position the appropriate personnel to evacuate diplomats and their staffs in a safe manner.

capacity to frame the four statutory players' understanding of the conflict at hand and the potential courses of action the U.S. government should pursue. These players are the Director of Central Intelligence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

*Statutory Advisors: Crisis Framers Address the
"What" and "How" of Crisis Intervention*

The Director of Central Intelligence (hereafter, the Director) and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs (hereafter, the Chairman) share a special role in the national security process: Both serve as statutory advisors to the National Security Council. However, the similarities regarding the functions of each cease to overlap from this point forward. While the Director serves as a statutory advisor, the intelligence community strives to ensure they provide "pure" intelligence regarding the situation, intelligence that is devoid of advice. In this capacity, the Director outlines the context of the crisis for decision-makers, providing insight regarding the "what" in relation to a specific conflict — *not* issues pertaining to "what to do" about the conflict. It is in this tradition that the Director strives to provide value-free information, not value-laden advice as his advisory role might imply. From the Director's perspective, the organizational interests of this community are linked to its desire to provide timely, accurate intelligence to all decision-makers. Hence, the shared image of the intelligence community — that of remaining value-free and providing intelligence, not

advice—frames every interaction between the Director and the national decision-makers. Unlike the Director, however, the Chairman *does* work toward providing value-laden advice.

The Chairman serves the National Security Council while simultaneously serving as the president's top personal advisor on military matters. Through this role he has direct and unimpeded access to the president and *can* circumvent the Secretary of Defense in these communications. While it is unlikely that the Chairman would present a position contradicting the Secretary's, the Chairman has the latitude to do so if he deems such a position is necessary for the preservation of national defense where the military instrument of power is involved. Further, because the Chairman typically has between 25-30 years military experience prior to becoming the nation's senior military official, most presidents recognize the value of the Chairman's professional training in the face of others' advice that is grounded in non-military experience. To this end, the Chairman's professional and personal values influence his one-on-one advice to the president. Since the end of the Vietnam War, the shared image of the military has been to avoid the "Tuesday Lunch"⁸ syndrome and to ensure objectives and

⁸ "Tuesday Lunch" syndrome refers to the actions of President Lyndon B. Johnson during the Vietnam War where he held Tuesday lunches to designate bombing targets (Sheehan 1988). Since this experience, military commanders have fought diligently for operational control of the conflict environment with strategic oversight on the part of the political decision-makers within the U.S. government. In this manner, the military commander expresses a strong desire for the political decision-maker to clearly define "what" they want to accomplish, leaving the "how" of

exit strategies are defined clearly. Such clarity should enable the commander to employ forces efficiently and effectively with an eye toward getting them out as quickly as possible. One can easily see how this advisory role, shaped by the institutional concerns of the military, differs sharply with that of the Director of Central Intelligence.

Looking beyond the six statutory players of the National Security Council System, we can begin to see where additional images and interests complexify the decision process. These players have an official role to play, but have no statutory mandate for involvement their in the process. Consequently, this work refers to them as "quasi-official" players. Their identification is the subject of the following section.

Quasi-Official Players: Presidential Prerogative Expands the Inner Circle

Returning to figure 4.1, we see that other players inform the national decision process. These additional actors include the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), the U.S. Information Agency (USIA),⁹ the Intelligence Community (consisting of all 13 interrelated U.S. government intelligence activities), and White House Chief of Staff (CS), the National Security Council

accomplishment in the hands of the professional military expert (see also Schwarzkopf and Petre 1992).

⁹ It is important to note that effective May 1997 both ACDA and USIA became part of the State Department, with complete integration expected by the end of 1999 (White House 1997).

Staff (NSC Staff), and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA). Let me briefly highlight the role each potentially plays in the development of conflict termination policy.

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency plays only a peripheral role in the development of intervention, and therefore, conflict termination policy. Of all the agencies involved in the national security process, this entity is the most forward-looking in their efforts to halt proliferation and maintain a stable armament balance throughout the world. Thus, while it may have a role to play, the specificity of its function limits its capacity to provide broad-based advice in situations where the scope of the crisis extends beyond their functional expertise. As directed by the Congress, this agency's director "serves as the principal advisor to the President, the National Security Advisor and the Secretary of State on arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament issues" (State 1997a, 1). Although this agency remains focused on ongoing arms control issues in a strategic sense (State 1997a), its ability to play a powerful role in the crises this research examines is severely limited. Toward that point, the Executive's 1998 U.S. government "Reorganization Plan and Report" states that "ACDA has no formal policy function" (State 1998). In this sense, while this agency may have performed some limited advisory role in the past, it is clear that its new parent

agency, the State Department, intends to limit, or as a minimum, filter, its capacity to serve an advisory role in the future. This leads to the second limited partner, the U.S. Information Agency.

U.S. Information Agency

Like the agency described above, the U.S. Information Agency plays an extremely limited role in intervention policy, and hence, conflict termination policy development. With its primary role as enhancing public diplomacy (State 1997c), this agency strives to explain U.S. foreign policy to foreign governments while simultaneously engaging foreign publics (*ibid.*). In this manner, the U.S. Information Agency has advised the principals in only a cursory manner when dealing with complex international contingencies. They have provided options for "selling" U.S. diplomacy abroad, but have had an extremely limited voice in the overall policy process. This is not true, however, of the next group of quasi-official actors. Looking to the Intelligence Community writ large, we can begin to recognize a clear increase in the capacity of other agencies to influence policy development.

Intelligence Community

The Intelligence Community is perhaps one of the most complex in all of Washington. Unlike the State Department or the Defense Department, this

community has members positioned within multiple government agencies.¹⁰ For instance, within the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),¹¹ members of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) augment CIA intelligence activities. The Director of Central Intelligence Interagency Balkan Task Force (DCI/IABTF) provides a keen example of this type of crossover effort. Through this interagency approach, the Task Force provides the Director the most accurate intelligence estimates based upon the views of the CIA, Defense, and State, ultimately speaking with one voice. This integrative effort is crucial to de-emphasizing parochial agency interests as the members of each individual agency develop working relationships across organizational bounds. However, this type of Task Force is unique to the Balkans crisis. In other cases, no such structured "team" exists and the Director—and indeed actors across the larger interagency process—must assimilate disparate ideas from the differing communities.

¹⁰ For an overview of all 13 U.S. government intelligence activities, access the Director of Central Intelligence website via <http://www.odci.gov/ic/functions/html> (ODCI 1998b). It is crucial to note that the National Security Council Staff also has an intelligence directorate, but little information is available outlining the specific duties of that "Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director." Nor is explicit information available detailing how this individual interacts with the remainder of the Intelligence Community.

¹¹ In conjunction with creating the National Security Council and the Department of the Air Force, the National Security Act of 1947 concurrently established the Central Intelligence Agency as "an independent agency, responsible to the President through the DCI [Director of Central Intelligence], and accountable to the American people through the intelligence oversight committees of the U.S. Congress" (ODCI 1998a).

Given the discussion offered earlier regarding each agency, one can assume that intelligence provided by the CIA, Defense, and State would necessarily conform to the institutional images of each respective Department. Consequently, the CIA attempts to provide value-free estimates; the DIA, defense-oriented estimates; and INR, diplomacy-oriented estimates. By providing subjective estimates of the situation that are influenced by institutional positioning, these intelligence agencies begin to frame the crisis in terms of their innate bureaucratic interests instead of the more objective estimate demanded by the Rational Actor Model. Hence, while the Director attempts to provide value-free estimates directly to the president and the National Security Council, the Intelligence Community's sub-components provide estimates to their functional leaders that are shaped by their respective institutional environments. In this manner, the Intelligence Community writ large provides information to the policy-makers through multiple points of entry and potentially differing perspectives – the Director, the State Department, the Defense Department, and others as required (e.g., the Department of Treasury, National Security Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation). While these three intelligence sub-communities are by far not the only ones who influence intelligence activities, for the purposes of this research they greatly overshadow all others.

This discussion previously addressed the statutory role of the Director of Central Intelligence, an individual located within the Central Intelligence

Agency. However, it is critical to note that just as this work is based upon the crucial assumption that the U.S. government is not a unitary actor, the same must be noted for the Intelligence Community. By identifying the four most influential intelligence actors as the Director and the three agencies listed above, we can begin to see that potential cleavages exist within the Intelligence Community based upon each actor's respective allegiances. Returning to the idea that shared images and organizational interests impact every aspect of an agency's operation, one can clearly begin to see the possibility that diverging patterns of intelligence analysis can emerge. These patterns of analysis have a definitive impact on framing the crisis from the bottom-up and a continuing role in shaping the events as they unfold over time. While these actors are considered part of the formal bureaucracy, a distinct cleavage begins to emerge when considering the remaining three quasi-official actors, actors who enjoy a more personal relationship with the president and usually have extended individualized contact with him. These actors are the White House Chief of Staff (CS) and the National Security Council Staff (NSC Staff), led by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA). Let us address each in turn.

White House Chief of Staff

Perhaps more than any other Executive Office of the President (EOP) staff member, the White House Chief of Staff becomes one of the president's inner

circle members in a crucial way. This individual not only keeps the White House functioning smoothly, but also prepares the president's briefing materials on a daily basis. In this manner, the Chief of Staff is usually the last individual to shape policy before it enters the public and interagency arenas via the Executive Office of the President. Further, the Executive selects this individual not only for his or her professional experience, but also because of the personal relationship (namely, demonstrated trust, loyalty, and judgement) the individual shares with the president. Through this relationship, the Chief of Staff is exposed to the president's innermost thoughts and feelings, engaging in a give-and-take relationship via these dialogues. Hence, the Chief of Staff becomes one of the president's most regarded advisors and retains the capacity to influence major policy decisions, including foreign affairs initiatives.

It is through this advisory role that the Chief of Staff serves as an information and access "gatekeeper," enabling some to gain entrée to the president in a timely fashion while impeding the efforts of others. This is especially true if the president has given this individual explicit guidance to serve in this capacity. Failure to fulfill this role would most assuredly result in dismissal; hence, this function is seen as being vitally important to keeping the president focused on the major issues and subordinating the less critical ones. However, linking this idea with Halperin's shared images issue brings up a critical point: Who decides which issues are major and which are less critical? Simply stating that "the

president" sets those parameters dismisses the bureaucratic reality of organizational life. The Chief of Staff has his or her own ideas regarding what the president needs to know or decide in conjunction with the guidance proffered by the president himself. The potential impact of this "advisor" cannot be underscored enough: The images and interests this person holds most important have the potential to shape all forms and levels of executive decision-making. Consequently, any study of governmental decision-making must consider this individual's role. However, a substantial National Security Council Staff, led by a competent Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, has the ability overshadow the influence of all other actors in the process.

NSC Staff & APNSA: The Supreme Presidential Confidants

The number of individuals on the NSC Staff has varied over the years, recently averaging between 140 and 160; of these, approximately 100 are involved in the policy functions while the remaining individuals serve as administrative support staff. Of these 100 policy-focused professionals, 70 percent represent the major Departments as detailees to the NSC Staff; the remaining 30 percent are political appointees selected by the president. It is important to note that State detailees generally outnumber Defense representatives by a 3-to-1 ratio. Together, these two Departments account for roughly 80 percent of the Policy Staff detailees with other government agencies

providing only a handful of organizational representatives.¹² Further, it is important to recognize that these detailees rarely fill the "Assistant to the President and Senior Director" positions; rather, political appointees normally serve in these senior advisory and decision-taking positions. These individuals do play a critical role, however, in that they are the "last stop" before the president. Charged with coordinating the interagency policy-making process and overseeing the implementation of presidential decisions (Powell 1989), this Staff has the opportunity to shape conflict termination policy in consequential ways. While they dare not risk misconstruing the principals' perspectives to the president, they can shape official guidance so long as it does not contradict the position espoused by the National Security Council. More importantly, principals and their agency members confer with relevant Staff members after the president takes a decision. It is through this type of post-hoc clarification that the Staff shapes U.S. government policy interpretation and implementation. While the Staff works at the mid and lower levels of policy development, the president's National Security Advisor is fully engaged with the principals in every government agency.

Much like the Senior Directors, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (APNSA; publicly known as the president's "National Security

¹² These figures emerged during interviews conducted at the White House from November through December 1998 (exact personnel numbers and ratios were not available).

Advisor" or NSA) is a political appointee¹³ who enjoys an extraordinary relationship with the president. Myriad factors shape the APNSA's relationship with the president, not the least of which is whether the administration has a predilection for foreign or domestic policy. In the case of the former, this individual's power and authority may overshadow that of the Chief of Staff. When the administration has a predominantly domestic agenda, the APNSA may run a close second in influence. In either case, this individual's ability to shape the policy process and its outcome is paramount. Given the working relationship the president will have with this individual, it is likely that he or she shares the images held most important by the chief executive (e.g., President Nixon and APNSA Kissinger or President Reagan and APNSA Powell). In cases where the president admittedly has a predominantly domestic focus, this individual will be empowered to act on behalf of the president where foreign affairs issues are concerned (e.g., President Clinton and APNSAs Lake and Berger). Consequently, this individual may complement the president by having a foreign policy agenda of his own when the president has little or none. Again, we see the opportunity for bureaucratic interests to dominate the development of

¹³ Statute does not mandate the APNSA position. Rather, "President Eisenhower created the post to monitor, on his behalf, the operation of the NSC and the various subcommittees" (Powell 1989, 205). Consequently, "He is not a statutory member of the NSC or even a 'principal', except as the President may give him authority in practice" (ibid.). Since its inception, presidents have consistently empowered this individual to oversee national security issues and, indeed, have treated this actor as a "principal."

conflict termination policy as another perspective, that of the APNSA connected with his shaping of the NSC Staff's, is introduced into the policy process.

One can begin to see the complexity of this decision-making apparatus by merely identifying the number of official and quasi-official actors involved in making policy — those who have a statutory role in the process as well as those who become influential based upon presidential prerogative or operational precedent. As perplexing as relationships across this "inner circle" may seem, to place the policy-making process within its more realistic context we must consider the influence of those with no official role in interagency policy outcomes. The ensuing discussion highlights these "influential actors."

Influential Actors: Identifying the "Outer" Circle

Returning to figure 4.1, this section addresses those actors who remain "outside" the official policy-making circle. These organizations and individuals influence the president as he attempts to function as the nation's chief executive officer, particularly in areas where national security and national interests are not defined clearly. While figure 4.1 does not depict all of the possible influential actors, it does identify those that hold greatest import for the development of conflict termination policy. These include: international allies and coalition partners; expert advisors; personal confidants, friends, and family; special

interest groups; think tanks; the media; the American people; and the Legislature. Let us address each in turn.

International Allies & Coalition Partners

Admittedly, this research makes no attempt to examine the interplay between international allies and the U.S. government interagency process (note that figure 1.1 separates the "Partners" from the U.S. government policy process). However, failure to recognize that friendly (and unfriendly) nations do play a role in the policy process would undermine the efficacy of this work. Allies and adversaries play a particularly important role in the two crises under examination here, a position that is borne out through the analysis of each case (see chapter 13).

In looking specifically at conflict termination policy, allies help frame the desired end state in a very macro sense while they simultaneously expand or limit courses of action regarding operational strategy. For example, Paul Kecskemeti's classic work on the war ending of World War II in the form of "unconditional surrender" aptly points out the Allies' role in collectively shaping the desired end state of "total victory." They collectively defined total victory as fighting a war of attrition to the point that peace terms could be "unilaterally imposed rather than negotiated" (Kecskemeti 1964, 215). Through this policy of unconditional surrender, Kecskemeti identifies the Allies' desired end state,

conflict termination criteria, and strategy to achieve conflict termination.¹⁴ In this manner, the Allies played a crucial role in developing conflict termination policy. Because it is unlikely that the United States will engage in unilateral actions at any point in the future, the role of allies in developing the "what" and "how" of intervention policy remains a key element in understanding how the U.S. interagency process formulates conflict termination policy.

The leverage these allies exert in the U.S. policy process is as multi-faceted as the potential combination of allies themselves. In today's complex and interdependent world, it is perhaps more appropriate to speak of rotating "coalition partners" rather than long-term "allies" (Rast and Sturk 1995; Riscassi 1993). Crosscutting interests create new opportunities for short-term interdependence (Coser 1956) while negating similar opportunities across differing contexts based upon multiple interlocking conflicts (Kriesberg 1992). For instance, in the case of the Persian Gulf War, Syria joined forces with the U.S. to stand against Hussein's aggression, while the U.S. held its long-term ally Israel at arm's length. In both cases, the interests of the coalition partners demanded that the U.S. temporarily reverse its policy on strategic allies. While this example

¹⁴ Note, however, that this is yet another example of a cost-benefit approach wherein the enemy will stop fighting when it can no longer continue the fight (based primarily upon logistical issues in this case since the strategy was one of force attrition). Incidentally, this work is a "must read" for serious students of conflict termination.

points to the upper end of the policy spectrum, these decisions have a very real impact on the activities of the force conducting the operational mission.

Coalition partners shape the development of strategy as policy makers and strategists determine the force structure required to achieve the desired outcome. This influence takes two forms: active and passive. The active influence of coalition partners is readily observable: Will Great Britain provide forces—if yes, how many and of what type? If no, who will fill the existing gap in the force structure? Secondly, if the country will not provide forces, will it provide subsistence-in-kind in the form of non-military resources or financial support as the Japanese did during the Persian Gulf War? Again, these forms of participation are easily identifiable and are evaluated as having a direct impact upon the operational mission. However, passive forms of participation are not as easy to identify or evaluate.

Passive forms of participation and non-participation can have as important an impact as active forms. For instance, forward deployment or staging locations to get forces from their home stations to the theater of operation are becoming increasingly crucial elements of intervention strategy. Relatedly, will an ally or coalition partner authorize overflight for the purpose of bombing a neighboring, non-allied country? Take, for example, the case of the 1986 U.S. airstrikes on Libya and Spain's refusal to authorize overflight. In this case, passive non-participation reshaped the U.S. approach to retaliating against Muammar

Qadhafi. More recently, by not authorizing flights from their soil Saudi Arabia constrained the United States' ability to take offensive action against Saddam Hussein in the face of continuing UNSCOM violations. Both of these examples demonstrate that allied relations can limit the U.S. government's options, particularly at the operational level. In this way, allies and coalition partners may agree on the desired end state (i.e., "what" needs to be done) but may disagree on the strategy to get there (i.e., "how" to do it). Interestingly, this dichotomous relationship between "what" and "how" is not alien to the interagency actors who are often split by the next group of influential actors, the expert advisors.

Expert Advisors

When evaluating this influence, it becomes difficult to identify structured bases for group inclusion. However, it quickly becomes apparent that individuals usually become expert advisors as a result of their past government service, exceptional academic record (especially when considered "the" area expert across academia and the government), or their capacity to "sell" their position to the media and the public through personal television appearances or their writings. When an individual shares characteristics of all three, that person will most assuredly be invited to the White House to advise the president and to other Departments to advise their principals. At the time of this writing, an example of this phenomenon is Dr. Richard Haass' continuing capacity to advise

interagency principals on the Middle East Peace Process. Haass served on President Bush's National Security Council, is an outstanding academic and recognized Middle East expert, and is often invited by prominent media organizations to render his opinion on the U.S. government's foreign policy position.¹⁵ This gives Haass, and others like him, an influential voice in the policy process that is difficult to link directly to a departmental position on an organizational chart. However, these advisors are also shaped by their past government experience as "in-and-outers"¹⁶ (Halperin et al. 1974) and by their individual personal experience.

It is likewise important to note that individuals who become "in-and-outers" reappear in important government positions based upon present successes. In other words, "the power to predict has always been the underlying source of the expert's mystique" (Smith 1991, 233). Those experts whose predictions bear out gain an even greater voice in the decision-making process, setting off the beginning of a self-perpetuating cycle wherein accuracy becomes the key to future success (i.e., future political appointments). It is through this cycle that these expert advisors maintain currency within the political system by

¹⁵ Haass is also a critical member of a revered Washington think tank, The Brookings Institution. When added to the three other characteristics, this makes him an individual within Washington whose opinion should at the very least be "asked for" if not "adhered to."

¹⁶ "In-and-outers" are people, usually political appointees, who serve in one Department, return to the private sector, reenter a few years later in another Department, then leave government service...and the cycle continues.

maintaining personal and professional relationships with those in the highest government positions. Hence, some expert advisors do become personal confidants as well. For the purposes of this research, however, that category has a slightly different meaning.

Personal Confidants, Friends, and Family

Closely related to expert advisors, personal confidants, friends, and family¹⁷ are people with direct, unimpeded access to interagency principals. However, unlike expert advisors, these individuals share no professional competence that grants them such access. They do share a more important characteristic, however, that of the principal's unbridled trust and respect and a relationship that goes beyond professional courtesy. Through the course of this relationship, a principal often asks the individual for his or her opinion on a particular issue—a perspective that principal may reflect in the White House Situation Room. Again, the critical aspect of these “advisors” is that they lack situational credibility in addressing these issues, but do share personal relationships that make them seem more objective or more neutral than the official actors involved in the process. The next group of influential actors is anything but neutral.

¹⁷ My gratitude goes to Dr. James Lucas at the National War College for identifying this critical omission in my original conceptualization of the policy process.

Special Interest Groups

It is a natural phenomenon of democratic government that its heterogeneous population forms characteristic-specific groups to make their individual voices heard. Not only do these groups make their political voices heard, but they also contribute vast amounts of financial support to political candidates who publicly support their positions. An expanding, diverse U.S. population has generated many ethnically, socially, and politically based special interest groups. These special interest groups greatly affect the chief executive in the formulation of domestic and foreign policy. Their influence is bound by their capacity to appeal to the personal or political interests of the principal (including financial support), usually revolving around ideals of justice and equity, preservation of individual rights and liberties, or some other niche interest (e.g., the environment). To put all of these interests and types of advice into perspective, principals often turn to the next group of influential actors, the "Think Tanks."

Think Tanks

Recognized for their in-house experts and their analytical rigor, these influential institutions play a significant role in shaping the policy-makers' understanding of the issues in concert with the public's ideas regarding the position the U.S. government should take in response to the crisis. James Smith contends that "though personal relationships will always shape the nexus

linking knowledge and political decision-making, informal ties have been powerfully augmented by formal research and advisory institutions" (Smith 1991, 12). However, while analytically rigorous in their own right, these institutions reflect their respective philosophical and political biases.¹⁸ Whether conservative or liberal, think tanks begin to make critical connections between knowledge and power more apparent. They begin to develop and refine our understanding of "the politics of knowledge" by creating, organizing, developing, selecting (according to their own values and interests), and disseminating knowledge (Lagemann 1989, 3-4). Further, government officials often invite key members of think tanks—such as members of the Carnegie Corporation of New York—to "participate in policy-making" or they may have "implemented the recommendations of Carnegie-supported groups" (ibid., 10). The earlier reference to Haass and The Brookings Institution makes clear that Carnegie does not stand alone in this practice; rather, think tanks play a powerful role in shaping the decision-maker's understanding of the crisis as well as the public's support base. It is for this reason that their activities serve as a convenient bridge to the next influential actor, the media.

¹⁸ For an introduction to many of the most influential think tanks that now influence foreign policy development, see Smith's "Think Tank Directory" (Smith 1991, 270). Smith surveys 44 of the most prominent, including their origins, finances, staff, programs of research, and their ideological orientations.

The Media

Members of think tanks use their written word to shape the politics of knowledge: The same is true of the media. Unlike the other influential actors identified thus far, the media influences *practically everyone's* ideas, not just those of the policy elite. In this manner, they play a crucial role in framing a crisis—much like the roles played by the Director of Central Intelligence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff—but on a much broader scale. Principals remain concerned with the representation of their ideas, as evidenced by the fact that each Department has its own fully-staffed public affairs directorate with a spokesperson responsible for disseminating the Secretary's "policy position." The positions taken by the media can prove harmful or helpful in the president's ability to sell a policy, especially one requiring a commitment of "blood and treasure"¹⁹ on foreign soil. This explicit support or criticism of the administration's policies can become a catalyst for action or inaction. When future re-election prospects are uncertain, the media's role in shaping foreign policy becomes particularly relevant. Even with the explosion of the information superhighway, the traditional media (i.e., print, television, and radio) remains the primary source of foreign and domestic policy information for the vast

¹⁹ Throughout the research process, informants from all Departments used the phrase "blood and treasure" to refer to the commitment of forces and financial resources to a crisis intervention policy and its ensuing implementation. The American public invokes this term as well when

majority of Americans. Therefore, the media plays an overwhelmingly decisive role in shaping the American public's opinion regarding the activities of government, an opinion that does influence interagency decision-making.

The American People

Presidents remained concerned about re-election opportunities, endorsement ratings, and public approval for their actions, especially concerning stationing troops abroad. The other principals likewise are concerned with gaining public approval, or at the very least sustaining public ambivalence, for government policies and practices. Relatedly, they are concerned with protecting the president's public image as it relates to his capacity to unequivocally lead the nation and remain a resoundingly strong presence on the international stage. The lessons of Vietnam, Watergate, and the Iran-Contra Affair²⁰ remind us that domestic opinion does matter and has a defining influence on American foreign policy (Kull and Destler 1999). While the literature on these three examples is

describing the nature of the commitment the U.S. should make to Kosovo, a crisis consuming NATO at the time of this writing.

²⁰ It is interesting to note that the media played a crucial role in shaping American public opinion in each of these events as well. In Vietnam, Walter Cronkite's description of the Tet Offensive and his implicit statements regarding the government's actions to positively "spin" wartime losses emerged as one of the earliest efforts of the modern media to serve as the public's watchdog. Similarly, the Richard Nixon cover-up during the Watergate Scandal and the Oliver North conspiracy dealing with the Contras re-energized the media's desire to expose corrupt government. Thus, in all three of these cases, the media portrayed a side of government to which the average citizen would have been unable to gain access.

overwhelming, the relationship between domestic politics and conflict termination in the case of Vietnam bears mention.

In her study of war termination in Vietnam, Jane Holl (1989) contends that through the analysis of domestic politics one can best understand the policy choices of a nation's leadership during the closing stages of a war. In this manner, domestic considerations – and not necessarily the conditions on the ground between warring factions – definitively shaped foreign policy and conflict termination decisions. Vietnam is not the first example wherein domestic politics shaped conflict termination policy: Similar domestic considerations surround analyses of the Japanese Government's decision to surrender during World War II (see Engelbrecht 1992; Iklé 1991; Sigal 1988).

In the final analysis, if the media serves as the bridge to the American public, domestic opinion in turn serves as the bridge to the final influential actor examined in this work, the Congress.

The Congress

Introduced in the beginning of this section as a primary actor in the national security policy-making process, the Legislature simultaneously serves in a less directly official capacity as elected representatives of the American public's interests. Through these representative roles, the members of the Congress articulate the desires of the American people, espousing positions that should

closely align with their respective constituent interests. It is this connection between public opinion and congressional authority that has the most influence on foreign policy development and conflict termination policy in particular since the American public is very concerned with issues of "blood and treasure," particularly when the blood of a loved one might be spilled on foreign soil. In this vein, the Congress becomes very concerned with "exit strategies" and bringing the troops home as safely and quickly as possible. Their focus on this aspect of conflict termination *as they define it* brings us back to the Congress' official function as legislators.

While their roles as supreme law-maker and budget authority provide the Congress entrée into the policy process, albeit through the Constitutional "back door," this capacity to pass laws restricting the use of force and to withhold funding for military operations provides this body an omnipotence that remains unique across the interagency process. While the Congress is not a player in the interagency process *pro forma*, there can be no doubt that it sits at the policy-making table as a shadow negotiator. Much like the public affairs components within each Department, every Department has a legislative liaison office charged with engaging congressional staffers on important policy issues. In fact, if a policy cannot be "sold to the Hill," that policy will eventually fail – in securing adoption, its subsequent implementation, or both. In the end, a policy without funding is not a policy but is merely a policy-maker's unrealizable

desire. This is the most fundamental rule of the game in Washington – the rule everyone understands and the language everyone speaks.

The foregoing discussion merely outlined the roles the official, quasi-official, and influential actors play in developing foreign and conflict termination policy. Yet, the rules of the game that guide the policy process are not only established by the actors themselves, but also by the context within which these actors must operate.

Contextual Factors: Rules Defining the Playing Field

The policy process remains bound not only by the actors, but also by their actions and the actions of those outside the process. In this manner, contextual factors expand or limit U.S. policy-maker's capacity – ability as well as willingness – to “color outside the lines” of expected foreign policy practice. For the purposes of this research, three emerge as having a dominant influence on the foreign policy process: U.S. national interests, the international context, and domestic concerns. Beginning with national interests, let us begin to explain how this contextual factor can serve as a critical component in developing conflict termination policy.

U.S. National Interests

Perhaps the most obvious contextual factor shaping the decision to intervene into a conflict on foreign soil is the answer to the question: What is the national

interest? Once again, posing this question necessitates the conduct of a cost-benefit analysis: What benefit does the nation gain...at what cost? Are these interests "vital" or "peripheral" — does the magnitude of interest influence our proposed level of commitment? Which policy-maker(s) ultimately decides whether a crisis is linked to U.S. national interests? It is this linkage with national interests that affects the policy-makers' collective ability to convince the media and, in turn, the American public that intervention is required. As a result, national leaders argue that the U.S. should commit its "blood and treasure" to achieving positive results for the long-term good of the nation and the global community. While this sounds altruistic on the surface, the actual definition of national interests can take many forms, some of them less magnanimous than we would at times like to admit.

Returning to the tenets of the bureaucratic model, this research contends that the different government Departments define national interests based upon their respective shared images and organizational interests (see also Iklé 1991). For example, the State Department may take a strong position on the use of force to prevent genocide, defining "earlier" intervention and humanitarian relief as U.S. national interests. Conversely, the Defense Department may push the interagency to frame national interests in more concise terms, asking the decision-makers to clearly identify the costs of nonintervention and its attendant benefits for comparison with the risks of intervention, measured primarily in

terms of the cost-benefit ratio. From Defense's perspective, the costs in terms of "blood and treasure" are easily measured and the benefits—in the absence of a clearly articulated foreign policy objective—remain ambiguous. Recalling the earlier discussion regarding philosophical/ideological perspectives, organizational cultures, and operational responsibility, these perspectives are recognizable. Taken a step further, these divergent perspectives prompt these two entities to define national interests asymmetrically, creating a fissure that has implications for conflict intervention and termination policy development across the policy process' highest levels. As much as we would like to think that national interests relate primarily to domestic considerations, the international context serves as an interrelated factor that must be considered when framing foreign policy.

The International Context

Since the end of World War II, the U.S. has found it increasingly difficult to isolate itself from activities abroad. In the face of intricate economic and security relationships, such detachment is not only impossible, but is simultaneously undesirable. For the U.S. to remain a powerful actor on the international stage, it must enhance its interconnectedness with those nations it endeavors to influence. In this manner, activities beyond America's borders continue to have a direct impact upon U.S. domestic policy in conjunction with their more obvious

relationship to foreign policy. One need only examine the underlying reason for the U.S. involvement in the Persian Gulf War – maintaining the free flow of oil for the U.S. *and its allies* – to find evidence of this. In this particular case, Saddam Hussein's ability to control almost 45 percent of the world's oil supply may have had a devastating effect on the West in general, but Japan and Germany in particular. After all, these two nations relied heavily upon the Gulf region for their oil supplies²¹ and served as the region's principal customers (Rubenstein 1993). If Hussein were to control the region, they could potentially lose the most compared with any of the other industrialized nations.²² Underwriting economies is only one form of interdependence: Ongoing security arrangements present the most visible form in the post-Cold War era.

Relations across international actors take on some elements of mutually beneficial interdependence, elements that affect the security of Americans at home. For instance, in one form or another International Organizations such as the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) served as

²¹ Joseph Rivas reports that the "US gets 12% of its total oil needs from the Middle East, less Iran (4% from Iraq and Kuwait); comparable figures for Western Europe are 27% and 14% and for Japan, 51% and 14%" (Rivas 1990, 2). The "45 percent figure" emerges from assessments contending Hussein potentially would control up to 25 percent of the world's reserves explicitly should he gain control of Kuwait and would leverage Saudi Arabia's 20 percent implicitly through sustained coercion.

²² Admittedly, this perspective has to be balanced by the perspective that the Iraqis would still need a buyer for their oil supply. Should Japan and Germany not purchase Iraqi oil, questions emerge regarding the capacity of Iraq's allies to absorb the surplus. In this manner, the interdependence of this supply-demand relationship would have detrimental effects on Iraq's economy as well.

mirror-image security reinforcement organizations (i.e., deterrent mechanisms). Within the 16-member nations of NATO (and now, 19 members), reciprocal expectations regarding political and military support guided much of U.S. foreign policy throughout the Cold War and continue to do so today. With the onset of the Balkans crisis in the early 1990s, questions regarding NATO's efficacy within this "new world disorder" have prompted a resurgence in U.S. efforts to bolster that organization's prestige and capacity to respond to emerging crises. American recognition and acceptance of this multi-layered interdependence demands that the U.S. maintain a coherent foreign policy in the coming years—technology and trade will continue to transform these types of interdependence for the foreseeable future. Moreover, national interest and the international context must be evaluated in concert with domestic issues.

Domestic Concerns

Highlighted earlier, domestic issues and interests can play an important role in foreign policy development and conflict termination decision-making. While these concerns necessarily affect the ways in which policy-makers frame U.S. national interests, they also shape the lenses through which national decision-makers see a crisis. While this discussion can take the form of the classic "guns and butter" argument, politicians' concerns for domestic issues can be a fundamental extension of their philosophical and ideological beliefs as much as

an outgrowth of current (and future) economic realities. It is here that we again see the influence of Allison and Halperin: Individuals and groups make salient sets of priorities to the likely demise of others' desires based upon their respective shared images and interests. Another level of domestic concerns surrounds the policy-making process as well — that of keeping the populace satisfied in an effort to ensure an individual politician's future success as well as that of the political party.

If plagiarism is the most significant form of flattery, re-election is the most conclusive form of public approval. Hence, an individual's desire to continue serving in his or her present political position parallels how closely one listens to and acts upon the desires of the American public. In a representative democracy as practiced in the U.S., politicians rarely go against the most vocal demands of their constituency. This does not mean that elected officials always vote in accordance with their district's simple majority on every issue. It does, however, mean that re-elected politicians quickly identify those issues on which they can vote "independently" and which they risk doing so in terms of losing an upcoming election. In this manner, when the public vocally opposes troop deployment to foreign soil or demands the withdrawal of previously deployed forces, federally elected officials pay attention — officials from both the Congress and the Executive Branch. These concerns may have little to do with Rational Choice Theory in terms of what is best for the crisis at hand, but may be very

"rational" in light of other contextual factors impinging upon the decision-making process. Rather, such pressures emanate from multiple sources — emotional, political, economic, or social — few of which may have any bearing on the crisis into which the U.S. government intervenes. Taken in conjunction with the framing of national interests and the evolving international context, domestic concerns can become an overwhelmingly powerful force in developing conflict termination policy for complex international crises.

It goes without saying that this discussion regarding national interests, the international context, and domestic concerns remains inadequate as an overall predictive element in the development of foreign policy in general, conflict termination policy in specific. It does, however, begin to shed light on the types of issues that shape the thinking of those charged with formulating policy and making decisions on behalf of the American public. This new illuminated pathway provides an avenue to approach the research problem.

LOOKING AHEAD: BUILDING UPON A FOUNDATION TOWARD NEW UNDERSTANDING

This chapter began with an introduction to an alternative approach to the Rational Actor Model of conflict termination decision-making. By introducing the Bureaucratic Politics Model of decision-making, the research transformed our understanding of group choice from a two-dimensional linear process into a multi-dimensional, dynamically complex and recursive process. This process is

driven by the shared images and organizational interests of those (1) who are players in the process, (2) define the rules of the game and its playing field, and (3) make choices based upon competing criteria and asymmetric preference orderings.

To begin framing the research in a concrete way, this text surveyed the actors and factors that shape the policy process. Where appropriate, it highlighted the potential differences across these multiple actors in an effort to demonstrate that these actors at times see crises from the perspectives of their respective organizations and interests. It is these cleavages between actors within the interagency process that affects the U.S. government's capacity to capitalize upon all of its resources when faced with an international crisis such as the Persian Gulf or Bosnia.

This discussion established the foundation upon which the remainder of this work is built. From this point forward, it explores the elements of bureaucratic relations that can potentially affect the interagency process' ability to envisage a desired end state, frame and select conflict termination criteria, and formulate a strategy capable of achieving sustainable conflict termination. The next chapter describes the methodological approach that guides this endeavor. It is here that we begin to extend Allison's and Halperin's works in an effort to identify the core factors that influence the development of conflict termination policy.

CHAPTER 5

CONSTRUCTING A COMPLEX MULTI-METHOD APPROACH: BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN THEORY & PRACTICE

OVERVIEW

The previous chapters provided the theoretical argument for developing a new approach to understanding group decision-making in an effort to analyze the development of termination policy for intervention into complex international crises. Keeping that theoretical perspective in mind, this chapter discusses practical methods for conducting research on this complex decision-making environment. What follows, then, is the construction of the bridge enabling us to conceptualize and operationalize the factors explored in this work. Once fully constructed, this bridge will enhance our understanding of the dynamics of the policy process in general (discussed in chapter 7), generating a more specific understanding of the development of conflict termination policy for the cases under analysis here, the Persian Gulf War and Bosnia (see chapter 13).

To achieve these goals, this section of chapter 5 develops a rationale for this research design, one that employs grounded theory in an effort to test hypotheses that emerge from a conceptual framework based upon this researcher's combined academic and professional experience. This coupled experience provides the foundation for the development of six core factors that depict hypothesized relationships across the variables used to operationalize this exploration. Once these relationships are explained, the data collection method is discussed, followed closely by a discussion of instrument development and an introduction to the data analysis techniques.

RESEARCH DESIGN: CREATING A MULTI-METHOD APPROACH

One of the greatest challenges researchers and analysts face is the selection of an appropriate methodology to match their conceptualization of the research problem. Fortunately for those investigating real-world conflicts, Anselm Strauss and Juliet Corbin's (1990) "grounded theory" approach enables researchers to employ a rigorous multi-method approach that best reflects the demands of the research problem (see also Creswell 1994). Simultaneously, it takes into account the researcher's experience and assumptions¹ and the realities of conducting real-world research, ensuring the findings can be validated through future replication

¹ Strauss and Corbin (1990) contend that many research problems emerge from the researcher's personal and professional experience. Noted in the introduction to this work, their assumption holds for this research as well.

and expanded through future conceptualization. Through an iterative process, grounded theory enables the researcher to build upon the hypothetical relationships inherent to the research problem that form the basis of the research's conceptual framework. This approach creates an avenue for non-hypothesized relationships to emerge by constructing research questions that provide opportunities for findings to emerge that the researcher failed to conceptualize. In this manner, this approach opens the door to new learning and enhanced understanding of real-world phenomena, avoiding Alexander Pope's maxim that "Some people never learn anything because they understand everything too soon" (Garborg 1993). It enables the researcher to frame his or her current understanding of a problem in a researchable manner and then, through a complementary multi-method approach, to test that idea with a view to (1) confirming and disconfirming the original conceptions through hypothesis testing and (2) identifying new aspects of the phenomenon to which the investigator remained blind. Given this rationale for the use of grounded theory, we can now begin outlining the specifics of its application in this work.

Methodological Strategy

This research explores the relationship between interagency conflict and the development of conflict termination policy. As a process of discovery and systematic verification regarding the phenomenon it strives to explore (Strauss

and Corbin 1990), the research design employs survey research (that is, focused and open-ended interviews of key and knowledgeable people involved in the policy process), content analysis of those interviews, and case study analysis to refine a conceptual model depicting the relationship between interagency conflict and the development of conflict termination policy.

A BASIC CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Strauss and Corbin contend that "science would not exist without *concepts*" (ibid., 62). They insist concepts are essential because

by the very act of naming phenomena, we fix continuing attention on them. Once our attention is fixed, we can begin to examine and ask questions about those phenomena (now of course, labeled as concepts). Such questions not only describe what we see, but in the form of *propositions* (hypotheses) suggest how phenomena might possibly be related to one another. Propositions permit deductions, which in turn guide data collection that leads to further induction and provisional testing of propositions. In the end, communication among investigators, including the vital interplay of discussion and argument necessary to enhance the development of science, is made possible by the *specification of concepts and their relationships* phrased in terms of propositions (ibid.; italics in original; see also Blumer 1969).

The discussion of Allison's Bureaucratic Politics Model and the identification of the interagency process actors (chapter 4) developed the initial conceptual groundwork for investigating the development of conflict termination policy. By identifying the actors in the policy process through academic study and professional experience, this research began to develop the hypothetical

relationships among the actors within the inner circle and the outer boundary of the interagency process (see figures 1.3 and 4.1). This initial conceptualization created the opportunity to suggest relationships among these critical actors to enhance understanding of interagency dynamics in a more specific way.

Identification of the players led to the development of specific propositions regarding expected relationships among them. These propositions led to the selection of six core factors, including the hypothesized relationships between them depicted in the Basic Conceptual Framework (figure 5.1). An infinite number of factors could influence the development of interagency conflict during the decision-making processes surrounding the formulation of conflict termination policy. Stating this possibility, however, fails to assist the researcher in developing a schema to help to conceptualize, operationalize, and analyze the relevant factors under study here. A second framework in the form of a hierarchical model, therefore, was developed to complement the Basic Conceptual Framework (as identified in figures 1.3 and 5.1) and in order to guide the data collection and analysis.




Figure 5.1. Basic Conceptual Framework

Frameworks and Models

The "Hierarchical Model"² depicted in figure 5.2 illustrates the relationships between the core factors first outlined in the Basic Conceptual Framework. Specifically, the factors that comprise the index *Decision-Making Profile* are analyzed with respect to those constituting *Organizational Communication* to help frame, in conjunction with other core factors, the *Policy-Making Approach* of the agencies under study. Similarly, in conjunction with *Level of Open Debate* and relevant indicators, this core factor is used to develop the agency's perspective on *Crisis Definition – Perception of Risk*. Once determined, this core factor is explored with regard to *NSC's Role* and relevant indicators to assess *Level of Interdepartmental Conflict*. At first glance this may seem to be, and arguably is depicted as, a linear approach. However, by unpacking these boxes (i.e., the core factors) to reveal their component parts (i.e., the indicators), one immediately recognizes that this approach is anything but linear. Instead, figure 5.2 serves as a framework to identify the relationships across the core factors under study so that they can be conceptualized, researched, and analyzed in systemic fashion.

² The construct and impetus for this approach came from Professor Daniel Druckman, based upon his 1986 work (with Justin Green) entitled, *Political Stability in the Philippines: Framework and Analysis* (Druckman and Green 1986). I am deeply indebted to him for providing such a tool—conceptualizing and operationalizing a research design of this magnitude would have proven impossible without his guidance.




Figure 5.2. Hierarchical Model: A Framework for Data Collection

To begin this journey, we must depict the core factors identified in figure 5.2 to illustrate the interaction between each component. Hence, while figure 5.1 serves as a mapping of the core factors as they most likely interact with one another, figure 5.2 provides an operationalizable data framework that can be analyzed statistically – it became the basis for the survey questionnaire and codebook (see Appendix B) that framed the data collection and analysis effort. The operationalization of this concept comes in the form of the six core factors. These are depicted in figures 5.3-5.9 on the ensuing pages which also show the specific hypotheses generated from figure 5.1. These factors represent the attitudes, perceptions, and beliefs that influence the policy-makers' approaches to decision-making and ability to develop conflict termination policy within the bureaucratic arena. As depicted in the next six figures, these models specified the relationships between the core factors the research investigated. It is suggested that the reader refer to each model in tandem with its description to get a complete understanding of the interaction across these figures.

Core Factors: Concepts Framing the Research

The Basic Conceptual Framework illustrated in figure 5.1³ depicts the anticipated relationships across the core factors in a realistic, dynamic fashion.

³ Note: Throughout these signed digraphs and the models that follow, "A's" refers to "Agency's" and "O's" to "Other's." In this manner, "A's perceptions of O's interagency tactics" translates to "Agency's perceptions of Other's interagency tactics."

The way in which these factors interact is crucial to understanding the level of interagency conflict that affects conflict termination policy development. Taking the *Level of Open Debate Surrounding Policy Options & Decisions* as an example, let us explain how this core factor interrelates with the others. Looking first at figure 5.1, we can see that this core factor influences four others in this study (i.e., *Crisis Definition – Perception of Risk*, *Organizational Communication*, *Agency's Decision-Making Profile*, and, ultimately, *Level of Interagency Conflict*) while itself being influenced by three others (i.e., *NSC's Role*, the *Agency's Decision-Making Profile*, and *Organizational Communication*). While these relationships appear plausible at the surface level, the core factors must be operationalized for data collection and analysis if they are to be useful in furthering our understanding of the actual relationship between interagency conflict and the development of termination policy. By "looking deeper" into each of these core factors we can begin to get a clearer picture of the indicators that comprise each core factor as they relate to the interplay of the factors in the overall framework. The "signed digraph models"⁴ depicted through figures 5.3-5.8 identify the indicators (also referred to as "dimensions") the research investigated and their hypothesized relationships

⁴ Developed within graph theory and applied across multiple fields, the "signed digraph model" is an excellent tool for brainstorming relations across several factors as they influence the concept under study. I am grateful to Professor Christopher Mitchell for introducing this technique to me during coursework at the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University, Fairfax, Virginia. For a more rigorous presentation of signed digraph theory, see Belk (1976), Chartrand, Lesniak, and Behzad (1986), Doreian and Mrvar (1996), and Yap (1986).

within the parameters of each of the six core factors. Initially, and for clarity's sake, each cluster of indicators is presented within a causal framework.

However, the final figure (5.9), representing the "Hierarchical Model," treats them as indicators of one of the six core factors in the model. It is important to note that the arrows depicted in these signed digraph models are currently unidirectional (i.e., "one-headed"). This illustrates the initial expectations of the existence of a relationship between the indicators. While these digraphs do not preclude the existence of bi-directionality, they illustrate the *initial* perspective that this research adopts regarding each independent relationship. Additionally, throughout these signed digraphs the reader will identify actual signs (i.e., "+" = congruous or parallel relationship; "-" = inverse relationship; and, "?" = unknown at this time). These signs indicate the nature of the relationship between the individual indicators. In essence, each arrow-sign combination depicts the expectations regarding the importance and direction of the patterns of indicators that influence the core factors, and ultimately influence the model's outcome.

In terms of Strauss and Corbin's vernacular, these six core factors serve as the fundamental concepts employed to explore the dynamics of the interagency process. In fact, individual indicators of these core factors provide one source for data collection—the survey (see Appendix B) used to gather quantitative data asked informants to provide information regarding these elements. Since we

began this discussion of core factors with the *Level of Open Debate Surrounding Policy Options & Outcomes*, this section depicts and discusses that signed digraph model here for illustrative purposes. Once the approach and interpretation of this signed digraph model has been made clear, we will proceed “clockwise” around figure 5.1 to discuss the five remaining core factors. Throughout this research, it should be noted that this is a study of the way people *perceive* relations between agencies.

*Level of Open Debate Surrounding
Policy Options & Decisions*

At its very essence, this signed digraph (figure 5.3) addresses the relationship between an agency and its perceptions of how others interact with it during crisis policy development. Implied by its title, at the center of this relational pattern is the level of open debate that takes place between agencies involved in policy options and decisions. The dimensions of this core factor include four aspects of interagency relations that relate to the agencies’ communication patterns: (1) an agency’s perceptions of other’s conflict orientation—collaborative or competitive, (2) an agency’s perceptions of other’s level of self-interest—low or high, (3) the nature of departmental relations at the time of initial crisis definition—hostile or collaborative, and (4) the pattern that open debate takes as the crisis progresses




Figure 5.3. Level of Open Debate Surrounding Policy Options & Decisions

over time — increases, constant, or decreases.⁵ This research hypothesizes, for instance, that among those other agencies with which a particular agency interacts, “if an agency perceives that the other agency’s conflict orientation to be collaborative, then it will perceive the other agency’s level of self-interest to be low.” In this manner, an agency’s perception of another agency’s conflict orientation should have a direct affect on the level of open debate while simultaneously having an indirect effect through perceptions of the other’s self-interest. In looking at these specific elements, the reverse also appears true: The agency’s perception of the other’s level of self-interest directly affects the level of open debate while simultaneously affecting perceptions of conflict orientation as that element relates to the level of open debate.

Note that “open debate” in this instance does not necessarily imply “public debate,” but instead implies the level and types of communication that exist across the interagency process as these agencies formulate termination policy. Thus, in this case, if relations are hostile and negative at the time of initial crisis definition, we expect to find little or no open debate across multiple levels of the

⁵ In the tradition of grounded theory, the author did not *originally* identify the pattern of debate over time as one of the dimensions relating to this core factor. Rather, this element emerged from conversations with professionals who noted that the change in the pattern over the cycle of the conflict is perhaps more telling than the level of open debate at the beginning of the crisis. Thus, this element emerged as a concept requiring further exploration and was added to the survey instrument after developing the original conceptual framework. Again, this author would like to point out that this is one of the crucial strengths of conducting research on social conflict through this methodology: It demands that the researcher employ a recursive process to incorporate emerging concepts as the researcher “gets smarter” regarding the problem being explored.

interagency process. If relations are stressed or tenuous at the time of initial crisis definition, we would expect to find limited exchanges across agencies that reflect structural (or legal) requirements to communicate with one another, but that an open and creative debate regarding policy options does not exist at all levels of the bureaucracy. Given this particular view, the existence and level of open debate are also likely to influence the nature of departmental relations.

At this juncture it is critical to *reemphasize* that subsequent analysis tests these hypotheses exploratory fashion in an attempt to determine which relationships across these elements are indeed relevant with regard to the *Level of Open Debate*, and consequently, the *Level of Interagency Conflict* over the vision for the desired end state, the selection of conflict termination criteria, and the development of a strategy to achieve conflict termination. In this way, the research does not conduct hypothesis testing according to a purist hypothetico-deductive paradigm. Rather, it facilitates this type of exploratory "testing" in an effort to identify those elements and relationships that are *generally held by experienced and involved professionals to be significant in the development of interagency conflict while identifying those that are not*. Further, if done correctly, this approach should enable unexpected relationships to emerge from the data. Based upon this approach, the remaining signed digraph models are now depicted in turn, beginning with figure 5.4.

Crisis Definition – Perception of Risk

One of the underlying assumptions of the research is that one's past experience informs current understanding. This perspective grows from the research of Tversky and Kahneman (1974). Referenced earlier within this work (see chapter 2), availability heuristics serve as parameters for interpreting events and for acting upon stimuli that resemble past experience.

This core factor deals exclusively with an agency's perceptions of risk for itself in terms of its prior experience with similar cases, the crisis' fit with national interests, and the agency's perspective regarding its responsibility to take the lead in the interagency process for policy development. It is important to note that these three indicators are operationalized in the survey instrument in conjunction with a question directly addressing perception of risk for self. The remaining two indicators, the agency's estimate of probable success and the agency's priority for the crisis were not addressed through the survey instrument, but in the interview using the open-ended questions that followed the completion of the survey. For the purposes of quantitative analysis, however, the research omitted these two factors.




Figure 5.4. Crisis Definition--Perception of Risk

Organizational Communication

One of the most obvious influences on interagency relations during crisis policy development is the way in which they communicate with one another. This core factor (figure 5.5) begins to address "organizational cultural" issues, but is necessarily limited to those issues that deal with interagency dynamics as affected by those cultural issues. Hence, the dimensions in this core factor include aspects of culture (e.g., Department's leadership style, departmental structure, and agency's perceived penalty for failure) that create a pattern of communication (i.e., contribute to flexibility or rigidity). This pattern of communication can be related to the interagency tactics an agency employs.




Figure 5.5. Organizational Communication

*Agency's Policy-Making Approach:
Interagency Tactics*

Implied by its subtitle, this core factor (figure 5.6) involves the tactics an agency employs when interacting with others across the interagency process. These interagency tactics are influenced by numerous elements, but the five indicators depicted in the model are proposed as most important. It is also essential to note, however, that this core factor incorporates the interplay of the agency's ideas regarding its own policy process, planning focus, and perceptions of one's own accountability in tandem with its beliefs regarding its capacity to influence the policy process as well as its perceptions regarding others' interagency tactics (i.e., others are collaborative or competitive).

Taken together, these dimensions should determine an agency's policy-making approach, signaling whether it tends to be collaborative or competitive.




Figure 5.6. Agency's Policy-Making Approach: Interagency Tactics

*Agency's Decision-Making Profile: Department
Explores Innovative Ideas*

Like figure 5.5, *Organizational Communication*, this core factor (figure 5.7) similarly includes some elements of organizational culture. For example, educational background is assumed to influence individuals' skills in analyzing crises in a specific way. It is hypothesized that a more technically-oriented individual will be less likely to propose innovative solutions since he or she will require the types of details that are rarely determinable in social crises and will look for straightforward cause-effect relationships in evaluating courses of action. Conversely, an individual with a humanities or social science background will be more likely to "see around the corners," recognizing that the causes of social conflict are complex and that one conflict is usually interlocked with others in interdependent ways (Kriesberg 1992). Hence, it is hypothesized that an individual with this type of educational background will be more able to propose innovative solutions.

As an additional facet of organizational culture, it is important to note that this core factor explores the relationship between individuals' willingness to propose innovative solutions in connection with the Department's exploration of those innovative ideas. These factors are hypothesized to be directly correlated, in that a high willingness to propose innovative ideas will lead to the




Figure 5.7. Agency's Decision-Making Profile: Department Explores Innovative Ideas

Department's exploration of such ideas. These dimensions, however, remain bound by the NSC policy-making process.

NSC's Role in the Policy-Making Process

Finally, we arrive at the critical link in the interagency process, the U.S. National Security Council's role in the development of conflict termination policy. Described previously, the NSC is charged with overseeing the interagency process as well as the implementation of decisions taken by the president. Thus, while the previous five core factors addressed interagency dynamics across all actors, this core factor (figure 5.8) focuses directly upon the process' key actor. Specifically, this signed digraph model represents the perceptions agencies have of their ability to influence the NSC in concert with their perceptions of other agencies' capacity to affect policy development through the NSC. As an added dimension, these relationships are expressed and modeled in terms of both formal and informal access and influence.




Figure 5.8. NSC's Role in the Policy-Making Process

Indicators, the Hierarchical Model, and Data

The core factors themselves, as the foregoing discussion indicates, are held to be the critical components in constructing a new understanding of interagency conflict. In reviewing the signed digraph models one can readily see the complexity this research entails. Many of the indicators identified within specific core factors have the potential to influence others while themselves being similarly influenced. However, by treating the dimensions in the digraphs as indicators of the core factors in the Hierarchical Model, it becomes possible to bring the analysis back to a model-building focus, and to a heuristic rather than a causal approach. Hence, the original figure 5.2 reappears as figure 5.9 with the indicators mapped directly onto the core factors in the model, thus serving as a guide and framework for data collection. Ultimately, this framework provides the basis for the generation of informants' estimates of interagency conflict based upon the statistical analysis of relationships computed across the indicators within each core factor.

In light of this final depiction it bears repeating that the interaction of the variables identified herein is not held to occur in linear fashion. They are presented in a somewhat static depiction to enable the researcher to operationalize the Basic Conceptual Framework guiding this study. As with much of social science research, however, the real-world interaction of




Figure 5.9. Hierarchical Model: A Framework for Data Collection (with Indicators)

these factors occurs at such a pace and with such extensive interdependence that their actual isolation proves virtually impossible. While their static depiction here—even with the benefit of signed digraph models highlighting possible linkages—presents a limitation for this research, only through initial conceptualization can we begin to discover the linkages across these critical factors. Any patterns that emerge are also likely to illuminate further the subsequent connection between interagency conflict and the development of conflict termination policy. The basic argument is that these six core factors, when taken in the aggregate, should help theorists and practitioners devise a more comprehensive awareness of the causes of interagency conflict as it relates to the U.S. government's development of conflict termination policy for complex international crises. A brief discussion of the proposed data collection techniques will move us one step closer to understanding the research design.

DATA COLLECTION METHODOLOGY

This research design employs survey techniques, content analysis, and case study analysis to provide data with which to explore the relationship between interagency conflict and termination policy development. At this point, it may be prudent to provide an overview of the units of analysis and methods, then discuss the three techniques by which this research method collected specific data.

Measurement and Methods

The researcher conducted this investigation using a multi-method approach that targeted those individuals with firsthand experience or knowledge of U.S. government interagency decision-making processes. This author conducted interviews (focused and open-ended) with members of relevant U.S. policy development organizations (namely, State, Defense, NSC, and the Intelligence Community).⁶ The focused interviews, conducted in the form of a survey (see Appendix B), provided data for the quantitative analysis by specifically addressing the actors' attitudes, perceptions, and beliefs that mold approaches to decision-making, as well as conceptions of their role in termination policy development within the interagency environment.

The research complemented this survey approach by content analyzing and axially coding (Strauss and Corbin 1994, 1990) the open-ended interview data related to the decision-making processes employed during the Persian Gulf and Bosnia, in conjunction with the ideas of professionals with current interagency

⁶ This research employed a reputational sampling technique to capture carefully members across departmental lines. For the identities of those interviewed, see Appendix A, List of Participants. For data analysis, this author classified these participants according to their individual experience. If the individual had experience either during the Persian Gulf War (1990-1991) or the policy development process for Bosnia (1993-1995), he or she was categorized as "Persian Gulf" or "Bosnia." However, if the participant did not have experience with either of those crises during the period specified, this analysis categorized the individual as a professional with "interagency experience" (period of service, 1996-1998). These individuals are relevant to developing an understanding of interagency conflict since they are embroiled in the policy process for the current-day Kosovo crisis, the continuing Persian Gulf and Bosnian crises, and ongoing African crises.

experience. Based on selected research questions, this procedure provided data for qualitative analysis to develop categories of factors the participants identified as critical to the development of interagency conflict and conflict termination policy. This qualitative analysis then led to an analysis of the two historical cases. This final methodological strategy attempted to explore and describe the conflict termination policy-making process by "identify[ing] the variety of different causal patterns that can occur for the phenomenon in question" by looking "as much in the differences among the cases as...their similarities" (George 1979, 58-59). Taken together, these three methods (i.e., interviewing, content analysis, and case analysis) worked to triangulate the findings, and, therefore, enhance their generalizability.

At this juncture, the methodology and units of analysis discussion must be connected through a brief overview of the approach that guided data-collection and analysis.

Survey Techniques: Questionnaires and Interviews

The research gathered data through interviews that (1) employed questionnaires and open-ended questions or (2) only open-ended questions. I conducted interviews for two purposes. First, the interview directed informants' attention toward the factors under exploration (for example, attitudes toward the

actor's experience as part of the decision-making process, perceptions of bureaucratic conflict and its ability to shape the policy-making process and its outcome, or the actor's understanding of conflict termination; see figures 5.3-5.8). Second, the interview technique allowed each informant to convey personal perspectives (i.e., opinions based upon experience) regarding individual perceptions of the relationship between interagency conflict and termination policy development. The focus of this research precluded this author from conducting interviews based upon a random sampling technique. Rather, the nature of this research problem necessitated reliance upon formal *organizational structures* (i.e., identifying informants based upon positions they occupy within a specific organization's functional chart) and *informants* to identify others experienced in the interagency process. This researcher took great care in attempting to capture adequately the factions within and across governmental agencies (see figure 5.10) as represented by the 135 research informants. This approach allowed the research to draw upon the experiences of people who represent particular aspects of the bureaucracy while also representing the cleavages surrounding intervention policy issues, focusing particularly on the development of termination policy.




Figure 5.10. Informant Demographic by Agency

The departmental classification of this population represents merely one dimension of overall participant demographics. Additional classification criteria are presented in the analysis of the quantitative data. It is important to recognize that this classification by agency is of critical import for the second technique employed in this research, content analysis.

As discussed later in chapter 9, analyzing the informant's experience with termination policy development in light of the individual's participatory level within the process remains critical to the interpretation of data in light of the research problem. For the case analysis, this research further classified the

informant population according to the case with which the individual has experience (i.e., Persian Gulf, Bosnia, or interagency experience). Once again the efficacy of this approach became apparent since it permitted the most salient themes to emerge independent of preconceived, deductively imposed categorizations. Hence, the interview data provided the basis for developing an inductive transcript-coding schema based upon the most significant themes presented by the 135 informants. The result of this approach complemented the survey data gained from the questionnaire, as it more clearly linked the cleavages within the U.S. government to the units of analysis, helping to identify further the most probable fissures undergirding the creation of interagency conflict during the policy development process.

A final justification regarding the dual approach (that is, interviews for both survey data and content analysis) is in order. This researcher selected these related tracks for one primary reason: An integrated approach had the potential to identify the policy-maker's tendency to *embrace cognitively* one theoretical approach while in fact *practicing* something quite different. Chris Argyris and Donald Schön (1989) develop this idea as a dilemma regarding "espoused theory versus theory in practice." In its basic form, it refers to an individual's tendency to "say one thing and do another." This theory's applicability may be borne out if the interview data indicate that an individual or organization purports to select termination criteria based upon one dominant factor (for example, the best

course of action for the conflict situation), but the content analysis indicates that they focus more upon other factors (for example, individual career risks or organizational needs). Identification of this phenomenon would have implications for future research, particularly in the areas of interagency trust-building, future interagency coordination efforts, choices regarding decision-making styles, and crisis problem definition.

Conjointly, the quantitative questionnaire data and qualitative interview data provided the basis for an important contribution to our understanding of interagency conflict. Once collected and analyzed, these data also became the foundation for this work's final phase—the case analyses.

Case Analyses: The Persian Gulf and Bosnia

Using a case analysis technique in conjunction with survey techniques and content analysis, this research employed the "*analytical inductive* approach to theory development" (George 1979, 58-59) in an attempt to conceptualize relationships among factors identified for analysis. The examination of two cases (i.e., the Persian Gulf War and Bosnia) presented an opportunity to identify the most prominent factors that influenced the interagency decision-making process through an analysis of the U.S. government's capacity to develop effective conflict termination policy in these specific cases. Connections spanning both cases were examined as a step toward generating a new theoretical

understanding of the relationship between interagency conflict and the U.S. government's capacity to develop termination policy for the crisis at issue. These findings are presented in chapter 13.

STRATEGY: RESEARCH INSTRUMENT DEVELOPMENT

An argument could have been made to include this discussion at an earlier point, perhaps aligning it with the "survey technique" passages. Yet, the complex nature of this research problem demanded a structured approach to variable operationalization and instrument construction. Therefore, this author decided to present instrument development as its own entity in an effort to draw attention to the demands of this type of social science research. To begin this discussion, the linkage between the indicators (or dimensions) of the core factors and their operationalization must be made evident.

Variable Operationalization

To give meaning to the six core factors (see figures 5.3-5.8), each had to be operationalized. In the classic sense, operationalization entails the creation of an "operational definition" that will "concretize the meanings of concepts...[laying] out the measuring procedures that provide criteria for the empirical application of concepts" (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 1992, 31). Operational definitions "tell *what to do* and *what to observe* in order to bring the phenomenon defined within the range of the researcher's experience" (ibid.; italics in original).

Taken independently of one another, each core factor and its dimensions needed to be operationalized, resulting in 44 different variables (see Appendix C). The initial operationalization of these variables generated 125 independent questions as a basis of core factor data collection. These questions became the basis of a twice-piloted evaluation of the interview approach.⁷ Based upon professional experience, this researcher presumed that the intended audience for the interviews would each provide an average encounter of 45-minutes. With this parameter in mind, the two pilot runs terminated at the 45-minute point. Unfortunately, each also terminated with having addressed fewer than 30 elements of the 125-question interview schedule. This realization inspired the employment of a Delphi panel to identify the interview schedule's most relevant elements in light of the six core factors.⁸

⁷ Special appreciation goes to two of my academic colleagues—Susan Allen Nan and Ilana Shapiro. They independently piloted the interview schedule, providing advice and ideas toward creating a more feasible interview technique, the one ultimately employed throughout this work.

⁸ For illustrative purposes, let us look briefly at the variable entitled, "Other's Level of Self-Interest." I initially proposed four questions regarding perceptions of other agency's self-interest: (1) Do you see other agencies as being predominantly focused on their own agency's needs during the policy-making process?; (2) Are any of the agencies involved in the crisis policy process focused on the policy outcome at the potential expense of their own agency's position or standing within the policy-making community?; (3) If some of the agencies are focused on the process and its outcome over their respective agency's standing, which ones are they?; and (4) Do you feel that some agencies are more focused on their position vis-à-vis other agencies more than they are focused on the policy outcome? Three members of the Delphi Panel ranked the first question as "number 1," one each ranked numbers two and four first (and one abstained). Based upon this ranking, the first question became questionnaire item 1(b): "When involved in a crisis policy-making process, I feel that other agencies' level of self-interest tends to be low/high" (see Appendix B).

Following the advice of Colin Robson, the author assembled a Delphi panel by "getting together a group of persons, either those who are involved directly in the project or a range of colleagues with interests in the focus of the research" (Robson 1993, 27). The panel consisted of three of the four dissertation committee members and three student colleagues—two of whom participated in the pilot, while the third remained familiar with this research throughout its conceptual development via shared graduate course experience.⁹ Before meeting as a group, each panel member received a package containing instructions and the 125-question variable operationalization table. Instructed to prioritize independently the elements within each core factor, these panelists individually and collectively provided keen insight into the selection of those questions that most effectively operationalized the core factors. Specifically, the panel rank-ordered the 125 questions related to each indicator for each core factor. For example, when operationalizing *Agency's Perceptions of Other's Level of Self-Interest* (see figure 5.3), the panel ranked four questions. Those questions ranked "number 1" by a simple majority of the panel emerged as the item most representative of the indicator the core factor attempted to operationalize.¹⁰ In this manner, the panel identified

⁹ My gratitude goes to my committee members for going "above and beyond" the normal expectations of committee participation. Additionally, I would like to once again thank Susan Allen Nan and Ilana Shapiro, in conjunction with John Windmueller, for their participation in this panel.

¹⁰ The panel did not produce a tie on any item. As a matter of process, however, an arbitrator remained prepared to break any tie that could have emerged.

those items used to generate the survey questionnaire and interview schedule employed throughout the research process.

Survey and Interview Schedule

The product of the Delphi technique, the survey (see Appendix B) provided the means to gather quantitative data efficiently and effectively in order to explore the hypothesized relationships presented in the six core factors. However, noting that this provided one type of data, the author employed an open-ended interview schedule to gather information in the form of qualitative data that would address the interagency process' development of conflict termination policy. A few words on each approach are now warranted.

Survey Approach

Noted earlier, the 32-question survey focused almost exclusively on the relationships hypothesized in the six core factors (i.e., the signed digraph models). These questions (with sub-questions) were:

- 1) When involved in a crisis policy-making process, I feel that:
 - a) other agencies tend to act **collaboratively/competitively**.
 - b) other agencies' level of self-interest tends to be **low/high**.
 - c) at the time of crisis eruption, Departments interact in **hostile/collaborative** ways.

- d) the level of open debate is generally **high/low**.
 - e) as the crisis progresses, the level of open debate: **increases/remains constant/decreases**.
- 2) My agency **does/does not** prioritize a crisis based upon a set of criteria.
- a) If criteria are used, what are the three most relevant criteria in a generic sense?
- 3) Roughly speaking, my agency feels it should serve as the "lead" agent for crisis policy development _____ percent of the time.
- a) **Less than 25%** b) **25-50%** c) **51-75%** d) **76-100%** e) **never**
- 4) My agency's experience with crises such as the Persian Gulf, Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia tends to be **broad/limited**.
- 5) My agency **does/does not** factor in "perception of risk for self" when engaged in the policy-making process.
- 6) When dealing with other agencies during the crisis policy-making process my Department tends to act **collaboratively/competitively**.
- 7) Daily, my Department operates within a **hierarchical/flattened** structure.
- 8) During crises, my Department operates within a **hierarchical/flattened** structure.
- 9) My Department's mission is generally focused on **prevention/defense**.
- 10) My Department's leadership style tends to be **participative/autocratic**.
- 11) My Department's political ideology tends to be **Realist/Idealist**.

- 12) People within my agency perceive the "penalty for failure" as being **high/low**.
- 13) During times of crisis policy development my Department's communication patterns tend to be **rigid/flexible**.
- 14) My Department employs an **open** (i.e., system utilizes multiple feedback loops)/**closed** (i.e., system presses forward with little feedback) policy process.
- 15) Of the Departments with which I interact most frequently on crisis policy matters, the
- a) most **collaborative** are: _____.
- b) most **competitive** are: _____.
- 16) I would characterize my Department's ability to influence conflict termination policy along the following three dimensions (see a, b, and c below) as:
- a) Creating a vision for the *desired end state*: **favorable/unfavorable**.
- b) Identifying, refining, and selecting *conflict termination criteria*: **favorable/unfavorable**.
- c) Developing the *strategy* to achieve conflict termination: **favorable/unfavorable**.

- 17) My Department has a **high/low** feeling of accountability for crisis policy-making.
- 18) My Department's policy process is predominantly focused on **strategic planning/crisis action response**.
- 19) When immersed in the interagency process, my Department tends to interact **collaboratively/competitively** with other Departments.
- 20) In general, I am able to conduct **deep/shallow** crisis analyses.
- 21) I would characterize my level of analysis for crisis situations (such as the Persian Gulf, Rwanda, Somalia, and Bosnia) as **deep/shallow**.
- 22) I rely upon others for a majority of the crisis analysis _____ percentage of the time. a) **Less than 25%** b) **25-50%** c) **51-75%** d) **76-100%**
- 23) I would characterize my ability to propose innovative solutions as **limited/extensive**.
- 24) I would characterize my experience with the US bureaucracy as **limited/extensive**;
- 24a) Length of service approximates to _____ years.
- 25) I would describe my Department's internal decision-making style as **participative/autocratic**.
- 26) People within my Department exhibit a willingness to promote new ways of thinking about complex problems _____ percentage of the time.
a) **Less than 25%** b) **25-50%** c) **51-75%** d) **76-100%**

- 27) My Department explores innovative ideas _____ percentage of the time.
- a) **Less than 25%** b) **25-50%** c) **51-75%** d) **76-100%**
- 28) I would describe my Department's formal ability to gain access to the NSC as **high/low**.
- 29) I feel that other agencies' informal access to NSC members has a **favorable/unfavorable** impact on crisis policy development.
- 30) My Department has a **great/limited** ability to influence the NSC.
- 31) During the crisis policy-making process, the NSC's operating procedures **facilitate/impede** the development of conflict termination policy.
- 32) I believe certain agencies are **often/rarely** "privileged" in their access to the NSC during crisis policy-making.

This questionnaire data collection technique provided an efficient means of gathering codable data for the purpose of generating correlation coefficients between the indicators within each core factor (see chapter 7 for the results). More importantly, the research employed a technique that generated intense discussion regarding the informant's personal experience within the interagency process.¹¹

¹¹ In an effort to enhance the face validity of this instrument, the author pretested the 32-question survey before administering it to the first official research participant (Converse and Presser 1986). Two U.S. government officials who are very familiar with the interagency process, and two individuals who have little familiarity with the interagency process, participated in this pretesting process. I am indebted to these volunteers for their insightful corrections – their willingness to get

In a very non-traditional fashion, the researcher administered the questionnaire at the beginning of the face-to-face interview. This approach stemmed from a two-fold research necessity. First, the author recognized the need to engage the participant early in the interview process while ensuring the highest possible return rate (Salant and Dillman 1994). In this way, the survey (known to the participant as "Phase I" of the interview) oriented the research participant toward the nature of the research, simultaneously serving as an ice-breaker in the generation of follow-on discourse. This administrative strategy paid huge dividends in many ways, not the least of which was that the return rate of 97.2 percent.¹² The second reason for administering the survey as part of the actual interview dealt directly with the design of the questionnaire itself.

Unlike most survey questionnaires based upon a Likert scaling technique,¹³ the researcher designed this survey to evoke a response on each individual item.

involved helped create a survey with greater clarity and functionality, thereby enhancing the overall reliability of the data.

¹² Of the 71 informants invited to take the questionnaire, 69 complied. It is critical to note that not all 135 research participants were asked to participate in the survey aspect of this research. In situations where the individual had extremely limited time, I opted to forego the questionnaire in hopes of getting as much information as possible related to the research questions themselves. Hence, it can be argued that I had a "captive audience" where these surveys were concerned. Indeed, I found this to be an incredibly valuable approach as I was able to communicate to each individual the importance of the questionnaire while gathering this type of data from 69 of 135 (51%) research participants.

¹³ Most individuals are comfortable with this type of questionnaire scaling as a method to measure their attitudes toward certain phenomena. Developed by Rensis Likert, modern Likert scales typically employ a five-point continuum of responses such as "strongly agree, agree, no opinion, disagree, strongly disagree" to capture an individual's attitudes. For examples of this approach, see Babbie (1989, 1990), Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (1992), and Robson (1993).

In this manner, the author instructed the participant to “use a 51 percent criterion” to elicit the informant’s most basic perception related to each item. However, before beginning the questionnaire this author informed the participant that “it depends” remained a valid response for each question if the “51 percent criterion” did not hold true. In this manner, the questionnaire – as evidenced by the interview transcripts – served as a tool to gather data that greatly enriched the context and understanding of the coded data. For instance, the first survey question asks the informant to determine whether other agencies tend to act “collaboratively or competitively” when involved in a crisis policy-making process. While many participants selected one of the polar categorizations for the “other’s behavior,” many noted that “it depends upon...resources, personalities,” and so forth. In cases where the informant determined that other’s behavior really did “depend” on various factors, this response was coded as “it depends” (see Appendix B for the survey instrument and codebook; Appendix C for the coded data). In this manner, the research coded a more valid response to the questionnaire item while simultaneously gathering supplementary data for the contextual analysis aspect of the interviews. This discussion leads into the second aspect of instrument development, the interview schedule.

Interview Schedule

Acting upon the recommendations of the Delphi panel, the author decided in addition to the questionnaire to use open-ended interview questions to gather data that related directly to the development of termination policy. Like Phase I, however, this aspect of the interview process provided much more than the author had initially expected in terms of survey clarification and follow-up.

Specifically, the dialogue phase of the interview process (known to the informant as "Phase II") created opportunities to clarify the meanings of the words used in each question and to identify apparent inconsistencies in the informant's survey responses. As an example of the first, many asked for clarification on question number 2: "My agency does/does not prioritize a crisis based upon a set of criteria." Some interpreted this as prioritizing multiple crises at one time; in other words, did the question ask whether the agency used criteria to rank-order crises within the agency (e.g., crisis "A" is more important than crisis "B")? While this is an important question, at issue *here* was whether the agency had a doctrinal or preconceived set of criteria it used to stimulate their involvement in the policy process (e.g., the Weinberger Doctrine,¹⁴ presidential concern, media pressure, and national interests). Because the

¹⁴ The "Weinberger Doctrine," developed in 1985 by Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, articulated a set of principles to provide the U.S. government guidelines in making decisions regarding the "application of force in settings ranging from full scale nuclear war to limited involvement in potentially low intensity conflict such as Somalia" (Osgood 1994, 1).

researcher remained in the presence of the survey participant, clarifications of this sort were offered as needed.¹⁵

As an example of the second benefit—that of identifying apparent inconsistencies in responses—this approach provided a contextual richness for the questionnaire data. Let us take survey question 16 as an example.¹⁶ If an individual responded that his or her Department's ability to influence conflict termination policy in terms of creating a vision for the desired end state was "favorable,"¹⁷ but noted its ability to influence the development of strategy as "unfavorable," that difference provided an opportunity to probe the individual's rationale for the divergent responses. These types of questions identified

¹⁵ Obviously, one potential limitation of any survey technique is that individuals ascribe meanings other than those intended by the architect of the instrument (Converse and Presser 1986). Another beneficial aspect of my approach was that it became readily apparent when an individual was unsure of the meaning of the question. At those points, I provided clarification, a technique that better equipped the informant to answer each question based upon "one" intended meaning. These clarifications remained consistent across informants as this author used keywords and metaphor to expand upon the meaning of words. For example, in addressing the questionnaire item related to the nature of the policy-making process, I used the metaphor of a "train leaving the station" to illustrate whether the process remained *linear* (i.e., failed to return to the station to incorporate new information once it became available) or *recursive* (i.e., the train returned to the station to incorporate this new information). The use of this metaphor helped maintain consistency in the definitions of "open" versus "closed" departmental policy processes (see questionnaire item 14, Appendix B).

¹⁶ I would characterize my Department's ability to influence conflict termination policy along the following three dimensions (see a, b, and c) as: (a) Creating a vision for the *desired end state*: favorable/unfavorable; (b) Identifying, refining, and selecting *conflict termination criteria*: favorable/unfavorable; and (c) Developing the *strategy* to achieve conflict termination: favorable/unfavorable.

¹⁷ "Favorable" for the purposes of this work represents an intensity measure, not a value. Thus, "favorable" equates to the perception that decision-makers incorporate one's ideas. Alternatively, "unfavorable" indicates the informant felt decision-makers ignored one's ideas. In this manner, these scales can also be thought of in terms of a "great" (i.e., favorable) or "limited" (i.e., unfavorable) ability to influence the development of termination policy's three dimensions.

conceptions regarding roles and missions, leadership, and resources—issues that would have been obscured had participants completed the survey instrument in isolation. Notably, many of these issues are not found in the original hypotheses. Again, the strength of the grounded theory approach proves capable of uncovering issues the researcher failed to consider. This, however, is not the only form of richness the interview process provided. The most critical contextualization of the interagency process occurred through the open-ended interview process.

While the questionnaire served as the orientation and icebreaker for over half of the participants, the initial question for the open-ended interviews provided that opportunity for everyone. By asking the informant if he or she had any insights regarding the development of conflict termination policy for the Persian Gulf War, Bosnia, or one's current interagency experience (e.g., Kosovo, Haiti, Somalia, or Rwanda), the interview provided the informant with an opening to share his or her most salient memories of the policy development process. Beginning with this type of open-ended question also provided another opportunity to get the participants to "buy-in" to the research process. After probing these responses as required, the dialogue progressed by asking the informant to respond to the three research questions introduced in chapter 1.¹⁸ It

¹⁸ The three research questions were: (1) What factors exacerbate, intensify, or create interagency conflict within the U.S. government during the development of conflict termination policy?; (2) How

is important to note that the author asked the participants to point out any omissions in the research's approach near the conclusion of the interview. Specifically, the researcher asked each informant if, based upon the dialogue, he or she felt there were issues I failed to address. In conjunction with the closing interview question (i.e., "If you were king or queen for a day, what would you change?"), this provided the participant a final opportunity to highlight critical issues related to interagency conflict and the development of termination policy. This final question accented several emergent themes that may serve as the basis for further research.

In keeping with the iterative approach of this research design, the author employed one additional technique in an attempt to confirm the preliminary research findings that crystallized in the middle of the data collection process. In this way, the preliminary findings became "new concepts" around which enhanced dialogue was framed.

Informant's Comments on "Preliminary Findings"

Upon completing the first 75 interviews, the author developed a set of "preliminary findings" and "key thoughts." Throughout the remaining interviews, informants—at the end of their individual interview—provided

does "decision-making by negotiation" shape policy choices within the U.S. government crisis policy-making arena?; and, (3) In what ways does interagency conflict influence the U.S. government's capacity to develop conflict termination policy for international conflicts?

comments regarding these initial conclusions. While this approach is far from normal, this author found that the informants' comments both reinforced the initial findings while providing an opportunity to push the development of those findings to a higher level (these discussions were recorded at the end of each transcript). Thus, while not biasing the participant in any way during the initial data collection effort, this additional exchange ensured the mid-course analysis and interpretation of the data proved commensurate with the experience of these high-level officials, with the added benefit of re-energizing the author toward the completion of this research.

Nature of the Data

As noted above, the data collected and analyzed in this work are of two types—quantitative and qualitative. The quantitative data will be analyzed in the aggregate using Spearman rank-order correlation coefficients (via SPSS 8.0)—all 69 cases were statistically analyzed to make inferences regarding the interagency process as a whole, irrespective of which case the data concerned. Chapter 6 details the mechanics of this procedure.

In the case of the qualitative data, the author classified the interview population of 135 according to their experience within the interagency process in terms of three dimensions—the case (i.e., Persian Gulf, Bosnia, and interagency experience), the individual's agency (e.g., State Department, Defense

Department, NSC), and the individual's level within the interagency process (i.e., principal, deputy, or interagency working group).¹⁹ Once classified, a random numbers table was used to select a sample from the population. These samples from each category were then coded "to ensure that different groups of a population are adequately represented in the sample so that the level of accuracy in estimating parameters is increased" (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 1992). In this way, this research analyzed the data according to "representative" samples from each case, each agency, and each level within the decision-making process. The author searched for similar themes across these data to form the basis for categories that could be developed in terms of their properties and dimensions (Strauss and Corbin 1990). Through this open coding procedure, the research findings were found to "constitute a theoretical formulation of the reality under investigation" (ibid., 24). Chapters 10 through 12 present this "reality." As with all data collection and analysis processes, there are strengths and limitations to the data undergirding this study. The following segment highlights these conditions.

¹⁹ Chapter 9 develops this classification schema further: It is introduced here as a preview regarding the nature of the data. It is important to note also that those falling outside the tripartite categorization of principal, deputy, and interagency working group (e.g., media representatives) were culled from the population before sampling.

Data Type: Strengths and Limitations

Although this research design made every effort to amplify the strengths and minimize the limitations of the data contained herein, the author would be in error for failing to highlight the analytical issues related to these data. Discussed at length in previous sections, the strengths of the data emerge as an outgrowth of the conceptual framework, data collection techniques, and, indeed, the participant demographics. The same cannot be said of their limitations.

It is important to note that the vast majority of the quantitative data are either nominal or ordinal, with very few at the interval level of measurement. Additionally, these data are not drawn from a normally distributed population and are not suited for parametric statistics because the conditions and assumptions for a normally distributed population do not exist within an informant population. As a result of the confluence of these two details, the third limitation is that these data are not as rich as they potentially could be and the statistical techniques are limited to nonparametric tests and, therefore, focus on the order or ranking of scores (Siegel and Castellan 1988, 3). Given the two different types of data analyzed in this work, a discussion of the specific limitations of the quantitative and qualitative data is provided through an introductory chapter to both analytical techniques (see chapters 6 and 9). One

additional factor that applies to the collection of both data types is interviewer bias (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 1992).

Recognizing that the interview process involved information exchange—or, in Robson's terms, "a conversation with a purpose" (Robson 1993, 228)—I attempted to limit interviewer bias by strictly conforming to the interview schedule throughout both the questionnaire administration and the open-ended discussion of the research questions. However, while I did attempt to remain objective and tried to avoid communicating my personal views (especially concerning the two cases under study), I recognize that I may have led the informants in instances where I offered explanatory remarks to clarify the meaning of certain concepts (e.g., defining risk). Recognizing this difficulty through two pilot interviews, I attempted to define these concepts consistently across *all* informants (see again footnote 15, this chapter). Given my professional affiliation (i.e., USAF officer), I had to minimize another potential source of interviewer bias as well.

Although I informed each informant verbally and in writing that I am an Air Force officer, I tailored my dress toward that of the business community throughout the interview process. In this manner, government officials did not "see" a military officer sitting in front of them. This approach attempted to minimize the halo effect (i.e., favoritism from those receptive to the military) *and* the horn effect (i.e., rejection from those less receptive to the military). Upon

conclusion of several interviews, I asked selected research participants if they thought that my civilian attire was appropriate for their interview. While I did not ask every participant, those I did ask (both in and outside of the military) responded that it was and felt that wearing the uniform when conducting this type of research would have proven counterproductive. Hence, the advice of my Committee paid great dividends as this one personal appearance alteration helped minimize interviewer bias (at least from the perspective of those I asked).

What is important here is the recognition that while these limitations do not prove overwhelming (and the multi-method approach is designed to dampen their effects), they must be acknowledged at the outset. Only then can the findings be placed within their proper context, that of testing hypotheses and identifying emergent themes for the purpose of model-building.

SUMMARY: TOWARD NEW CONCEPTIONS OF INTERAGENCY CONFLICT

This chapter constructed the bridge between the academic theory of group choice and the researchable practice of real-world interagency decision-making. By identifying the overarching research philosophy as that of a multi-method approach for the purposes of exploratory hypothesis testing, the methodological approach laid the foundation for enhancing our understanding of interagency conflict's effect on the development of termination policy. As the supports for this bridge, this work identified the units of analysis and demonstrated how the

data collection techniques provide both quantitative and qualitative data. The quantitative data were used to analyze the original assumptions and hypotheses depicted in each of the six core factors. In related fashion, the qualitative data analysis techniques provided a contextual richness for the correlation coefficients identified as significant within each core factor, simultaneously addressing the specifics of the interagency process' ability to develop conflict termination policy for the cases under investigation. Together, these data were analyzed and interpreted in an effort to make comparisons across two cases with two types of complementary data (see chapter 13). Before making such comparisons, however, the quantitative findings must be addressed. This undertaking is the focus of the next chapter.

CHAPTER 6

QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS: PREPARING THE DATA FOR TESTING AND EMERGENT RELATIONSHIP IDENTIFICATION

OVERVIEW

Employing the multi-method approach introduced in the previous section, this chapter concentrates upon the factors that shape the interagency process. This first section describes the research's approach to data preparation for statistical analysis by outlining the coding and analysis approach employed in the examination of the six core factors (as introduced in chapter 5). By addressing the data analysis issues related to the quantitative data, the chapter describes the coding process and classification issues related to maintaining balance along demographic conditions (e.g., departmental affiliation, level within interagency process, status within agency). After presenting these conditions, the section acknowledges the caveats inherent to these data by illuminating the analytical challenges they present. It then concludes by discussing the statistical technique employed to generate the correlational analysis presented in chapter 7. To begin the next phase in the construction of our bridge toward an enhanced

understanding of conflict termination policy development within a bureaucratic environment, the second section discusses the coding and analytical approaches employed in the quantitative analysis phase.

DATA ANALYSIS: CODING, CAVEATS, AND STATISTICAL TECHNIQUE

Data coding and analysis can be thought of as two sides of the same coin. Hence, when one develops a coding scheme for data analysis, the type of examination one intends to perform regarding those data must be considered. For that reason, this section addresses coding and analysis conjointly to shed light on the relationship between instrument development (see chapter 5), data coding, and analytical purpose. Let us begin this discussion by refreshing our understanding of instrument development as it relates to the data coding procedure.

Data Coding: Codebook and Classification Issues

The survey questionnaire used to gather quantitative data for this research (see Appendix B) provided an efficient method to collect information regarding the interagency experiences of those engaged in policy-making as that experience related to the core factors developed at the start of the research. A codebook (also presented in Appendix B) provided the frame within which to analyze these

data.¹ Because the respondents provided these data themselves, coding proved relatively straightforward. Further, the dialogue that occurred between the informant and the author provided additional validation for each individual's questionnaire responses. However, in addition to the 32-element (with sub-elements) questionnaire, the research coded each informant according to relevant demographic characteristics – the Department the individual represented, the individual's level of experience regarding the interagency process, the individual's status within his or her organization, educational background, professional status, and case specificity. Each of these categories demands further explanation regarding its relevance for this research. It is important to acknowledge that these factors, with the exceptions of Department and case specificity, serve as indicators for figure 5.7, Agency's Decision-Making Profile. In this manner, the factors address aspects of organizational culture as they relate to the Department's exploration of innovative ideas. Although presented as part of this study's *quantitative* analysis, these classifications play a role in the *qualitative* analysis as well and are reintroduced as appropriate in future chapters. Let us begin this discussion with the informant's Department, working through each successive classification in turn.

¹ In this manner, this research coded an informant's response to the first question as follows: "collaboratively" equaled "1"; "it depends" equaled "2"; and, "competitively" equaled "3." The codebook provides the specific numerical codes for each question-response set.

Department

On the surface, the identification of the individual's "Department" would seem to stand as a relatively unambiguous coding element. However, as was quickly learned, those at the highest level of government tend to undergo a "cross-fertilization" process by serving in different posts (at different management levels) across many government Departments. This cross-fertilization process is complicated by the fact that certain posts are bound by limited periods of service (e.g., two years for career appointees at the NSC) while others are not. In the absence of an absolute standard, the research classified individuals according to their current positions. With one exception,² every individual had a minimum of six months in his or her current position or within his or her current agency.³ While this schema would prove satisfactory for the vast majority of the informants, another coding difficulty emerged when categorizing Intelligence Community professionals.

Noted earlier, the Intelligence Community is comprised of at least 13 different intelligence activities (see chapter 4). The interviews captured many components

² The exception to this periodic rule of thumb is Dr. Morton Halperin who had returned to the State Department the month before our discussion. However, as one can ascertain from his biographical sketch shown in Appendix A, he is familiar with the government bureaucracy based upon service in multiple posts. Consequently, Dr. Halperin also emerges as one of those with cross-fertilization characteristics.

³ It was not uncommon to talk with State or Defense personnel who had just moved into their current positions. However, these individuals remained within one Executive Department and were coded as State or Defense personnel, respectively.

of this community, including individuals serving both in uniformed and non-uniformed capacities. For the purpose of this research, the analysis coded *all* Intelligence Community informants as "CIA," irrespective of their parent agency (i.e., functional agency, such as the Defense Intelligence Agency). A review of the interview transcripts for these informants validated this decision as well – it became clear in all nine cases that the individuals represented an intelligence activity perspective, not one of their parent organization.⁴ Instead, those in the intelligence field tended to identify with the CIA's overarching shared goal of "presenting objective assessments in a timely fashion."

As depicted in figure 6.1, each research informant was coded according to his or her respective Department. The next classification process would prove somewhat challenging as well since the research classified the informant population according to each individual's level of experience within the interagency process.

⁴ In retrospect, this facet of coding ran counter to one of the underlying assumptions that proposed each agency would present intelligence in light of its organization's interests. It is interesting that a few of the nine did comment that "others" within the Intelligence Community tended to do this, while insisting "they" did not.

Table 6.1. Participation in National Security Council System Activities (JCS 1996, II-3)

	OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE	JOINT STAFF	DEPARTMENT OF STATE	OTHER EXECUTIVE BRANCHES**
NSC	Secretary of Defense	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff	Secretary of State	President, Vice President, Director of Central Intelligence, National Security Advisor, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, Secretary of Treasury, Asst. for Economic Policy, Chief of Staff to the President, Attorney General, Et al.***
PRINCIPALS COMMITTEE	Secretary of Defense	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff	Secretary of State	National Security Advisor, Director of Central Intelligence, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, Asst. for Economic Policy, Et al.***
DEPUTIES COMMITTEE	Under Secretary for Policy or Principal Deputy Under Secretary for Policy	Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff	Under or Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs	Deputy National Security Advisor, Other Deputies
INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP	Assistant or Deputy Assistant Secretary*	Director/Vice Director	Deputy Assistant Secretary of State	Appropriate Deputy/Under Secretaries
WORKING GROUPS	Office of the Assistant Secretary Action Officer	Joint Staff Action Officer	Desk Officer	U.S. Government Agency Action Officer

* Office of the Secretary of Defense representatives at interagency working groups may be Assistant Secretaries, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretaries, Deputy Assistant Secretaries, Directors, or Task Force Directors/Members

** A brief listing of other executive branch participants

*** Invited as appropriate

In the first instance, people who are relatively junior in the overall interagency process experienced intimate daily contact with one or more principals based upon this individual's functional responsibilities. Within the Defense Department, this type of relationship emerged with great clarity as the "Executive Assistants" provided insights from a "process observer" perspective while simultaneously lending a measure of objectivity that others were unable to provide. The information these individuals furnished did not contradict the perspectives of the principals themselves. Rather, it enhanced the context of those perspectives and created latitude for more in-depth exploration of central themes. In the early stages of the interview process several principals strongly recommended that the research record the perspectives of the executive assistants since they experience the principals' firsthand perspectives but have less of a vested interest, relatively speaking, as compared with the individual principal. For these reasons, the analysis classified these executive assistants as principals. For similar reasons, a third category of principals emerged as data collection progressed.

The staggering demands of the U.S. government bureaucracy require that individuals within the government policy-making process identify and rely upon "suitable substitutes" at various points in policy development. These "suitable subs" attend interagency meetings at the Principals Committee level. When an informant noted that he or she regularly attended meetings as the "plus one,"

that signaled the individual had access to the principals at the highest level of policy development on a systematic basis. Consequently, these individuals were categorized as principals as their experience dictated. Just below the principals is the second formalized category of National Security Council System participation, the Deputies Committee.

The Deputies Committee (DC) is comprised of the senior sub-Cabinet level individuals, usually those positioned as deputy secretaries (*ibid.*). These individuals are essentially the "number two" (or perhaps, "number three") people within each Department. As with the Principals Committee, Deputies Committee meetings often include a "plus one" agency representative. Consequently, the above rules regarding principals classification applied here and the "plus one" informants were coded as "deputies" based upon the rationale offered previously. Once these informants were categorized, identifying individuals in terms of the third and fourth classification levels proved simple.

The individuals involved with the Interagency Working Group (IWG) are those action officers across the U.S. government charged with developing the details for their respective deputies and principals. While table 6.1 shows a structural break between those involved at the Interagency Working Group and Working Group levels, that delineation is less clearly defined in reality. Suffice it to say, although someone takes the lead for each agency as its Interagency Working Group representative, it is common to find individuals who have

knowledge of the issue under decision involved at these two levels – irrespective of organizational affiliation. The Assistant or Deputy Secretaries and the Director/Vice Director of the Joint Staff, in conjunction with other appropriate Deputy/Under Secretaries, build their departmental “teams” to address a particular crisis. It is critical to recognize that these two levels are not only charged with crisis framing and analysis duties, but are also responsible for strategy development and implementation once the Principals (or Deputies) Committees take a decision.⁶

Finally, for those who did not meet the criteria for the first three classifications, certain informants were categorized into a fourth category – “not applicable.” Again, surveying the “List of Participants” (see Appendix A) one must ask: What does a syndicated columnist or USAF historian know about the interagency process? While the response to this inquiry might prove surprising, the research excluded these individuals’ views as part of the quantitative data collection because they lacked firsthand interagency process experience. Thus, while these individuals may have an informed perspective on interagency dynamics and intraparty conflict across the U.S. government, none of these individuals provided a response to the questionnaire (hence, figure 6.2

⁶ It is important to note that many decisions are taken at the Deputies Committee level and do not require Principals Committee involvement. When the National Security Council System is functioning optimally, only the most critical decisions get pushed upward to the Principals




Figure 6.2. Informant Demographic by Level within Interagency Process

does not include these informants). Their views become extremely important when analyzing the qualitative data as they provide another facet of contextual richness. Consequently, as figure 5.10 (see page 207) depicted the aggregate informant demographic by Department, figure 6.1 (see page 253) shows the informant demographic for the purposes of the quantitative data analysis phase. Based upon the criteria for coding informants, figure 6.2 further classifies the interagency informants by their level within the interagency process.

Committee. In this manner, the 3-tiered system should, in theory, facilitate effective decision-making at the most appropriate government level.

The foregoing classifications – Department and Level within Interagency Process – involved some measure of interpretation on the part of the researcher, judgments future researchers and analysts may challenge. However, for the purposes of this research, in the absence of unambiguous criteria *consistency in coding* emerged as the most valid method for informant classification (e.g., informants were classified as “principals” if they consistently participated in the interagency process at that level – either as a direct decision-maker or as an executive assistant who had access to the Principals Committee). The remaining categorizations proved straightforward in comparison – beginning with *Status within Agency*, the ensuing discussion outlines each category.

Status within Agency

Throughout this research, references to organizational culture and communication have been made, implicitly as well as explicitly. Thus, in conjunction with an individual’s level of participation in the National Security Council System, one core factor (see figure 5.7) makes distinctions regarding an individual’s level or position within the agency’s structural hierarchy. This dimension acknowledges that while not all of the Department’s leaders and managers are interagency participants in the formal sense, each of these executives, middle managers, and staff members is a decision-maker and shares some responsibility for creating his or her agency’s organizational culture.

Because someone may serve as a staff member while simultaneously being classified as a principal, this research designed figure 5.7 to capture those subtle differences as they relate to an *Agency's Decision-Making Profile*. Figure 6.3 depicts this classification regarding one's status within his or her agency.




Figure 6.3. Informant Demographic by Status within Agency

The assumptions related to figure 5.7 with regard to status within agency parallel those related to the next characteristic as well, that of educational background.

Educational Background

Chapter 4 argued the importance of including educational background as a demographic characteristic of these research informants. Based upon the relationships hypothesized through figure 5.7, this analysis classified informants as having a technical/engineering science educational background or one based

upon humanities/social science. Figure 6.4 shows this classification schema, data for which emerged during the interviews.




Figure 6.4. Informant Demographic by Educational Background

Those with undergraduate *and* postgraduate humanities or social science degrees were classified accordingly. Individuals holding postgraduate humanities or social science degrees with undergraduate technical or engineering degrees were classified as “technical/engineering sciences,” since the logic that undergirds engineering science is assumed to inform the critical analysis process these individuals perform with regard to crisis framing and course of action development. Finally, this analysis classified those with undergraduate *and* postgraduate technical or engineering degrees as

“technical/engineer” as well.⁷ Another demographic characteristic depicted in figure 5.7 is the individual’s professional status.

Professional Status

In accordance with figure 5.7 informants were classified according to their professional status—political appointees (or, in the U.S. government’s current lexicon, “non-career appointees”) or career professionals. As identified in this figure, an individual’s professional status is hypothesized to relate to a Department’s exploration of innovative ideas, an individual’s ability to propose innovative solutions, and one’s capacity to conduct problem analysis in general. As depicted through the relationships presented in figure 5.7, it is hypothesized that this characteristic plays an important role in an agency’s exploration of innovative ideas.

⁷ Anecdotally, it is interesting to note that of the 135 research participants, approximately 70 percent held doctoral or other terminal degrees. This author believes this “shared” educational experience greatly enhanced access to these individuals—not only did they feel the research proved worthy on its own merit, but they also empathized with the demands of conducting this type of research.




Figure 6.5. Informant Demographic by Professional Status

The foregoing five classifications are most closely associated with the quantitative analysis considered in this analytical phase. The sixth, case specificity, holds particular import for the qualitative analysis: It is introduced here to contextualize the quantitative findings only, not as a statistical schema for the quantitative analysis. However, as outlined in the closing pages of chapter 8, this classification shows interesting differences regarding interagency dynamics and is, therefore, worthy of consideration throughout both analytical phases, quantitative and qualitative.

Case Specificity

Of all the classifications introduced thus far, classifying the informants according to case proved the most unmistakable (see figure 6.6). For the




Figure 6.6. Informant Demographic by Case Experience

purposes of this work, three categories emerged: Persian Gulf, Bosnia, and Interagency Experience.⁸ Again, while the Gulf and Bosnia represent actual historical cases, informants with interagency experience ranging from 1996-1998 provided another perspective regarding perceptions of interagency relations. While these individuals did not share common experience regarding one particular crisis, they did share experiences on a much smaller scale surrounding other security policy processes. This classification proves significant in the analysis of the qualitative data (see chapters 10 through 12) and the case analyses (see chapter 13), although it is less salient for the macro process level this

⁸ Recall from chapter 5 that these "cases" represent roughly 2-year periods: Persian Gulf (1990-1991), Bosnia (1993-1995), and Interagency Experience (1996-1998).

quantitative analysis explores. However, chapter 8 illuminates those characteristics most affected by case. The fact that the research classified the informants, and that they did not classify themselves, is also of some import as it is the final classification and one involving researcher judgement, not participant stipulation.⁹

With data collected for these six variables, the author used a computer-based program to analyze the data and identify statistically significant Spearman rank-order correlation coefficients. It is important to remember that the frequencies for each category presented above incorporate only those 69 informants who provided data for the questionnaire. Chapter 9 presents the overall participant demographic as a prelude to the qualitative interview data analysis. Before presenting that discussion and the findings made apparent through its application, the challenges presented by the quantitative data must be addressed to place the analysis within its proper perspective.

Caveats: Challenges Interrelated with the Data

Chapter 5 introduced the strengths and limitations of the data collected through this research. The specific challenges related to the quantitative analysis

⁹ The informants identified their specific periods of service with each Department. In cases where an individual had experience with two cases, this researcher asked the informant to focus upon one for the purpose of data collection. In two instances, informants served in critical positions during both the Persian Gulf and Bosnia – data collection took place in the form of two sequential interviews for these two individuals.

effort must be acknowledged here to identify the caveats regarding these data. The first three issues relate to the informants' presentation of their perspectives; the last, the researcher's translation endeavor to enrich the data set. Let us begin with the information each informant provided, addressing the sampling frames (by Department and case) and the qualifying factors of the informants themselves.

While the research strove to collect data across the most relevant U.S. government actors, the effort did not capture each Department evenly. However, in light of the numbers of personnel each Department employs in policy-related functions, the populations represented by these data do have face validity as a non-probability or purposive sample (Robson 1993; see also Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 1992). The research selected individuals to satisfy the needs of the project (Robson 1993), making every effort to balance the representation across Departments. While the purposive sampling frame does not mirror the populations of each Department exactly, by capturing percentages of each Department's population that remain *relative to the overall size of that Department*, the technique did achieve a sense of balance. Conversely, had 50 percent of the questionnaire informants represented the State Department, the data would be skewed, since the number of people involved in policy-related activities at the Defense Department is significantly greater compared with the number involved in such activities at State Department. Given the relative size of the remaining

agencies, this approach remains valid across all actors. The same cannot be said for data representation by case.

The most profound characteristic affecting the research's inability to capture equivalent purposive samples across the two historical cases is time. Over time (a span of nine years) and a change in administrations (from President Bush to President Clinton) informants who have direct experience with the Persian Gulf Crisis proved less accessible.¹⁰ Because the research phase explored the interagency process, not the two cases, chapter 7 analyzes the six core factors using all 69 informants. Again, for exploratory purposes chapter 8 presents these findings by historical case.

With these two caveats declared in advance, it is necessary to reiterate that the analysis investigates the data not in the hypothetico-deductive tradition of normally distributed populations and representative sampling. Rather, it establishes relationships, in a tentative fashion, across the core factor's dimensions based upon purposive sampling. Two challenges relate to the nature of the data provided by the informants as well, in that the informant's particular experience probably represents something other than "pure" recall.

¹⁰ This is not to say that with an extended period to research this case and with an expanded budget these individuals could not be reached. It is to acknowledge, however, that within the parameters of this research these individuals proved less accessible compared with those having experience with Bosnia, or more obviously, current interagency experience through their positions within the U.S. government as this research progressed.

Asking people to recall from memory their individual experience remains an approach with inherent problems. Discussed earlier, many informants, particularly those operating at the Principals Committee level, have crossover experience in multiple Departments. Thus, although posted at the State Department at the time of the interview, the researcher may have asked them to provide information regarding their experience in another Department, perhaps as much as nine years earlier. The information they provided is perhaps as accurate as one can articulate, yet, the nature of their experiences between the actual event and their current endeavors shaped the information they provided. In this way, the salience of their current experience regarding interagency dynamics may have unconsciously informed their reflections of past experience, or vice versa. Thus, this research recognizes that Tversky and Kahneman's (1974, 1981) availability heuristic may influence data reliability due to an informant's historical experience. This challenge is accentuated for those involved with the current Balkans crisis (1998-1999) who share firsthand experience with the Bosnia process (1993-1995). This limitation regarding recall is not a new phenomenon—it affects all real-world research. The use of the multi-method approach employed throughout this research attempts to increase the reliability of the data and increase the validity of both data analysis and interpretation of findings (Robson 1993).

The final challenge presented in preparation of the quantitative analysis of the data surfaced when this author recoded the questionnaire data to include the "it depends" response (see Appendix B). In comparing the informants' actual questionnaire responses with the discussions that ensued around the 32 elements (as recorded in each interview transcript), it became readily apparent that the data provided an additional measure of richness not captured by the dichotomous coding scheme (leaving out the "it depends" option). Accordingly, each case was coded with respect to its interview transcript.

The research systematically recoded these data by analyzing the interview transcripts related to the questionnaire responses in conjunction with the questionnaires. It is important to note that almost every informant provided the impetus for this action by writing "it depends" on the questionnaire instrument itself or making such remarks during the dialogue surrounding questionnaire completion. If the informant provided no caveats for the survey items, the codebook provided the code for his or her response. Additionally, since the informants accomplished the survey in the researcher's presence, notes were taken during each questionnaire completion which provided insight on the informant's perspective. For example, many said agencies acted both "competitively and collaboratively, it depended on...." If the informant circled only one response but provided that type of caveat (some circled both – this too was coded as "it depends"), the transcripts were used to recode the response as

“it depends” since the individual noted that interagency behaviors remained contingent upon other factors. In this mode, the grounded theory approach again provided both the *rationale* and the *mechanism* to enhance the validity of the data analyzed throughout this research. The result of this recoding generated a much richer data set, one that more closely represented each informant’s experience within the interagency process.

The caveats above recognize the limitations of the data collected in this research. The very nature of the research problem, in conjunction with its purpose of model-building, in some ways made these challenges inherent factors within the research design. The use of purposive sampling based upon the informant demographic outlined above, in conjunction with informant recall and recoding issues, necessitated a multi-method approach be used to enhance the reliability of the data. This multi-method approach based upon survey techniques, content analysis, and case analyses makes strides toward enhancing the trustworthiness of this research by minimizing problems related to internal validity (Robson 1993). One issue of trustworthiness this research does not violate, however, is that of claiming generalizability of the findings (*ibid.*). For the reasons outlined above – most notably that an informant strategy identified the participants through a purposive sampling technique that in no way reflected the characteristics of a normally distributed population – the data analysis

procedures employed herein were based upon the assumptions and conditions of nonparametric statistics, the subject of the ensuing discussion.¹¹

Statistical Technique: Nonparametric Statistics

Once coded, SPSS 8.0 analyzed the aggregate data (i.e., all 69 cases using the correlation, crosstab, and explore functions). Since these data did not meet the qualifications or assumptions of a normally distributed population, and because the requirement of an interval level of measurement was not met, the researcher chose nonparametric statistical techniques to analyze these data (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 1992; Siegel and Castellan 1988). The correlations provided in each of the core factors are based upon the Spearman rank-order correlation coefficient (r_s). In layman's terms, SPSS 8.0

uses the rank order of each data value in the formula for the Pearson correlation coefficient (adjustments are made if there are ties). The values of this statistic range between -1 and +1 like the Pearson correlation coefficient. However, the assumption of normality is not required, so this measure is appropriate for variables with ordered codes as well as quantitative variables (SPSS 1998, 178).¹²

¹¹ According to Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias, a "parametric test is a statistical test based on several assumptions about the parameters of the population from which the sample was drawn. Among the most important ones are the assumptions that (1) the observations must be drawn from a normally distributed population and (2) that the variables are measured on at least an interval scale" (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 1992, 456). Since these data fail to meet those two conditions, nonparametric tests of significance were used to analyze the data and no inferential claims are made regarding the generalizability of these findings in terms of statistical representativeness.

¹² From an analytical perspective, it is important to note that the efficiency of the Spearman rank-order correlation coefficient when compared with the most powerful parametric correlation, the Pearson product-moment correlation (r), is approximately 91 percent (Siegel and Castellan 1988)

One additional facet of statistical analysis must be addressed before moving forward into the core factor analysis — this is the issue surrounding the use of “one-tailed” versus “two-tailed” tests of significance and the inability to predict causal inference.

As depicted in the statistical table providing these correlations (see Appendix D), the Spearman rank-order correlation coefficient does provide information regarding the direction of the relationship between variables. In the most basic sense, the correlations identified as significant using the one-tailed test provide directionality; those identified as significant using the two-tailed test show that the variables covary (i.e., are related), but no assumptions regarding the direction of the relationship can be made (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 1992; Kachigan 1986; Siegel and Castellan 1988). However, Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias counsel that considerations for rejecting the null hypothesis when using a one-tailed test of significance are based upon two factors: (1) the implication of “a specific direction to the predicted results” and (2) “whether it specifies large or small values” (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 1992, 454). Since the fundamental purpose of testing the hypotheses in each core factor was

when the conditions for the normal distribution apply. This means that the Spearman correlation coefficient is 91 percent as efficient as the Pearson correlation coefficient in rejecting the null hypothesis if the sample is drawn from a population with a bivariate normal distribution. However, since no assumptions of normality are made concerning the sampling frame used herein, we are unable to make any comparative inferences regarding the efficiency of the Spearman correlation with respect to the Pearson for this analysis.

to establish a statistical relationship (i.e., "recognizable pattern of change in one variable as the other variable changes"; Meier and Brudney 1993, 210) and the direction of that relationship with respect to the scaling of the indicators (i.e., "+" indicates a congruous correlation¹³ where the magnitude of the variables change in the same direction; "-" indicates an inverse correlation where the magnitude of the variables change in opposite directions), this work deliberately does not address the second condition for employing the one-tailed test. Further, this research recognizes that "the existence of a correlation between two variables *does not imply causality*" (Kachigan 1986, 213). As such, no attempt is made here to establish the *direction of causality*, an error Sam Kachigan (1986) contends often occurs when a causal interpretation seems credible. Following Kachigan's advice, this research acknowledges that other "confounding variables" may account for both the size and direction of the correlations this data analysis identifies as significant.¹⁴ Consequently, the issue of *relational directionality* remains the crucial association explored through the analysis of the six core factors: The correlations identified as significant in the modified signed digraphs are those that are significant when using only the two-tailed test (see Appendix D). Therefore, in

¹³ Some research methodology texts refer to this as a "positive relation" (see, for example, Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 1992, 58).

¹⁴ Researchers sometimes refer to this problem as "multi-collinearity," a condition that occurs when every independent variable is related to every other. The problem for correlational research is that you cannot interpret a regression analysis because everything relates to everything else.

what follows, a reader should assume that all correlations refer to the two-tailed test of significance unless otherwise stated. Note, however, that those correlations identified as significant using the one-tailed test (see Appendix E) are discussed within the individual sections for each core factor, but these relationships are not "mapped" onto the modified signed digraph models.

At this juncture it is critical to reiterate that *relational directionality, not the size of the correlation*, remains the essential aspect of this quantitative analysis. Because nonparametric techniques analyzed relationships across variables drawn from a purposive sample, this research seeks to identify relationships across the indicators (i.e., the dimensions) of each core factor as the first step toward building a model that describes the U.S. government's level of interagency during the conflict termination policy development process. The research explores these hypotheses to identify tentatively these significant relationships, striving to identify the *relationships*, not their *strength*. Hence, the analysis examines *all* statistically significant relationships irrespective of the magnitude of the correlation coefficient. In the same fashion, the final model (figure 14.1) moderates the importance of those indicators (as originally presented via figures 5.3-5.8) for which the data failed to support through either the quantitative or

qualitative analysis.¹⁵

SUMMARY: QUANTITATIVE DATA PREPARATION

This chapter described the particulars related to data coding (i.e., codebook construction and informant classification issues), the caveats presenting challenges to coding and analysis, and the nonparametric statistical technique employed to analyze the quantitative data. By addressing these issues at the outset, we can now proceed to the statistical analysis of the data as they inform the initial conceptualization of the six core factors.

¹⁵ In other words, it is possible that the quantitative analysis fails to support a relationship across two dimensions. However, if the qualitative analysis indicates that the dimension is important, this research retains it in the final model. This finding may illuminate that the core factor incorrectly operationalized the dimension or that the assumptions surrounding that dimension proved flawed and it requires reframing in light of the qualitative findings.

CHAPTER 7

STATISTICAL CORRELATIONS: EXPLORING RELATIONS ACROSS THE SIX CORE FACTORS AND THEIR INDICATORS

OVERVIEW

The discussion leading to this point has been as straightforward as possible while attempting to convey the complexity of this research. The data analysis enables us to examine interagency dynamics through an empirical lens, a lens that brings into focus the relative importance of the indicators operationalized in this work as perceived by informants who have been involved in actual policy-making. This approach hopes to identify the significant relationships influencing interagency conflict. What follows reports the aggregate findings related to the six core factors, outlined in the Basic Conceptual Framework presented here in light of quantitative data analysis, focusing on confirmed relationships, unsupported hypotheses, and emergent findings. Presented in the same order as in chapter 5, let us begin with the six core factors themselves.

Post-Analysis Core Factors

This section discusses the six individual core factors modified by the calculation of the Spearman rank-order correlation coefficients. Within the review of each independent core factor, each confirmed relationship is discussed and those the data failed to support as significant are also highlighted. Finally, emergent relationships revealed by the analysis as statistically significant, but not originally hypothesized are discussed. Let us begin this discussion with the core factor entitled *Level of Open Debate Surrounding Policy Options and Decisions*, proceeding through the analysis of each signed digraph model in turn.

Level of Open Debate Surrounding Policy Options & Decisions

Originally conceptualized as figure 5.3, figure 7.1 depicts the modified signed digraph model for this core factor. Using the questionnaire and codebook (see Appendix B), the research collected data on the four indicators and the core factor itself. However, the modified core factor depicts statistically significant relationships between only three of the indicators. While no attempt at causality is made through this analysis, it is interesting to note that the data indicated reciprocal relationships exist between these variables in pairs.




Figure 7.1. Level of Open Debate Surrounding Policy Options & Decisions (Post-Analysis)

Confirmed Relationships

In the first pairing, *Departmental Relations at Time of Initial Crisis Definition*¹ and *Agency's Perceptions of Other's Conflict Orientation*, the data analysis suggests the research appropriately conceptualized this relationship, noting that the correlation is significant at the .05 level (-.254, n=66).² Thus, if the informant classified *Departmental Relations* as "hostile," the informant's agency perceived the *Other's Conflict Orientation* to be "competitive." Similarly, if the agency perceived the *Other's Conflict Orientation* to be "competitive," then the informant framed *Departmental Relations* as "hostile." This same relationship holds in both directions: If *Departmental Relations* were "collaborative," then the agency perceived the *Other's Conflict Orientation* to be "collaborative" (and vice versa). These relationships seemed sound based upon a priori conceptualization—the data indicate that *Departmental Relations* and *Perceptions of Other's Conflict Orientation* do shape ideas regarding group dynamics in terms of interagency behaviors. However, while these affect one another as variables in a relationship, the data do not indicate that they directly relate to their hypothesized core factor, *Level of Open Debate Surrounding Policy Options and Decisions*.

¹ To set the indicator and core factor titles apart from the general text, these labels are italicized throughout this analysis. Similarly, quotation marks distinguish the scaling dimensions (e.g., "high" or "low").

² According to Robson (1993), if the statistical significance of a correlation is quoted, then the size of that correlation and its sample should be included.

In the second pairing, the data indicate that an *Agency's Perceptions of Other's Level of Self-Interest* relates to an *Agency's Perceptions of Other's Conflict Orientation*. Again, the research conceptualized this relationship in the appropriate direction, noting that the correlation is significant at the .01 level (.334, $n=66$). In this way, if an agency perceived *Other's Level of Self-Interest* to be "low," then it simultaneously perceived *Other's Conflict Orientation* to be "collaborative"; the reverse is also true. Relatedly, if an agency perceived *Other's Conflict Orientation* to be "competitive," it likewise perceived *Other's Level of Self-Interest* to be "high." Again, the data support the hypothesized relationships across this pairing, yet, as with the first pairing, the data do not support a relationship between either variable independently and *Level of Open Debate*.

Unsupported Hypotheses

In addition to these statistically significant relationships, what may be of greater import regarding this core factor's a priori conceptualization is that the data *did not confirm* statistically significant relationships across any of the remaining indicators. This finding necessitates the reconsideration of the initial assumptions underpinning this core factor's development. Specifically, it was initially hypothesized that an *Agency's Perceptions of Other's Level of Self-Interest* would relate inversely to *Departmental Relations at Time of Initial Crisis Definition*. The hypothesized relationship assumed that perceptions of high self-interest

would promote hostile relationships since actors would be inclined to withhold information to position themselves better vis-à-vis others within the interagency process. A plausible proposition on the surface, this operationalized relationship did not anticipate that 78.3 percent (54/69) of the respondents would indicate that *Other's Self-Interest* is "high." In other words, it is clear that perceptions of high self-interest permeate the interagency community – a high level of self-interest is therefore "accepted" in the development of policy and, accordingly, has little noticeable influence on interagency dynamics.

The data also indicate that actors within the interagency process feel that 76.8 percent of the time *Departmental Relations at Time of Initial Crisis Definition* tend to be "collaborative" (53/68), with another 13 percent acknowledging that "it depends" on other factors related to the process (9/68). Accordingly, only 8.7 percent of the responses noted that *Departmental Relations* tend to be "hostile" (6/68). It is important to note that the framing of these questions (see questionnaire items 1b and 1c, Appendix B) may have created the opportunity for subject bias (Robson 1993; see also Converse and Presser 1986) to influence the data. The first question (item 1b) asks the informant to attribute behaviors to another agency while the second (item 1c) necessitates reflection upon the behavior of one's own Department. In this manner, the majority of informants may have unconsciously (or consciously) avoided defaming their own

Departments.³ However, they may have also reflected the version of reality they perceived, after all, "knowledge is held to be a product of one's experiences, as facets of the physical, biological, and social world play upon the senses" (Sjoberg and Nett 1968, 26). In the final analysis, for the purpose of this research it is important to recognize that this hypothesized relationship did not materialize via the data analysis technique employed herein. Interestingly, while the data failed to support some initially hypothesized relationships, other, unanticipated relationships involving those indicators emerged.

Emergent Findings

While no emergent relationships could be identified within this core factor in isolation from the remaining five, relationships did emerge between indicators within this core factor and two others. As an example of this phenomenon, let us examine the critical element labeled *Open Debate as Crisis Progresses*. From the data analysis, we can determine that ideas regarding *Open Debate as Crisis Progresses* have no bearing upon *Level of Open Debate*. Although this indicator

³ This perspective seems to be supported by the responses to item 6 regarding one's departmental interagency behavior: 48/68 responded that their own Department tended to act collaboratively; 11/68 indicated that it depended upon other factors (e.g., issue under discussion or the personal relationships between the individuals involved in the interagency process); and, only 9/68 indicated that their own Department tended to act competitively when engaged in interagency policy processes. However, data for item 1a note that "Other Agencies" behavior is more evenly split across the three response dimensions: collaboratively, 26/66; it depends, 23/66; and competitively, 17/66. These data dispute the idea that informants overwhelmingly attributed competitive behaviors to others. Therefore, subject bias may not be as prevalent as one might otherwise presume.

emerged as a product of grounded theory methodology, prompting its inclusion for analysis within this core factor, the aggregate data demonstrate that its incorporation here is erroneous. This indicator is, however, related to two variables *outside* of its core factor – *Criteria Set*⁴ and *Individual's Department*.⁵ These correlations represent emergent relationships involving more than one core factor, providing a potential basis for future research.

Preliminary Conclusions

In analyzing these findings from a macro perspective, it becomes readily apparent that an *Agency's Perceptions of Other's Conflict Orientation* serves as the linchpin of this core factor. Consequently, while the *Level of Open Debate* may be important on some level, perhaps this core factor should have been labeled *Perceptions of Other's Conflict Orientation* and the indicators designed to measure that dimension rather than *Open Debate*. For the moment, it will remain *Level of Open Debate* at least until the qualitative analysis is performed. With this core factor analyzed, we can now move onto the second, *Crisis Definition – Perception of Risk*.

⁴ The correlation is significant at the .01 level (.327, n=68).

⁵ The correlation is significant at the .01 level (-.330, n=68).

Crisis Definition – Perception of Risk

Surveying the post-analysis signed digraph model for *Crisis Definition – Perception of Risk* (figure 7.2), one can see that the *data confirmed no relationships* across indicators that proved statistically significant when applying the two-tailed test of significance. This is indeed a curious finding since it seems obvious, even without the benefit of a substantial body of theoretical literature, that an agency's policy perspective would be shaped by its perceptions of risk (see, for example, Arrow 1982; Camerer 1995; Elliott and McKee 1995; Follert 1981; Janis and Mann 1976, 1977; Jervis 1992; Kahneman 1991; Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982; Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Kameda and Davis 1990; Levy 1992, 1997; Slovic and Lichtenstein 1983; Tversky and Kahneman 1986, 1991; Tversky, Slovic, and Kahneman 1990; Tversky and Wakker 1995; Ulen 1990; Zey 1992). It is important to recognize this research defined "perception of risk for self" in bureaucratic terms, not in terms of physical risk. The research asked informants to reflect upon risk in terms of future interagency engagements – would their actions in the current policy process magnify or detract from their political currency in future policy processes or job security, for example. Beginning at the 12 o'clock position and moving counter-clockwise around the perimeter of the core factor, let us work through this signed digraph model systematically.




Figure 7.2. Crisis Definition--Perception of Risk (Post-Analysis)

Unsupported Hypotheses

It is logical to presume that an informant's prior experience with similar cases would inform his or her estimate of probable success⁶ which, in turn, would shape perspectives regarding identification of the lead agent. This critical element, in conjunction with the agency's perspective regarding the crisis' fit with national interests, should determine the agency's priority for the crisis and shape perceptions of risk for that agency. However, the data argue that no relationship exists among these factors, nor do any exist with regard to the indicator's independent linkage with the core factor itself. For instance, 85.5 percent (59/69) of the informants indicated that their agency possessed a broad-based experience with crises such as the Persian Gulf, Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia. Depicted as an inverse relationship, the original model hypothesized that a "broad" experience base would equate to a "low" perception of risk for self because the agency would benefit from the lessons learned from past crises of that same type, making it feel more competent and comfortable during the development of policy. Yet, the data did not confirm this relationship, leading this researcher to rely upon the qualitative data analysis (forthcoming, chapters 10 through 12) to help elucidate the suggested lack of relationship. This is not the only flawed original hypothesis according to these data: No relationship exists

between an *Agency's Perception of Risk for Self* and its *Perspective Regarding Lead Agency*.

Much like the foregoing discussion, the apparent lack of relationship between perception of risk for self and the identification of the lead agent for policy development seems curious. If an agency believes its future ability to influence policy development would be damaged by taking the lead on policy development, it follows that the agency would step away from the lead role in favor of passing it to another agency. While the data identified no correlation between these variables, it is interesting to note the informants identified a clear criterion for determining the lead agent based upon functional responsibility rather than perceptions of risk. In fact, although 32.3 percent (10/31) of Defense Department personnel responded they should be the lead agent more than 51 percent of the time, these informants commented that the "lead" in this sense referred to operational and tactical command once military personnel were introduced into the environment (i.e., "on the ground"). Overwhelmingly, however, the 81.8 percent (9/11) of the White House/National Security Council informants and the 92.3 percent (12/13) of the State Department informants believed their agency should serve as the leader for policy development more

⁶ Note, quantitative data regarding this indicator – *Agency's Estimate of Probable Success* – were not collected. Future research should operational and analyze this dimension (see figure 14.1).

than 51 percent of the time.⁷ Moreover, Defense Department personnel agreed with this assignment of responsibility (noting, however, that the NSC should play more of a coordinating role, but has the capacity to "take the lead" based upon proximity to the president and its control of the interagency policy agenda). This collective perspective could indeed explain the lack of a relationship between these two factors as originally proposed. Although the two-tailed test of significance indicated that no relationships existed between these or any other indicators in this core factor,⁸ one emergent finding proves noteworthy.

Emergent Findings

Using a one-tailed test of significance at the .05 level, *Agency's Perspective Regarding Crisis' "Fit" with National Interests* correlated with *Crisis Definition* (.203, $n=69$). The data indicate that in cases where stated criteria are used to prioritize a crisis, *Perceptions of Risk for Self* are "high." Conversely, when the agency does not use criteria, perceptions of risk are "low." Admittedly, while this correlation coefficient is relatively weak, it does denote some relationship between these two

⁷ In keeping with the description of the Intelligence Community's shared images as outlined earlier in this work, 7 of 9 CIA-classified informants responded that taking the lead in policy development is not their function.

⁸ It is interesting to note that with the exception of one executive agency, the data provided for "Crisis Definition" were split evenly between "does" and "does not." Only in the case of the White House/NSC did informants choose "does" by a margin of 75 percent (9/12) while informants replied "does not" in only 3 of 12 cases.

indicators. The inference here, supported by the informants' verbal comments, is that the existence of a criteria set provides *the* metric against which people—political opponents and others—can judge an agency's performance. In this manner, stated criteria can become contextual factors that hamper an agency's capacity to think creatively about the policy challenges it faces. This proposition bears further examination through the second phase of the research, the qualitative analysis performed in chapters 10 through 12.

Preliminary Conclusions

At this point, we can determine that many of the assumptions undergirding this research are supported by the data yet others are not. The data indicate that as originally operationalized, these dimensions are of little significance in illuminating sources of interagency conflict. This preliminary finding demands further research through the qualitative analysis. While the foregoing discussions of these two core factors entail a level of complexity in their own right, the relationships reinforced by the data for figure 5.5, *Organizational Communication*, take on a life of their own.

Organizational Communication

Rivaled in complexity only by figure 5.7, *Agency's Decision-Making Profile*, the data analysis indicated that this core factor serves as a pillar for understanding interagency dynamics. Just glancing at the modified signed digraph model

presented in figure 7.3, the validity of some of the originally hypothesized relationships becomes apparent immediately. Using the two-tailed test of significance, the data corroborated six hypothesized relationships and indicated that four unanticipated relationships also exist among these indicators. Further, although not depicted in this figure, three additional one-tailed relationships (one hypothesized and two emergent) materialized. However, the data failed to support 11 other hypothesized relationships. To work through each of these categories of findings, let us begin with the relationships upheld by the data, introducing emergent relationships where appropriate. Given the complexity of this core factor, the ensuing discussion makes no attempt to disconnect these categories artificially. Rather, where appropriate, confirmed, unsupported, and emergent relationships are discussed concurrently, noting that the two follow-on sections consider those relationships not discussed in the first section on "Confirmed Relationships."

Confirmed Relationships

Beginning in the upper left corner of the illustration, the correlation between *Department's Internal Decision-Making Style* and its *Leadership Style* appeared fairly strong at the .01 level (.548, $n=69$). Those informants reporting their Department's internal decision-making style as "participative" likewise




Figure 7.3. Organizational Communication (Post-Analysis)

characterized their Department's leadership style as "participative" (and vice versa). A strong correlation, this finding remains logical as one would expect a strong positive relationship between leadership style and internal decision-making. This same intuitive logic holds for the second strongest correlation, that between *Departmental Structures*, daily and when in crisis.

Significant at the .01 level (.519, $n=69$), one would expect a direct relationship between the manner in which a Department operates daily and its mode of operation when engaged in a crisis policy-making context. While one would expect some streamlining of process due to the demands for expediency during a crisis, one would correspondingly anticipate that this streamlining would flatten the departmental structure in the process and this does seem to be the case. In the aggregate, the data show that 73.9 percent (51/69) of the informants classified their Department's daily structure as being "hierarchical" while 60.9 percent (42/69) responded that it remained "hierarchical" during crises. Interestingly, only the White House/NSC informants reported that their agency remained flattened in both instances (8/12—daily; 7/12—crisis). Further, the shift from hierarchical to flattened occurred across two agencies—State and Defense. All 14 State Department informants noted that their organization operated within a hierarchical structure daily, but 4 of these 14 noted its structure flattened during crises. Likewise, 87.9 percent (29/33) of Defense Department personnel reported they operated within a hierarchy daily, but 7 of those 29 informants insisted

Defense shifted to a flattened structure during crises (11/33). Additionally, one informant each from both the White House/NSC and CIA noted that its agency actually became more hierarchical during crises. In addition to its correlation to *Departmental Structure (Daily)*, the data denote that a Department's crisis structure is related to a *Department's Internal Decision-Making Style* as well as its *Leadership Style*. Let us begin with internal decision-making.

Originally hypothesized as an inverse relationship, the data asserted that when departmental structures are "hierarchical" in times of crises, their internal decision-making styles are "autocratic"; alternatively, when structures are "flat," decision-making styles are "participative." A correlation of moderate strength at the .01 level of significance ($-.379, n=69$), it is important to note that 60.9 percent (42/69) reported their departmental structure during times of crisis as "hierarchical," yet 66.7 percent (46/69) said their Department's internal decision-making style remained "participative." Despite the significant correlation referenced above, these individuals indicated they felt they had the latitude to participate in the decision-making process even within hierarchical structures. As such, this finding must be addressed by the qualitative analysis to give further credence to its relevance for this core factor. The relationship between a Department's structure during crisis and its leadership style proved more straightforward.

As shown, the signed digraph model predicted that Departments with hierarchical structures during crises would experience an autocratic leadership style while those with flattened structures would enjoy participative leadership. Data confirm a relationship in the predicted direction between these two indicators at a significance level of .05 ($r = -.280$, $n = 69$). Noting the positive correlation between *Department's Leadership Style* and *Department's Internal Decision-Making Style*, this finding seems internally valid. Had the data analysis indicated no correlation or an incorrectly hypothesized relationship, the association between these variables would be suspect. As a third point of validation, an unanticipated inverse relationship emerged between *Department's Leadership Style* and *Departmental Structure (Daily)*. Significant at the .05 level ($r = -.301$, $n = 69$), this relationship supports the previous findings. *Department's Leadership Style* also correlated with two additional indicators, *Agency's Perceived Penalty for Failure* and *Organizational Communication*, the core factor itself.

The research did not set out to test the association between *Leadership Style* and *Perceived Penalty for Failure*. Rather, this relationship emerged from the data. Significant at the .01 level ($r = -.317$, $n = 69$), this correlation indicates that when a Department's leadership style is "participative," individuals within its respective agencies perceive the penalty for failure as being "low." Conversely, in those Departments with an "autocratic" leadership style, the data assert that individuals perceive the penalty for failure as "high." Yet, the raw data indicate

that 71.0 (49/69) percent of the informants rated the penalty for failure as "high" while only 27.5 (19/69) rated it as "low."⁹ Additionally, only the CIA stipulated that the penalty for failure was "low" more often than "high" (5/9, low; 3/9, high; 1/9, it depends). While these numbers present no stark contrast in isolation, the fact that the remaining agencies overwhelming reported the penalty for failure levied against the individual as "high" (compared with the CIA's "low" ratings) may have implications for risk-averse behaviors and the non-communication of "bad" or undesirable news in those agencies. Note, however, the data indicated no relationship between *Perceived Penalty for Failure* and *Organizational Communication*. These issues are explored in the ensuing chapter through the qualitative analysis that complements this quantitative analysis. These data did detect, however, a relationship between *Leadership Style* and *Organizational Communication*.

It was originally assumed that Departments with "participative" leadership styles would experience "flexible" communication patterns; those with "autocratic" styles, "rigid" communication patterns. Significant at the .01 level (-.312, n=69), the data substantiate this relationship. The raw data support this finding as 58.0 percent (40/69) reported that their *Department's Leadership Style* remained "participative" and 76.8 percent (53/69) indicated their *Organizational*

⁹ Only 1 person out of 69 (.01 percent) said it depended on other factors.

Communication patterns were “flexible.” At this point, we can begin to see a new pattern emerging with *Department’s Leadership Style* as the central component of this modified core factor. Before discussing that notion, it is important also to note that the data supported one final hypothesized relationship in this core factor — that between *Agency’s Perceptions of Penalty for Failure* and the *Department’s Interagency Tactics* — as well as two additional relationships using the two-tailed test of significance.

Significant at a level of .05 ($-.249$, $n=68$), the data affirmed an inverse relationship between *Penalty for Failure* and *Interagency Tactics*. Thus, the informants reported that perceptions of a “high” penalty for failure corresponded with “competitive” interagency tactics. Again, this association appears sound since its conceptualization presumed interagency actors would strive to protect their respective bureaucratic equities and would become competitive with one another in the pursuit of avoiding failure “at all costs.” Support for this relationship may be related to the linkage between *Penalty for Failure* and *Departmental Mission/Goals*.

As indicated by the emergent relationship identified in this figure, if the *Penalty for Failure* is perceived to be “high,” then the Department is most likely focused on “defense” in terms of crisis reaction as opposed to crisis prevention (correlation significant at the .05 level; $-.301$, $n=67$). Interestingly, 49.3 percent (33/67) of the informants classified their Department’s mission as “defense”

while only 44.8 percent (30/67) classified it as "prevention" and 6.0 percent (4/67) noted their Department's mission included elements of "both." However, comments regarding this item revolved around issues of Departments being reactive (i.e., defense-oriented) or proactive (i.e., prevention-focused). With the exception of Defense Department informants, those who responded "defense" said they would like their Department to be more prevention-focused, but the realities of today's complex international environment and its attendant crises forced them into the reactive mode, compelling them to be defense-oriented rather than prevention-focused.¹⁰ An emergent finding of some interest, another emergent finding of parallel consequence accompanies it.

This core factor hypothesized a relationship between *Departmental Structure (Crisis)* and *Department's Interagency Behavior*. As the signed digraph model indicates, the data failed to support such an association. However, it did indicate an association between perceptions of one's own *Interagency Behavior* and *Departmental Structure (Daily)*. Significant at the .05 level (-.254, n=68), the data disclose that when a Department believes it engages in "collaborative" *Interagency Behavior* its *Departmental Structure (Daily)* tends to be "flat." Alternatively, those that engage in "competitive" behaviors tend to operate

¹⁰ This is not to intimate that Defense personnel believe their mission is purely "defense." It is referenced here to highlight the fact that non-Defense personnel made a point to say their Departments should be more prevention-focused.

within “hierarchical” structures. This correlation, while hypothesized correctly according to the Spearman rank-order correlation coefficient, seems counterintuitive when compared with the raw data. Specifically, 73.9 percent (51/69) of the informants classified their daily Department structure as “hierarchical,” while simultaneously 70.1 percent (48/68) reported that their Department acted “collaboratively” when engaged in the interagency process. However, what may be of greater import here is that 16.2 percent (11/68) asserted the nature of their interagency tactics depended on other factors (i.e., other variables — the personalities of those involved, the issues under consideration). Since no significant correlation supported the hypothesized relationship between *Departmental Structure (Crisis)* and *Interagency Behavior*, yet a strong correlation supported the association between the way a Department operates daily and during crises, this relationship must be explored further and will arise again as part of the qualitative analysis. Likewise, the hypothesized relationships the data did not confirm must be analyzed further through the qualitative process, although they also require discussion here to address potential rationales for the data’s lack of support.

Unsupported Hypotheses

Noted earlier, the data failed to substantiate 11 originally hypothesized relationships within this core factor. The previous discussion highlighted many

of these unsupported hypotheses as warranted by their conceptual relevance to the confirmed relationships outlined previously. Since this research attempts to examine these conceptualized relationships using an informant approach, this is not necessarily a counterproductive outcome. In fact, it is beneficial as it makes possible a more succinct conceptualization of the final model (again, with the foreknowledge that the second phase of analysis will refine the final model). As before, it does call certain underlying assumptions into question. Because all but one indicator shared a supported relationship with at least one other critical element, only *Ideology* (which accounts for 4 of those 11 unsupported hypotheses) is presented in depth here. Following a discussion of that indicator, the hypothesized relationships of two other critical elements are highlighted.

Perhaps the most unexpected non-supported indicator in this core factor is *Ideology*. Informed by the international relations and related literatures (see, for example, Barringer 1972; Belliveau and Stolte 1977; Bonham, Shapiro, and Nozicka 1976; Chan 1979; Cimbala and Dunn 1987; Druckman 1997; Engelbrecht 1992; Estes 1973; Gallhofer 1996; George 1974; Janis 1989; Preston 1996; Schelling 1984; Spanier and Uslaner 1974; Ulen 1990; Vayrynen 1991; Young 1972), it was presumed that ideology would play a crucial role in developing organizational culture, and thus, influence the organization's patterns of communication. The data failed to endorse this preconception, highlighting the potential that a faulty assumption undergirded its creation. The raw data do indeed support this

position. Specifically, a clear ideological divide was assumed to exist between the interagency actors, the Departments of State and Defense in particular. This cleavage would prompt the actors to frame crises from different worldviews, negatively affecting their collective ability to develop conflict termination policy. Despite this original assumption, 77.9 percent (53/68) categorized Department ideology as "realist" – only 13.2 percent (9/68) identified Department ideology as "idealist" while 8.8 percent (6/68) labeled it as "both" realist and idealist. In light of the fact that this research focuses specifically on the use of force as it relates to intervention and conflict termination policy development, this finding is of great import.

Referring back to the discussion regarding departmental ideology (see chapter 4, beginning on page 142), the research initially asserted that an ideological split between State and Defense affected interdepartmental relations. If, however, individuals from both Departments report that their organizations tend to be more ideologically realist than idealist, this difference does not exist. Perhaps the more relevant approach would be to ask representatives from these two Departments what they think the "other's" ideological disposition is vis-à-vis their own. If such a relationship was proved to exist it would reveal that perceptions of difference shape interagency relationships between these two actors and that their perceptions impede the actors' ability to recognize they share overlapping aspects of the *Realpolitik* worldview, thereby erroneously

contributing to an organizational ideological divide that may not exist in reality. While this certainly highlights an issue for future research, the importance of this finding must be reviewed again and, as with others presented herein, tempered in the light of later qualitative analysis. Issues surrounding non-supported relationships related to *Ideology* are accompanied by those encompassing two other indicators, *Department's Interagency Behavior* and *Departmental Structure (Crisis)*.

Figure 5.5 originally conceived of four relationships associated with *Department's Interagency Behavior* but data supported only one of these, *Agency's Perceptions of Penalty for Failure*. The data analysis found no significant correlations between *Interagency Behavior* and (1) *Departmental Structure (Crisis)*, (2) *Department's Leadership Style*, and (3) *Organizational Communication*. Together with the unsupported hypotheses related to *Ideology*, these account for 7 of the 11 faulty conceptualizations within this core factor. In the first case, collaborative interagency behaviors should have correlated with flattened departmental structures during crisis policy-making. Discussed earlier in this section as it related to the significant correlation with daily departmental structures, this unsupported hypothesis must be clarified through further research and is not discussed further. The second problem, however, is not mentioned elsewhere in this analysis and requires further explication.

Assuming that participative leadership styles would correlate with collaborative interagency behaviors, this relationship is devoid of statistical evidence. While 57.4 percent of informants (39/68) registered their Department's leadership style as "participative," 76.9 percent (30/39) classified their Department's interagency tactics as "collaborative." Conversely, 32.4 percent (22/68) reported their leadership style as "autocratic," yet 77.3 percent (17/22) of these informants *still* asserted their Department acted "collaboratively" within the interagency process. Therefore, the data indicate that the way the leadership acts within the Department has little bearing upon that Department's interagency behaviors. This perspective is likewise appropriate in examining the relationship between *Interagency Behavior* and *Organizational Communication*.

In this third instance, "collaborative" interagency behaviors were assumed to parallel "flexible" communication patterns while "competitive" behaviors would correspond with "rigid" communication patterns. Emphasized earlier, 70.6 percent (48/68) of the participants categorized their Department's interagency behaviors as "collaborative." Of these, 77.1 percent (37/48) reported their organizational communication patterns remained "flexible." The data may support no relationship between these factors since an overwhelming majority of the informants (76.5 percent; 52/68) claimed organizational communication maintained "flexible" patterns irrespective of the Department's interagency behaviors. Although unanswerable at this juncture, these non-existent

relationships generate even more questions in light of the final unsupported hypothesis discussed below.

In looking at *Department Structure (Crisis)*, the data failed to confirm two crucial relationships. Since the relationship with *Interagency Behavior* has been addressed previously, this section focuses specifically upon *Departmental Structure (Crisis)* and *Organizational Communication*. Based upon the corollary assumptions this research made regarding hierarchical organizational structures, this core factor presumed hierarchical structures would be accompanied by rigid communication patterns. As depicted in this modified signed digraph model, the data supports no such assumption. In fact, of the 42 informants who reported their departmental structure as "hierarchical" during crises, 73.8 percent (31/42) maintained that their communication patterns continued to be "flexible." These data suggest that organizational structure during crises has little bearing upon communication patterns.

Recognition of the above findings enables us to view figure 7.3 from an enriched perspective. As a complementary factor in generating that enrichment, the emergent findings must be identified.

Emergent Findings

As appropriate, several of the emergent findings were discussed throughout this section. However, three one-tailed emergent relationships — each related to

Department's Internal Decision-Making Style—demand further reflection. In the first instance, the original signed digraph model (figure 5.5) depicted an inverse relationship between *Department's Internal Decision-Making Style* and *Departmental Structure (Daily)*. Note that the unidirectional hypothesis is drawn to indicate an ordered relationship between decision-making style and structure (daily). The one-tailed correlation is significant at the .05 level ($-.215, n=69$), supporting the idea that a hierarchical structure (daily) was associated with an autocratic internal decision-making style; likewise, a flattened structure was associated with a participative style. Notionally, the raw data provide latitude for this relationship since 73.9 percent (51/69) reported a hierarchical structure and 58.0 percent (40/69), a participative leadership style. Conversely, 24.6 percent (17/69) reported a flattened structure and 31.9 percent (22/69), an autocratic leadership style. Whereas only 0.01 percent (1/69) classified departmental structure as "it depends," 10.1 percent (7/69) noted that their internal leadership style remained contingent upon multiple factors, having a tendency to be somewhere between participative and autocratic (i.e., depending, for example, on the nature of the problem, media attention, and the principal's level of interest). With this hypothesized relationship clarified, we can now move on to the second and third one-tailed findings, relationships that emerged from the statistical analysis.

Once analyzed, the data indicated an inverse relationship existed between *Agency's Perceived Penalty for Failure* and *Department's Internal Decision-Making Style*. Significant at the .05 level ($-.230, n=69$), credence must be given to the idea that those who perceive the penalty for failure as "high" also perceive their Department's internal decision-making style to be "autocratic." Likewise, in those Departments where organizational communication tends to be "rigid," people classify their organization's internal decision-making style as "autocratic" (correlation significant at the .05 level; $-.200, n=69$). It is the inverse of these relationships that proves noteworthy here: People operating within Departments with "participative" internal decision-making styles tend to perceive the penalty for failure as being "low"; similarly, they perceive communication patterns to be "flexible." These findings have implications for both interagency dynamics and the development of conflict termination policy that relate directly to crisis analysis and course of action framing. They need to be explored further through the qualitative and case analyses that follow and complement this present quantitative analysis.

Preliminary Conclusions

At first glance, the complexity presented through figure 7.3 has the potential to be overwhelming. Yet, the preceding discussion segmented the interdependent relationships by discussing the data analysis in three categories:

confirmed relationships, unsupported hypotheses, and emergent findings. Examining the signed digraph model itself distinguishes the most obvious emergent finding. Diagrammatically, it becomes apparent immediately that this core factor's point of convergence should be reframed in terms of *Department's Leadership Style*, not *Organizational Communication* as originally conceptualized. The second most valuable indicator within this core factor is *Department's Internal Decision-Making Style*. Again, in light of the strong correlation between *Leadership Style* and *Decision-Making Style*, this not only makes logical sense, but is supported by the data. Having finished discussion regarding this core factor, we can proceed to the fourth factor, *Agency's Policy-Making Approach*.

Agency's Policy-Making Approach: Interagency Tactics

Originally presented as figure 5.6, the post-analysis signed digraph model for this core factor (figure 7.4) illuminates a new condition. For the first time the data reversed the directions of hypothesized relationships, signaling that the original signed digraph model incorrectly forecast these associations as a result of flawed assumptions. In keeping with the pattern of discussion established for the three previous factors, let us begin with the relationships that were confirmed.




Figure 7.4. Agency's Policy-Making Approach: Interagency Tactics (Post-Analysis)

Confirmed Relationships

As depicted through this modified signed digraph model, the two-tailed test of significance supported the existence of only one relationship as hypothesized and two more, although in opposite directions to those originally proposed. Further, the data confirmed a fourth relationship not pictured here since it resulted from a one-tailed test of significance. Beginning with the relationship confirmed as conceptualized, let us work through these four correlations.

Significant at the .01 level (.481, $n=66$), the data disclose a moderately strong relationship between *Agency's Perception of Other's Interagency Tactics* and the core factor itself, *Agency's Policy-Making Approach: Interagency Tactics*. A positive relationship, the correlation indicates that when an agency perceives others to be acting in "collaborative" ways it responds likewise with "collaborative" interagency behaviors. Similarly, perceptions regarding other's competitive tactics corresponded with reciprocal interagency tactics on the part of the agency itself.¹¹ Informants reported that they responded "in-kind" to their perceptions of others' behaviors. The consequences of this relationship may have special import for the development of interagency conflict and will be investigated further

¹¹ In the conflict resolution and communication literatures, this approach is known as "reciprocity" (see, for example, Boyle and Lawler 1991; Kondo 1990; Kumagai and Straus 1983; Larson 1988; Osgood 1980; Patchen 1995; Westphal and Zajac 1997).

through the qualitative analysis. The same can be said for the two relationships established as being in the inverse direction.

From a perspective of initial speculation, this core factor assumed an agency's attempts to protect its equities (i.e., any asset that adds value to or is the defining characteristic of an agency) would influence its interagency behavior. The initial hypothesis held that if an agency believed it possessed great ability to influence policy, it would contend with others for supremacy in the policy-process and, therefore, would behave competitively. Conversely, if an agency felt it had limited influence on policy, it would collaborate with others since it had a better chance of protecting its equities by collaborating with those who could favorably influence the policy process, and ultimately, the weaker agency's role in implementation. Significant at the .05 level (.284, $n=67$), the data revealed quite the opposite, indicating that a positive relationship exists between these indicators. Those reporting a "great" ability to influence policy-making within the National Security Council System tend to engage in "collaborative" interagency tactics. Conversely, those with self-reported "limited" ability tend to engage in "competitive" tactics. In retrospect, this finding is not as counterintuitive as it may appear to be. Those who feel they have control of the process might collaborate more often than not, as they do not feel threatened by the competitive behaviors of others. Alternatively, competition might be the

result of frustration regarding one's ability to influence what is going on within the interagency process. This realization transforms this research's underlying propositions regarding control of the policy process and interagency tactics. Just as *Ability to Influence Policy* related to *Interagency Tactics* in a falsely hypothesized relationship, the same is true for its relationship to *Agency's Description of Own Planning Focus*.

Logically, one would presume that organizations focused on strategic planning would possess the capacity to anticipate future events, in terms of both forecasting and preparedness. Following this logic, this core factor operationalized a positive association between *Agency's Beliefs Regarding Own Ability to Influence Policy* and *Agency's Description of Own Planning Focus*. To wit, those with a strategic planning focus would be positioned to influence greatly the policy process, including policy developed for crisis situations. Significant at the .05 level (-0.270 , $n=67$), the correlation depicted in figure 7.4 shows the model originally conceptualized this relationship in the opposite direction. The analysis indicated that those with a "strategic" planning focus believed they had "limited" ability to influence policy; those with a "crisis action" orientation, a "great" ability. Only 20.3 percent (14/69) of the informants classified their Department's planning focus as strategically-oriented; 60.9 percent (42/69) labeled it as crisis action response-oriented; and, 18.8 percent (13/69) reported their planning focus as having elements of both. Perhaps the original

conceptualization of this relationship discounted the degree to which international and domestic contexts drive policy development and response in today's volatile world situation. Interestingly, even though the State Department has a "Policy Planning" staff that is purportedly focused on strategic planning, not one (0/14) of State's informants categorized any part of its planning focus as being purely strategically-oriented. Likewise, one would expect the Defense Department to be predominantly focused on strategic planning due to its elaborate planning process (i.e., "OPLAN" development) and intricate staffing relationships (i.e., integration and redundancy between the Pentagon's Joint Staff and the on-site commander in chief's [CINC] Staff). Yet, only 30.3 percent (10/33) of those informants classified Defense's planning process as being purely strategic, while 48.5 percent (16/33) said they are focused on crisis action response and 21.2 percent (7/33) noted that the Defense Department does both strategic and crisis action planning. Further, informants across government agencies noted that the policy process is driven by the "crisis of the day," not a concerted focus on long-term strategic national interests. Informants' promotion opportunities, then, are necessarily shaped by their ability to "handle" effectively the current crisis, not the ability to forecast and prepare for future crises that have not yet materialized within the principals' visual fields.¹² Discussion of this

¹² Obviously, this idea can be taken to extremes and one could argue that the military's preparation for nuclear or major theater wars remain outside the scope of this perspective. As a point

final hypothesized relationship leads to the fourth supported relationship, that between *Agency's Description of Own Policy Process* and *Agency's Perception of Other's Interagency Tactics*.

While the original conceptualization anticipated this relationship, the data did not support it when the two-tailed test of significance was applied. However, using a one-tailed test the analysis supported this relationship at a significance level of .05 (.216, $n=67$). This relationship contends that those within agencies employing "open" or recursive policy processes (i.e., multiple feedback loops) tended to perceive other's interagency tactics as "collaborative." Alternatively, agencies with "closed" or linear policy processes (i.e., limited or no feedback loops) perceived other's interagency behaviors to be "competitive." This finding may relate to the policy process control issue highlighted earlier, perhaps creating a self-fulfilling prophecy as those with open processes invite others to participate and thereby contribute to developing a collaborative interagency process. When policy processes are closed, agencies attempt to exclude others and see other's interagency tactics as also being competitive as they try to "take control" of the process. Again, the potential for protection of bureaucratic equities emerges here and must be analyzed further using qualitative data.

of fact, however, it may be that preparation for these contingencies is taken for granted, further reinforcing the idea that success is measured in terms of one's ability to deal with the "here and now," not the impending future.

These confirmed relationships, with two proving to operate in reverse directions to those proposed, indicate that ability to influence policy development plays a role in shaping interagency dynamics. Questions are raised, however, regarding the conceptualized relationships these data failed to support.

Unsupported Hypotheses

As the signed digraph model shows, data failed to support six hypothesized relationships. While each does not warrant discussion individually, two of the unsupported relationships are intriguing. First and foremost, the data analysis found no relationships involving *Agency's Perceptions Regarding Own Accountability*. While 84.1 percent (58/69) of the informants reported their agencies felt accountable for crisis policy-making, this widespread feeling of accountability appears to have no association with either an agency's interagency tactics or an agency's ability to influence policy-making. Sharing features of other indicators discussed previously, this overall feeling of accountability may be "taken as a given" and, therefore, be irrelevant to the construction of beliefs regarding effect on policy-making and on interagency tactics. For reasons this research may not have addressed, the data reveal that this indicator is not salient in terms of model revision. As straightforward as the dismissal of this indicator may be, the same cannot be said for the unsupported relationship involving the next indicator.

Noted throughout this analysis, the data upheld significant correlations involving *Agency's Beliefs Regarding Own Ability to Influence Policy*, with one exception. The data failed to confirm a relationship between this indicator and *Agency's Perceptions of Other's Interagency Tactics*. This lack of any relationship is curious in the light of the moderate to strong correlation between *Agency's Perception of Other's Interagency Tactics* and *Agency's Policy-Making Approach: Interagency Tactics* (see prior discussion). Logically speaking, by following the signed digraph model diagrammatically, one would assume the property of transitivity should apply to the indicators within this core factor. Following the relationships depicted in figure 7.4, if *Agency's Beliefs Regarding Own Ability to Influence Policy* correlate with *Agency's Policy-Making Approach: Interagency Tactics*, (which in turn correlates with *Agency's Perception of Other's Interagency Tactics*) then, *Agency's Perception of Other's Interagency Tactics* should correlate with *Agency's Beliefs Regarding Own Ability to Influence Policy*. As the data indicate, however, no such transitivity exists across these indicators. This lack of transitivity aptly reminds us that correlations do not imply causality, as the property of transitivity implies.¹³ Yet, this relationship justifies additional

¹³ The mathematical property of transitivity contends that if variable "A" is smaller than variable "B" and variable "B" is smaller than variable "C," then variable "A" is also smaller than variable "C" and this can be determined without directly comparing "A" to "C." In other words, the direction of the relationship across these variables can be interpreted as causal, in that the relative size of each variable ultimately causes variable "A" to be smaller than "C."

consideration during subsequent qualitative analysis. With an understanding of the confirmed and unsupported hypotheses, we can now discuss the final data-substantiated relationship within this core factor, one that emerged as a product of the actual analysis.

Emergent Findings

One unanticipated relationship emerged from these data. Significant at the .01 level (.387, $n=67$) using a two-tailed test of significance, *Agency's Description of Own Policy Process* correlated with *Agency's Beliefs Regarding Own Ability to Influence Policy*. A positive association, those with an "open" policy process believed they possessed "great" ability to influence policy-making. Conversely, those with a "closed" policy process believe their agency has "limited" ability to influence policy development. The informants' responses correspond with a separate indicator, namely that regarding their Department's ability to influence conflict termination policy development in terms of (1) creating the vision for the desired end state and (2) identifying, refining, and selecting conflict termination criteria. In the aggregate, 74.6 percent (50/67) claimed they had a great influence on the NSC (and hence, the national security policy process). Correspondingly, 75.4 percent (52/69) believed they had a favorable influence on the creation of the desired end state, together with 76.5 percent (52/68) who reported a favorable ability to identify, refine, and select conflict termination criteria as

actors within the interagency policy-making process. This finding generates questions regarding information exchange and the maxim that contends "knowledge is power." Recognition of these issues regarding information exchange demands further examination during qualitative analysis of interview data.

Preliminary Conclusions

From a macro perspective, the picture outlined through this post-analysis signed digraph model indicates that open policy processes encouraging reciprocal collaboration within the interagency process favorably impact an agency's ability to influence policy. With the analysis of this core factor complete, we can now proceed to the next to last factor, *Agency's Decision-Making Profile: Department Explores Innovative Ideas*.

Agency's Decision-Making Profile: Department Explores Innovative Ideas

Identified earlier as a core factor of immense complexity, figure 7.5 depicts the post-analysis perspective regarding an agency's tendency to explore innovative ideas. This research operationalized the indicators within this core factor as a means to discover whether certain interagency actors were more innovative than others, and whether asymmetric innovation created interagency conflict during the development of termination policy. As such, more than any




Figure 7.5. Agency's Decision-Making Profile: Department Explores Innovative Ideas (Post-Analysis)

other core factor, this signed digraph model takes departmental demographic characteristics into account, specifically incorporating factors related to an individual's level within the interagency process, status within the agency, educational background, and professional status. Chapter 6 classified each of these demographic factors to provide evidence for the broad-based informant population upon which this research draws. Further, as depicted by the original signed digraph model (see figure 5.7), this research posits that these characteristics influence an individual's capacity to innovatively analyze crises and frame courses of action (i.e., "think outside the box") during the development of conflict termination policy. In light of the magnitude of this core factor, let us push forward to its analysis by discussing the confirmed relationships. As with the caveat regarding presentation of findings for figure 7.3, the complexity and interdependence of these indicators necessitate discussion of relationships on an "as appropriate" basis. Those relationships not addressed below are discussed in the two follow-on sections, "Unsupported Hypotheses" and "Emergent Findings."

Confirmed Relationships

The data analysis supported 15 hypothesized relationships across this core factor. In reviewing this modified signed digraph model, perhaps the most logical place to begin a discussion of confirmed relationships is with the

strongest correlation coefficient, delineated in the lower left-corner of figure 7.5. Significant at the .01 level (.816, $n=67$), the data supported the hypothesized relationship between *Crisis Analysis* and *General Problem Analysis*. While one would anticipate a direct association between these, the strength of the correlation calls into question a priori assumptions regarding certain dimensions of crisis and problem analysis, including the time element. This research presumed, perhaps erroneously, that individuals involved in crisis analysis would rely upon others for information input more often than these same individuals relied upon others during general problem analysis. This seems, however, not to be the case. In fact, the two emergent findings related to *Rely on Others for Majority of Crisis Analysis* clearly indicate relative parity regarding individuals' reliance upon others for crisis analysis, maintaining that those who are able to perform "deep" analysis in both situations "rarely" rely upon others for a majority of the crisis analysis.¹⁴ This finding does not stand alone as the sole time dimension assumption questioned by these results.

The data supported a correlation between *Crisis Analysis* and *Level/Position within Agency's Hierarchy*, albeit in the reverse direction (significant at the .05 level; .260, $n=68$). Originally hypothesized based upon the notion that executives

¹⁴ Significant at the .01 level (.333, $n=67$), those performing deep crisis analysis reported they rarely rely upon others for a majority of the crisis analysis. Similarly, significant at the .05 level (.308, $n=67$), those performing deep general problem analysis reported they rarely relied upon others for a majority of the crisis analysis.

possessed limited opportunity to conduct their own deep crisis analysis in light of competing organizational pressures, the data overturn this assumption since “executives” indicated they do feel they conduct “deep” crisis analyses. In fact, 84.4 percent (27/32) of the executives characterized their crisis analysis as deep while only 60.0 percent (6/10) staff members and 61.5 percent (16/26) middle managers characterized their analysis as deep. Given the normative assumptions of leadership and management—the higher up in an organization a person is, the less he or she knows about the specifics of any given situation—this finding is rather interesting and is explored in the forthcoming qualitative analysis. Less questionable are the two remaining supported hypotheses. Let us continue with this theme relating to *Level/Position within Agency's Hierarchy*.

Significant at the .01 level (.640, $n=69$), the data argue that an individual's *Level/Position within Agency's Hierarchy* correlates strongly with his or her *Level within Interagency*. Recalling from the earlier discussion of these categorizations, this research made individual determinations based upon the informant's experience level. The point here is that those at the highest levels within the Departments serve as the principals in the national security policy-making process. On its own merit, this proves a rather uninteresting finding since this relationship remains logical. However, when associated with *Bureaucratic Experience*, this finding takes on new meaning.

Although not depicted in figure 7.5, a one-tailed test of significance at the .05 level ($-.220$, $n=67$) confirmed a relationship between *Bureaucratic Experience* and *Level within Interagency*. Note that the hypothesized relationship specified no direction. The data reveal that an inverse relationship exists — those at the highest level of the interagency process (i.e., the principals charged with taking decisions) characterized their experience within the bureaucracy as “limited.” Similarly, the one-tailed test of significance at the .05 level ($-.208$, $n=68$) reversed the direction of the hypothesized relationship between *Bureaucratic Experience* and *Level/Position within Agency's Hierarchy*, further validating the finding identified above. These findings bring Halperin's (Halperin et al. 1974) ideas regarding “in-and-outers” back to the fore. They empirically support his idea that those at the highest levels of government possess the least amount of process experience and are often “survived” by the career bureaucrats who occupy middle management and staff positions in the shadow of political appointees, yet have the greatest experience. In concert with these findings, the data confirmed a relationship between *Bureaucratic Experience* and *Agency's Decision-Making Profile: Department Explores Innovative Ideas*.

Framed as an inverse relationship, these data confirmed associations¹⁵ indicating that those with “extensive” *Bureaucratic Experience* believe their

¹⁵ Correlation is significant at the .05 level ($-.220$, $n=67$).

Departments "rarely" (i.e., less than 50 percent of the time) explore innovative ideas. Conversely, those with "limited" *Bureaucratic Experience* believe innovative solutions are "always" (i.e., more than 51 percent of the time) explored. This finding relates to those just discussed above and raise new questions regarding the organization of government agencies and the backgrounds from which their members emanate. The data did confirm an association with one of these environmental factors, that of *Educational Background*.

Not depicted in the modified signed digraph model, a one-tailed test of significance at the .05 level ($-.223, n=65$) provided evidence of an inverse relationship between *Educational Background* and *Agency's Decision-Making Profile: Department Explores Innovative Ideas*. The only significant correlation concerning educational credentials, these data claim that those with "technical or engineering science" backgrounds believe their Departments "rarely" explore innovative ideas. While beyond the scope of this research, this finding raises questions regarding the analytical processes employed during crisis policy-making. For example, do those with technical backgrounds believe their Departments rarely explore innovative solutions because the analytical process employed fails to generate innovative options for exploration? Questions of this type bring us to the final supported hypothesis for this core factor.

Depicted as a congruous relationship, a two-tailed test of significance at the .01 level ($.789, n=68$) validates a positive relationship between *Individual's*

Willingness to Propose Innovative Ideas and Agency's Decision-Making Profile:

Department Explores Innovative Ideas. The data show that 58.8 percent (40/68)

reported that people within their Departments exhibited a willingness to promote new ways of thinking about complex problems more than 51 percent of the time. Of those 40 individuals, 72.5 percent (29/40) believe their Departments explore those innovative ideas more than 51 percent of the time. This finding supports the assumption that Departments that create working environments wherein innovation is explored will be comprised of individuals willing to propose "out-of-the-box" thinking in times of crisis policy development.

Conversely, if Departments "rarely" explore innovative thinking their individuals' willingness to propose a creative idea is reported as "low."

Affirming the idea of the self-fulfilling prophecy regarding organizational cultures, it is interesting to note that these data provided no evidence of emergent relationships, particularly involving *Individual's Ability to Propose Innovative Solutions*. Given the complexity of this core factor one could have expected such evidence. This void calls into question this indicator's overall utility with regard to understanding interagency dynamics—it serves as an appropriate segue into a discussion of the unconfirmed hypotheses.

Unsupported Hypotheses

While these data supported 15 relationships (i.e., hypothesized and emergent), they failed to provide evidence for 11 others. The foregoing section addressed many of these unconfirmed relationships. Yet, those related to two specific core factors — *Status within Agency* and *Individual's Ability to Propose Innovative Solutions* — warrant discussion at this juncture. Let us begin by examining the indicator labeled *Status within Agency*.

In light of the structure of the U.S. government, this research made four specific assumptions regarding the status of individuals within agencies and their roles in the policy process — the data supported none of these hypothesized relationships. First, political appointees were presumed to be most influential in the policy process by virtue of the idea they served as the principals within the interagency process. This perspective failed to take into account the number of people involved in the interagency process — both political appointees and career professionals. Further, a research design based upon an informant strategy would significantly impair this research's capacity to access representative samples across the three categories of interagency actors in terms of their professional status (i.e., political appointee or career professional). Consequently, the table 7.1 provides the specific data for this classification.

Table 7.1. Status within Agency Classified by Level within Interagency

Status within Agency * Level within Interagency Crosstabulation

Count	Level within Interagency (PC/DC/IWG/na)			Total
	PC	DC	IWG	
Political Appointee	5	4	1	10
Career Professional	20	29	10	59
Total	25	33	11	69

Note that the lack of a significant relationship does not adversely affect the findings discussed thus far. This issue is acknowledged here to reiterate that this research methodology is not based upon a random sampling technique, but one of purposive sampling. Had the former been true, the absence of a statistically significant relationship would prove problematic in terms of research design. This sampling issue fails, however, to provide a logical rationale for the three remaining faulty hypotheses.

Interrelated assumptions framed the thinking behind the three outstanding hypotheses related to *Status within Agency*. First, since political appointees were presumed to head the Departments (and indeed they do at the highest departmental posts – the secretaries), this research assumed these individuals would (a) characterize the nature of their general problem analysis as shallow,

b) classify their ability to propose innovative solutions as limited,¹⁶ and (c) rarely (i.e., 50 percent or less of the time) explore innovative ideas. With regard to the data provided by political appointees, 30.0 percent (3/10) classified their problem analysis as shallow, 30.0 percent (3/10) claimed their ability to propose innovative solutions remained limited, and 80.0 percent (8/10) asserted their Department explores innovative solutions 50 percent of the time or less.¹⁷ Hence, no support for these hypotheses exists within this data set. These are not the only unsupported hypotheses that command our attention: Two other disjunctions, also related to *Individual's Ability to Propose Innovative Solutions*, appear to be of consequence.

Framing this core factor in terms of the Department's exploration of innovative ideas necessitated the consideration of the individual's ability to propose innovative solutions. In addition to being linked with an individual's professional status, the signed digraph model connected *Individual's Ability to Propose Innovative Solutions* with both *Educational Background* and *Level within Interagency*. As the digraph shows, these data produced no statistically significant correlations. Again, suppositions regarding both educational background and

¹⁶ It is particularly important to note this hypothesis emerged from the mindset that the political appointee would be less willing to propose solutions he or she felt the president would reject. Hence, this research assumed that the political appointees' performance is evaluated largely by his or her ability to serve the president first, his or her Department second.

¹⁷ Note that these sample sizes are not representative and are too small – no inferences should be drawn regarding the beliefs of political appointees in general.

professional experience shaped the development of these relationships, assuming that those with technical or engineering science backgrounds would look for “the” irrefutable empirical solution relative to those with humanities or social science backgrounds. Relatedly, those acting as principals would either be unwilling to propose innovative solutions since the need to protect future job prospects would make them risk-averse, or unable to propose innovative solutions because they would have only limited information regarding the specific nature of the crisis. These aspects of an *Individual’s Ability to Propose Innovative Solutions* may prove beneficial to future research. For the purposes of this research, however, the data failed to support these propositions and the relative utility of this indicator must be interpreted in that light. Before discarding this critical element on the basis that these data did not confirm its three hypothetical relationships, we must recognize that this indicator is related to three emergent findings, relationships that propel us toward this analysis’ next segment.

Emergent Findings

The two unanticipated relationships these data revealed in relation to *Crisis Analysis* were addressed earlier. Yet, five additional emergent findings must be addressed to complete this discussion of *Agency’s Decision-Making Profile*. Admittedly, two of these five are only moderately interesting – the remaining

three are quite thought provoking. Let us begin with the mundane and proceed to the extraordinary.

Although the data failed to provide evidence for four hypothesized correlations related to *Status within Agency*, they did provide the basis for two emergent findings. First, using a two-tailed test at a significance level of .05 (.240, $n=69$), these data indicate that the *Length of Service* for "political appointees" tends to be "brief" while that of "career professionals" tends to be "prolonged." As one would expect, this correlation further supports Halperin's (Halperin and Kanter 1974) ideas regarding "in-and-outers," but is of little additional utility for this research.

Second, using a one-tailed test of significance at a level of .05 (.207, $n=69$), these data confirm that an individual's *Level or Position within Agency's Hierarchy* positively corresponds with his or her *Status within Agency*. Again, this finding is logical as one's knowledge of the U.S. government's bureaucracy would predict that executives tend to be political appointees and staff members, career professionals. While these two emergent findings are commonsensical and rather banal, the remaining three are more interesting.

The remaining emergent findings each relate directly to *Individual's Ability to Propose Innovative Solutions*. Significant at the .05 level (-.281, $n=68$), *Innovative Solutions* is inversely related to *Crisis Analysis*. In this manner, those reporting a "limited" ability to propose innovative solutions characterized their crisis

analysis as "shallow." Similarly, those claiming they possessed "extensive" ability to promote innovative solutions described the nature of their crisis analysis as "deep." While not a counterintuitive finding on its own, it takes on a new dimension when considered in tandem with the second emergent finding.

The informants reported data confirming a relationship between an *Individual's Ability to Propose Innovative Solutions* and one's level of *Bureaucratic Experience*. Significant at the .05 level (.263, n=68), the data assert that if an individual's ability to promote innovative solutions is "limited," this individual tends to have "extensive" bureaucratic experience.¹⁸ Alternatively, those with "extensive" ability to innovate tend to have "limited" bureaucratic experience. This finding calls to the fore Kachigan's (1986) cautionary reminder that "confounding variables" influence correlations and, therefore, correlations do not translate into causal relationships. Thus, while this may seem a counterintuitive finding since those with extensive experience should be equipped to "think outside the box" as a result of their experience with complex situations and their ability to maneuver within the interagency process, this relationship does not address an individual's "willingness" to innovate. Because the data support no statistically significant relationship between an *Individual's*

¹⁸ It may be that these individuals have come to know how complex bureaucracies resist innovation and are familiar with the penalties for thinking beyond the bureaucracy's shared images.

Willingness to Propose Innovative Ideas and an *Individual's Ability to Propose Innovative Solutions*, further deductions cannot be made at this time.

The third, and final, emergent relationship further supported the relationships discussed earlier. Significant at the .05 level ($-.233$, $n=69$) using a one-tailed test of significance, these data expose an inverse relationship between *Individual's Ability to Propose Innovative Solutions* and *Level/Position within Agency's Hierarchy*. Again, the data argue that those with a "limited" ability to propose innovative solutions are the "staff members" while the "executives" within an agency possess an "extensive" ability to propose innovative solutions. In the aggregate, these relationships have implications for information exchange and attitudes toward risk. These issues will be explored further through the qualitative analysis.

Preliminary Conclusions

The data confirmed several critical relationships regarding an *Agency's Decision-Making Profile*. Yet, those relationships the data failed to support call into question the operationalization of this core factor (i.e., the assumptions framing the core factor's indicators and their relationships). Merely glancing at the modified signed digraph model provides clues regarding its most important indicators, critical elements that share more in common with one's level or position within the agency than the *Agency's Decision-Making Profile* as

conceptualized in figure 7.5. With this in mind, future interpretations of this core factor should focus upon internal departmental leadership in terms of its relationship to crisis analysis and innovative solution generation. Drawing these tentative conclusions enables us to move forward to the sixth and final core factor, *NSC's Role in the Policy-Making Process*.

NSC's Role in the Policy-Making Process

As discussed through the introduction of this core factor (see chapter 5, figure 5.8), the National Security Council System plays a pivotal role in the development of conflict termination policy. This special role vis-à-vis that of the other agencies embroiled in the process demanded specific exploration. Thus, while the previous five core factors framed interagency dynamics as they applied to all agencies involved in the interagency process, operationalization of this core factor required informants to contemplate the National Security Council System's role in the policy process. With this caveat in mind, let us proceed with the analysis of this agency-specific core factor by examining the confirmed relationships presented in figure 7.6.

Confirmed Relationships

In comparison to the complexity of the previous core factor, a quick review of this modified signed digraph model provides a sigh of relief. Although the data confirmed only three relationships, in light of the role the National Security




Figure 7.6. NSC's Role in the Policy-Making Process (Post-Analysis)

Council System plays in the development of policy the importance of these relationships should not be underestimated. Since the data confirmed only one of the three hypotheses in its operationalized direction, let us begin with that correlation and proceed to the remaining two inverted associations.

The data confirmed a moderately strong correlation between *NSC's Role in the Policy-Making Process*¹⁹ and *Agency's Perceptions Regarding Own Ability to Influence NSC* (and, by extrapolation, policy development). Significant at the .01 level (.410, n=64), those who believe their agency has a "great" ability to influence the National Security Council rate its role in the policy process as "facilitative." Conversely, those who perceive their ability to influence the National Security Council is "limited" contend the National Security Council is an "impediment" to policy development. Again, issues of control arise: Those who think they control the process maintain the National Security Council facilitates policy development; those with less control assert that the operating procedures of the National Security Council impede the development of policy. While this finding may seem somewhat Machiavellian in nature, it conveys the importance of creating a collaborative interagency team whose members each feel they have an influential role to play in the development of policy. Once disenfranchised, these

¹⁹ It is important here to note that "NSC" in this sense refers to the broader National Security Council System, including the NSC Staff, not merely the four statutory members of the National Security Council (for a refresher, see chapter 4).

"outsiders" perceive that the National Security Council's operating procedures thwart effective policy development. It is at this point that these disenfranchised actors could begin to create a more competitive interagency dynamic as they fight for "their fair share" of process control and policy influence. Interpreting the next two findings proves a less straightforward task.

The two incorrectly operationalized hypotheses both relate to an *Agency's Perceptions Regarding Impact of Other's Informal Access Upon Policy*. Although the data supported both associations, it did so only by reversing the directions of the relationships. Significant at the .05 level (.253, $n=61$), the data revealed that if an agency perceives the impact of another's informal access upon policy development to be favorable, then the National Security Council facilitated policy-making. In cases where that perception regarding informal access proved unfavorable, informants characterized the National Security Council's role in policy-making as an impediment. The original conceptions of these relationships assumed that agencies would prefer every agency gain only formal access (i.e., according to the structured policy-making process) to the National Security Council over informal or "privileged" access. The data indicate such an assumption was in error.²⁰ These same assumptions applied to the remaining

²⁰ Throughout the data collection process, informants noted that all agencies are privileged in their access to the National Security Council during certain crises and based upon myriad factors (e.g., expertise and personal relationships with those developing policy options).

inverted hypothesis, that regarding *Agency's Perceptions Regarding Own Ability to Influence NSC*.

Framing the association from a competitive perspective wherein the amount of influence remains finite, and thus revealing an inherent bias within this core factor, this hypothesis assumed that other's ability to influence the policy process through informal channels would diminish an agency's relative capacity to influence the National Security Council. Significant at the .05 level (.254, $n=64$), the data confirmed a relationship between these two indicators, *albeit in the opposite direction*. Hence, again if an agency perceived other's informal access to be "favorable," the actor simultaneously perceived its own ability to influence policy as "great." Those who rated other's informal access as having an "unfavorable" impact upon policy correspondingly perceived their own influence as "limited."

Taken together, these three relationships indicate that the National Security Council does indeed play a pivotal role in developing an agency's perceptions regarding its ability to influence policy formulation. Based upon the foregoing relationships confirmed throughout all previous core factors, it is logical to assume that the National Security Council's actions help frame all other aspects of interagency behavior. This proposition requires further investigation and is explored through the qualitative analysis (forthcoming, chapters 10 through 12). Just as important, however, are the relationships the data did not confirm.

Unsupported Hypotheses

It becomes apparent immediately that formal access — that of one's own agency as well as others — does not play a significant role in the development of perceptions of the National Security Council's role in the policy-making process.²¹ Paradoxically, analysis of the quantitative data failed to provide evidence of any relationship between *Agency's Perceptions of Other's Favoritism in Access* (to the NSC) and any other indicator operationalized through this research although 69.2 percent (45/65) of those surveyed reported that privileged access occurs often. Further, of those reporting that privileged access occurs often, 62.2 percent (28/45) contended such access has a favorable influence on the policy process. In the light of the correlational analysis, this is a surprising finding.

In this manner, some would insist those involved in the policy process take on a "the more, the merrier" attitude when considering the number of actors involved in the policy process. These relationships indicate that the National Security Council's management of those actors within the process is perhaps more important than the number of actors in total. With these confirmed and unsupported relationships acknowledged, and noting the data revealed no

²¹ A possible explanation rests with the idea that all informants perceived their agencies as having equal "formal" access as a product of the National Security Council's structure—State, Defense, and the CIA each have at least one statutory representative and the APNSA represents the NSC Staff while managing the system at the request of the president.

emergent findings, we can proceed to the final segment, "Preliminary Conclusions."

Preliminary Conclusions

The amended signed digraph model depicts that the data revealed no emergent findings among the six indicators. However, the connection between the National Security Council as an agency with the opportunity to control the policy process and shape an individual's perceptions regarding their own and other's ability to influence policy development cannot be overemphasized. Thus, the NSC's role in the policy-making process demands further exploration.

SUMMARY: STATISTICAL CORRELATIONS ACROSS SIX CORE FACTORS

The foregoing discussion revealed the complexity related to conceptualizing, operationalizing, and analyzing the interagency dynamics on which this research focuses. The analysis managed this complexity by highlighting the confirmed relationships, unsupported hypotheses, and emergent findings evidenced by the quantitative data analysis. A brief summary of the signed digraph model analysis and an introduction of emergent themes are now warranted.

Interim Conclusions: Signed Digraph Model Analysis

Analysis of these six core factors revealed that perceptions remain a critical element in shaping interagency dynamics. To capture these complex findings in

a succinct manner, the table 7.2 summarizes the *confirmed relationships* through the construction of "If..., then..." statements. The scaling order equates the first response of the "if" condition with the first response of the "then" condition; similarly, the responses enclosed in parentheses for each relationship denote a correlation. For simplicity, this table summarizes these relationships only once; the reverse relationships remain valid, but the number of statements corresponds with the number of statistically significant correlations. Thus, figure 7.1 shows two significant correlations, so the table shows two relationships supported by the questionnaire data.

Table 7.2. Correlational Summary by Core Factor²²

Core Factor	IF..., THEN....
Figure 7.1	IF agency's perceptions of other's conflict orientation are <i>competitive (collaborative)</i> , THEN...
Level of Open Debate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ departmental relations at time of initial crisis definition are <i>hostile (collaborative)</i>. ➤ agency's perceptions of others' level of self-interest are <i>low (high)</i>.
Figure 7.3	IF department's leadership style is <i>participative (autocratic)</i> , THEN...
Organizational Communication	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ department's internal decision-making style is <i>participative (autocratic)</i>. ➤ departmental structure (daily) is <i>flat (hierarchical)</i>. ➤ departmental structure (crisis) is <i>flat (hierarchical)</i>. ➤ organizational communication is <i>flexible (rigid)</i>. ➤ agency's penalty for failure is <i>low (high)</i>.
	IF departmental structure (crisis) is <i>hierarchical (flat)</i> , THEN...
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ departmental structure (daily) is <i>hierarchical (flat)</i>. ➤ department's internal decision-making style is <i>autocratic (participative)</i>.
	IF department's interagency behavior is <i>collaborative (competitive)</i> , THEN...
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ➤ departmental structure (crisis) is <i>flat (hierarchical)</i>. ➤ agency's perceived penalty for failure is <i>low (high)</i>.

²² Figure 7.2, *Crisis Definition – Perception of Risk*, reflected no statistically significant relationships and is, therefore, not included in this table.

Core Factor	IF..., THEN....
Figure 7.3 (continued)	IF agency's perceived penalty for failure is <i>high (low)</i> , THEN... ➤ departmental mission/goals are oriented toward <i>defense (prevention)</i> .
Figure 7.4 Agency's Policy-Making Approach	IF agency's beliefs regarding own ability to influence policy are <i>great (limited)</i> , THEN... ➤ agency's description of own planning focus is <i>crisis action (strategic)</i> . ➤ agency's policy-making approach: interagency tactics are <i>collaborative (competitive)</i> . ➤ agency's description of own policy process is <i>open (closed)</i> . IF agency's perception of other's interagency tactics is <i>collaborative (competitive)</i> , THEN... ➤ agency's policy-making approach: interagency tactics are <i>collaborative (competitive)</i> .
Figure 7.5 Agency's Decision-Making Approach	IF crisis analysis is <i>deep (shallow)</i> , THEN... ➤ individual's ability to propose innovative solutions is <i>extensive (limited)</i> . ➤ rely on others for majority of crisis analysis <i>rarely (always)</i> . ➤ level/position within agency's hierarchy is <i>executive (mid/staff)</i> . ➤ general problem analysis is <i>deep (shallow)</i> . IF general problem analysis is <i>deep (shallow)</i> , THEN... ➤ rely on others for majority of crisis analysis <i>rarely (always)</i> . IF length of service is <i>brief (prolonged)</i> , THEN... ➤ status within agency is <i>political appointee (career professional)</i> . IF level/position within agency's hierarchy is <i>executive (mid/staff)</i> , THEN... ➤ level within interagency is <i>PC (DC/IWG)</i> . IF bureaucratic experience is <i>extensive (limited)</i> , THEN... ➤ individual's ability to propose innovative solutions is <i>limited (extensive)</i> . IF individual's willingness to propose innovative ideas is <i>high (low)</i> , THEN... ➤ agency's decision-making profile: department explores innovative ideas <i>always (rarely)</i> .
Figure 7.6 NSC's Role in Policy-Making	IF agency's perceptions regarding own ability to influence NSC are <i>great (limited)</i> , THEN... ➤ agency's perceptions regarding impact of other's informal access upon policy are <i>favorable (unfavorable)</i> . ➤ NSC's role in policy-making process is <i>facilitative (impediment)</i> . IF agency's perceptions regarding impact of other's informal access upon policy are <i>favorable (unfavorable)</i> , THEN... ➤ NSC's role in the policy-making process is <i>facilitative (impediment)</i> .

From a macro perspective, the views of these informed participants tentatively indicate that communication and leadership play crucial roles in

developing interagency dynamics and organizational cultures. The findings suggest that absence of effective communication enables negative stereotypes to affect adversely interagency relations, tending to create or intensify interagency conflict (figure 7.1). Through open communication, decision-makers could explain their behaviors and their rationales for high levels of self-interest. Such communication could generate greater understanding across interagency actors and thereby dampen interagency conflict. Relatedly, leadership appears to play a defining role in organizational communication.

In those Departments where leadership styles facilitate participation, organizational communication patterns tend to be flexible (figure 7.3). By allowing others to participate in decision-making (usually through a more flattened organizational structure), these leaders create an organizational culture wherein individuals perceive that the penalty for failure (for them professionally) is low — these individuals tend to think proactively about preventing crises. The creation of this cooperative organizational culture is associated with collaborative interagency behaviors; when reversed, these conditions prompt interagency competition. As these leadership dimensions shape internal organizational communications, they similarly influence an agency's decision-making approach.

Although not tested stringently through this analysis, the data revealed that when organizational communication is flexible (figure 7.3), crisis analysis tends

to be deep (figure 7.5).²³ Executives characterize their crisis analysis capability as deep and an individual's ability to propose innovative solutions remains extensive (figure 7.5). Similarly, these individuals characterize their general problem analysis as deep and rarely rely upon others for a majority of their crisis analysis effort. Within these agencies, a political appointee's length of service tends to be brief and the executives serve as members of the interagency principals committee (likewise, middle managers serve as members of the deputies committee and staff members serve as members of the interagency working group). It also seems that when an individual is willing to propose innovative ideas his or her Department explores those innovative ideas. However, it is interesting to note that those with extensive bureaucratic experience are least able to propose innovative solutions. Again, this limitation may emanate from an appreciation of the interagency process' inertia. Alternatively, those with extensive experience have been around the bureaucracy the longest and may perceive their ability (not willingness) to propose innovative solutions is limited by the structure of the bureaucracy. Specifically, these career professionals recognize that political appointees serve in the most influential executive positions and that these people make the decisions for their organization and the interagency process. In this manner, those with the most

²³ Two-tailed correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (-.262, n=68); see Appendix D.

extensive bureaucratic experience may feel they have the least influence on their agency's policy-making approach.

Those agencies characterizing their own abilities to influence policy as great described their planning foci as crisis action-oriented and their policy processes as open (figure 7.4). These individuals claimed that other's interagency tactics tended to be collaborative and that they responded with reciprocal collaborative behaviors. The characterization of an agency's ability to influence policy as great likewise held import for perceptions of the National Security Council's role in policy-making.

When an agency perceived it possessed great influence on the NSC, it characterized the impact of other's informal access as favorable. In this manner, these individuals believed the NSC should grant access to anyone who—irrespective of government or nongovernmental affiliation—could illuminate potential solutions for the crisis. When they grant such access, agencies assert that the NSC facilitates conflict termination policy development. Again, these perspectives intimate that open communication remains the essential element to effective policy-making.

Together, these findings indicate that the analysis of interagency dynamics remains complex and that interrelated dimensions regarding perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs shape these dynamics. It appears that leadership plays a crucial role in developing cooperative organizational cultures that promote open

communication and collaborative interagency behaviors. Through a cross-factor correlation, it seems that a relationship exists between these positive dimensions of interagency dynamics and the capacity for individuals to analyze crises deeply and to propose innovative solutions. Finally, the agencies' collective preference for uninhibited access to the NSC on the part of all agencies indicates that these decision-makers feel open communication is the essential element in intelligent policy-making. In concert with these relationships, the quantitative analysis generated emergent themes that require exploration.

Emergent Themes

Given the magnitude of these findings, it may prove useful to summarize those findings that future research should explore. Noting that the second phase of investigation relies upon the inductive emergence of themes from interview data, recording those themes that emerged from the quantitative data provides a logical starting point. Fourteen unanticipated relationships or themes emerged from the analysis and are summarized overleaf. However, they can be grouped into six themes. Since these themes are discussed later within the context of the qualitative analysis, they are presented in table 7.3 to provide a snapshot of those issues the quantitative analysis raised but left unresolved. It is critical to recognize that *these questions do not present an entirely new research problem*. Quite the opposite, grounded theory methodology is designed to generate additional

Table 7.3. Emergent Themes Requiring Further Exploration

Emergent Theme	Issue
Perceptions of Risk	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In what ways does past experience shape conceptions of risk for future engagements? • Does past experience provide a means to evaluate courses of action as a means to diminish risk? • How do perceptions of risk shape ideas regarding penalty for failure as well as organizational communication?
Intervention Criteria	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How do the actors frame national interests? Who defines whether an issue is related to national interests? • Why do the actors frame criteria sets as metrics for evaluating operational missions vice principles to guide policy development?
Information Exchange across the Interagency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In what ways does increased perceptions of penalty for failure lead to rigid communication? • In what ways does participative decision-making make communication more flexible? • Why do those with open policy processes believe they have a great influence on policy development? • What role does the protection of bureaucratic equities play in information exchange?
Leadership and Interagency Dynamics	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What role do leaders play in creating perceptions of risk for both their organizations and its members? • What do leaders within hierarchically structured organizations "do" that makes their people feel as if they have a high degree of participation in decision-making? • Why do executives, who have the least bureaucratic experience, believe they conduct deep analyses vis-à-vis the specialists (i.e., the staff members)?
Perceptions of Other's Interagency Tactics	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How salient are notions of reciprocity? Do the actors recognize reciprocal behaviors in the midst of crisis policy-making? • Do actors see others (or self) as taking active measures to protect their equities during policy-making?
Roles & Missions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What role does the NSC play in shaping the overall interagency dynamic?

questions for exploration through the remainder of the research. While these issues will not be dealt with in the form of "research questions" per se, they do provide additional themes to stimulate the qualitative data analysis.

This completes the process of analyzing the quantitative data from questionnaires administered to informants from the major U.S. government agencies (i.e., the White House/NSC, State, Defense, and CIA), all three levels of the interagency national security policy-making process (i.e., principals, deputies, and interagency working group) and those involved in the "cases" (i.e., the Persian Gulf, Bosnia, and those with interagency experience) under study. While not the dominant purpose of the quantitative phase, seeking significant differences by Department, actors' level within the interagency process, and case may generate themes that require further examination during the qualitative analysis. The next chapter thus provides a brief look at some of those differences in an effort to generate additional ideas for exploration.

CHAPTER 8

DEMOGRAPHIC CLASSIFICATION: ANALYZING THE QUANTITATIVE DATA BY DEPARTMENTS, LEVELS, AND CASES

OVERVIEW

Where appropriate, chapter 7's analysis of each core factor included information related to Department (e.g., the White House/NSC, State, Defense) or Level within the Interagency (i.e., principals, deputies, or interagency working group). The brief discussion that follows in this chapter highlights those differences across these two factors, and makes the first step toward the case analyses by addressing case specificity as well. The purpose of this discussion is to provide a basis for exploring those issues that, in addition to those outlined in table 7.3, require further investigation through the qualitative analysis of interview data. Consequently, this discussion is based upon SPSS-generated diagrams (i.e., boxplots) that visually depict differences across these three classifications based upon the quantitative questionnaire data. Merely impressionistic in nature, this summary remains an impression drawn from the

data set. Let us begin with the most obvious classification schema, that of Executive Departments.

Department Specifics

The diagram for each indicator provides evidence of differences across Departments in some areas, while no contrasting perspectives exist across others. Some of these differences may contribute to interagency conflict and should be identified for further investigation. Beginning with the first of the six core factors, *Level of Open Debate Surrounding Policy Options and Decisions*, this section considers each significant difference in turn.

Noting that the data confirmed only two significant relationships between indicators of the first core factor, significant variation on each of these variables would not be expected. Indeed, only one, *Open Debate as Crisis Progresses*, depicts a wide range of responses. For illustrative purposes, the SPSS "boxplot" for this variable is shown as figure 8.1. The "hinges" (i.e., the edges) of each box identify the 25th and 75th percentiles and 50 percent of the data values are contained within the range of the box. Additionally, the "thick line" for each box represents the median (i.e., the middle value) for each value range. Finally, the "whiskers" (i.e., the vertical lines protruding from the top and bottom of each box) show the

range of values that fall within the specified range without being an outlier.¹ The importance of this statistical tool rests with its ability to provide a "succinct summary of where the bulk of the values are concentrated and the shape of each distribution" (ibid., 41). Additionally, such a visual tends to diminish the importance of sample size, allowing us to focus specifically upon the range and "density" of responses. In other words, a "short box" indicates the informants' responses regarding this indicator varied little, while a "long box" represents great variation and a "flat line" indicates no variation. Similarly, the "whisker" extension indicates that the majority of the responses were found within the "box," but that some informants provided responses over a broader range of options. With this introduction to boxplots, let us review figure 8.1.

¹ An "outlier" is an extreme value that skews the mean of a data set as a result of the mean's "sensitivity to every numerical value," but does not affect the median (Kachigan 1986, 47). For a more technical explanation of this diagram, consult a statistics text (see, for example, Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 1992; Meier and Brudney 1993) or the *SPSS 8.0 Base Applications Guide* (SPSS 1998).




Figure 8.1. Open Debate as Crisis Progresses
Classified by Department²

While the exact numbers that correspond to particular responses are of consequence, the overall visual significance of this graphic is of greater import. Thus, figure 8.1 provides a quick visual cue to the fact that each Department's perspectives regarding *Open Debate* vary, although not significantly. The first, "short" bar in the figure indicates that the White House/NSC informants perceived that *Open Debate* decreases or remains constant as a crisis progresses. The second, "long" bar shows that the State Department informants perceived debate as increasing, remaining constant, decreasing, or depending on other

² Scaling: 1=increases; 2=remains constant; 3=decreases; 4=it depends. Also, note that the parenthetical references on each axis label refer to the survey item used to collect data regarding that dimension (see Appendix B).

factors. However, the median (i.e., middle value) for both of these agencies reflected the perception that debate decreases over time. Thirdly, Defense informants felt debate ranges from increases to decreases, with their median value indicating that debate remains constant. The CIA's perspective contrasts with the three other agencies, reflecting the perception that debate remains constant or increases, with increases serving as this agency's median. Finally, the one "Other" informant reported that the nature of the debate "depended" on other factors and could not be characterized by one of the other three scaling options. This difference does call into question the various Departments' perspectives regarding what *Open Debate* should resemble during crisis policy-making processes. It also reminds us to reconsider issues related to information exchange. While this is the only variable of significance in the first core factor, the second — *Crisis Definition* — contains a couple of interesting classified indicators.

Although discussed in the previous section outlining the modified core factor, the boxplots for two indicators associated with this core factor substantiate the interpretation of two issues related to *Crisis Definition*. First, a clear fissure does exist regarding the use of criteria to prioritize crises (see figure 8.2). Second, the boxplot illustrates differences by Department concerning the issue of which agency should serve as the "lead agent" (see figure 8.3).




Figure 8.2. Criteria Set Classified by Individual's Department³

While the White House/NSC and Defense Department informants expressed a wide range of responses as depicted by the "long boxes," the State Department and CIA are clearly on opposite ends of the spectrum regarding the use of a criteria set (represented by the "flat lines" on opposite ends of the scale) and each shares less overlap with the White House/NSC and Defense than they probably realize. However, perceptions regarding the "lead agent" are clearly verified through the use of this statistical tool.

³ Scaling: 1=does; 2=it depends; 3=does not.




Figure 8.3. Lead Agent (Self) Classified by Individual's Department⁴

These two indicators represent the only interesting findings for departmental classification for this core factor. Again, the "short boxes" for the White House/NSC and State Department indicate that each agency perceives it should serve as the leader for policy development from 51 to 100 percent of the time. The Defense Department informants provided a broader range of responses, noting that Defense should serve as leader less than 25 percent to 75 percent of the time. In contrast, the "flat lines" connote that CIA informants indicated they should never serve as leader and the "Other" informant said its agency should serve as leader less than 25 percent of the time. Resuming this discussion with

⁴ Scaling: 1=less than 25%; 2=25-50%; 3=51-75%; 4=76-100%; 5=never (not our role).

Organizational Communication, let us continue through the remaining four core factors.

From the complexity of the modified core factor itself, one could logically expect numerous interesting classified findings by Department. While the Departments' perspectives do indeed vary greatly on almost every indicator, the most important differences were addressed during the discussion of the core factors themselves in chapter 7. Perhaps most striking here, based upon the assumptions framing this research, are the *similarities*. Two warrant attention as a means to reinforce these findings before proceeding to the qualitative analysis. They reflect perceptions of departmental missions/goals (i.e., oriented toward prevention, defense, or both) and departmental political ideology (i.e., *realist*, *idealist*, or a mix of both).

First, it is again striking that the Departments' views regarding missions/goals remain consistent (see figure 8.4). This figure shows that the White House/NSC informants perceive their mission to be one of defense (i.e., responding to crises) while both the State and Defense Departments collectively characterized their mission as involving elements of defense and prevention (i.e., proactive crisis aversion). Data indicated that only the CIA (with one outlier) and "Other" informants perceived their roles as predominantly prevention-oriented.




Figure 8.4. Department Mission Classified by Individual's Department⁵

Relatedly, with the exception of the State Department (and the one "Other"), views regarding political ideology illustrate that the U.S. government officials responding to the questionnaire remain overwhelmingly *realist* in political orientation (at least where foreign affairs and national security are concerned; see figure 8.5). In reviewing the second, "long" bar representing State Department perceptions of political ideology, it appears that the informants reported a range of views, indicating that some State decision-makers reflect the *realist* paradigm, some the *idealist*, and many, a mix of both. This highlighted difference will be

⁵ Scaling: 1=prevention; 2=defense; 3=both.

explored further during the qualitative analysis. By this point, the interpretation of these visual tools is perhaps transparent. Thus, for the remainder of this section the actual boxplots are illustrated as figures, but discussed only in abbreviated fashion.




Figure 8.5. Department's Political Ideology Classified by Individual's Department⁶

While these are interesting visuals for these two indicators, no departmental classification issues proved relevant for the core factor representing *Agency's Policy-Making Approach*. This is not so for the fifth core factor, *Agency's Decision-Making Profile*.

⁶ Scaling: 1=realist; 2=mix of both; 3=idealist.

In reviewing the critical elements related to *Agency's Decision-Making Profile*, the range of perspectives regarding crisis analysis is remarkable. Perhaps most interesting is the departmental classification of the indicator related to reliance upon others for a "majority" of the crisis analysis (see figure 8.6).




Figure 8.6. Majority of Crisis Analysis Classified by Individual's Department⁷

One can draw his or her own conclusions from this figure, but it is interesting to "see" the distinction between the State Department and the remaining agencies regarding this issue. It also highlights a potential question regarding trust between agencies during information exchange — does State trust the Intelligence

⁷ Scaling: 1=less than 25%; 2=25-50%; 3=51-75%; 4=76-100%.

Community less than the others, compelling it to conduct its own crisis analysis? If this is the case, how does recognition of this redundant intelligence effort affect interagency relations? Purely conjecture at this point, this departmental classification pushes this type of question to the fore and demands exploration through the qualitative analysis phase of this research.

The issues highlighted above—from perceptions of *Open Debate* to ideas related to the conduct of a *Majority of Crisis Analysis*—take on additional significance viewed in terms of each Department's perspective. This is one classification condition that produced interesting results. Differences also exist across the interagency process in terms of one's level of involvement in policy-making.

Level within the Interagency Process

Employing an approach similar to that above, this section discusses differences in terms of informants' *Level within the Interagency Process*, that is across the three levels of the interagency community: principals, deputies, and those at the interagency working group level. Looking first at the *Level of Open Debate Surrounding Policy Options and Decisions*, it easy to identify a contrasting perspective regarding *Other's Self-Interest Level*. Depicted as figure 8.7, this boxplot indicates a fissure between the principals-deputies groups and those at the interagency working group level. Admittedly, the number of individuals

classified at the interagency working group level is small, but this contrasting perspective does raise questions regarding the factors that prompt self-interest to be polarized toward the “high” end at the highest levels of the policy process. This relationship is depicted below – note, however, there are “outliers” who contend the level of self-interest is not “high” in both the principals and deputies groups (see figure 8.7).




Figure 8.7. Other's Self-Interest Classified by Level within Interagency Process⁸

Interestingly, differences surround notions of *Open Debate* as well. While the principals almost uniformly believe open debate is high (note there are outliers

⁸ Scaling: 1=low; 2=it depends; 3=high.

within the PC category), the deputies and those below them share a different conception (see figure 8.8).




Figure 8.8. Open Debate Generally Classified by Level within Interagency Process⁹

This dramatic cleavage becomes even more apparent when looking at the raw data the informants provided (see table 8.1).

⁹ Scaling: 1=high; 2=it depends; 3=low.

Table 8.1. Perceptions of Open Debate Classified by Level within the Interagency Process

**Level within Interagency (F5.7/B) * Open Debate Generally
(F5.3/S1d) Crosstabulation**

Count		Open Debate Generally (F5.3/S1d)			Total
		High	It Depends	Low	
Level within	PC	21	4	—	25
Interagency	DC	23	—	10	33
(F5.7/B)	IWG	5	1	5	11
Total		49	5	15	69

Placed within the context of the earlier discussion regarding the idea that the agency executives classify the nature of their *General Problem Analysis* as “deep,”¹⁰ this fissure bears further investigation since those at the lowest level of the policy process are evenly split regarding the level of open debate and those at the mid-level are mixed, but still tend to believe debate is “high.” Again, looking across core factors we can see a potential linkage to *Crisis Definition – Perception of Risk*.

It seems as if those at the highest levels of policy development may perceive their agencies have far broader experience with the types of crises the U.S. government will face in the future than do those “specialists” at the lower level of the policy process. This contrasting perspective became immediately apparent when reviewing table 8.2 and figure 8.9.

¹⁰ Recall that 84.4 percent (27/32) of the executives characterized their crisis analysis as deep—only 60.0 percent (6/10) staff members and 61.5 percent (16/26) middle managers characterized their analysis as deep.

Table 8.2. Perceptions of Agency's Experience Level Classified by Level within the Interagency Process

Level within Interagency (F5.7/B) * Agency's Experience (F5.4/S4) Crosstabulation

Count		Agency's Experience (F5.4/S4)		Total
		Broad	Limited	
Level within Interagency (F5.7/B)	PC	23	2	25
	DC	29	4	33
	IWG	7	4	11
Total		59	10	69




Figure 8.9. Agency's Experience Classified by Level within Interagency Process¹¹

¹¹ Scaling: 1=broad; 2=it depends; 3=limited.

From these cleavages, we can begin to recognize related fissures across the three actors within the interagency process. One of those connections can be made with *Ideology*. Identified earlier as a similarity across Departments, the principals-deputies level agrees that the political philosophy that drives policy development is almost universally *realist* in nature. However, as figure 8.10 depicts, those at the interagency working group level believe the *Ideology* within their respective Department is more mixed. In fact, while 82.5 percent (47/57) of those at the principals and deputies levels report *Ideology* as "realist," only 54.5 percent (6/11) of those at this third (and lowest) level classified it as "realist."




Figure 8.10. Department's Political Ideology Classified by Level within Interagency Process¹²

¹² Scaling: 1=realist; 2=mix of both; 3=idealist.

Again, while noting there are outliers in both the principals and deputies levels, this picture paints a stark contrast in views regarding the motivations behind interagency dynamics. This contrast may indeed relate to the two remaining divisions, those related to *Organizational Communication* and *Department's Internal Decision-Making Style*.

An argument can be put forth that the principals (and to a lesser degree the deputies) believe *Organizational Communication* is "flexible" during crisis policy development and (since the principals are at the heads of these Departments) that their *Department's Internal Decision-Making Style* is "participative" as an outgrowth of their worldview, a perspective directly influence by a *Realpolitik* political philosophy. These divisions are depicted in the two figures below (figures 8.11 and 8.12, respectively).




Figure 8.11. Organizational Communication Classified by Level within Interagency Process¹³

This figure indicates that both the principals and deputies characterize *Organizational Communication* during crises as overwhelmingly “flexible,” yet proportionately more within the interagency working group level perceive communication at times to be rigid.¹⁴ From this perspective, one can make a connection to *Department’s Internal Decision-Making Style* (see figure 8.12).

¹³ Scaling: 1=rigid; 2=it depends; 3=flexible.

¹⁴ In fact, only 17.2 percent (10/58) of the principals and deputies collectively characterized communication as “rigid” as compared with 36.4 percent (4/11) of those at the interagency working group level.




Figure 8.12. Department's Internal Decision-Making Style Classified by Level within Interagency Process¹⁵

We see that the principals described their Department's decision-making style as enthusiastically "participative," yet the deputies and interagency working group level actors see decision-making through a somewhat different lens. This difference in visual acuity may account for yet another variation across interagency levels, that related to the nature of the policy process.

Given the fact that under normal operating conditions the deputies are the bridge between the principals and the interagency working group, it is

¹⁵ Scaling: 1=participative; 2=it depends; 3=autocratic.

interesting to note the variation in levels regarding the nature of the policy process as being "open" or "closed" (see figure 8.13).




Figure 8.13. Description of Own Policy Process Classified by Level within Interagency Process¹⁶

Here, the principals classify the policy process as "open" while the deputies perceive it to be both "open" and "closed." We see that the interagency working group also believes it is a mixed process, yet 72.7 percent (8/11) contend it is more "open" than "closed." Highlighted as a topic for additional exploration earlier, this phenomenon needs to be examined in terms of the leadership issues addressed in table 6.3 (i.e., do the actions of the deputies provide a rationale as to

¹⁶ Scaling: 1=open; 2=it depends; 3=closed.

why people within a hierarchically-structured organization feel they operate within participative departmental environment?). This is an intriguing issue but perhaps one of the most crucial differences that becomes obvious by viewing the indicators through this analytical approach relates to *Perceptions of Other's Interagency Tactics*.

Identified during the discussion of this core factor as a reciprocal relationship (see discussion of figure 7.4), the correlation between *Agency's Perceptions of Other's Interagency Tactics* and *Agency's Policy-Making Approach: Interagency Tactics* remains a critical association for this research. It is interesting to note the difference in perception regarding *Other's Interagency Tactics* in terms of the three levels of interagency actors. As with other differences, both the tabular data and the visual depiction help accentuate this variation (see table 8.3 and figure 8.14, respectively).

Table 8.3. Perceptions of Other's Interagency Tactics Classified by Level within Interagency Process

Level within Interagency (F5.7/B) * Other Agencies Act (F5.3/S1a)					
Crosstabulation					
Count					
		Other Agencies Act (F5.3/S1a)			Total
		Collaboratively	It Depends	Competitively	
Level within	PC	9	12	4	25
Interagency	DC	14	8	8	30
(F5.7/B)	IWG	3	3	5	11
Total		26	23	17	66

The visual representation of these data proves confirmatory as one can immediately identify the differences between the principals and interagency working group, noting that the deputies' perspective spans both.




Figure 8.14. Perceptions of Other's Interagency Tactics Classified by Level within Interagency Process¹⁷

Perhaps of all the differences, however, this final classification is most noteworthy. After all, one can make a coherent argument that the National Security Council System remains the center of policy development. If that is indeed the case, then perceptions regarding one's ability to influence that system

¹⁷ Scaling: 1=collaboratively; 2=it depends; 3=competitively.

are of critical importance. Figure 8.15 captures the differences across the policy-making community regarding this crucial indicator.




Figure 8.15. Department Influence on NSC Classified by Level within Interagency Process¹⁸

This picture illustrates that the principals feel their respective Department's each have a "great" influence upon the National Security Council System, and thus, the development of policy. While the deputies share that perspective in part, the proportion of those at the interagency level that believe as strongly as the principals drops off sharply at this lowest level actor. The data in table 8.4 reinforce this impression.

¹⁸ Scaling: 1=great; 2=it depends; 3=limited.

Table 8.4. Perceptions Regarding Own Ability to Influence NSC Classified by Level within Interagency Process

Level within Interagency (F5.7/B) * Dept influence on NSC
(F5.6_5.8/S30) Crosstabulation

Count		Dept influence on NSC (F5.6_5.8/S30)			Total
		Great	It Depends	Limited	
Level within	PC	22	—	2	24
Interagency	DC	23	2	7	32
(F5.7/B)	IWG	5	2	4	11
Total		50	4	13	67

Taken together, these visual representations of differences in perspective across the three levels of actors within the interagency process begin to provide rationales for some of the issues addressed through this research. Given that this exploration strives to produce an empirically verifiable model relating interagency conflict to the development of conflict termination policy, these visual cues remain impressionistic but do provide clues to direct the remainder of this study's analytical effort. It is within this framework that these "findings" must be interpreted as we turn toward the second phase of this analysis, the content analysis of the interview data. Before proceeding with this activity, a few words must be said about the classification of these indicators with regard to case experience.

Historical Case Specifics

It must be reiterated that the presentation of these "findings," as with the others of this genre, remains impressionistic and exploratory given the purposive sampling technique used to collect data for analysis. Differentiating these indicators by historical case may highlight a few additional issues to orient the focus of the impending qualitative research. Noted earlier in the discussion of case specificity, "interagency experience" is considered a "case" in conjunction with the two primary events, the Persian Gulf and Bosnia.¹⁹ With these caveats repeated, we can now proceed.

Beginning with *Level of Open Debate Surrounding Policy Options and Decisions*, the similarities between Persian Gulf and Interagency Experience vis-à-vis Bosnia become almost immediately apparent. Specifically, the data indicate that with the exception of a few outliers, individuals with both Persian Gulf and Interagency Experience cases classified departmental interaction as "collaborative" while those with experience in Bosnia include the broader range of behaviors, noting "competitive" and "it depends" responses in conjunction with "collaborative" (see figure 8.16).

¹⁹ This approach is logical based on the chronological development of the interagency process. Hence, the Persian Gulf captures the 1990-1991 timeframe; Bosnia, 1993-1995; and Interagency Experience, 1996-1998. In this manner, the changes over time can be identified through the examination of these three periods.




Figure 8.16. Departmental Relations at Time of Initial Crisis Definition Classified by Case²⁰

This difference is accompanied by another related to perceptions of *Open Debate at Time of Crisis Definition* (see figure 8.17). We again see similarities across the Persian Gulf and Interagency Experience cases, yet a void appears when considering the range of responses provided by those whose experience dealt with the Bosnia policy development process.

²⁰ Scaling: 1=hostile; 2=it depends; 3=collaborative.




Figure 8.17. Open Debate Generally Classified by Case²¹

This figure illustrates that perceptions of open debate fluctuated. Moreover, the data indicated that impressions of political ideology also vacillated with a complete similarity becoming visible in the cases of the Persian Gulf and Interagency Experience (see figure 8.18). Hence, those with experience with these paired cases characterized political ideology as predominantly "realist," those with experience with Bosnia provide a range from "realist" to "idealist," with a mixture of both possible as well.

²¹ Scaling: 1=high; 2=it depends; 3=low.




Figure 8.18. Department's Political Ideology
Classified by Case²²

A different pattern emerges when reviewing data regarding *Organizational Communication*. Unlike the previous pairing, we now see that an overwhelming majority of the Persian Gulf (83.3 percent) and Bosnia (83.9 percent) informants classified communication as "flexible," yet only 65.4 percent of those embroiled in interagency decision processes from 1996-1998 categorized communication as "flexible." Figure 8.19 depicts this difference.

²² Scaling: 1=realist; 2=mix of both; 3=idealist.




Figure 8.19. Organizational Communication
Classified by Case²³

This finding is related to another pairing between informants representing the first two cases. This pairing returns us to similarities between the Persian Gulf and Interagency Experience. Depicted in figure 8.20, it appears that perceptions regarding *Department's Internal Decision-Making Style* varies by case. Here, we see that Persian Gulf and Interagency Experience informants believe their Department's decision-making style tends to be "participative." Of those with experience with Bosnia, 54.8 percent (17/31) contend their Department's internal decision-making style is "participative," 32.3 percent (10/31) rate it as

²³ Scaling: 1=rigid; 2=it depends; 3=flexible.

"autocratic," and 12.9 percent (4/31) maintain that their Department's decision-making style remains contingent upon other factors.




Figure 8.20. Department's Internal Decision-Making Style Classified by Case²⁴

Acknowledging these similarities opens the door to yet another Persian Gulf-Interagency Experience pairing, that related to *Planning Focus*. It appears that the Departments acknowledged more of a strategic planning focus when considering the processes associated with the Persian Gulf and current Interagency Experience. Conversely, 64.5 percent of those providing data regarding Bosnia

²⁴ Scaling: 1=participative; 2=it depends; 3=autocratic.

planning processes characterized them as "crisis action response." Figure 8.21 illustrates this arrangement.




Figure 8.21. Planning Focus Classified by Case²⁵

Another potentially intriguing relationship is that between Persian Gulf and Interagency experience in terms of an *Individual's Ability to Propose Innovative Solutions*. Depicted as figure 8.22, it appears that those with Bosnia experience almost uniformly classify their ability to propose innovative solutions as "extensive"; those within the other two classifications report a mixed response, with the most current interagency experience indicating a trend away from an "extensive" ability to innovate.

²⁵ Scaling: 1=strategic planning; 2=crisis action response; 3=both.




Figure 8.22. Individual's Ability to Propose Innovative Solutions Classified by Case²⁶

These differences are interesting, but must be evaluated within the context of the national security process by examining the variation across these classifications with regard to the National Security Council System. A quick review of those indicators illumines two additional findings that warrant attention. Let us begin with *Agency's Perceptions Regarding Own Ability to Influence NSC*.

Identified as a significant indicator during the core factor analysis in chapter 7, an agency's beliefs regarding its ability to influence the NSC seem to vary

²⁶ Scaling: 1=limited; 2=it depends; 3=extensive.

across these three cases, with a distinct parallel surfacing between Persian Gulf and Bosnia in direct contrast to Interagency Experience (see figure 8.23).




Figure 8.23. Agency's Perceptions Regarding Own Ability to Influence NSC Classified by Case²⁷

This pairing is curious when considered in light of the next indicator, *NSC's Role in Policy-Making Process* (see figure 8.24). Together, these two pictures communicate a growing feeling within the Interagency Experience informants of a limited ability to influence the National Security Council (figure 8.23) while a growing number believe the National Security Council's operating procedures "impede," rather than "facilitate," policy development (figure 8.24). It is interesting to discover the progression of these perceptions over time as one

²⁷ Scaling: 1=great; 2=it depends; 3=limited.

notes that the Bosnia policy development process stands as an interim chronological bridge between the two extremes (i.e., "Interagency Experience" can be viewed as a temporal point like the Persian Gulf and Bosnia cases).




Figure 8.24. NSC's Role in Policy-Making Process
Classified by Case²⁸

As with the identification of difference according to *Department* and *Level within Interagency Process*, the issues outlined according to *Case Specificity* illuminate a third basis for difference, perhaps one shaped by the context of the crisis itself. This supposition will be investigated further during the qualitative analysis of the interview data.

²⁸ Scaling: 1=facilitate; 2=it depends; 3=impede.

DEMOGRAPHIC CLASSIFICATION: SUMMARY AND INTERPRETATION

Merely "thumbing through" these simple figures reflecting the differences across the three classifications makes apparent that the most pronounced variation exists across the three *levels of actors*. Although the foregoing discussion only briefly surveyed these differences, it did highlight that major differences in perspective persist based upon these three categories. Recognition of these differences in this impressionistic, yet methodical, way provides a logical connection with this inquiry's second analytical phase, creating a link between the analysis performed throughout this chapter and the forthcoming qualitative analysis. Before pressing forward, let us briefly summarize the essence of these findings.

When assessing the differences across Departments, the greatest variation existed regarding perceptions of open debate (figure 8.1), the use of a criteria set to prioritize crises (figure 8.2), and who conducts a majority of crisis analysis (figure 8.6).²⁹ In the first instance, the White House/NSC and State Department contended *Open Debate* decreased as the crisis progresses, Defense asserted that it remained constant, and the CIA felt it increased. This suggests that debate diminished as policy development and implementation become routinized once the crisis proceeds from its initial outbreak to a point where decision-makers

²⁹ Although other differences exist, these three present the most interesting findings. Hence, this discussion is limited to these three interdepartmental cleavages.

became more focused on departmental operations and less oriented on overall policy development. This would also account for the increase in debate by the CIA as they would gather increased amounts of intelligence and convey that information to their functional agencies. Likewise, the Director of Central Intelligence would take on a greater information dissemination role in the NSC System. This issue regarding information exchange via open debate requires further exploration through the qualitative analysis. Just as interesting is the dichotomy between State and Defense regarding the use of criteria to prioritize crises.

Although the White House/NSC responses covered the range of options from "does" to "does not" use a criteria set, the White House/NSC informants replied that the use of a criteria set "depends" on other factors (e.g., presidential attention, domestic politics). The Defense Department's responses covered the range as well, yet they claimed their Department did tend to use criteria (e.g., the national interests). The CIA also claimed their agency employed criteria. Alternatively, the State Department indicated clearly (with a couple of outliers) that their agency did not use criteria to prioritize crises. This difference between State and Defense highlights one critical area in which organizational cultures differ. This difference may be important for agency views on the use of force and demands further exploration through the upcoming qualitative analysis. This brings us to the final broad-based difference illuminated through this analysis,

views regarding whether the informant conducted a majority of the crisis analysis.

The interesting aspect of this finding (see figure 8.6) is that only the State Department informants reported that they relied on someone else for a majority of the crisis analysis less than 25 percent of the time. Noted in the discussion of this boxplot, the fact raises issues related to interagency communication and information exchange, issues for the qualitative analysis to explore.

Together, these three differences related to open debate, criteria sets, and crisis analysis provide areas for further analysis since they indicate an organizational cultural cleavage that may impact interagency dynamics significantly. Differences in perception related to informants' level within the interagency process accompanied these departmental differences.

The data reflected disparate views regarding several dimensions of interagency dynamics, including: other's level of self-interest (figure 8.7), open debate (figure 8.8), agency's experience (figure 8.9), Department's political ideology (figure 8.10), organizational communication (figure 8.11), Department's decision-making style (figure 8.12), nature of the policy process (figure 8.13), perceptions of other's interagency tactics (figure 8.14), and perceptions regarding departmental influence on the NSC (figure 8.15). While specific summaries of each are not required here, the intriguing feature of this analysis appears to be the overall similarities in perspective between the principals and deputies, and

the apparently major differences between these two levels and the interagency working group. This cleavage generates questions regarding the decision-makers' perspectives on leadership and decision-making styles, the role of prior experience, the nature of organizational communication, and perceptions of other's interagency behaviors. Most importantly, however, these differences across interagency actors raise questions about departmental influence on the NSC. Principals believe their respective Department's have great influence; deputies perceive departmental influence as predominantly significant, but recognize that such influence remains contingent on other factors; and interagency working group members' perspectives on influence covered the entire range from great to limited. Together with the issues identified earlier, this difference emphasizes that those at the highest level of policy-making believe their influence is significant—these are the political appointees who serve as the principals (and some deputies) in the interagency process. Conversely, those who serve at the lowest level (i.e., the career bureaucrats with the greatest process experience) view their influence as mixed, suggesting that this influence remains contingent upon other factors beyond process structure. This finding demands further exploration through the qualitative analysis. Before proceeding to that phase, let us summarize these findings in terms of case specificity.

Recognizing again that the number of informants in each category remains too dissimilar to make valid comparisons (especially with only 12 Persian Gulf

informants), the quantitative data have illuminated similarities and differences across these indicators within the core factors according to case pairings—three distinct groupings emerged. First, the Persian Gulf and Interagency Experience shared similar findings (with the Bosnia case providing less consistency across these dimensions) in terms of perceptions of departmental interaction (figure 8.16), open debate (figure 8.17), Department's political ideology (figure 8.18), planning focus (figure 8.21), and individual's ability to propose innovative solutions (figure 8.22). Anticipating later discussion, after almost 200 hours of interviews I concluded that one possible explanation for this similarity between the Persian Gulf and Interagency Experience along these dimensions arose from a structural condition. Those involved in the Persian Gulf process at the interagency working group level now possess almost 10 years more experience and are positioned organizationally to develop interagency dynamics in ways that reflect their earlier experiences. These individuals were not positioned to have this type of influence during the Bosnia policy process. Hence, these individuals recreated the organizational dynamics they experienced during that period. Moreover, their subordinates now emulate them, a phenomenon reflected in the data. This pairing could also be explained through an issue related to timing. The Bosnia dimensions may be dissimilar to the pairing because the interagency developed policy at the beginning of a new administration when the newly appointed decision-makers and other actors had

yet to establish working relations. This precept may be valid especially for departmental relations and open debate as these dimensions both relate to communication. The installation of new actors may account likewise for the perspectives on Department's political ideology in that the Clinton administration may have broken with the Bush administration's *realist* perspective early in its first term, but moved away from its *idealist* perspective over time (and with lessons learned) toward a more *realist* ideology in its second term. In similar fashion, a learning process may have exposed the need to plan for a longer vision in Clinton's second term. Hence, while the administration's planning focus during Bosnia proved one of crisis action response, current decision-makers (i.e., Interagency Experience informants) reflected a move toward strategic planning. Finally, the idea that the ability to generate innovative solutions is becoming more limited in the Interagency Experience case may reflect that the principals and deputies are more comfortable now with making decisions, or perhaps, they recognize their role is to make those decisions. Some within the decision-making process may perceive this as a move that limits innovation. Together, these inferences demand further examination regarding the role leadership, decision-making style, and prior experience play in creating interagency dynamics, as well as the ways in which these individuals define their roles within the interagency process. This last finding may account for the transformation of relations within organizations as depicted by the second

classification where Interagency Experience differs from the Persian Gulf and Bosnia pairing.

The Persian Gulf and Bosnia shared similarities (with the Interagency Experience case providing less consistency across these dimensions) regarding organizational communication (figure 8.19), Department's internal decision-making style (figure 8.20), and agency's perceptions regarding own ability to influence the NSC (figure 8.23). In the first instance, as noted above, an enhanced comfort level with one's responsibilities may create an environment wherein individuals perceive they have less influence. Hence, if decisions are being made within Department's by the principals (and deputies), this may create the perception that organizational communication is less flexible than in the past. This does not fit with the second finding in this pairing, that related to decision-making style. The quantitative data reflected that those with Interagency Experience classified Department's decision-making style as participative (with a few outliers), yet informants for the Persian Gulf and Bosnia characterized their departmental decision-making styles as including both participative and autocratic dimensions. Finally, those with Persian Gulf and Bosnia experience perceived their Department's influence on the NSC to be high whereas those with Interagency Experience characterized their influence as great, but moving toward being limited. In light of the signed digraph analysis presented in chapter 7 (see figure 7.6), those who believe they have a great ability to influence the NSC

characterized the NSC's role in policy-making as facilitative. This perspective on the NSC's role highlights the final similarity across these cases, illuminating a pairing between Bosnia and Interagency Experience.

The Bosnia and Interagency Experience cases shared similarities (with the Persian Gulf providing less consistency) across one dimension, perspectives regarding the *NSC's Role in the Policy-Making Process* (figure 8.24). It follows that the gradual shift in a Department's ability to influence the NSC from "great" (Persian Gulf) to "limited" (Interagency Experience) across these three cases would mirror perspectives on NSC procedures, from "facilitative" (Persian Gulf) to being an "impediment" (Bosnia and Interagency Experience) to policy-making. As with previous dimensions, these findings point to a need to explore further the role of leadership, communication, and agency roles in the policy process.

At this juncture, summarizing the findings by demographic classification may prove helpful. Table 8.5 lists the indicators the data identified as the most divergent according to *Department*, *Level within the Interagency Process*, and *Historical Case*. This visual comparison also illuminates the indicators the data revealed as different for two or more cases (e.g., *Open Debate (Generally)* and *Department's Political Ideology*). Although further discussion is not warranted at this point, recognizing these demographic parallels may facilitate explanation of the qualitative data analysis.

Table 8.5. Demographic Classification Summary of Findings

Indicator:	Dept.	Level	Case
<i>Open Debate as Crisis Progresses</i>	X		
<i>Open Debate (Generally)</i>		X	X
<i>Criteria Set</i>	X		
<i>Lead Agent (Self)</i>	X		
<i>Department Mission</i>	X		
<i>Department's Political Ideology</i>	X	X	X
<i>Majority of Crisis Analysis</i>	X		
<i>Perceptions of Other's Self-Interest</i>		X	
<i>Agency's Experience</i>		X	
<i>Organizational Communication</i>		X	X
<i>Department's Internal Decision-Making Style</i>		X	X
<i>Description of Own Policy Process</i>		X	
<i>Perceptions of Other's Interagency Tactics</i>		X	
<i>Department Influence on NSC</i>		X	
<i>Planning Focus</i>			X
<i>Individual's Ability to Propose Innovative Solutions</i>			X
<i>NSC's Role in Policy-Making Process</i>			X
<i>Agency's Perceptions Regarding own Ability to Influence NSC</i>			X
<i>Departmental Relations at Time of Initial Crisis Definition</i>			X

Although exploratory in nature, this analysis provides the basis for analyzing the qualitative data in two ways. First, recognition of the fact that the greatest differences across these interagency levels (i.e., principal, deputy, or interagency working group) provides the basis for organizing the qualitative data and the selection of those informants whose interviews provided data for coding (see discussion in chapter 9). Second, the differences related to leadership, agency roles, communication, decision-making styles, the use of criteria to prioritize crises, and influence within the policy-making process provide a quantitative

data baseline (in conjunction with table 7.3) for identifying themes during the process of coding the qualitative data. With these points in mind, let us proceed to the qualitative data analysis.

CHAPTER 9

QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS: PREPARING THE DATA FOR CONTENT ANALYSIS
AND EMERGENT THEME IDENTIFICATION

OVERVIEW

The previous chapters analyzed quantitative findings concerning the interagency dynamics that characterize the U.S. government national security policy-making process revealed by data from *questionnaires*. This chapter discusses the approach to qualitative data preparation and analysis as a bridge into the ensuing analytical chapters. It briefly outlines the data collection and analysis process applied to qualitative *interview* data, beginning by reiterating the purpose of the qualitative approach and explaining the data analysis technique employed throughout the qualitative analysis by highlighting the classification schema and sampling frame. As a preview to the data analysis technique used to develop the qualitative findings, this chapter explains by example the data coding process whereby emergent themes were identified. It concludes by discussing the limitations of qualitative analysis. Let us begin by reiterating the purpose of the qualitative analysis.

PURPOSE OF APPROACH

Quantitative analysis provided the basis for exploring the nature of the interagency dynamics that shape the national security decision-making process. This chapter's complementary analysis – the qualitative, content analysis of the interview data – provides contextual richness to enhance our understanding of the interagency process and conflict termination policy development. Specifically, this analytical phase connects the interagency *process* of decision-making to the *policy* it produces. In this manner, a process-substance relationship emerged when analyzing the interview data, a relationship that contextualizes and enriches the quantitative findings related to the six core factors while providing the basis for analyzing the two historical cases of the Persian Gulf War and Bosnia. To ground this analysis in its proper context, a few words regarding data analysis techniques are now warranted.

DATA ANALYSIS: CLASSIFICATION AND SAMPLING

Recognizing that the research collected data via a purposive sampling technique (i.e., an informant strategy), a method to protect the identities of the informants had to be developed while simultaneously capturing the breadth of views represented by the individuals themselves. Selecting a random sample from the categorized population of informants achieved these interrelated goals. Hence, to explore the connection between interagency dynamics and policy

development, the analysis built upon the quantitative findings by classifying the informant population according to the individual's "level within the interagency process." Recall that the quantitative analysis indicated that the greatest differences existed across the principal, deputies, and interagency working group levels (see chapter 8). Since the research strives to identify the effects of interagency conflict on the development of conflict termination policy, focusing on the informants' level within the process emerged as a logical starting point for analyzing the qualitative data. After classifying the 135 interview informants according to the criteria presented in chapter 6,¹ this analysis divided the aggregate population by "Level within the Interagency Process" (i.e., the principals [PC], deputies [DC], interagency working group [IWG], and "not applicable" [N/A]) categories to produce the following classifications (see figure 9.1).

¹ Specifically, "principals" are those who (1) are the top executives of each agency (e.g., Secretary of State, Director of Central Intelligence—the "actual principals"), (2) regularly attend "principals plus one" meetings, or (3) serve as executive assistants to the "actual principals" and therefore have access to the principals and their ideas on a regular basis. Similarly, "deputies" are (1) the "actual deputies" (e.g., the Undersecretaries or Principal Deputies) or (2) regularly attend "deputies plus one" meetings. Finally, the "Interagency Working Group" members are those who serve as action officers across the U.S. government and are charged with developing the details for their respective deputies and principals.

Level within the Interagency Process




Figure 9.1. Informant Demographic by Level within Interagency Process

Note that the "not applicable" category includes those individuals representing the media, think tanks, and others who are not involved with the interagency policy process firsthand, but do have experiences that help clarify an understanding of the process itself. Although not coded for the purpose of the present analysis, it is important to include them in the demographic representing the total research participant population. It is also interesting to note that with the exception of the DC-level which reflected a decrease of 10 percent for this analysis, the percentages by category do not differ significantly with those of the

69 informants used in the quantitative analysis (refer to figure 6.2). Using the three interagency informant classifications and a threshold of 50 percent of the total informant universe, a random numbers table identified the informants whose interviews would be analyzed. This approach led to the selection of 75 interviews for analysis, representing slightly more than 50 percent of the 135 informants. Again using a random numbers table, additional transcripts were added to ensure the greatest diversity based upon other demographic characteristics (e.g., inclusion of political appointees if not captured in the original identification process or inclusion of Intelligence Community individuals if not selected in the first sampling phase). While this approach did require more principals to be coded vis-à-vis deputies (and certainly, those at the interagency working group level), that is a logical outgrowth of the political appointee system that positions most non-career appointees at the highest level of government, the principals level. By Department, the coding schema produced the result presented in table 9.1.

This table shows that the coding schema maintained relative parity across the three major policy-making agencies at the principals and deputies levels, and across State and Defense at the interagency working group level (note that this analysis coded no White House/National Security Council informants at this level). Additionally, this schema made every effort to include CIA perspectives as well. While the one PC-level CIA informant could have been coded as an

Table 9.1. Coding Schema for Qualitative Interview Data (by Department)

Level within Interagency * Individual's Department * Qualitative Coding Accomplished Crosstabulation

Count

Qualitative Coding Accomplished			Individual's Department				Total
			WH/NSC	State	Defense	CIA	
Yes	Level within Interagency	PC	11	10	13	—	34
		DC	1	11	11	6	29
		IWG	—	5	6	—	12
	Total		12	26	30	6	75
No	Level within Interagency	PC	6	6	5	1	18
		DC	—	2	16	4	22
		IWG	—	4	4	—	9
		N/A	1	—	—	—	11
	Total		7	12	25	5	60

addition to the original 50 percent sampling frame, after reviewing the transcripts I determined that the inclusion of the six others at the DC-level more than adequately captured this individual's perspective.²

To summarize, this research classified the 135 research informants according to their respective level within the interagency process. Using a random numbers table, I selected 75 interviews for thematic analysis. Once classified, the data were prepared for content analysis.

CONTENT ANALYSIS: CODING THE INTERVIEW DATA

Through an inductive process that allowed themes to emerge, I coded the data to identify recurring themes. In a very basic sense, informants' responses

² Note that I reviewed this transcript since it represented the only PC-level informant—such was not the case with the other second-round coding additions.

were coded according to the essential idea each response conveyed. These coded responses (which contained the demographic coding for Department, Level within the Interagency Process, Historical Case, and the informant's interview number) were then separated and categorized according to aggregate themes (e.g., leadership, organizational culture, strategic vision). I then explored these 26 emergent themes for possible connections, discovering they could be recast into 7 macro themes which were supported by the remaining 19 micro themes. For example, one key thought provided by an informant was:

More than anything else, the lack of a coherent policy at the highest level is the problem [in generating interagency conflict]. From the very top there must be articulated a vision and a policy. In their absence, these fiefdoms will always push their agendas (e.g., human rights, energy).

The central aspect of this thought dealt with "vision." Therefore, this idea was coded as "Strategic Vision," a macro theme that emerged from the data analysis (i.e., it did not serve as a pre-existing theme for which I sought confirmatory evidence). This emergent theme was supported further by various interrelated micro themes. Let us look briefly at one for illustrative purposes.

The micro themes served as foundational components for the macro themes. In keeping with the above example regarding "Strategic Vision," one informant noted that

Interagency conflict results from a lack of understanding of each agencies'/Departments' (intra- and inter-) capabilities and a lack of

connectivity between your short-range crisis reaction types and your long-range visionaries. That's a corollary to "you've got to have strategic vision" – and we don't have it.

This idea, and others like it, illuminated the relationship between "core competencies" (i.e., the expertise that an agency brings to bear as a product of its roles and missions) and "vision." In this manner, the informant provided the impetus to classify core competencies as a supporting micro theme related to "Strategic Vision." This iterative coding process identified the emergent themes these knowledgeable policy-makers perceived as most important in the development of interagency conflict and termination policy. Before discussing these themes in detail, however, the limitations of the data must be addressed to ground these qualitative findings within their proper context.

Limitations of Qualitative Analysis

All data have inherent limitations. In addition to those limitations outlined in the methodology section of this work (see chapter 5), three emerge as preeminent in conducting interviews in this study: selective memory, incomplete sampling, and a lack of comparability. It is important to recognize that the 135 informants interviewed to provide the data for this research suffer the effects of the judgmental heuristics discussed in the earlier critique of Rational Choice Theory (see chapter 2). Specifically, an informant's ability to recall past events is tainted by current experience as well as the salience he or she gives to certain facets of

one's prior experience with regard to the evaluation of that prior experience as a whole. Thus, individuals whose recall capacity is shaped by the more positive memories of their experience will discount the negative facets of that experience. Relatedly, those who harbor significant emotional distress as a product of that experience will distort those negative images, having the effect of suppressing the positive memories. In this manner, selective memory presents a significant challenge for any research based upon perceptions. This dilemma is complicated by the second limitation, incomplete sampling.

The research repeatedly emphasized that purposive sampling was used to collect both the quantitative and qualitative data to explore interagency dynamics and its relationship to conflict termination policy development. While the caveats noted in chapter 6 apply here as well, it is important to reiterate that every attempt has been made to lessen the negative effects of this limitation through a multi-method approach. Further, as explained above, analysis included additional interviews to enrich the qualitative data set in an effort to capture the widest breadth of departmental views (refer back to table 9.1). As broad as this sampling frame is, I would be remiss if I failed to acknowledge the fact that the purposive sampling technique used herein presents the third limitation of the data, the lack of comparability.

In essence, the sampling approach employed in this research forfeited breadth to achieve depth. Because the sampling frame did not emanate from a

normally distributed population, the data cannot be interpreted as scientifically representative of the actors within the interagency process. Consequently, this lack of comparability ensures that the findings cannot be generalized to the population of U.S. interagency policy-makers in a statistically inferential manner.

With these three limitations acknowledged, it is now possible to place the analysis and findings in their proper context. The purpose of this qualitative analysis is to provide further evidence on the quantitative findings detailed in chapter 7 while simultaneously exploring the data for those themes not investigated through the quantitative approach. Taken together, these heuristic findings create a model that illuminates the effects of interagency conflict on the development of conflict termination policy. Through future research, this framework can then be tested and refined to produce a model with enhanced predictability. With this understanding in mind, let us begin the qualitative analysis.

CHAPTER 10

DYNAMIC THEMES: RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN INTERAGENCY DYNAMICS
AND POLICY SUBSTANCE

OVERVIEW

This chapter begins the qualitative data analysis. It develops a framework to classify emergent themes into three categories — (1) those illuminating the ways in which selected *dynamic themes* affect interagency dynamics, (2) those characterizing the ways in which the *contextual elements* framing the policy process shape the *dynamic themes*, and (3) those that have *crosscutting effects* on both process and substance (i.e., they influence both *dynamic themes* and *contextual elements*). Where appropriate, the next three chapters incorporate the quantitative findings presented in chapter 7 to connect the findings of the quantitative and qualitative approaches the research employs. The chapter concludes by interpreting these findings in light of their fit with the Bureaucratic Politics Model of decision-making.

EMPLOYING A MULTI-METHOD APPROACH: CONTENT ANALYSIS
& THEMATIC IDENTIFICATION

Using the inductive coding process outlined in the previous chapter, the content analysis of these 75 interviews shed light on 26 interrelated themes (see table 10.1). The quantitative analysis performed in chapter 7 highlighted issues related to six of these themes for further exploration through the qualitative analysis (see table 7.3; i.e., risk, criteria, information exchange, leadership, interagency tactics, and roles and missions). Upon closer examination, it became apparent that these themes could be classified as ideas dealing with (1) the ways in which the *dynamic themes* related to policy-making (e.g., leadership, personalities, personal relationships) shape the interagency process or (2) those dealing with the ways in which the *contextual elements* serve as parameters for the policy process, therefore shaping interagency dynamics. Admittedly, analysis revealed a great deal of interplay between these two categories throughout the policy-making process. An in-depth data analysis revealed that these experienced informants' ideas could be recast into macro and supporting micro themes based upon the connections they made between 26 interrelated qualitative themes (these are recast in table 10.2). Specifically, the data indicated that *Leadership*, *Decision-Making as Negotiation*, and *Domestic Politics* emerged as three macro themes that illustrate the ways in which interagency dynamics shape process and the substantive aspects of policy.

Table 10.1. Qualitative Theme Categorization in Terms of Process and Substance

Dynamic Themes	Contextual Elements
Access/Privileged Access/Policy Outcome	Perspectives on Conflict Termination Policy
Communication/Debate/Information	Realistic Strategy/COA Development
The Congress	Budget/Funding/Resources
Decision-Making Style	Core Competencies
Domestic Politics/Public Opinion	Views of Crisis Analysis
Innovative Thinking	Views regarding Termination Criteria
Leadership	Views of End State Vision
Decision-Making as Negotiation	Institutional Equities
Organizational Culture	National Interests
Personality	Prior Experience
Personal Relations/Networking	Risk/ Accountability
	Strategic Vision/Planning
	Worldview/Ideology/Philosophy

In related fashion, the data showed that Strategic Vision and Planning Processes, Institutional Equities, and Perspectives on Appropriate Conflict Termination Policy represented themes wherein contextual elements shape interagency dynamics and, therefore, policy outcomes. Finally, the data revealed that two factors had crosscutting effects on both interagency dynamics and contextual elements. These two crosscutting effects themes emerged as Roles and Missions and Media Influence. This refined categorization (presented in table 10.2) does not intimate that these themes remain mutually exclusive. To the contrary, the informants provided data that cut across these classifications. However, their arrangement here provides a framework to explain their

significance for national security policy development in terms of the relationship between interagency dynamics and conflict termination policy.

Table 10.2. Macro and Supporting Micro Qualitative Analysis Themes

DYNAMIC THEMES:	CONTEXTUAL ELEMENTS:
Leadership <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Personality • Organizational Culture <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Decision-Making Style • Innovative Thinking • Communication, Debate, & Information • Personal Relations & Networking 	Strategic Vision & Planning Processes <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Core Competencies • National Interests & Intervention Criteria • Worldview: Ideology & Philosophy
Decision-Making as Negotiation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Access & Privilege • Policy Outcome 	Institutional Equities <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Personnel & Budgets • Risk & Accountability • Prior Experience
Domestic Politics <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Public Opinion • The Congress 	Perspectives on Appropriate Conflict Termination Policy <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Crisis Analysis • End State Vision • Termination Criteria • Strategy & COA Development
<div style="display: flex; align-items: center; justify-content: space-between;"> ← CROSSCUTTING EFFECTS: → </div> <p style="text-align: center;">"Roles and Missions" & "Media Influence"</p>	

Given the complexity of this approach, there is utility in recasting these themes to portray their interrelated, cumulative nature. Shown through figure 10.1, this perspective depicts the interaction between the "Contextual Elements," "Dynamic Themes," and "Crosscutting Effects" that frame interagency conflict

during termination policy development.¹ This chapter begins to elucidate this alternative approach to visualize the relationships between the *contextual elements* and *dynamic themes*, in concert with the *crosscutting effects*. As presented in figure 10.1, *dynamic themes* directly influence interagency conflict over termination policy development and are discussed, therefore, as the first category of emergent themes (see the shaded area of the framework). These themes concern the ways in which interagency dynamics influence the development of interagency conflict in terms of *Leadership, Decision-Making as Negotiation, and Domestic Politics*. In turn, figure 10.1 shows that *contextual elements* of *Strategic Vision and Planning Processes* and *Institutional Equities* influence these *dynamic themes*, a relationship examined through chapter 11. Finally, chapter 12 unveils the *crosscutting effects* of *Roles and Missions* and *Media Influence*, discussing the ways in which these emergent themes influence both the *dynamic themes* and *contextual elements*, and, in the final analysis, serves as another factor in the generation of interagency conflict over termination policy development.

¹ My deepest appreciation goes to Tracy Ann Breneman and Larissa Fast for their innovation in helping me develop this alternative framework.




Figure 10.1. Interactive Model: Dynamic Themes

DYNAMIC THEMES SHAPE INTERAGENCY DYNAMICS: LEADERSHIP, DECISION-MAKING AS NEGOTIATION, AND DOMESTIC POLITICS

Analysis of the data provided by the informants at all three levels of the interagency process served as the basis for these three process-related themes (i.e., *Leadership*, *Decision-Making as Negotiation*, and *Domestic Politics*). Informants referred to the theme of leadership most often. Additionally, the framework presented in table 10.2 indicates the data revealed six supporting micro themes that relate to this macro theme. As the most critical element in terms of shaping policy outcomes, leadership must be discussed first as it emerged the dominant theme that shapes interagency dynamics within the policy process.

Leadership

The most universally consistent comment regarding the effective development of conflict termination policy involved leadership, particularly the president's ability to lead his principals and the nation.² Recall that previous quantitative analysis revealed 10 significant statistical correlations across indicators in the signed digraph model (see figure 10.2, a reproduction of figure 7.3), indicating that the core factor should be reframed in terms of *Department's*

² The leadership literature is perhaps one of the most vast bodies of scholarship in existence, both from an analytical perspective and from a personal memoir standpoint. An overview of leadership as it relates to decision-making and foreign policy is provided by Barnard (1938), Beach et al. (1992), Boutros-Ghali (1998), Bush (1998), Carter (1998), Deshong (1996), Garborg (1993), Gorbachev (1998), Holl (1989), Janis (1989), Preston (1996), Schein (1992), Tutu (1998), Vroom and Yetton (1973).




Figure 10.2. Organizational Communication (Post-Analysis)

Leadership Style rather than *Organizational Communication*. Hence, it is reassuring that the qualitative analysis likewise indicated that leadership is a crucial factor in shaping the interagency dynamic. In fact, almost half³ of the informants mentioned some type of relationship between leadership and policy development. Several noted that the system does not fail to produce sound policy, but rather, leaders fail the system. Informants contended that having strong, opposing views is healthy for the process as it helps avoid the groupthink phenomenon, but noted that leaders must “harness the friction that may become debilitating”⁴ to control the institutional process. One high-level State Department official asserted that “it is usually the fault of leadership, not the process, that impedes policy from energizing.” This leadership from the top must be decisive in its presentation of a coherent policy vision from the highest levels of government. Such decisiveness generates teamwork, provides a cohesive

³ This qualitative analysis is not laden with numbers and statistical references. Rather, where most illuminating, this discussion uses phrases such as “a majority” or “almost half” to clarify the frequencies of particular themes. Please note that where these percentages are included they refer to the percentage of those whose interviews were selected for inclusion in this qualitative analysis. Unless otherwise noted, these figures relate to the qualitative coding sampling distribution identified in table 9.1. Hence, a reference to “50 percent of those at the NSC” equates to “6 out of 12,” not 10 out of 19. Finally, this research makes no attempt to transform this grounded theory categorical analysis into a quantitative presentation of these thematic findings.

⁴ All quoted items come directly from the interview transcripts that support this research. To maintain the anonymity of the informants citations are not provided anywhere in this text. Where possible, this research frames quotations in terms of the individual’s level within the interagency process, departmental affiliation, and the case with which they are associated. However, I have taken great care to preserve the identities of the informants with regard to their specific comments—I hope I have done them justice.

perspective to all government agencies regarding the president's policy choices, and communicates effectively with the public to create domestic support for security policy initiatives. One principal noted:

More than anything else, the lack of a coherent policy at the highest level is the problem [in generating interagency conflict]. From the very top there must be articulated a vision and a policy. In their absence, these fiefdoms will always push their agendas (e.g., human rights, energy).

The essence of this perspective permeated *every* conversation I had with these seasoned professionals. More than any other issue, interagency informants agreed that top-down leadership that effectively communicates a clear policy vision remains the crucial factor in generating collaborative interagency dynamics and ensuring policy successes. The words of a National Security Council principal echoed this sentiment: "When the system has to push the president, it does not work—the president must lead the NSC." Clearly visible leadership, then, can move the bureaucracy in a focused direction. The absence of such leadership enables interagency conflict to fragment the policy process as personalities overwhelm the policy-making structure. Consequently, "personality" emerged through this qualitative analysis as a theme that did not emanate from the quantitative analysis, but one that a majority of the informants interviewed identified as crucial to the development of interagency dynamics. Personality's relationship to leadership, as demonstrated throughout the

interview data, caused me to classify it as leadership's first supporting micro theme.

Personality

Informants followed their comments regarding leadership with ideas on the role personality plays in developing the interagency dynamic. Again, while ideas surrounding these two themes remained diverse, these professionals agreed that the policy-making system is personality-driven, especially at the upper levels. According to these informants, the success of the systems begins with the president's personality, hence its direct linkage to leadership. One Defense Department official noted:

Every president stamps his identity in some way on the Administration. How policy is formed is to a large extent reflective of the character of the president. If [the president is] disengaged...the opportunities for power centers to form is there—if they have an ideological bent, it comes through.

Once the president establishes the tone for interagency relations, the personalities of the principals within each Department begin to establish the parameters within which each agency operates both internally and externally.

Separating "leadership qualities" from "personality characteristics" is a difficult task beyond the scope of this work. The important factor for this analysis is that informants perceived that these two remain linked. Thus, in the same vein as leadership, personalities shape the nature of the interagency

process and are responsible at least partially for the substantive output of the policy process. This perspective seemed especially salient for those at the White House and National Security Council where 4 out of 5 people referenced personality as a factor in shaping interagency dynamics, compared with almost half of the State, Defense, and CIA informants. Together, these informants believe the personalities of the president and principals (e.g., Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, vice president) do shape the institutional process in distinct ways. Crucial issues related to this personality dynamic included the "strength of the principal" and the "ego factor."

Repeatedly, and across all agencies, the "strength of the principal" emerged as a factor having an overarching affect on interagency dynamics and subsequent policy development. A multifaceted element, decision-making style and ego appeared as the most consistently referenced characteristics related to perceptions of a principal's strength within the interagency environment. Decision-making style becomes a factor in the perceived strength of a principal as the principal's subordinates observe the ways in which the principal interacts with others inside the Department and across the government. When interagency actors identify a particular principal as a strong player at the highest level, subordinates at the deputies and interagency working group levels feel empowered to push their positions at their respective levels. Such behaviors increase interagency conflict. Because "procedures are personality-driven,"

people enter the policy-making process at lower levels with the attitude that "if I've got the influence, then I'm going to overrule you, particularly if my principal is stronger than yours."⁵ An element related to this perception regarding a principal's strength is his or her "ego."

As with most personality dimensions, the nature of one's ego can have both positive and negative implications for the development of interagency dynamics. On the positive side, an actor's desire to satiate his or her ego can impel an individual to act. However, acting without conducting a comprehensive analysis can be detrimental to the development of policy. More often than not, this seems to be the effect of personal ego impinging on the policy process. One informant asserted that

So much of the interagency process is done so that "I" will be successful—not so much that we'll achieve broader goals.... It's not only the big names, but it's the little names...and their efficiency reports. I see policy as being driven by personal career goals—a lot of their inclination is driven by that.

Others supported this view, relating the nature of ego to competitive behaviors by noting that "institutions are not competitive, personalities are." The

⁵ Individuals from State and Defense made this type of comment, noting that the strength of the Secretaries of State and Defense accounted for much of the policy-making dynamic and output. In fact, references to William Perry serving as the "de facto Secretary of State" were not uncommon, nor were comments regarding the nature of the relationships between Henry Kissinger and William Rogers, Caspar Weinberger and George Schultz, and Madeleine Albright and William Cohen. In each pairing, informants claimed that personality tended to drive the policy-making process. According to a National Security Council member, the strength of these personalities becomes especially important during periods of transition where "patterns are established based either upon

effects of these competitive personalities are most often manifest in interagency meetings where the actors vie for the president's or APNSA's ear.⁶ This competition closes interagency communication channels and stymies innovative thinking as egos overwhelm rationalism during crisis analysis and bias the shape of proposed courses of action during planning. The negative effect of this dynamic becomes acute during crises. One high-ranking State Department official noted that "the interagency process is truncated during crises – influence depends on the personality and power of the Secretary and a couple of other people at the senior levels." This truncation has implications for the development of termination policy in terms of crisis analysis and option generation. Moreover, quantitative analysis presented earlier in figure 7.5 also raised the issue that internal departmental leadership should be explored in terms of its relationship to crisis analysis and innovative solution generation. Indeed, this qualitative finding supports this proposition. Given the salience of personality as exposed by the interview data, it is useful to report the ways in which these individuals

personalities or the entropy of the bureaucratic organization of the people who try to keep the train running."

⁶ Informants referred often to this phenomenon. One senior government official remarked that he never realized the prominence of this "macho ego" factor until he experienced it throughout the interagency process. It has been his observation that even in meetings on national policy, egos play an important role as people role-play for the president's attention: "I'm tougher Mr. President, watch me...I need to be heard." For another account of this phenomenon, see Leon Sigal's (1998) characterization of the most recent diplomatic crisis between the U.S. and Korea regarding nuclear arms.

framed the connection between leaders' personalities and the development of organizational culture.

Organizational Culture

Organizational culture is truly a multidimensional concept, one that 7 out of 10 informants felt remained a crucial element in the development of interagency dynamics.⁷ Recall that the signed digraph model labeled *Organizational Communication* (see figure 10.2) tested relations between many dimensions of organizational culture, including ideology, leadership style, decision-making style, penalty for failure, organization structure, interagency behavior, and patterns of organizational communication⁸ and produced the conclusion that these elements of organizational culture should be explored in terms of the role leadership plays in developing each indicator. Qualitative data from the interviews suggested that organizational culture affected interagency dynamics in three pronounced ways: (1) establishing the organizational climate, including decision-making styles, (2) shaping communication patterns, and (3) influencing

⁷ Those interviewed mentioned issues related to organizational culture more often than any other theme. It is critical to note that due to the methodology employed to collect this data, the nature of the questions themselves drove this result. However, it is interesting to note that these informants felt that perceptions of their own agency and their perceptions of others remained a critical factor in their inability to understand one another, a factor that is explored further in the forthcoming discussion of "core competencies."

⁸ For additional facets related to organizational culture, see Chatman and Barsade (1995), Druckman (1997), Harrison and Phillips (1991), Ott (1989), Pettigrew (1979), Schein (1987, 1989, 1992), and Sethi (1994).

innovative thinking. Together, these three factors help to shape perceptions of one's own agency and others.

The informants interviewed perceived that a leader's personality shaped their organization's climate because "the personality of leadership drives the agenda for the organization." This agenda included the identification and prioritization of issues as well as setting parameters for the nature of relationships within one's own agency and the agency's interrelationships with others. Concerning issues, the cliché that "my boss' priorities are my priorities" is particularly fitting within government agencies wherein promoting institutionally "shared images" becomes an important means of determining an individual's professional success. The connection here is that an interagency actor will assume the priorities his or her principal has regarding the importance of particular issues even when this individual knows that his or her interagency counterpart does not share that perspective. For example, it is customary for interagency actors to come into conflict regarding the use of military force to assist in nation-building or humanitarian relief operations. Because this individual must represent the views of his principal as if they were his or her own, differences on substantive issues create interpersonal conflict, tension that is then transformed into interagency conflict on a broader scale. This type of polarized dynamic relates to another major component of shared images—the beliefs an agency holds about other government agencies.

While diverse views exist regarding the organizational cultures of all agencies across government, the most pronounced differences surrounded the Departments of State and Defense. The informants consistently described "State's view of Defense" and "Defense's view of State," yet not one of these informants shared a personal perception contrary to the shared image he or she described. In this manner, State reportedly believes Defense "has all the toys" (i.e., resources) but does not want to "use" them. Similarly, Defense sees State's (and the NSC to a lesser degree) primary mission as putting troops in harm's way for issues that are not within the country's "vital national interests." Shared across all three levels of the interagency process, these perceptions create an interagency climate wherein the decision-makers, especially at the lower levels, recognize only confirming evidence of these stereotypes while failing to take account of disconfirming information. Over time, these stereotypes bolster self-perpetuating cycles of interagency conflict within the policy-making process. Accordingly, these actors respond with reciprocal behaviors, increasing the tension that exists across the interagency process, while proving unable to recognize behaviors designed to decrease the intensity of interagency conflict. This perpetuates further each agency's ideas regarding others taking active measures to protect their respective equities⁹ during crisis policy-making. Although not the only

⁹ An "institutional equity" is defined as any asset that adds value to or is the defining characteristic of an agency, one that becomes a substantive input into the policy process. This theme

factor in establishing decision-making style, these perceptions may play a significant role in framing decision-making dynamics.

These polarized perspectives help generate "bureaucratic turf battles" at all levels of the interagency process. Most pronounced at the IWG level, these turf battles occur because individuals are unwilling to publicly oppose their principal's stated positions. In the absence of a clearly articulated position from the president and the principals, those stereotypical beliefs about one's own agency and others create situations wherein standard operating procedures and the dogmatic application of institutional perspectives negate the actors' abilities to make consensual decisions at lower levels. This phenomenon is exacerbated by an additional difference in organizational culture related to decision-making styles: Individuals within the State Department tend to be consensus-builders while Defense Department officials tend to be decision-takers.

Interview data denoted the critical impact of this difference between consensus-builders and decision-takers, saying such a difference in decision-making style can paralyze the policy process. One National Security Council informant stated his experience has shown that "decision-making by consensus is used by Departments to avoid taking decisions [and] accountability." In speaking on the Bosnia policy process, another high-ranking official noted

is discussed in detail in chapter 11 as an emergent macro theme.

Bosnia has a consensus-driven system starting from the top. This makes it easy to be obstructionist and encourages hedgehog behaviors. A consensus approach tends to drive people toward the bureaucratic behaviors...it encourages turf battles.

This continual drive for consensus manifests itself in tangible ways as Defense officials attend interagency meetings for the purpose of taking a decision on an issue. After numerous interactions, Defense Department actors within a consensus-oriented administration become increasingly frustrated as they "spend an entire meeting watching people dance with each other" when they want a decision to be made. "When they start dancing again, that creates conflict." An overwhelming emphasis on generating consensus around a policy creates interagency conflict as those who must develop the tangible facets of the strategy implementing the policy feel crucial time is being wasted on creating a sense of "buy-in" at the expense of determining the implementation details. While the effects of an overemphasis on a consensus-oriented policy process can generate interagency conflict, the same can be said of an autocratic decision-taking style.

The influence of personality again comes to the fore as those decisions made in spite of bureaucratic turf battles or a zealous drive for consensus usually result from pre-existing personal relationships among individual members of the interagency process. Some of these decisions are taken through a governmental ad hoc body known as the "kitchen cabinet," mobilized when the president (or

the principals within their own agencies) surrounds himself with a few trusted advisors. The president (or principal) selects these advisors as members of this ad hoc group based upon their personalities and established personal relationships. During times of crisis policy development, "increased pressure leads to the increased likelihood to circumvent the ordinary decision-making machine and use the 'kitchen cabinet'." A State Department official noted that this tendency for a principal to sit down with a limited group of people from his or her own bureaucracy creates conflict. This approach disenfranchises people from both policy development and its subsequent implementation¹⁰ while establishing the conditions for continued conflict in future interagency engagements. This finding is supported by the previous quantitative analysis that indicated Departments with less participative leaders correlated with higher perceptions of penalty for failure which in turn related to competitive interagency behaviors (see figure 10.2). The patterns of communication the principals establish for their organizations further inflame these conditions.

Leadership plays a crucial role in developing the parameters for communication, a critical component in establishing the "rules of the game" for

¹⁰ This condition is visible at many levels across the interagency process, but is particularly acute in terms of the "headquarters-field" relationship. Several informants with experience outside Washington noted that an attitude persists wherein those in the field believe Washington's policy-makers are too disconnected from the contextual realities of crises on the ground to make adequate decisions. This said, there is often a "Washington can do whatever it wants" attitude toward following the directions of the U.S. government. Halperin (Halperin et al. 1974) discussed this situation as well — the findings here reinforce its continued existence.

interagency conduct (Allison 1971; Halperin et al. 1974; see also chapter 4).

Previously discussed quantitative findings indicated that relations across Departments correlated with *Agency's Perceptions of Other's Conflict Orientation*, which in turn correlated with *Agency's Perceptions of Other's Level of Self-Interest* (see figure 10.3, a reproduction of figure 7.1). Recalling that this signed digraph model addressed *Level of Open Debate Surrounding Policy Options & Decisions*, note that the later analysis of qualitative data from interviews revealed three further elements related to communication patterns not captured in the signed digraph model. These three components were (1) the structure of communication patterns, (2) information exchange, and (3) the nature of the interagency debate. An argument can be made that the first necessarily influences the other two; therefore, let us begin this discussion with the structure of communication patterns.

Among those interviewed, perceptions regarding the structure of communication patterns within agencies remained mixed. Several portrayed information exchange as linear and closed while others characterized it as recursive and open. Informants from both State and Defense did perceive that patterns change over the life cycle of a crisis, becoming more structured over time as formalized chains of command (within both Departments) are clarified. Overall, however, the informants agreed that communications across the government remain too compartmentalized. This compartmentalization results




Figure 10.3. Level of Open Debate Surrounding Policy Options & Decisions (Post-Analysis)

from interoperability challenges¹¹ exacerbated by dissimilar organizational cultures.

In the first instance, interoperability challenges emanate from physical technological disjunctures. With the exception of the Secure Video Teleconferencing System (SVTCs), there exists no method to exchange and discuss sensitive or classified information save the face-to-face meeting that must take place in one room. Obviously, the logistical demands inherent to this approach become debilitating over time as the number of meetings expands to consume the decision-maker's day.¹² This said, currently there is no government-wide interconnected classified computer system (or unclassified for that matter), nor has there ever been one to this point.¹³ An intangible interoperability issue compounds this challenge as diverse organizational cultures operate using different languages — these vocabularies and their meanings are not always consistent across interagency domains.

¹¹ Interoperability refers to the inability of different agencies to work together, either based on human or technological incompatibility. For example, during the Persian Gulf War military interoperability resulted from dissimilar communication equipment that would not allow different services to talk with one another during the execution of the mission. (This problem has been corrected where U.S. joint operations are concerned.)

¹² This generates another organizational dilemma: If the principal or deputy is involved constantly in meetings, how is he or she supposed to "run" an agency and deal with other pressing matters? Hence, this approach becomes a "non-starter" from the perspective of the decision-maker.

¹³ One informant noted that many government officials do not want to record their views because such records are subject to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Such records create an accountability issue and, according to this high-level official, most interagency actors do not want to be held to that standard.

Mentioned in the discussion of perceptions across Departments, the State Department's and National Security Council's organizational cultures strive to create an interagency environment that enables these agencies to keep all of their options open. Consequently, these agencies avoid specificity when framing their proposals. In the words of one high-ranking Defense official, "this is an anathema" to military officials. At the same time, State officials tire of the Defense Department's unyielding demand for clarity and precision, particularly regarding a definition of the desired end state. They interpret such demands as an excuse for Defense to "do nothing." These types of cleavages encourage Departments to hand off the problem to the other as they take a more passive approach to policy formulation and information exchange. Hence, State's and the National Security Council's *implicit* desire for ambiguity clashes with Defense's *explicit* need for precision. Taken together, these data supported the quantitative finding that when *Departmental Relations at Time of Initial Crisis Definition* are perceived as "hostile," then *Agency's Perceptions of Other's Conflict Orientation* tended to be "competitive." In other words, if the Departments interrelate in an environment based upon the inability to discuss the crisis due to organizational cleavages, then they will behave competitively toward one another from the outset. In related fashion, these perceived competitive behaviors are normally associated with "high" *Perceptions of Other's Level of Self-Interest*. These differences do go well beyond mere words and often have a detrimental

influence on interagency dynamics, especially when related to information exchange. The lack of effective information exchange can have serious consequences for interagency dynamics and the policy outcome of that process.

Interview data showed that informants agreed that "information is power." While most asserted that people did not withhold information in times of crises and the development of high policy, a few cited instances wherein individuals controlled the flow of information to finesse policy outcomes. Actors use information to shape the policy process and to provide their respective principals with a competitive advantage within the interagency arena as they attempt to protect their respective bureaucratic equities. Controlling information exchange is only one issue related to communication patterns. The nature of the exchange presents another dilemma.

Two factors shape the nature of interagency exchange—the number of actors within the process and the actors' most salient objectives during the communication process. In the first instance, several informants noted that "as the importance of the issue increases, the importance of avoiding leaks increases—the more important the issue, the more likely the experts will be excluded."¹⁴ Thus, expertise is often times traded to maintain secrecy, a practice

¹⁴ On this point, one official noted that there is no deliberate attempt to exclude the experts, but it occurs through decision-makers' efforts to "know who knows." They attempt to avoid information leaks due to the sensitivity of the information. For a more in-depth examination of this issue, see James Thompson's (1967, 1987) work on *Organizations in Action*.

that again has grave implications for crisis analysis and option generation.

Discussed earlier, the negative implications of the "kitchen cabinet" reemerge as important in shaping information exchange. It is also important to recognize that the actors themselves have objectives for their participation in information exchange sessions. While some do hope to enhance their (and other's) understanding of the issue, when parochial interests intrude actors can create interagency conflict by not listening to others involved in the process. One individual involved at the IWG level noted that

There's very little discussion among people—they come to the table with a set of views that are "deployed" but not discussed. There is relatively little give-and-take, and no debate. Debate goes on within an agency...but bureaucracies come together with separate bottles—each has its own container and [it] is not shared around.

A principal reinforced this comment by saying that a lack of communication at all levels generates interagency conflict. He went further to say that conflict is exacerbated by the perceived proprietary interest in a genuine policy that makes a group of policy-makers believe that

One agency considers that it has either the primary or sole responsibility for carrying out a given piece [yet] others feel they should have a role—this creates tension; or, one agency or small group's feeling that a particular party is competent [and information is dispensed on a] "need to know basis." For example, I was trying to work my way into [the CIA] and was told "we can't release anything to you, but the DCI is communicating with the Secretary of State directly"—it did not happen.

These elements related to information exchange shape the third aspect of communication, the nature of the interagency debate surrounding crises.

The most frequent comment in the interviews regarding the nature of interagency debate noted that the level and nature of the debate depended upon the issues, the personalities involved in the exchange, and the timing of the discussion in terms of the nature of the impending crisis. Additionally, the data showed that debate is more open at the higher levels and less so at the lower levels (since these actors are charged with protecting their respective agency's bureaucratic equities).¹⁵ Further, one informant asserted that "high open debate [exists] horizontally at the highest levels, but not necessarily vertically." A National Security Council member very aptly described the generic nature of interagency crisis debate:

What tends to happen is that when the crisis erupts, you've got to sort out what's going on. Inherently, there's a lot of debate on what the crisis is, what's important to us, [and] how it will evolve. There's a sphere of debate on the nature of the crisis and then debate on what's going on resumes at a lower level. Immediately, after you sort out "what's the situation?" [and] then decide how to respond, there's a high level on interests, level of response, [and] options for responding. Then, in course of discussion, you merge toward consensus. The situation peaks, then you determine what the response should be.

¹⁵ One National Security Council principal asserted that the interagency's IWG-level should indeed be a "food fight" as these people are responsible for protecting their agency's respective equities. Only at the DC and PC-levels are decision-makers authorized to "negotiate away" such equities.

While this perspective logically describes issue-related factors, it does not account for the other two conditions that affect debate, namely personalities and timing, conditions that can increase or decrease debate.

Data from the interviews indicated that debate surrounding policy options tends to *increase* under three circumstances: (1) when no consensus on crisis definition or policy options has been achieved, (2) when individuals are unhappy with the initial decisions, and (3) when principled differences of opinion exist regarding capabilities. With the exception of the last element, the informants offered little in the way of a constructive rationale for debate to increase based upon principled differences. Instead, their comments substantiated notions regarding strong personalities and the need for individuals to satisfy their egos (discussed earlier). Personalities, then, seem to have an impact on increasing the debate that takes place within the interagency forum. Combined with interpersonal relations, personality also seems to affect a decrease in debate as well.

The informants claimed that debate tends to *decrease* under four conditions: (1) when time pressures demand immediate action, (2) when things are going well and there is agreement across the interagency, (3) when key decisions have already been made, and (4) when the principal takes a position and makes that position public. One can recognize the dampening effect that the first three conditions would have on open debate as a consequence of the environment

within which these policy decisions are made. The rationale for this last circumstance relates directly to the earlier discussion of personalities, personal relationships, and shared images in terms of the risk associated with putting forth a perspective contrary to the principal's stated position.

Together, these three elements—the structure of communication patterns, information exchange, and the nature of the interagency debate—serve as indicators of the organization's internal culture. The data related these elements to communication patterns' influence an individual's willingness to promote innovative thinking.

Reflecting on figure 10.4 (a reproduction of figure 7.5), bear in mind that the quantitative analysis produced no significant relationship between an *Individual's Ability to Propose Innovative Solutions* and *Individual's Willingness to Propose Innovative Ideas*.¹⁶ It is important to bring this relationship back into focus since the comments offered in the interviews shed new light on this disjuncture. While informants noted they felt able to propose innovative solutions for crises, they universally noted that other factors limited their agency's exploration of these ideas. The most salient inhibitor seemed to be the "inertia of the bureaucratic process" that is tied to prior experience. Put succinctly, if an agency's prior experience with a situation has prompted it to develop a contingency plan to

¹⁶ For an additional perspective on innovative thinking, see Kaufmann (1993) and McGowan (1976).




Figure 10.4. Agency's Decision-Making Profile: Department Explores Innovative Ideas (Post-Analysis)

deal with future occurrences, or even a "folk memory" of what worked and did not work the "last time," then opportunities to think innovatively about the new situation diminish. This is known across government as the "plan in the can" phenomenon. Within the Defense Department, informants noted that there is a genuine recognition of openness to ideas but that senior members of the Joint Staff act as filters based upon their personal experiences, often dismissing ideas more junior officials would classify as innovative. From the perspective of a Defense Department IWG-level interagency informant, "the Department isn't really interested in innovation or creative ways...this is a result of our organizational culture."¹⁷ This ability to recall prior experience is linked to a second condition that affects innovative thinking, that of the pressure of other business and the desire to pronounce options consistent with an agency's shared images.

Throughout the interview process, I learned that it is very common for the professionals with whom I spoke to work an average of 14 to 16 hours a day, 5 to 6 days every week. These demands on people's time to make the government

¹⁷ Note that Defense Department perspectives on innovative thinking remained mixed. This perspective imparts only one view. It is highlighted here to demonstrate that this individual made a direct connection between innovative thinking and organizational culture. An outside reader clarified this perspective, noting that there is another level of analysis involved. Contingency plans are devices to expedite decisions within the Defense Department. There is a time issue inherent in this – they feel that others need to demonstrate that the conditions do not fit the contingency plan. From this official's perspective, it is not a matter of being resistant to innovation. Rather, it is a matter of all the pre-work and analysis that generated the contingency plan, work that Defense is hesitant to discard unless other agencies provide a better alternative.

function under normal conditions (i.e., not during crises) are nothing less than astonishing. During periods of acute crisis, the length of the workday elongates significantly.¹⁸ Within this time-restricted environment, it becomes very difficult to reach a consensus on issues and push ideas through to completion. A Defense Department official characterized this by saying "Up to a certain point you can discuss anything, but on the big issues you can only throw the bomb in the organization once or do it all the time and no one listens. People are not morally afraid, there just is a certain imperative." This informant went further, claiming that "people can talk out-of-the-box, but not get out-of-the-box."¹⁹ The daily pressures of doing business coupled with the desire to remain an active player in the policy process limit willingness to propose solutions that move beyond the agency's shared prior experience. This prior experience shapes the images of the organization's current sense of purpose and produces constraints on conceptualizing new approaches to deal with complex crises. A senior State Department official characterized this by saying, "For everyone who wishes to walk through the gates of the future, the path is blocked by 10,000 guardians of

¹⁸ This comment is an aside, but a relevant one: Who completes the routine work of these individuals during times of crisis? Knowing that it does not take care of itself, this unfinished business creates a crisis of its own as deadlines approach that require immediate attention both during periods of intense crisis and in the aftermath of the acute crisis situation.

¹⁹ This dichotomy addresses one of the aspects this research attempted to investigate, namely the tendency for people to think something happens one way in theory, but behaviors and attitudes actualize in a different manner in practice. Hence, the ability for people to "think" outside the box but not "get" outside that box provides evidence that this theory-practice fissure exists.

the past."²⁰ Finally, it is important to recognize that these informants perceived that organizational culture and training biases affected their ability to think innovatively about conflict termination policy.

This discussion addressed the organizational culture issue previously in terms of one's desire to be seen as an agency "team player" by continuing to share the images of the principal and his or her organization. Relatedly, people believe this factor stifles creativity at the lower levels and influences the nature of communications between the deputies and the principals. One State Department official characterized the dynamic by saying

As the stakes get higher, as people have committed their resources, energy, and prestige, etc., receptivity to "out-of-the-box" thinking declines and the willingness of intermediate supervisors to up-channel is limited. The internal debate gets limited too.²¹

A State Department environment wherein some principals believe people "should be judged on how well we made the case and carried out what you intended to do" reinforces this perspective. Because of the dilemma created by shared images, individuals are not willing to promote propositions to higher levels that have the potential to be seen as "flaky" even though they believe these

²⁰ Ambassador Jacques Paul Klein provided this insight; permission to attribute granted by Ambassador Klein (1998).

²¹ A Defense official noted that "proposing innovative solutions makes it harder to get consensus. The thought process is, 'if it's outside, there's a hidden agenda... what's he trying to slip by me?' That's the psychology of the interagency."

positions warrant further exploration. A State official claimed this dynamic limits receptivity to "out-of-the-box" thinking.

In the final analysis, State Department officials agreed with outsiders who characterized their agency as a process-oriented organization, one whose organizational culture conflicts with the Defense Department's self-reported results-oriented perspective. Hence, comments within State (and NSC) reflected a relatively greater receptivity to innovative thinking. Conversely, those from Defense (and CIA) highlighted the "what has worked in the past" mentality, an attitude reinforced by training and one that limits both willingness and ability to think innovatively during periods of intense crisis policy-making.²²

The foregoing discussion highlighted the ways in which divergent organizational cultures affect decision-making styles, communication, debate, information exchange,²³ and innovative thinking. Reinforced by self-perpetuated stereotypes, this organizational cleavage remains pronounced between the Departments of State and Defense. In the face of such disjunctures, informants

²² A senior Defense Department official noted that military members at the operational level (i.e., theater level) are not trained to think through all the steps beyond warfighting because this is not "their role." Rather, this individual intimated that the State Department and the National Security Council should be considering the post-conflict environment and that the "key is for all the principals to have the perspective across the board and to understand the whole issue."

²³ An ever-expanding literature continues to enhance our understanding of communication, debate, and information exchange (see, for example, Bornstein, Mingelgrin, and Rutte 1996; Bornstein et al. 1989; Bowey 1972; Caplan 1976; Carroll and Payne 1991; Corman 1990; Insko et al. 1993; Koopman and Pool 1991; Larson, Foster-Fishman, and Keys 1994; Maurer and Lord 1991; Minsky 1968; Pavitt 1994; Sabrosky, Thompson, and McPherson 1982; Thomas 1994; Thompson and Faith 1980; Walton and Dutton 1989; Zaller 1991).

noted that policy is made in spite of the system designed to produce policy outputs. Data revealed fairly clearly that this policy output results from personal relationships and networking. Therefore, personal relationships and networking is discussed here as the final micro theme relating leadership to the interagency dynamics that shape the substance of policy.

Personal Relations and Networking

The chemistry between personalities enables the interagency actors to create personal relationships that significantly affect interagency dynamics. While the presentation of *personalities* reflected primarily the negative effects that individuals have on interagency dynamics, the *personal relationships* people develop across agency boundaries have an overarching positive influence on the interagency process.²⁴ Data from the interviews indicated that positive and respectful interpersonal relations shaped collaborative interagency behaviors. At the same time, however, a few informants noted that a principal could sideline individuals in terms of "playing the game" if they are not trusted or if the principal prefers one individual to another based upon pre-existing personal relationships. There also may be a tendency to push issues up the policy-making

²⁴ The academic and popular literatures describe personal relationships and networking in myriad ways (see, for example, Carroll and Payne 1991; Corman 1990; Doreian and Mrvar 1996; Haas 1992; Molnar 1978; Morley 1992; Sabrosky, Thompson, and McPherson 1982; Westphal and Zajac 1997).

chain if individuals do not like one another at lower levels. These behaviors emerged as the few negative effects personal relationships can have on interagency dynamics. For the most part, interviewees identified personal relations as shaping the interagency dynamic in very positive, effective ways.

More than one third of the informants referred to the positive effects of personal relationships, noting that "relations between principals make development of foreign policy doable." In fact, these informants universally agreed that personal relationships develop a positive interagency dynamic that makes the system work: "If the personal relationship goes away, the lines of communication are cut off...the system breaks down. If it's not there, integration occurs only because people want it to—if they don't like it, they close it down." The drawbacks of "kitchen cabinet" approaches have already been mentioned, but many informants viewed this approach as also having some positive results. We see the efficacy of the "kitchen cabinet" approach to policy-making as the president and principals surround themselves with small groups of advisors with whom they feel personally connected. One senior Defense official remarked that "relationships determine who gets included in these things." A State official echoed this sentiment, stating that "if people are known by decision-makers and considered important, they will be in the loop whether the normal hierarchy and communication patterns would include them or not." A DC-level informant contended these individuals are operating first "from a personal relationship

platform to each other," relationships that have been developed by prior experience and not through the current interagency exchange. The general perspective, as characterized by one Defense official, is that "you don't develop relationships in a crisis."

Perhaps the most important aspect of personal relationships and networking is the recognition that breakthroughs in policy development emerge from these pre-existing personal relationships which enable policy-makers to set aside their competing institutional interests and interact with one another on a very personal level. As a very convincing example, a NSC official pointed out that last two years of the Reagan Administration the "haircut group" developed policy on China. A group of close friends across government who were both interested and knowledgeable regarding China policy met during periods blocked on their calendars as "haircut." While there is nothing inherently improper about this approach, it is interesting to note that these policy-makers felt the need to find a work-around to the formal policy process. This alternative process grew from the personal relations these individuals shared: It serves as an example of the idea that personal relationships and networking can play a crucial role in policy development as a temporary substitute for a structured process.

The patterns described above illustrate the power of personal relationships and networking in creating a positive interagency dynamic that is able to overcome competitive interagency behaviors that hamper policy-making. In this

vein, the influence of pre-existing personal relationships cannot be overemphasized and must be considered in the analysis of the national security policy-making process.

The foregoing discussion demonstrated that qualitative data from the interviews indicated that leadership remains the most influential aspect of the policy-making process affecting interagency dynamics. Not only is a clearly articulated top-down vision required, but leaders must remain cognizant of the ways in which their actions as principals in the interagency process create or diminish interagency conflict. As leaders interact with actors across the interagency process their personalities shape organizational cultures, including perceptions of risk for the individual if he or she deviates from the agency's shared images or the principal's stated policy position. Further, these leaders rely upon personal relationships and networking to develop national security policy.²⁵

With an understanding of the informants' perspectives on the role leadership plays in shaping the interagency dynamic, let us move on to the second macro theme related to process shaping substance, that of decision-making as a process of negotiation. According to the data analyzed throughout the qualitative

²⁵ The case analyses of the Persian Gulf and Bosnia (forthcoming, chapter 13) make this precept more tangible.

analysis, personal relationships also play a crucial role in developing this interagency negotiating process.

Decision-Making as Negotiation

One of the questions that framed this research inquired about ways in which "decision-making by negotiation" shaped policy choices within a bureaucratic environment.²⁶ Two micro themes emerged regarding the relationship between decision-making and negotiation. The first related to the interagency process in terms of access and privilege and results from pre-existing personal relationships; the second, the nature of the policy outcome.

Access and Privilege

Regarding access and "privileged access," a review of figure 10.5 (a reproduction of figure 7.6) depicts no statistically significant relationship between the indicator relating *Agency's Perceptions Regarding Other's Favoritism in Access* and the core factor characterizing perceptions of the *NSC's Role in Policy-Making Process*. In addition, recall that privileged access to the National Security Council System is an accepted practice, with State and Defense most often being

²⁶ It is important to reiterate here that this study is not a study of negotiation. Rather, it examines the interagency process by determining whether the decision-making process is a negotiation. For a review of the literature related to decision-making *and* negotiation, see Bacharach and Lawler (1986), Carroll and Payne (1991), Donohue et al. (1991), Elgstrom (1994), Gregorian (1980), Kramer, Pommerenke, and Newton (1993), Levy (1997), Nicholson (1991), Robinson (1980), Roth (1991), Thompson, Peterson, and Brodt (1996), Vayrynen (1991), and Zartman (1977).




Figure 10.5. NSC's Role in the Policy-Making Process (Post-Analysis)

the privileged actors. Many informants noted that such access is required to ensure the policy-making process is as inclusive as it can possibly be in light of operational security concerns (e.g., troop protection or intelligence source protection). In fact, of the 21 informants who discussed privileged access, only 2 (one each from State and Defense) felt such informal contact with the NSC could have detrimental effects on policy-making because it provided an opportunity for one agency to shape the National Security Council's perspective before any other. Data indicated that the informants perceived this privileged access had a favorable impact "because it's from those informal contacts that you're most likely to get innovative ideas and out-of-the-box thinking -- [people are] less likely to be competitive in a crisis if [they] know each other." Another informant described this privileged access as having a favorable impact on policy development because "what the NSC does is receive and transmit information. They condition the activities of the interagency." It is important to note, however, that these informants distinguished "access" from "influence."

Data indicated that "access" does not necessarily equate to an ability to shape the perspective of the National Security Council.²⁷ Repeatedly, informants noted that while privileged access allows many individuals the opportunity to shape

²⁷ For various views on the relationship between access and privilege in organizational decision-making and foreign policy, see Boone (1987), Deshong (1996), Freij (1992), Kim (1996), Korbani (1989), Kowert (1992), Meernik (1992), Orbovich (1986), Powlick (1990), and Tan (1989).

policy, personal relationships provide some individuals with greater capacity to influence policy. One high-ranking State Department official described it in this manner: "I think they all have access but that's separate from influence. Some are privileged in their influence depending on the APNSA" (i.e., the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs). A National Security Council principal echoed this perspective, noting that there is a personality and relational dimension to this access as well "because these folks come from different Departments, [they] have informal contacts." We again see the influence of personality and personal relationships coming to the fore in terms of enabling some individuals to access and to influence the policy-making process. Since some are able to influence the substance of policy because of their entrée into the process, another facet of networking emerges as personalities and personal relationships, not organizational structures, create opportunities to influence policy outcomes. The recognition and acceptance of this idea is what leads those with an open policy process to believe they have a great influence on policy development. After all, irrespective of the nature of the policy process (i.e., open or closed), personal relationships, not the nature of the process itself, remain the critical factor in one's ability to influence both the policy process and policy outcomes. In this way, these findings provide a supporting rationale for the

quantitative findings presented in figure 10.5. These personal relationships lead directly to a discussion of the second micro theme concerning negotiation, the policy outcome.

Policy Outcome

In analyzing the interview data regarding the policy outcome resulting from the interagency negotiating process, a very clear theme emerged: The interagency process is a negotiating process wherein decision-makers compromise to reach consensus regarding a middle ground option. Data showed that this decision-making process takes longer, delays actions, and dilutes the policy outcome, often resulting in a "least common denominator" policy product. Added to this, each interagency actor enters the negotiation with his or her clearly-defined boundaries, parameters that the individual is not authorized and remains unwilling to cross. One principal characterized this process by saying

You get a much more muddled set of choices via negotiation that may contain inherent contradictions. It's a bit like Congress and the War Powers Act—it tries to staple two houses of Congress together. The problem with negotiated positions equates to a significant risk of the camel as a product of committee: You may not want a camel with two humps, may not want any humps at all. You may produce a policy position that is less clear-cut, has inherent contradictions—like stepping on the accelerator and brake at the same time. It may be unsuited to the problem [as] other agendas are pursued with less focus on the problem at hand. While negotiation generates increased unity on the U.S. side, it may come

at the price of a policy position that is not well targeted, and one with extra baggage.

This passage summarizes the essence of the data related to decision-making via negotiation. It also highlights another theme regarding this decision-making process by claiming that negotiation increases unity on the U.S. side. While informants pointed out that this negotiation process has a tendency to produce sub-optimal outcomes, they simultaneously asserted that decision-making by negotiation is required if the government hopes to achieve a sense of "buy-in" regarding policy implementation. One principal noted that "we make consistently sub-optimal decisions that get us where we want to go—we bend, but do not fracture." The data also indicated that these informants believe this process does not conform to the tenets of Rational Choice Theory and its Rational Actor Model of Decision-Making.

A State Department official remarked that policy-making is "all about negotiation—that's the way policy is made." The individual went on to say

Rational actor models assume an understanding of what's "actually" in the national interest. If using it descriptively, it's a tautology. It presumes one can tell what's in the national interest—12 others outside the government have other versions not in the national interest. I do not think anybody knew or has a way to figure out what's in the national interest. There is a presumption of a "clear" thing in the national interest. So the negotiation and the accident of who the players are—a government without a CIA or Air Force—you get different outcomes.

This individual highlights two important criticisms of the Rational Actor Model decision-making approach described in chapter 2. First, the informant notes that there is no clear, unified understanding of national interests. The most basic assumption of Rational Choice Theory asserts that an individual knows ones goals and that they remain static over time (Brennan 1992) or for some period. Recall that the validity of this assumption is undermined when applied to the group choice setting where differing values and goals are encoded across diverse individual cognitive maps. Divergent cognitive maps create intragroup conflict surrounding problem definition. Here, we have an experienced interagency actor noting that this indeed characterizes the interagency process in terms of clarifying national interests (i.e., problem definition in this sense). A DC-level actor corroborated this perspective, indicating that the unitary actor model does not fit reality because the government is not a unitary actor with a single goal or policy vision: "Cost-benefit analysis assumes unity of action—it is not. Policy is not made this way." Without going into detail, this individual indicated that the interplay of certain actors influences negotiating process. The individual illuminates a second critical aspect of the policy process by intimating that "accident" may dictate who the players are in any given interagency process.

Through an agency's inclusion, or indeed, its exclusion, the interagency process can produce different policy outcomes. Recognition of this interagency dynamic moves the U.S. government policy-making process further away from a

Rational Actor Model: The assumptions of Rational Choice Theory dictate that the most appropriate individuals be included in *every* interagency exchange.

Instead, as many have indicated previously the identification of the actors is based on personal relationships and personality characteristics. In the final analysis, a DC-level informant best describes the overall negotiation process and its influence on policy development, stating

The bureaucracy affects the decision—it's not entirely a rational actor [process]—time is a compressing factor. People do try to make rational decisions as they analyze as best they can. There are conflicting points of view [and people] go for the middle ground. It comes back to leadership.

This individual brought the macro theme of negotiation back to the starting point for this qualitative analysis: leadership. Again we see that interagency actors perceive leadership to be the most critical element in creating an interagency dynamic capable of negotiating policy that meets the interagency's most demanding criterion—implementability, as measured through the lens of interagency "buy-in."

As the data indicated, this metric must likewise account for another factor, the influence of domestic politics on both the interagency dynamic and the policy outcome. The nature of this negotiation process is tempered through the prism of domestic politics, namely the role of the Congress and efforts to shape public

opinion. As such, domestic politics is the final macro factor discussed with regard to the way in which interagency dynamics shape policy substance.

Domestic Politics: Public Opinion and the Congress

The group of informants who were interviewed highlighted a very important theme not captured anywhere in the preceding quantitative analysis of interagency dynamics: Domestic politics plays a crucial role in shaping ways in which agencies interact while also having a substantial impact on the policy outcome.²⁸ The nature of this influence is captured by two streams: (1) the influence of public opinion and (2) the Congress' effect on the official interagency decision-makers. In the first instance, the data indicated that policy-makers across the government share a heightened sensitivity to the public's desire to avoid "another Vietnam" and to prevent American casualties at all costs. These desires relate directly to prior experience. When looking at the two historical cases explored through this research and the data provided by these informants, bear in mind that the Vietnam experience shaped the decision-makers at the highest levels of government and the vast majority of the American adult populace. One CIA official remarked that

²⁸ Domestic politics, especially public opinion, plays a significant role in the development of policy (see, for example, Dandeker 1995; Eveland, McLeod, and Signorielli 1995; Fearon 1994; Foyle 1996; Foyle 1997; Frensey 1996; Gibson 1991; Holl 1989; Iyengar and Simon 1993; Jhally, Lewis, and Morgan 1991; Katz 1987; Krosnick and Brannon 1993; Kull and Destler 1999; Lian and Oneal 1993; Parker 1995; Powlick 1990; Powlick 1991; Putnam 1988; Rothstein 1970; Russett and Graham 1989; Spanier and Uslaner 1974; Thomas 1981; Zaller 1993).

This is a country wherein the public and the politicians are unwilling to accept casualties. So that when they see people getting killed, they want to 'engineer,' to borrow Kissinger's term, a solution. The problems can only be ameliorated — they look for an empirical solution.

This perspective is not lost on the interagency decision-makers, themselves products of this national culture. Officials across the government agreed that "the use of force is really a function of politics and something that can be decided only when sustainable domestically." From this perspective, domestic politics influences interagency dynamics as the policy-makers use the media to shape public opinion and pay attention to the desires of the populace as measured through public opinion polls. Another conduit to convey public opinion to the Executive Branch is through the Congress.

Recall that the earlier depiction of the policy process in motion (see chapter 4) asserted that the Congress plays a multifaceted role in national security policy development. The data indicated that two critical elements emerged concerning interagency dynamics: partisan politics and the power of the purse.²⁹ With regard to the first issue, informants at all three levels noted that the National Security Council, State Department, and Defense Department all pay attention to the congressional perspective when the potential exists for military engagement. This is not so much in the vein of the War Powers Resolution as hypothesized

²⁹ Obviously, the control of the budget has implications for policy outcomes. The ensuing chapter discusses congressional influence from that substantive perspective.

earlier, but more to gain leverage in the interagency process to control the policy outcome. A National Security Council principal declared, "we take Congress into consideration on everything we do." As reported in a November 1989 Defense *White Paper*, the daily activities of the Defense Department vis-à-vis congressional reporting put this relationship into perspective:

The frequency and range of interchanges between DoD and the Congress is truly remarkable. The July 1989 Defense Management Report cited 2,500 telephonic and 450 written inquiries from Congress to DoD *every working day*. Congressional reports and audits require the equivalent of 900 full time employees on a continuing basis. Largely in addition to those efforts, there are over 500 people in the Pentagon whose only job is to deal with the Congress or respond to routine Congressional requests. In turn, there are over 1,500 Congressional staffers who deal nearly exclusively in defense issues (DoD 1989; italics added).

The rationale for including this supporting material is to highlight again that uninterrupted relationships exist between the three primary interagency actors (i.e., the National Security Council, State, and Defense) and the Congress. These relationships provide actors opportunities to shape congressional opinion regarding policy development. Further, these actors recognize that these relationships exist and use "off-line" communications to leverage the interagency process in their favor. In fact, the Congress then becomes a "shadow negotiator" within the interagency process. This condition manifests itself in two distinct ways. As one example, the data indicated that part of President Clinton's 1993 unwillingness to put forth a position contrary to that of General Colin Powell

analysis of the *dynamic themes* shaping interagency dynamics, these two macro themes labeled *contextual elements* are supported by myriad micro themes that emerged during the analysis of qualitative interview data.

Noting that the methodological constraints and qualitative analysis approach apply to this phase in the same manner as that involving process influences, they do not warrant duplication here. Yet, it does bear repeating that this analysis employs axial coding, a qualitative technique that could be easily replicated by another researcher using the same data. This discussion develops understanding regarding the “Contextual Elements” that influence interagency dynamics and, hence, policy outcomes. Against this background, the themes relating to the substance-process aspects of national security policy-making must be analyzed.

CONTEXTUAL ELEMENTS FRAMING THE INTERAGENCY PROCESS: “STRATEGIC VISION AND PLANNING PROCESSES” AND “INSTITUTIONAL EQUITIES”

Analysis of the data illuminated two complementary themes related to the ways in which *contextual elements* drive interagency dynamics, thereby shaping policy outcomes. These two themes are *Strategic Vision and Planning Processes* and *Institutional Equities*. All five macro themes interact to shape agencies’ perspectives of *Conflict Termination Policy*—shown as the shaded area in table 11.1, it serves as the culminating theme and is discussed in chapter 13. As with the foregoing analysis of the “Dynamic Themes” (chapter 10), several micro

Although leverage as a shadow negotiator and partisan politics represent merely two examples of congressional influence on interagency dynamics, this type of tactical advantage has strategic implications for the policy-making process. The Congress plays a related role through its authority to control the fiscal matters of the nation. Thus, while the public influences congressional perspectives and is made aware of their representative's perspective via the media-promoted rhetoric that surrounds crisis decision-making, the Congress' role in controlling the budget cannot be underscored enough.

The Congress has a pronounced influence on the policy process through its ability to shape the policy outcome. Legislative liaisons in all Executive Departments work diligently to lobby the Congress to gain support for policy initiatives (if possible, before making these initiatives public). This influence relates directly to the substance of the policy process, but again plays a role in shaping the interagency dynamic. Specifically, informants from the Defense Department noted that in the absence of a continuing resolution or appropriations bill to support troop deployment, the Defense Department recognizes that it will have to absorb the costs of intervention. This creates interagency conflict by perpetuating the stereotypes regarding the use of force for intervention activities that do not relate clearly to U.S. national interests,

war in the Gulf (Bush 1990). Many perceived this as a congressional attempt to reassert itself within the foreign policy arena.

national interests the president has failed to define and communicate effectively.³² Defense officials characterized this as State "having their hand in our pocket." From a Defense perspective, these monies are required to prepare the force for the next major theater contingency. Therefore, using them to fund State Department initiatives that Defense opposes ensures, in their minds, that the U.S. cannot sustain a military force capable of "fighting and winning the nation's wars."³³ It is in this manner that congressional action—or the threat of inaction, in this case—plays a major role in sustaining negative stereotypes across the agencies while exacerbating interagency conflict.

From this brief analysis, we can begin to see that *Domestic Politics*, in terms of public opinion and the Congress' influence (as a government actor outside the formal interagency process), is seen as playing a crucial role in shaping both interagency dynamics and the policy outcome. In conjunction with the two other macro themes of *Leadership* and *Decision-Making as Negotiation* (and their supporting micro themes), *Domestic Politics* serves as a dominant factor in shaping the ways in which the interagency actors deal with one another when

³² This perspective relates back to leadership: Actors within all agencies perceive one of the primary responsibilities of the president and his administration to be defining and articulating the national interests that frame his presidency and establish the vision for the country.

³³ One principal made an interesting and innovative observation regarding military funding. He said, "If you follow Powell's dictum, we would have lost the support and would not be enjoying the budgets we have today. To maintain a strong military we had to keep the military relevant for today's problems to prepare for tomorrow's problems. This is why we needed to play role in Haiti, Bosnia, Somalia, etc., while at the same time building a military to handle Korea, China, etc."

making the choices that produce national policy. It is critical to note, however, that while these three macro themes emerged from the interview data as those that have the greatest effect on interagency dynamics, the data also revealed two crosscutting themes that affect both *interagency dynamics* and *contextual elements*. These *crosscutting effects* are framed as (1) *Roles and Missions* and (2) *Media Influence*. These crosscutting themes mold both the ways through which interagency dynamics affect the substantive aspects of the policy and the ways in which contextual elements affect interagency dynamics, and ultimately, the policy outcome. The ensuing chapter discusses the *contextual elements* that frame the *dynamic themes*. Once these two primary categories have been discussed, chapter 12 examines these two *crosscutting effects* to bridge our understanding between (1) those factors that enable the *dynamic themes* to shape interagency dynamics, and ultimately, policy outcomes (i.e., themes presented in this chapter) and (2) those wherein *contextual elements* interactively shape the dynamic themes. Before moving forward, let us bring this phase of the qualitative analysis to closure.

INTERPRETATION OF FINDINGS: DYNAMIC THEMES SHAPE INTERAGENCY DYNAMICS

The findings related to *dynamic themes* (see the shaded area of figure 10.6) indicate that Allison's Bureaucratic Politics Model characterizes the interagency policy-making process in terms of the ways in which the *process identifies the*




Figure 10.6. Interactive Model: Dynamic Themes

players and the *players frame the process dynamic*. The most salient factor in shaping the process itself seems to be the leadership provided by the president and the principals in conjunction with the individual personalities of the decision-makers and the personal relationships they share with others throughout the process. In this manner, this finding conforms with Allison's propositions regarding the identification of the players, their perspectives or "stand" on the issues (as framed by organizational cultures and shared images), and the influence they have within the policy process in terms of shaping the interagency dynamic and the policy outcome. Personalities, personal relationships, and organizational culture play an associated role in developing the process dynamics anticipated by Allison.

Data illustrated that individuals control information exchange, manipulating the interagency negotiation process to achieve policy outcomes that truly are "political resultants" in Allison's classic sense. Bureaucratic infighting occurs at lower levels of the interagency process, but is not as salient at the principals or deputies levels unless the issue under consideration threatens the core values or equities of the Department or institution (e.g., readiness, budgets, or the strength of diplomacy). Further, once a principal pronounces his or her institutional position publicly, the parameters are set, and crisis definition and option generation are bound by that principal's perspective. This pronouncement can create interagency conflict across the IWG as the actors become increasingly

resistant to "negotiating away" their respective principal's stated perspective — even if the context of the crisis demands such positional reconsideration.

Organizational cultures dictate that reversals can come only through the statements and actions of the principals themselves. This is not to say that continued intradepartmental debate is discontinued. Rather, it does suggest that public interagency debate will potentially divert its focus from the problem under consideration as the actors become increasingly loyal to their principals in cases where the debate is framed as a bureaucratic fight, one whose "primary" purpose is to protect and preserve one's particular equities.

Informants agree that the policy-making process should be, and indeed is, an exercise in decision-making by negotiation. Only through such a process can the U.S. government build the required levels of buy-in toward a broader consensus approach, one that is clearly not a "rational actor" approach in terms of subjective expected utility. This consensus approach then becomes the critical component in implementation. When adequate levels of buy-in are not achieved through the interagency process, Departments act in fulfilling policy mandates but operating at the margins through exercising bureaucratic power in interpretation and implementation of the stated policy.³⁴

³⁴ Numerous examples of such policy decisions were conveyed throughout the interview process. For example, during the 1983 Lebanon crisis the Defense Department stationed a U.S. Marine Corps unit off-shore for quick evacuation purposes in lieu of positioning U.S. Army troops on the ground. While the positioning of the Marines met policy requirements, the Defense

Having determined that these data conform to the first two elements of Allison's Bureaucratic Model, let us move forward to the analysis of those themes wherein the *contextual elements* of the process shape interagency dynamics through their ability to frame the *dynamic themes*. Through the analysis of the findings presented here and those that emerge via the two upcoming chapters, we should be able to determine whether Allison's third and final modeling precept fits the interagency process by discovering the ways in which these *dynamic themes* and *contextual elements* influence policy alternatives. Let us now proceed to the second phase of the qualitative analysis, investigating the ways in which the *contextual elements* circumscribing the policy process shape interagency dynamics.

Department selected the Marine component with the foreknowledge that it was *not* the most appropriate or prepared military unit for the mission. More recently, during the evacuation mission in Somalia that simultaneously attempted to capture warlord Mohammed Farah Aidid, Defense employed Black Hawk Helicopters in place of the more appropriate AC-130H gunships. During the 17-hour firefight that ensued during the rescue attempt on October 3, 1993, "elite units of the U.S. Army's Rangers and Delta Force were ambushed by Somali men, women and children armed with automatic weapons and rocket-propelled grenades" (Frontline 1999). As a result of this effort to protect bureaucratic equities — the U.S. Army's "go it alone attitude" in this case — 18 Americans died and 84 others were wounded.

CHAPTER 11

IDENTIFYING EMERGENT THEMES: RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN
CONTEXTUAL ELEMENTS & INTERAGENCY DYNAMICS

OVERVIEW

Chapter 10 completed the first phase of the qualitative data analysis, describing the ways in which the “Dynamic Themes” of *Leadership, Decision-Making as Negotiation*, and *Domestic Politics* shape interagency dynamics. This chapter provides the second of three qualitative analysis components by demonstrating the ways in which the “Contextual Elements” framing the policy process interactively shape the “Dynamic Themes,” and ultimately, interagency dynamics (see the shaded area of figure 11.1). The *contextual elements* are framed in terms of the respective *Strategic Visions and Planning Processes* of the agencies and the *Institutional Equities*¹ they strive to protect. Together with the *dynamic themes* discussed in the previous chapter, these emergent themes interact to shape the agencies’ views of conflict termination policy. As with the preceding

¹ Recall from the previous chapter that an “institutional equity” is defined as any asset that adds value to or is the defining characteristic of an agency, one that becomes a substantive input into the policy process. This theme is discussed in detail later as an emergent macro theme.




Figure 11.1. Interactive Model: Contextual Elements



analysis of the *dynamic themes* shaping interagency dynamics, these two macro themes labeled *contextual elements* are supported by myriad micro themes that emerged during the analysis of qualitative interview data.

Noting that the methodological constraints and qualitative analysis approach apply to this phase in the same manner as that involving process influences, they do not warrant repeating here. Yet, it does bear repeating that this analysis reflects an axial coding, a qualitative technique that could be easily replicated by another researcher using the same data. This discussion develops understanding regarding the “Contextual Elements” that influence interagency dynamics and, hence, policy outcomes. Against this background, the themes relating to the substance-process aspects of national security policy-making must be analyzed.

CONTEXTUAL ELEMENTS FRAMING THE INTERAGENCY PROCESS: “STRATEGIC VISION AND PLANNING PROCESSES” AND “INSTITUTIONAL EQUITIES”

Analysis of the data illuminated two complementary themes related to the ways in which *contextual elements* drive interagency dynamics, thereby shaping policy outcomes. These two themes are *Strategic Vision and Planning Processes* and *Institutional Equities*. All five macro themes interact to shape agencies’ perspectives of *Conflict Termination Policy*—shown as the shaded area in table 11.1, it serves as the culminating theme and is discussed in chapter 13. As with the foregoing analysis of the “Dynamic Themes” (chapter 10), several micro

Table 11.1. Macro and Supporting Micro Qualitative Analysis Themes

DYNAMIC THEMES:	CONTEXTUAL ELEMENTS:
Leadership <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Personality • Organizational Culture <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Decision-Making Style • Innovative Thinking • Communication, Debate, & Information • Personal Relations & Networking 	Strategic Vision & Planning Processes <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Core Competencies • National Interests & Intervention Criteria • Worldview: Ideology & Philosophy
Decision-Making as Negotiation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Access & Privilege • Policy Outcome 	Institutional Equities <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Personnel & Budgets • Risk & Accountability • Prior Experience
Domestic Politics <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Public Opinion • The Congress 	Perspectives on Appropriate Conflict Termination Policy <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Crisis Analysis • End State Vision • Termination Criteria • Strategy & COA Development
<p style="text-align: center;">  CROSSCUTTING EFFECTS:  </p> <p style="text-align: center;">“Roles and Missions” & “Media Influence”</p>	

themes support these macro themes (refer again to figure 11.1 or table 11.1).

Based upon its capacity to frame the interagency dynamic, interview data supported *Strategic Vision and Planning Processes* as a critical emergent macro theme. Consequently, it is the subject of the ensuing discussion.

Strategic Vision and Planning Processes

That this theme would be identified as a critical component of the *contextual elements* could have been anticipated as its complementary *dynamic theme* is

Leadership. Recall that *Leadership* emerged as the most salient theme in shaping interagency dynamics. The substantive extension of leadership manifests itself in those issues surrounding the nature of the strategic vision and planning processes² that guide the interagency process toward a policy outcome. Analysis of the data illuminated three interdependent issues related to strategic vision and planning processes: (1) political vision, (2) shared images, and (3) a tactical focus. These themes are supported by micro themes related to core competencies, national interests and intervention criteria, and worldview (in terms of ideology and philosophy). Let us briefly discuss these topics and then proceed to the micro theme analysis.

Political Vision

Noting again the potential crosscutting effects of this theme, strategic vision becomes a parameter for process dynamics and, hence, policy outcomes through its ability to either enhance cohesion or fragment the interagency process from the outset of policy formulation. Simply put, the data indicated that informants felt that the presence of a clearly articulated strategic vision diminished

² For literature related to strategic vision and planning, see Allotey (1995), Andriole (1979), Bantel (1993), Fishel (1994), Follert (1981), Mason (1981), McGowan (1976), Nutt (1981), Rothstein (1972), Thomas (1981), van de Vall (1975), Vayrynen (1991), and Weaver and Pollock (1995).

interagency conflict by providing a coalescing goal for the agencies to pursue.³ In contrast, the absence of strategic vision creates interagency conflict and adversely affects the policy outcome. In characterizing the post-Cold War era one State official remarked, "there's no strategic vision—none similar to NSC-68 which carried us to the end of the Cold War. That strategy and doctrine carried us for 45 years."⁴ Defense officials echoed this perspective. One noted that

We are fast approaching the point where the "inbox rules" and knee-jerk reactions [prevail] with no larger vision for how this fits into the strategic vision [and] without even thinking how this fits into the larger picture. Again, personality and credibility often override the process. Political vision is lacking, therefore, so is the political will.

This lack of strategic vision coupled with the inability to mobilize political will creates an environment wherein disparate perspectives on *Roles and Missions* reinforce differing analyses of a crisis and divergent views regarding potential U.S. policy responses. This dilemma emanates from the disparate shared images that dominate perspectives on crisis analysis and course of action development.

³ Gordon Allport (1958) provides a theoretical basis for this intergroup behavior with regard to racial prejudice in his classic, *The Nature of Prejudice*. It is interesting to note that his "contact hypothesis" holds here as well as diverse groups coalesce around goals to achieve a greater outcome, one they could not achieve independently. It is through this "integration" that dissimilar groups achieve true conflict resolution (*ibid.*, 320).

⁴ For an outstanding analysis of NSC-68 and its legacy, see *NSC-68: Forging the Strategy of Containment* (Drew 1996).

Absence of Shared Images

Alluded to above via the reference to NSC-68, the qualitative data analysis revealed that interagency actors do not share a common image concerning the nature of threats to national security and the most appropriate responses to those threats once identified. A State Department official characterized this problem by saying, "One of the things that drives the current period is the lack of shared images on the nature of threats and the use of force. The assumption in the argument is that people want to employ [Defense Department] resources, but the military does not." The absence of shared images enables personalities to dominate the process and generates a policy outcome that is not connected to a broader strategic vision. The result of philosophical differences, this defect allows the Congress and the media to take on a substantive role in policy development. A State Department principal noted that

Quite often, those of us in government, the civilians, take each crisis as it comes with very little reference to a policy document. If a serious action, it will work its way up to the PC and president if necessary. It brings with it things that are not necessarily...part of a policy document—the Hill and what the media is saying about it.

Another State official asserted

The interagency process is cumbersome; [it] necessarily works well at working level [IWG] when people understand clear policy lines and you're tracking. When making new policy it can be very time consuming. Within the standard IWG, DC, PC process, when there are contentious issues, there's not enough discipline and agencies in this Administration [Clinton's] frustratingly reopen decisions

and take each...to the Hill—that's Washington. If you have a core team with a mandate, then it works.

The absence of an overarching national strategy as framed by shared images and a common understanding of roles and missions adversely affects long-term planning for complex crises.

Tactical Focus

Perhaps one of the most observable cleavages across the interagency process emerged concerning the actors' perspectives regarding planning. Analysis of the qualitative data revealed that the interagency process has no planning mechanism to integrate the incongruent strategic visions of the various agencies (when such visions exist). The absence of leadership and dissimilar organizational cultures are partly responsible for producing this dynamic. Beginning with the National Security Council, informants claimed that the NSC tries to engage in forecasting and strategic planning, but they remain consumed by the crisis of the day. Although it has an office entitled "Strategic Planning" (SP), the State Department likewise is consumed by "the crisis du jour." One State official characterized the problem for this office by saying

There are so many crises—State has an interest in almost all of them. If you are SP, Strategic Planning, you are marginalized. Yes, [strategic planning] is a good idea, but it is never effectively used in that way. No one at State has come up with a way to integrate effective strategic planning into daily operations.

Another State official corroborated this perspective, insisting that “DoS/SP gets into much of day-to-day stuff more than the long-term vision, it’s not a J-5.”⁵ The successful SPs don’t do long-term stuff – they put out fires (i.e., crises) for the Secretary. SP is marginalized if focused on the long-term.” The data indicated there is no imperative within the State Department to perform strategic planning. This omission conflicts with the Defense Department whose strategic planning office *really does* strategic planning.⁶

A Defense Department deputy captured the essence of this cultural divide by stating

[You] have State who doesn’t understand backwards planning coming into contact with DoD who does that kind of planning. Now [you] have an institutional battle – the breakthrough comes in terms of personality. If you get good personality matches, you get good policy: Personality matches make this happen. This “Let’s go and do something” approach is prevalent in other agencies.

Inherent in this approach, according to one experienced informant, is the unwillingness of interagency actors to “ask the tough questions” (e.g., “How long will this take?.... Ten years, no way – eight months, maybe.”). Added to this factor, a National Security Council official contended that “going through the process to develop options/strategies is very useful for [the president]. The

⁵ “J-5” is the Joint Staff’s strategic planning component and is part of the Defense Department.

⁶ It is important to note that the CIA also has a pseudo-strategic planning function in terms of its “early warning” intelligence activities. However, their focus is on collecting information and interpreting it for decision-makers to use in developing options. In this manner, they are not responsible for developing “strategic plans” in the same vein as the NSC, State, and Defense.

military does not understand that interagency planning at the policy level is a process that creates choices, not a plan." This individual continued by saying "a plan is worthless, but planning is everything." In the words of another official, this disconnect regarding the nature of planning and their resultant plans ensures that even "if there is a vision, there's no strategy to achieve it."

The net result of this chasm is that the policy process is driven more toward the development of tactical options in place of the strategic vision necessary to guide national security policy and crisis response activities. Analysis indicated that each agency agreed that the policy process is reactive and tactically focused, promoting ad hoc responses to the crisis du jour across all agencies. The exploratory methodology employed by this research cannot confirm whether this tactical focus *causes* this reactive planning and response cycle (nor can it conclusively support the reverse relationship). However, it is interesting to reflect upon one State Department official's perspective, a perspective that links strategic vision directly to planning and crisis action response:

There is not too much of a distinction between strategic and crisis action planning. If you started at the beginning administration and get a vision, you use the crisis to advance the interests you have already identified. In that sense, crisis management is the fire you are waiting for.

Two factors related to strategic vision play into the interagency actors' collective inability to capitalize on, or prepare for, the crisis of the moment. First, because

the lower-level actors do not have a strategic vision to guide their activities, they lack an understanding of the crisis as it relates to national interests and the broader geo-political context.⁷ This narrow focus becomes critical in the early stages of crisis analysis where decisions are made in terms of framing the underlying causes and conditions of conflict and potential courses of action to respond to the crisis. This problem continues to hamper policy development as these actors clarify issues upward to the next interagency level. Second, the time and resource constraints that accompany the crisis analysis phase of policy development magnify these problems. Contrary to the tenets of the Rational Actor Model, the analysis revealed that neither unlimited time nor unbounded resources (e.g., number of people to work the crisis or capacity to access "pure" intelligence) exist. Such limitations compress greatly the analysis and response cycles for each crisis while negating the decision-maker's ability to respond to the crisis in terms of the broader strategic vision (again, assuming one has been articulated).

In the end, the qualitative data analysis suggests that the issues related to *Strategic Vision and Planning Processes* shape the substance-process relationship by injecting disparate inputs into the interagency process in the initial stages of

⁷ This assumes, of course, that national interests have been defined and articulated. This subject is discussed later in this section as the data revealed it as one of the supporting micro themes for *Strategic Vision and Planning Processes*.

policy development and continuing to reinforce them well into the production of policy outcomes. These disparate inputs regarding strategic vision (i.e., political vision and shared images) drive the planning process downward toward a tactical-level focus instead of the strategic vision required to guide the overall planning and response processes. The effects of a tactical perspective and response process can be identified readily in the policy outcomes the interagency process produces. Because the views of the desired end state are politicized at the highest levels of government, the data indicated that people remain unwilling to ask (and, indeed, answer) tough questions concerning crisis analysis and response. A National Security Council principal adeptly characterized the problem as one related to organizational culture:

[The pol-mil planning process] has [an] advanced planning process – different from the military's deliberate planning. The [object of the] deliberate planning process is to provide a plan – the product of the advanced planning process is to create options, the policy-maker wants choices. Below the policy-maker, the strategizer level of DoD wants objectives.

This cleavage illuminates one of the most disturbing substance-process disjunctures across the interagency process, a fissure that prevents the decision-makers from developing effective conflict termination policy. In the end, the interagency actors remain unable to translate the "policy-maker's choices" into measurable military "objectives" that can be operationalized in terms of a strategy and the identification of the conflict termination criteria to guide that

strategy toward the desired end state. The emergent micro themes provide evidence for this conclusion. These supporting themes strengthened my understanding of the ways in which substance-process issues shape policy outcomes. The data analysis revealed that issues surrounding core competencies, national interests and intervention criteria, and agency worldviews (including ideological and philosophical perspectives) served as substantive inputs to the development of strategic vision and, therefore, influenced planning processes. Taking each in turn, the ensuing discussion provides evidence for those relationships.

Perceptions of Core Competencies: Self and Others'

Arguably, this research could have analyzed issues related to *Core Competencies* in terms of the *Clarity of Roles and Missions* discussion presented in the ensuing chapter. While a direct relationship does indeed exist as an agency's core competencies⁸ frame their ability to perform certain roles while negating their ability to perform others, the connection between core competencies and strategic vision is important for this analysis. Specifically, it is the lack of a substantive understanding of each agency's core competencies (i.e., the expertise that one brings to bear as a product of an agency's roles and missions) that

⁸ Core competencies are the functional activities an agency trains and equips for as its functional roles. Core competencies for State include diplomacy and negotiation; for Defense, warfighting and operations other than war, including peacekeeping.

creates interagency conflict and produces sub-optimal policy outcomes. This iterative cycle results from the capacity of the misunderstandings regarding core competencies to fragment the policy-makers' comprehension of the national interests that frame strategic vision.

Analysis of responses from informants highlighted an acute misunderstanding of core competencies across the interagency process. This confusion emanates from a lack of connectivity across the agencies and leads to "finger-pointing" (i.e., interagency conflict) and increased media activity. One Defense official characterized the problem by saying

Interagency conflict results from a lack of understanding of each agencies' / Departments' (intra- and inter-) capabilities and a lack of connectivity between your short-range crisis reaction types and your long-range visionaries. That's a corollary to "you've got to have strategic vision" – and we don't have it.

The agencies' respective organizational cultures – particularly those of the NSC, State, and Defense – magnify this lack of understanding. The effect of this magnification leads non-uniformed decision-makers to view the use of force as a surgical instrument within the conduct of diplomatic operations. A National Security Council principal described the problem by noting that

Through most of the Cold War virtually everyone had some understanding of the military. That is now the exception rather than the rule. We have been saved from an even worse disaster by Goldwater-Nichols giving the Chairman (CJCS) a clearly political role which the CJCS did not have prior to Goldwater-Nichols. It is a serious problem because fundamentally, unless you have been in

the military, things always gets screwed up—it never goes as planned. To many of the high officials now, the military is this sort of flawless medical instrument—“a nice clean little war.”

This lack of understanding goes beyond perceptions of a “nice clean little war” in that the National Security Council and State Department fail to understand the logistical requirements of force employment. A State principal remarked that part of the problem emanates from his agency and the National Security Council:

One of the limitations in this building and at NSC [is that] there is an over-emphasis on the theory of the practice of politics and diplomacy, but not enough on the hands-on experience of multi-aircraft tasking packages. There isn't enough attention paid to how we maintain the force—that is the specialist argument we started out with.

This official's ideas identify another issue related to *Perceptions of Core Competencies*, that surrounding the “generalist versus specialist” debate. Simply put, analysis of the data illuminated a structural problem between these organizational cultures and understandings about core competencies: The interagency process is designed to bridge the gaps in the decision-makers' understanding of core competencies. Yet, precisely because *non-uniformed personnel* are educated, trained, and rewarded by an organizational culture that emphasizes non-military means to manage and resolve crises while *uniformed personnel* are educated, trained, and rewarded according to an organizational culture that focuses almost exclusively on the use of force to control the crisis environment, the U.S. government has very few individuals who understand or

embody the asymmetric shared images of both cultures. In essence, then, the decision-makers remain isolated from one another as they practice and refine their respective core competencies and analyze crises in terms of their mutually exclusive experiences. As a result, these decision-makers have failed to understand the connections and differences between the strategy of diplomacy and the operational art of war. The failure of leadership to integrate fully these two cultures exaggerates this chasm at all levels of the interagency process. Hence, misperceptions of core competencies shape substantive inputs to the policy process as perspectives on what you think you *can* do (i.e., substantive inputs) shape ideas regarding what you *should* do (i.e., policy outcomes). This perspective, in turn, stifles innovative thinking regarding roles and missions and forces the visionary and planning processes "into the weeds" (i.e., tactical level). The analysis indicated that this "can-should" relationship is distorted further by the individual agencies as they independently frame national interests and intervention criteria.

Framing of National Interests & Intervention Criteria

A very interesting relationship between national interests and intervention criteria emerged in terms of the relationship between interests and values.⁹ The

⁹ For a broader discussion of national interest framing and its relationship to policy development, see Allotey (1995), Andriole (1979), Ederington and Mazarr (1994), Gigot (1991), Kim (1996), Maoz (1990), Reese (1993), and Tims and Miller (1986). Similarly, for an expanded perspective

analysis revealed that decision-makers framed *interests* by evaluating potential alternative futures; conversely, decision-makers framed *values* more broadly in terms of past commitments or humanitarian issues. The data showed perspectives on interests and values differed concerning foreign policy,¹⁰ illuminating a distinct cleavage across the informants. Interests tended to relate to diplomatic, economic, and military prowess (e.g., maintaining oil flow from the Persian Gulf to the U.S. and its allies). Alternatively, values concerned social aspirations (e.g., preventing or mitigating humanitarian disasters abroad or maintaining a positive return on a prior investment). This dichotomy originates from the dissimilar images that shape asymmetric strategic visions, perspectives that fail to distinguish among "supreme, vital, strategic, and tactical interests" (Freeman 1997). This muddled definition of national interests enables prior experience, perceptions of risk, and personality to dominate the debate regarding intervention criteria.

Recall from the quantitative data that perceptions regarding the use of criteria to prioritize a crisis remained mixed. In fact, a majority of the 69 questionnaire

on intervention, see Belliveau and Stolte (1977), Boyle and Lawler (1991), Carnevale and Keenan (1992), Donohue et al. (1991), Parker (1991), Raymond (1994), Smith (1995), Thompson and Faith (1980), Young (1967, 1972), and Zartman (1989).

¹⁰ It is important to note that framing interests and values in terms of *domestic policy* would also include enhancing the political currency of the presidency, the Congress, and the political parties, each according to their respective "strategic interests."

informants said their agency did apply some form of formal criteria; the remaining informants said their agencies had no formal criteria, but relied upon informal criteria. The quantitative data indicated that these perspectives on criteria use were split almost evenly across the three levels of the interagency process.¹¹ Interview data reinforced this finding while simultaneously revealing that recollections of prior experience, especially in terms of risk, helped frame the formal intervention criteria. Alternatively, perceptions related to domestic politics, media spin, and presidential desires framed the informal criteria.

The Defense Department tended to cite formal criteria more often than the other agencies. Specifically, the data reflected these officials invoked interpretations of the Weinberger Doctrine that remained bound by their professional experience. One Defense principal noted:

Criteria for involvement were those in the Weinberger Doctrine — this was the benchmark and nobody else had such a thing.... We tried to apply the Weinberger Doctrine with these criteria in mind: (1) vital national interests, (2) clear political objectives, and (3) [a] reasonable strategy for achieving goals and have all other means been exhausted prior to the introduction of forces. Finally,...Weinberger always asked if it was sustainable with the American people.

This official continued by asserting that the State Department has consistently rejected these criteria, principles the Defense Department has guarded

¹¹ The ratios across the three levels in terms of "does/does not" use criteria were: principals level, 11/14; deputies level, 19/14; and, interagency working group, 5/6.

vigorously since their inception in the 1980s. One Defense principal characterized this as an educational process for both the military and other government agencies. Referencing Secretary of Defense William Perry's speeches regarding "criteria for intervention," this official contended "there's an increased awareness on the part of the military in terms of understanding (a) why military force is used and (b) what we hope to achieve with military force." This tendency to apply the Weinberger Doctrine leads military professionals to assess the risks of conducting the mission in terms of costs (i.e., "blood and treasure") and feasibility (i.e., probability for success or failure). The warfighter's prior experience, in both training and combat, influences these assessments regarding costs and feasibility.¹² Note also that these risks are evaluated in terms of "vital national interests," clarity of political objectives, and the use of force as a last resort (i.e., all other means have been applied and, by definition, have failed). Although an abridged version of the evaluative process that characterizes the Defense assessment process, the crucial aspect of this finding is that members across the agency share this viewpoint concerning the process for framing intervention criteria. The same cannot be said for the National Security Council, State Department, and CIA, agencies that each frame intervention criteria

¹² As an example, one official noted that the "Weinberger criteria [were] discussed formally and informally on the Joint Staff. There's a story that became a tone-setter early-on [in the Bosnia policy development]...someone brought General Powell a map and he remarked, 'Looks like Dien Bien Phu.'"

according to their institutional perspectives. Perhaps the most obvious difference in the framing of intervention criteria with regard to these agencies is that State and the NSC reverse the priority given to criteria vis-à-vis the Defense Department's rank ordering of these same criteria.

This analysis leads me to conclude that these agencies do not discount the importance of those criteria Defense regards as preeminent. However, they emphasized that the informal criteria of domestic politics and presidential attention tend to eclipse other criteria in the policy-making process. Domestic politics plays a role in terms of both public opinion and special interest groups because of their capacity to energize partisan politics. Relatedly, the media's ability to focus attention on issues that could be sensitive politically for the president ensures the National Security Council and State Department elevate its importance. Consequently, the media's perspective influences intervention criteria and goals, particularly those related to humanitarian values.¹³ This NSC and State perspective is refined further by the president's attention. The informants noted that issues the president becomes personally involved with take on a higher priority, effectively overshadowing any other criteria (see, for example, Druckman, Husbands, and Johnston 1991). A State principal remarked that his agency measures policy, and by extension, intervention criteria, in terms

¹³ The case analyses make this precept more apparent (forthcoming, chapter 13).

of whether it (1) has been “articulated,” (2) is “sustainable,” and (3) is “the best use of resources.” Another State deputy noted that even when national interests are considered as criteria they are defined very broadly as economic (i.e., dealing with business) or the safety of citizens abroad. In fact, one State official claimed,

We do not [use criteria]. It’s systemic—State tends to treat everything as an equal priority. In the end, we do try to look at things in accordance with national security interests, but it happens after the fact.

A National Security Council principal contextualized the use of criteria across the interagency process, noting that “criteria happen least in a crisis.” Instead, the critical factors become the “level of interest at stake, political sensitivity, [and] how fast events are moving.” In this manner, the absence of a clearly articulated national security policy that builds upon identifiable national interests that are similarly interpreted across the interagency process ensures that these agencies independently frame intervention criteria according to their respective departmental interests, not the national interests of the entire country. Returning to the discussion presented in chapter 10 illuminating the ways in which interagency dynamics shape policy outcomes, the role of personality and the influence of personal relationships again emerge as a critical components of the policy process. In the final analysis, the absence of mutually accepted principles to frame and evaluate intervention criteria enhances the potential for

the strength of personality to have a defining influence on intervention criteria and the use of force.

Clearly articulated national interests provide the substantive goal around which the interagency process can develop and implement policy. The absence of clarity creates interagency conflict during the process of policy-making as disagreements over national interests harden the agencies' perspectives regarding their respective roles in developing policy and the missions they will perform to fulfill that policy mandate. This tension generates ambiguity of purpose and is reflected in the resultant policy outcomes. These policy outcomes evaluate issues in terms of past commitments, not future prospects. In this way, they tend to be affected by the problems inherent to psychological entrapment (Kameda and Sugimori 1993; Mitchell 1991; Rubin et al. 1980). Such an approach mirrors Mitchell's (1996) "entrapment model" while discounting the possibilities of alternative futures as presented in his "enticing opportunity model" (see chapter 3). One principal's argument supporting intervention into Bosnia captured this perspective: "We spent 40 years building Europe to this level...." The inference here is that the U.S. has "so much invested" in the past that it could not afford to remain uninvolved in Bosnia's future. Perspectives regarding past investments and alternative futures reflect the decision-makers' ideologies and philosophies, thereby providing an appropriate segue into the final micro

theme supporting *Strategic Vision and Planning Processes*—that connecting worldviews to ideologies and philosophies.

Worldview: Ideology and Philosophy

Worldview is not a new concept among philosophers and social scientists, but it is now gaining currency across all disciplines.¹⁴ The description offered by Oscar Nudler contextualizes the significance of this concept by highlighting the effects of conflicting worldviews:

Both “world” and “frame” refer then to a set of assumptions or principles which enable us to structure situations and, by the same token, make them real for us.... Worlds (are) rooted in fundamental need (for meaning).... Now we can see why conflicts between worlds may be so hard to handle: they may imply alternative, competing ways of meeting the need for meaning and, therefore, they may be perceived as putting in danger our way, a way on which all the rest of what we are depends (Nudler 1990, 178).

From this perspective, the relevance of worldview takes on greater significance as the agencies within the policy-making process are in conflict as they try to meet their respective need for meaning (part of which is captured by their self-described roles and missions). A Defense Department principal captured this significance by saying

Friction is always present: Fundamental differences of opinion over vital interests—this generates a certain amount of friction. I don’t think it’s necessarily unhealthy. You get friction between

¹⁴ For a broader explanation of worldview theory, see Docherty (1998), Etzioni (1973), Freij (1992), Lazarus (1993), Moreno (1987), Nudler (1990), Park (1991), Potter (1991), and Sandole and van der Merwe (1993).

Departments: The State Department differs from the way the Defense Department views the world – their relative view affects the definition of the situation.

The data reflected that worldviews shaped the “definition of the situation” for these agencies in two critical ways: (1) according to the decision-makers’ ideological perspectives regarding the use of force and (2) in terms of their philosophy for the employment of military forces. Ideology plays an important role in the development of worldview as it shapes the ways in which agencies perceive the world and their roles in it. In this context, ideology refers to one’s perspective regarding the use of force to bring about desired results. Looking at this concept from a peace research perspective, Michael Banks contends

The sharpest distinction [between the realist and idealist] is to be found in their respective attitudes toward the use of force as a means of conflict management. Conservatives [realists] accept it and seek to refine it, direct it rationally and minimize it. Liberals [idealists] try to escape from it, seeking refuge in law, international organizations and a great variety of piecemeal modifications (Banks 1987, 262).

Recall that figure 8.9 (shown here as figure 11.2) explored relationships between *Ideology* and the indicators related to *Organizational Communication* (e.g., *Department’s Leadership Style*, *Departmental Mission/Goals*, and *Agency’s Perceived Penalty for Failure*). The quantitative data revealed no significant relationships between *Ideology* and any other indicator within that core factor. Remember also that the subsequent analysis by Department, Level within Interagency, and Case




Figure 11.2. Organizational Communication (Post-Analysis)

(see chapter 8) indicated that with the exception of the State Department, interagency actors characterized their agencies as predominantly *realist* where foreign and national security affairs are concerned. Qualitative data from further interviews supported these conclusions, but they also highlighted additional issues that further demonstrate the ways in which ideology becomes a substantive input to the policy-making process.

The quantitative data showed that actors across the interagency process agree that the U.S. government is comprised predominantly of realists. However, qualitative data indicated that policy-making also includes an idealistic element that manifests itself in the formation of "moral" policy. One State deputy noted that "there is a moral and religious component to our policy that has nothing to do with strategy." A State Department principal maintained it is too difficult to generalize regarding ideological perspectives because such alignments are issue-specific. This official categorized as *realistic* those issues related to diplomatic relations and the regular conduct of diplomacy; *idealism*, in his view, included issues related to human rights, democracy, and, to some degree, the environment. Another State official further delineated the organizational culture of that agency by claiming the geographic bureaus (e.g., Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs) tend to be more *realistic* in their outlook since they focus on interest-related issues, while the functional bureaus (e.g., Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor) remain more *idealistic* as they focus on value-related

issues. In contrast to the State Department's mixed ideology, the National Security Council and Defense Department characterized their ideological perspective as *realist* in nature. This ideological cleavage between agencies generates interagency conflict as it perpetuates the stereotypes discussed previously within this work. A Defense Department principal characterized the problem in this manner:

Within the senior levels at the State Department and the NSC staff, there's a left-wing bent toward value-laden policies rather than interest-laden policies. They push to get U.S. forces involved in pursuit of liberal values...that's a left-wing bent.

These stereotypes are politicized further as actors within the process tend to ascribe political party affiliations to these interest- and value-laden perspectives.

One State official expressed this through a political party stereotype:

"Republicans see people as nation-state actors—Democrats tend to look at issues." From this perspective, stereotypes classifying Republicans as *realists* who pursue interest-related issues conflict with those characterizing Democrats as *idealists* who pursue value-laden issues. These types of classifications shape interagency dynamics in terms of process (namely, exacerbating pre-existing cleavages between organizational cultures and mobilizing agents in terms of domestic politics) and policy outcomes in terms of the substantive inputs introduced into that process. The philosophies these agencies employ as a

reflection of their respective ideological perspectives make this substance-process relationship evident.

Philosophy plays a crucial role by providing a system of principles that guide each agency's views on the use of force. A National Security Council principal noted that "philosophies provide the overall parameters for interagency conduct." The analysis indicated that philosophy regarding the use of force has a huge impact if the principals do not share a sense of teamwork. As products of polarized ideology, dissimilar philosophies have a splintering influence on the definition of national interests, intervention criteria, and, hence, strategic vision. Together, these fissures decrease trust across agencies and further perpetuate harmful stereotypes. These factors interact to produce divergent views on the appropriate use of force in times of crisis, creating a dynamic wherein Defense perceives that State sees military force as a tool to be manipulated. A National Security Council principal noted, "It is ironic that State is eager to use force when it hits a snag in diplomacy." A Defense principal likewise asserted, "the problem we are having is that other agencies commit our force—it has now become the punitive arm to slap people around." A Defense Department deputy presented another viewpoint:

The State Department [people]...most of what I've heard there is they like to use military force on the edges—things like no-fly zones, shaping diplomatic purposes, humanitarian operations, stability operations, shows of force—more in a preventive mode to discourage aggression and encourage stability.

Consequently, Defense *perceives* that State's (and the National Security Council's) first inclination is to use force. A State Department official similarly reflected this perspective, claiming that

State Department people can be pretty strong-headed on the requirement to use force, but they do not always understand implications of the use of force. State wants to use force first—Defense is always the biggest hindrance to the use of force.

The qualitative data reflected this asymmetric philosophy regarding the use of force in terms of the State Department's "sense of urgency to do something" as well as the Defense Department's "caution signal." It is demonstrated further by State's desire for ambiguity and Defense's drive for specificity (as discussed previously).

In the end, differences in ideology and philosophy create a prism through which dissimilar worldviews produce asymmetric definitions of national interests and intervention criteria, producing nonparallel strategic visions across interagency actors. Within the context of a nonintegrated planning system, these disparate visions generate different understandings of core competencies, national interests, and intervention criteria, creating asymmetric levels of commitment regarding the strategy to achieve the stated policy outcome. Hence, these substantive inputs to the policy process shape interagency dynamics and, consequently, the resulting policy outcome. The final macro theme, however, may hold the greatest import for the bureaucratic aspects of policy-making

where substance serves as a driver for process. From this perspective, the *Institutional Equities* restricting the interagency process must be discussed.

Protection of Institutional Equities

This work defined an equity as any asset that adds value to or is the defining characteristic of an agency. From this perspective, Allison's axiom of "where you stand depends on where you sit"¹⁵ aptly captures the framing process that identifies institutional equities. In this manner, resources (e.g., budgets, personnel, and equipment) and functions (i.e., the respective agencies' roles and missions) emerged as the most tangible assets the Departments view as equities. However, intangible factors continuously refine the agencies' views regarding their respective equities. These intangible factors include perceptions of risk, of accountability and, referenced earlier, prior experience. Beginning with the tangible factors, the ensuing discussion addresses each supporting micro theme in turn. By demonstrating the ways in which these three factors shape departmental viewpoints regarding their respective equities, the qualitative data analysis stimulated the conclusion that these equities shape substantive inputs to the policy process. Consequently, this conclusion necessitates a discussion of "personnel and budgets" as the agencies' primary resources equities.

¹⁵ Repeatedly, the informants used this phrase to characterize the nature of institutional equities. In this manner, Allison's work has become ingrained popularly in the descriptions of the bureaucratic stakes these decision-makers strive to protect.

Personnel and Budgets

The resources and functions each agency controls serve as the critical elements of each agency's identity. Consequently, these elements take their most visible forms in terms of the personnel, budgets, assets, and responsibilities Departments regard as their own. As will be elucidated through the *Clarity of Roles and Missions* discussion in the next chapter, perceptions of confusion and overlap exist regarding these responsibilities when these agencies take part in the interagency process. Despite this ambiguity at the interagency level, the data indicated that these boundaries are defined clearly when one's own institutional equities are at stake. Further, in the cases where these agencies lack large budgets and operate with limited personnel, their ability to perform their function becomes their most protected institutional equity. Beginning with the National Security Council, let us work through each of the major actors in turn.

The National Security Council is constrained by its size (i.e., approximately 156 people). One of its primary goals—indeed, many informants characterized it as a responsibility—is to protect the long-term legacy of the presidency. This functional responsibility demands the NSC react to media reports and respond to congressional pressures. While doing so, as coordinator of the interagency process and the last stop for policy formulation before involving the president, this agency “wants to achieve compromise above all else.” Thus, while

maintaining relations with the media and the Congress that enhance the legacy of the presidency remains a priority, its most protected equity – its defining characteristic – is its capacity to build consensus across the interagency process. This equity is projected inward toward the intergovernmental relations of U.S. agencies, but it has played a supporting role in the development of both State's and Defense's institutional equities.

At the most basic level, data from the interviews indicated that State Department defined its most important equities as the strength of its diplomacy, its uninterrupted worldwide presence, and its identification as the U.S. government's foreign policy leader. A State Department deputy characterized it this way:

The closer you get to an institution's core interests, the more competitive a Department gets. State's core interests tend to be process-oriented and institutional: The reputation of the Foreign Service, the role of the ambassador, the conduct of American foreign policy through...traditional diplomacy...[maintaining] a non-isolationist perspective in the world.

Again, functional responsibilities come to the fore as the dominant forces shaping the State Department's views of its equities. The State Department's capacity to fulfill its functional equities often exposes the nexus where the political and military equities come together. This nexus illuminates the resource-related equities that appear as the Defense Department's visible assets.

Of all the agencies, only the Defense Department controls the most visible resource equities, equities that comprise the very soul of the military: troops and budgets.¹⁶ Informants' perspectives of these two factors are linked to the Department's organizational culture and its conceptions of leadership. The first, issues related to troops, manifests itself as an institutional bias in two interrelated ways—the number of people the agency commands coupled with the command responsibility that agency has to its people. The military recognizes that it has the largest personnel tally, making it an easy target for the “lowest common denominator” phenomenon highlighted earlier. In essence, the data revealed that the interagency decision-makers recognize that Defense personnel *are* the lowest common denominator because no other agency possesses the capacity to organize people and lead them as effectively as Defense. Recognition of this status on the part of Defense officials makes them even more cautious toward the use of forces¹⁷ since they, more than any other decision-makers across the interagency process, grasp fully the gravity of putting troops in harm's way. The

¹⁶ The reference to troops here is understandable. The reference to budgets is not meant to derogate the military's image; this theme of budget protection emerged repeatedly as one the Defense Department regarded as critical to its survival.

¹⁷ It is critical to note there is a difference between the “use of force” and the “use of forces.” The “use of force” relates directly to the employment of military technologies in a warfighting capacity to bring about the desired result. Alternatively, the “use of forces” conveys a message that military personnel are used in some other role, one that does not involve (necessarily) the employment of forces for a combat mission. It is important to note that the distinction is not intended to communicate that an ego factor shapes the first. On the contrary, it is the commander-subordinate loyalty relationship discussed here that creates caution on the part of commanders to put troops in harm's way, irrespective of the mission.

commander-subordinate loyalty relationship that exists within the military's organizational culture molds this perspective. The lethality of the mission and potential for loss of life (both U.S. troops and other individuals) demand Defense officials to protect this equity as fervently as possible. Efforts to protect this equity do, however, create interagency conflict and further perpetuate negative stereotypes. For example, a National Security Council principal asserted that "JCS will not recommend to the Chairman anything that derogates force protection." Because of this hesitance, a State official contended the American political and bureaucratic context is "obsessed by force protection. This leaves the force less capable of filling other missions." Troop protection is not the only equity Defense officials strive to protect: Budgets (and, by extension physical assets) are regarded highly as well, the protection of which augments Defense's reservation to volunteer for those "other missions" the foregoing State Department official referenced.

The size of Defense's budget is important in its own right: Of greater significance is its size when compared to that of the State Department. According to one Defense principal, the asymmetry of the budgets between Defense and State generates problems for interagency relations:

State has taken a much higher hit than Defense in resources. Congress does not want to give them the resources and State is forced to close embassies. When you consider how much we rely upon diplomats and we give them nothing to do the job—they [i.e., the Congressional Foreign Affairs Committee] deal with funds

based upon political whims. Albright talks about the \$270 billion [Defense budget] — they have \$18 billion — they cannot run foreign policy on that money. I do not blame her — the answer is to give them more.¹⁸

While these figures are based upon late 1990s funding levels, the overwhelming budgetary disparity between these agencies did not occur overnight and is hard to miss: State is forced to sustain its diplomatic operation on roughly 7 percent of the total Defense budget. Arguably, the need to maintain billion-dollar equipment items demands that Defense receive a much larger operating and maintenance budget. However, Defense recognizes, based upon prior experience, that ongoing State-initiated contingencies¹⁹ involving the use of forces will deplete Defense of vital monies for readiness and training, thereby adversely affecting its ability to fight and win the nation's wars — the ultimate purpose for its existence. Discussed previously, this dynamic produces interagency conflict by creating "the perception [within] this building (Defense) is that State runs around with their hand in our pocket. State's view is that if

¹⁸ More than one government official called my attention to the "games" the Congress plays regarding funding. Another individual noted that the Congress responds to funding contingencies in three primary ways. First, if they support the operation and feel Defense has the funding to cover it, the Congress does nothing. Second, if they support the operation and feel Defense lacks sufficient funding, the Congress passes a supplemental appropriations bill to fund the contingency without taking additional monies from Defense. Third, if they do not support the operation, they deny funding for the particular activity undertaking the operation, effectively diminishing its capacity to fulfill the policy mandate.

¹⁹ Recall the earlier discussions of national interests and strategic vision that highlighted these "State-initiated" purposes tend to fall outside the national interests from Defense's perspective since they tend to reflect value-laden policies, not interest-laden judgments.

Defense has all the toys, why won't you use them."²⁰ From the beginning of the interagency process, the protection of troops and budgets as substantive inputs to the policy process generates interagency conflict. While the National Security Council and Departments of State and Defense remain the primary actors in the interagency process, the Intelligence Community – the CIA in particular – likewise plays a significant role as the protection of its functional equities connect directly to the substantive inputs around which the interagency dynamic is formed.

The introduction of the Intelligence Community presented in chapter 4 identified this actor's primary goal as that of presenting objective estimates of the situation in a timely fashion. However, comprised of 13 distinct but interrelated intelligence activities, the different actors within the Intelligence Community share this image regarding objective estimates, but not necessarily a sense of ownership regarding those estimates. One CIA official noted that competition becomes a factor if certain intelligence agencies "don't have all the knowledge and won't defer to those 'in the know.'" In this manner, equities across the Intelligence Community relate to their institutional affiliations (e.g., State's

²⁰ General Colin Powell captured one such conversation in his memoirs when then UN Ambassador Madeleine Albright asked him, "What's the point of having this superb military that you're always talking about if we can't use it?" (Powell and Persico 1995, 576).

"Bureau of Intelligence and Research" and the military's "Defense Intelligence Agency") as well as the quality of the intelligence assessment itself.

Notions regarding these respective equities²¹ must be placed within the overall interagency context. According to one IWG-level informant, this tendency to "protect our own rice bowls" creates interagency competition and defines the boundaries of both agency interaction and resource commitment, both of which have a direct influence in shaping the policy outcome. One NSC principal notes that the principals exacerbate this problem somewhat: "I would find budgeting/mechanical issues of concern—it's rare to see these come up at PC/DC levels—PCs just say, 'Do it.'" This conduct pushes these equity-based discussions back down to the lower levels, levels wherein decision-makers are rewarded for competitively protecting their respective equities. Perspectives on institutional equities are refined further by perceptions regarding risk and accountability, the subject of the ensuing section.

²¹ The data revealed other institutional equities exist as well. For example, the Department of Justice is playing more of a role as they focus on "dotting the i's and crossing the t's." This can lead to delays and constrain rules of engagement (e.g., more narrowly interpret the Geneva and Hague

Risk and Accountability

Agencies frame risk and accountability very differently across the interagency process.²² Alluded to above, Defense defines its troops as its central equity, one to protect and avoid risking at all costs. On the other hand, State frames risk to its equity of diplomatic viability in terms of sustaining worldwide diplomatic presence. These equities clash when Defense must employ its troops to evacuate State personnel when crises erupt. It is not the evacuation that creates the clash of equities; rather, it is the perceived delay on the part of the State Department that increases the risk to Defense personnel. As argued earlier, this relates directly to the widespread lack of understanding of each other's core competencies, but further relates to another organizational culture dimension that holds significant import for the protection of equities. In essence, diplomats and warfighters have asymmetric conceptions of time.

Data from interviews led me to believe that diplomats regard their mission as one of extended duration—they are there “for the long-haul.” Conversely,

Conventions). Additionally, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is taking on a larger role by asking who is going to pay for these contingencies earlier in the policy development process.

²² The literature on risk and risk avoidance remains one of the most diverse, spanning the fields of psychology to economics (see, for example, Arrow 1982; Camerer 1995; Elliott and McKee 1995; Follert 1981; Grether and Plott 1979; House 1979; Janis and Mann 1977; Jervis 1992; Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982; Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Levy 1992; Levy 1997; Slovic and Lichtenstein 1983; Tversky and Kahneman 1986; Tversky and Kahneman 1991; Tversky, Slovic, and Kahneman 1990; Tversky and Wakker 1995). While the accountability literature is not as diverse, an overview is provided by Carroll and Payne (1991), Gregorian (1980), Kramer, Pommerenke, and Newton (1993), and O'Loughlin (1990).

warfighters view their role as one of "getting in, accomplishing the mission, and getting out." Thus, the risk to Defense's equities increases exponentially the longer the troops are engaged: This becomes the impetus for Defense's demand for clearly defined exit strategies. For diplomats, the risks remain relatively constant over time as they are there before troop deployment and remain there long after troops return to their home bases. This creates interagency conflict as, in the view of one State official, an equity is also framed in terms of an agency's "place in control of an issue, [its] political currency." A State principal noted that during the Lebanon example cited previously (see chapter 10) Defense remained unwilling to entertain State Department views regarding the positioning of the Marines offshore: "That has been traditionally regarded by our armed forces as encroachment." Hence, a clear connection exists with the roles and functions discussion and the *Clarity of Roles and Missions* debate examined in the next chapter. The other side of the risk issue that is related to the protection of equities is the notion of accountability.

Accountability obviously has many dimensions. The data revealed two of great importance for equity framing—accountability in terms of commission and omission. In the first instance, the data revealed that agencies exhibit risk-averse behaviors regarding accountability as they tenaciously avoid committing decisions to paper, thereby preventing them from becoming part of an official

government record.²³ Not only does recording or publishing decisions lead to heightened risks of leaks (again, for the political opposition this serves as fuel for their anti-administration policy efforts), but it also increases the decision-maker's accountability if the policy fails.²⁴ In this manner, government officials desire not to hand their political opposition the noose with which to hang themselves (i.e., the potentially damaging effects of domestic politics dominate policy-making conduct). The absence of such a record, albeit public or private, diminishes continuity across the interagency process as the individual actors emerge from meetings with disparate perspectives regarding what the policy *is* and what it *means*—perspectives influenced by their need to avoid unnecessary risks and protect institutional equities. The interactive effects of accountability continue to permeate the process as the need to avoid unnecessary risks and protect institutional equities mandates active participation in the interagency process to avoid “accountability via omission.”

²³ This fact became a reality for this research as well: I quickly realized that these actors did not record decisions or their analytical processes on paper (save a limited number of highly classified documents that could not be included in this work). Consequently, I had to modify the research methodology by deleting the archival content analysis I originally planned to conduct. As one example, a State official communicated that their Strategic Planning office had written a couple of papers on conflict termination for the Persian Gulf War. When I asked if I could review them, this official replied, “I don’t know where they are—we don’t keep records of such things.”

²⁴ A Defense principal recounted the U.S. experience in Panama with regard to objectives, noting that “the Bush administration went into Panama with four objectives—three were attained within 48 hours. Yet, we could not get Noriega, the fourth objective. I think this was prime in the White House and the Pentagon—we found him and it did become a victory. By making Noriega an objective, we were more vulnerable to failure.”

The data revealed that agencies fear being pulled into situations that adversely affect the institutional equities described earlier while simultaneously increasing risk and accountability for their Departments. Such fears demand these agencies become involved in the policy process as early as possible to avoid what I have labeled as "accountability via omission." Specifically, the data showed that concern exists that the interagency will make bad decisions if one's own agency is not involved early in the decision-making process.²⁵ Given the discussion of troops as Defense's primary equity and a recognized lack of understanding regarding core competencies across the interagency process, this anxiety remains particularly acute for the military. A National Security Council principal recognized this anxiety, noting that

It is ironic that State is eager to use force when it hits a snag in diplomacy. The military [is reluctant] to get involved. In a sense, they are holding the bag...will have their budget eaten up.

The decision-makers' prior experiences further reinforce these fears of accountability via omission.

²⁵ Bush captures the essence of this as well when reflecting upon his presidency. He notes, "Brent [Scowcroft] and Jim [Baker] did get moderately crosswise, but very rarely. Jim worried that he might be excluded from a decision that affected his department. As a former chief of staff, he knew how a strong-willed presidential advisor, if backed by a president, can easily isolate a cabinet member" (Bush and Scowcroft 1998, 36). Reports in the aftermath of the Sudan bombing effort of 20 August 1998 implying that the White House truncated the interagency process in its haste to act validate this concern.

Prior Experience

With the exception of those diplomats and national leaders who have served in a career capacity, few share images arising from prior experience to the same degree as the uniformed professional. For this individual, prior experience is ingrained as part of his or her profession—institutionally and personally. Only the military promotes a “Professional Military Education” system that regularly (and repetitively at different levels) educates its members on leadership, historical conflicts, and the art and science of its profession—warfighting. In this manner, the education and training system institutionally emphasizes lessons learned from past conflicts or the assumption that future conflicts will be similar to those prior experiences. Decision-makers then interpret these lessons learned in light of their current personal experiences and those shared by the high-ranking officials they strive to emulate. When these personal experiences are limited to comparable organizational cultures with little or no opportunity for sustained cross-fertilization, the emphasis of lessons learned leads to a tendency to perpetuate stereotypes. One State Department official noted that stereotypes do come to the fore in the interagency process:

Everybody to a certain extent meets their stereotype. For example, CIA analysis is always pessimistic. DoD always thinks State is trying to take resources and commit troops. State always thinks DoD is unwilling to employ forces.

These stereotypes, based upon prior experience, shape perspectives regarding risk and accountability to one's institutional equities, especially personnel and budgets. The agencies' perspectives regarding their own and others' equities frame the substance-process aspects of the interagency process by determining the salience of goals and establishing the level of commitment these agencies furnish to the implementation of the policy outcome. The internal evaluative processes of the agencies, according to one State official, prompt these agencies to conduct a "cost-benefit analysis from their interests, not the national interest." Consequently, interagency actors protect their respective equities at lower levels as a result of process design. The principals' stands further constrain the abilities of the lower level actors to compromise. Additionally, leaders do not provide mid-course corrections for this behavior because, in the words of one State principal, "the president and senior officials do not begin to understand how the problems bubble up. They don't understand that people protect their turf." Within the interagency negotiation process, the result in day-to-day policy-making approach according to a National Security Council official is that these turf battles "keep splitting the differences until the policy is neutered." Yet, if decision-makers employ this negotiating process fully, the interagency discussions of these equities provide *the* feasibility check for building consensus

around the policy and its ensuing implementation.²⁶ It is in this manner that perspectives concerning *Institutional Equities* play a commanding role in shaping the substantive inputs that drive the policy process.

This discussion of *Strategic Vision and Planning Processes* and *Institutional Equities* demonstrates the ways in which the interagency informants who were interviewed characterize the influence of the *contextual elements* that shape interagency dynamics. Before proceeding to a discussion of the *crosscutting effects* of the two remaining emergent themes—*Roles and Missions* and *Media Influence*—let us briefly recapture the essence of these relationships to highlight the ways in which substantive inputs shape interagency dynamics.

INTERPRETATION OF FINDINGS: CONTEXTUAL ELEMENTS SHAPE INTERAGENCY DYNAMICS

The analysis presented within this chapter made known the ways in which *contextual elements* framing the policy process shaped interagency dynamics (see figure 11.3). These *contextual elements* shape criteria selections and preference orderings, thereby illustrating Allison's Bureaucratic Politics Model's third tenet whereby the policy outcomes of this negotiating approach emerge as *political*

²⁶ It is in this tradition, then, that the interagency process attempts to produce integrative outcomes as a product of its negotiation process. Only through such integrative outcomes can the respective agencies commit fully to the execution of the policy. The previous chapter referenced the effects of such a lack of commitment previously by citing the Lebanon and Somalia examples where the shortsighted protection of bureaucratic equities brought about disastrous results.




Figure 11.3. Interactive Model: Contextual Elements

resultants as opposed to the Rational Choice Theory's criteria-based cost-benefit analysis approach. One stimulus inspiring these *political resultants* arises from the distorting effects surrounding misconceptions of substantive inputs to the policy process in terms of the *contextual elements* discussed here. As such, these themes regarding substance-process relationships emerged to complement the process-substance themes presented in the previous chapter. Interview data revealed this substance-process relationship manifest in two interrelated ways—through the *Strategic Vision and Planning Processes* that filter inputs into the process and the *Institutional Equities* that serve as the framework for those inputs.

The *Strategic Vision and Planning Processes* shape the perspectives the agencies bring to bear upon the crisis the interagency process strives to address. The data showed that dissimilar political visions fragment policy process inputs while simultaneously exacerbating interagency conflict. The absence of a clearly articulated goal around which the agencies can coalesce results from disparate shared images regarding the nature of the crisis itself in conjunction with the ambiguity surrounding the respective roles each agency should play in policy formulation and implementation. This role ambiguity emanates from divergent perspectives regarding the utility of planning, perspectives that, in the absence of strategic vision and shared images, drive the planning process downward toward a tactical-level focus, instead of an essential strategic perspective. A

government-wide misunderstanding of agency-specific core competencies further exacerbates this tendency to focus on tactical-level issues.

Precisely because the agencies fail to understand the nature of one another's expertise that each brings to bear as a result of particular roles and missions, the flawed expectations each agency holds for others regarding core competencies creates interagency conflict. This discord is apparent particularly with regard to the expectations the State Department has of Defense, and vice versa. Intensified by contrasting organizational cultures, this lack of understanding is distorted further by the agencies' respective definitions of national interests and intervention criteria.

This analysis demonstrated that the decision-makers framed national interests differently, a difference made evident through perspectives on *interests* and *values*,²⁷ and their relationship to intervention criteria. Decision-makers who evaluate alternative futures tended to frame intervention criteria in more formal language that focused on interests in terms of diplomatic, economic, and military supremacy. These informants noted that formalized intervention criteria (e.g., the Weinberger Doctrine) shaped their perspectives on the use of the military for crisis intervention. Alternatively, those who made connections with past investments or the need to prevent humanitarian crises abroad framed

²⁷ For a more general theory of the interplay between values and interests in negotiation, see Druckman and Zechmeister (1973) and Druckman and Green (1995).

intervention criteria based upon values. These values shaped intervention criteria differently, tending to rely upon informal intervention criteria (e.g., presidential attention) to shape perspectives on the use of the military for crisis intervention. These perspectives emanated from the worldviews each agency held, worldviews shaped by their respective ideologies and philosophies.

Worldviews held particular import for the ways in which these agencies defined a crisis. Ideology plays a major role in shaping perspectives on the use of force for crisis management. Although *realists* dominate the interagency process, the existence of a moral component in the framing of U.S. policy provides an arena for competing interest- and values-laden definitions of national interests and intervention criteria to clash. Where the use of force is concerned, the interaction of these dichotomous interest- and value-laden perspectives creates interagency conflict. This conflict is evident in the philosophies regarding the use of force wherein, generally, *realists* contend force should be used to promote interests and *idealists* argue force should be used to secure values. The perpetuation of stereotypes and the influence of partisan politics tend to expand this ideological-philosophical chasm, creating an interagency dynamic wherein perceptions of dissimilar worldviews exacerbate interagency conflict.²⁸ These

²⁸ It is crucial to acknowledge that *not all* interagency conflict is dysfunctional. Interagency conflict that clarifies roles and missions, core competencies, risk, feasibility, and related issues can be very instrumental to effective policy development. However, the interagency conflict addressed here

polarized perceptions materialize via the *Institutional Equities* these agencies strive to protect.

Based upon Allison's perspective, this work argues that parochial interests framed political resultants (see chapter 4). The findings presented here support that precept, but from a more positive, less parochial, perspective. Through discussions of the agencies' respective institutional equities, the interagency process conducts a systematized feasibility check while educating decision-makers regarding the respective core competencies each agency brings to bear during crises. Each agency's need to protect (and enhance) its respective equities is reflected through a competitive interagency dynamic that ensues regarding "personnel and budgets" and "risk and accountability," as framed by the decision-makers' prior experiences.

Shaped by the need to protect institutional equities within a bureaucratic environment wherein decisions are made via negotiation, these dissimilar and sometimes competing strategic visions and planning processes generate divergent criteria selections and preference orderings regarding the use of force to manage crises. These criteria and preference orderings become the substantive inputs to the decision-maker's understanding of unambiguous termination policy.

tends to shutdown communication channels so that the decision-makers *cannot* achieve clarity regarding those types of issues.

In the end, this analysis revealed a dangerous cleavage between interagency decision-makers regarding the development of termination policy: This cleavage is pronounced between those decision-makers in State and Defense. A Defense Department official provided a fitting transition into this discussion of conflict termination policy:

A military person understands conflict termination and exit strategy. DoS understands trip wires — they understand things differently. In the military, we are warfighters — [that is how we] are brought up.... Their mindset is different — they're more concerned about the individual person, we're concerned about the mission. Their mission is diplomacy, our mission is to respond when diplomacy fails. They're supposed to complement one another.

Toward refining our understanding of this fissure, the ensuing chapter discusses the final category of emergent themes — those having *crosscutting effects* on both *dynamic themes* and *contextual elements*. To bring these ideas together, chapter 13 completes the analysis of these emergent themes, integrating the quantitative and qualitative findings through the examination of policy development for the Persian Gulf War and the Bosnia crisis.

CHAPTER 12

CROSSCUTTING EFFECTS: CLARITY OF ROLES AND MISSIONS
& MEDIA INFLUENCE

OVERVIEW

The macro and micro themes analyzed in the two previous chapters (i.e., the “Dynamic Themes” and the “Contextual Elements”) undoubtedly share a crosscutting ability to influence policy outcomes as well as interagency dynamics. While this research framed them in terms of their influence on the latter and not the former, there can be no mistake that the data exposed clearly the tendency for the informants’ ideas regarding *Roles and Missions* and *Media Influence* to affect both *dynamic themes* and *contextual elements*. It is appropriate, then, to analyze these two *crosscutting effects* as the bridge between interagency dynamics and policy outcomes. Shown as the elements outside the inverted triangle in figure 12.1, “Crosscutting Effects” have considerable influence on interagency conflict during the development of termination policy. Let us begin with *Roles and Missions*.




Figure 12.1. Interactive Model: Crosscutting Effects

CLARITY OF ROLES AND MISSIONS

Returning to figure 7.2 (reproduced here as figure 12.2), recall that the quantitative analysis of questionnaire data revealed no significant relationship between *Agency's Perspective Regarding Lead Agency (for policy development)* and any other indicator within the signed digraph model. The qualitative data indicated there is little confusion regarding roles and missions at the highest levels of policy development.¹ The data identified the president, the National Security Council, and the State Department as the three actors most responsible for the development of termination policy.² This finding supports the original conceptualization of the policy process depicted via figure 1.3.³ According to the data, the president establishes the national policy vision. Included in this role is

¹ Interestingly and without providing specifics, one principal remarked, "Senior management knows what it has the lead for and what it does not. The White House is the top level – the chief executive. Some on the NSC staff assumed authority they do not have."

² See also figure 8.16 that reflects the National Security Council's and State Department's expectations that the "lead" for policy development is indeed the *independent role* of each agency, but not necessarily *their collective* responsibility.

³ Recall that this figure depicts the four statutory actors that "are" the National Security Council as being most responsible for the development of national security policy.




Figure 12.2. Crisis Definition--Perception of Risk (Post-Analysis)

the responsibility to establish the vision for the desired end state.⁴ The National Security Council is responsible for policy coordination and implementation oversight. The State Department plays an essential role in this process since it is responsible for formulating the nation's foreign policy and maintaining diplomatic relations abroad. In turn, the Defense Department is responsible for winning the nation's wars and for advising civilian policy-makers regarding the use of military force. Finally, the CIA is responsible for providing intelligence to support policy-makers and warfighters. On the surface, these roles seem well defined and mutually exclusive. However, as the data indicated, this is true only in theory – the practice of making policy includes other dimensions that generate interagency conflict, dimensions that blur the otherwise clearly-defined roles and missions outlined above.

⁴ One informant noted as well that the "end state and goals [are] defined by the NCA [National Command Authorities]. The NCA is really two people, the president and the Secretary of Defense. Nevertheless, the Secretary of State, while not a part of the NCA (and neither is the APNSA [Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs]) has significant, if not overriding, influence on the identification of the end state. Usually, ordinarily, the APNSA has the greatest influence over the president – whether it is formal or informal is hard to tell. The agency with the greatest informal influence on the NSC is State...[because] the NSC does not have a game-plan." A high-ranking State official reinforced this perspective by asserting that it is the State Department's "job to create a vision for the desired end state." These diverse perspectives provide evidence for the continuing conflict over roles regarding agency responsibility for end state definition.

Role Ambiguity

According to an IWG-level informant, these roles and missions have sufficient overlap to create confusion and generate tension across the interagency environment:

I don't think we have a coherent interagency process — we have few examples of coherent interagency vision or strategic planning. The problem is that we have different responsibilities, missions, and capabilities within these agencies. The problem is there is some overlap and often there are not clear lines of responsibility.

Overlap in an environment where responsibilities are not defined clearly leads to the second source of interagency conflict regarding roles and missions, that of resisting a role in order to protect one's respective equities.

Resistance to roles seemed to have a particular resonance with the Department of Defense. Defense, along with other interagency actors, noted a hesitance on the part of the military to get involved in missions not defined explicitly as their traditional warfighting role. Again, the idea of shared images comes through as Defense personnel hold a stringently circumscribed perspective on the military's role and the missions it should perform. According to a National Security Council source

You have an inherent tension in civil-military conflicts between the need for a logistics capability on the ground and the fact that a lot of these tasks are more civil-oriented. When the U.S. government needs to move, plan, etc., there's one organization that does this stuff — the military. But the Pentagon does not believe it's their job

to do civil affairs stuff—building wells, transportation, etc., but other, responsible agencies cannot do it right away.

In sentiment echoed by the State Department, Defense agrees it has been less than proactive about taking on these “nontraditional” missions. A Defense official noted that the Department’s cultural bias plays into this as well: “We forget that we work for civilians and if the National Command Authorities have established new perspectives for the nation, then we need to accept that.” In essence, Samuel Huntington’s (1957) ideas regarding the continuing tension in civil-military relationships has as much, perhaps more, import for modern interagency relations as they did in the post-World War II era. These cultural differences are exacerbated by the role the National Security Council plays in the policy process, a role that tends to generate interagency conflict across the three major actors within the policy process.

As described in chapter 4, the National Security Council serves as the president’s policy coordinator and implementation supervisor (Powell 1989). However, data from the interviews indicated that the NSC is seen as having taken on a role beyond coordinating⁵ and has abdicated responsibility for implementation oversight. A State Department deputy noted that

Paradoxically, the NSC now dominates the process. Because it is now dominant, it deals with all the issues, but only episodically. It

⁵ A National Security Council official noted that “for the NSC and State there is friction over leadership in foreign policy issues—it can become institutional or personality driven.”

exacerbates the problem by not paying attention except to the "crisis of the day." That decreases pressure for State and Defense to work together, so they continue to do their own things. The NSC does not do a good job of forcing people to work together.

A Defense Department official asserted that the NSC has now transformed itself into a position wherein the "NSC's desire to be the State Department, OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense], etc.,...their desire to be the 'prime mover' rather than the 'prime shaper' has created confusion about who's in charge." According to the data, this dilemma is especially critical for implementation wherein the lack of policy oversight enables bureaucratic equities to resurface:

There's no consistent management at the top so implementation is not smooth and the bureaucratic differences reassert themselves in implementation. I've seen that happen fairly often because it's very hard to have consistent policy management. It's harder than policy-making. The NSC has to be the policy manager, not just the broker of the policy decision.

A principal focused this issue by saying, "statute specified the roles of the CINC, etc., but that's not the only thing that specifies how we deal with these roles. The judgement and capabilities of the people who occupy these posts—sometimes people don't know their roles."⁶ This role ambiguity creates an interagency dynamic that adversely affects inputs to the policy process as the actors become polarized with regard to each other and shift their focus from the

⁶ The use of CINC does not refer to the President of the United States as "Commander-in-Chief" of the Armed Forces. Rather, "the acronym 'CINC' refers to the commander of a unified or specified command" (AFSC 1993, I-4).

crisis at hand to their immediate crisis in the White House Situation Room.⁷ In addition to these role-identification dilemmas connected to departmental missions, these data revealed a parallel roles and missions issue that enables the substantive aspects of policy formulation to shape interagency dynamics. Highlighted in the previous chapter's analysis of interagency dynamics, the perception that the interagency process intends the IWG-level exchange to be a *"food fight" by design* presents a particular challenge for conflict termination policy development.

"Purposeful" Interagency Conflict

The data generated the conclusion that a higher level of interagency conflict exists at the IWG-level in contrast with the deputies and principals levels (see chapter 10). One principal affirmed that description of the process by saying

First, it is designed that way for [a] useful purpose: Each agency is assigned certain responsibilities and authorities – the process is designed to look after those. Second, the process has an underpinning of good sense in that it forces the bureaucracy to seek compromise rather than having a "first among equals." It forces people to stay within their boundaries rather than directing them...compromise rather than dictate.

⁷ These interagency negotiations take place in other venues as well. This example is used to make the point that the actors lose focus on the needs of those whom they are supposed to be assisting (i.e., those in the field), only to focus on their respective bureaucratic needs vis-à-vis others engaged in the policy process.

In similar fashion, a deputy noted that "junior people draw the initial battle lines, but not the outcome."⁸ The data indicated clearly that the expectation from the more senior decision-makers is that the lower-level actors will protect their respective agency's bureaucratic equities throughout the interagency policy-making process. When these lower-level actors feel their ability to protect those equities is limited, they push the issue up to the next level for decision. In this manner, a principal noted that "most action officers feel their duty is not to decide, but to clarify."

In the final analysis, this struggle to protect institutional equities generates interagency conflict, especially at the lower levels. These blinders negate the actors' abilities to analyze the entire crisis spectrum for fear of "negotiating away" their respective equities. Consequently, these interagency decision-makers create a self-perpetuating dynamic of interagency conflict. The continuation of this conflict impedes the U.S. government's capacity to explore all of its potential options for dealing with complex contingencies. A National Security Council official claimed this problem goes beyond the "you can't see the forest for the trees" metaphor: "The more you see, you realize you don't see other stuff. It's not just the forest or the trees, there's a mountain, an ocean, and a

⁸ This perspective has become so ingrained, according to this deputy, that the standard joke from the NSC and State with regard to Defense's position on troop employment is, "Whatever the action is—the standard answer is 20,000 troops (one Division) and \$2 billion."

planet." In these complex crises, the problem then becomes one of agencies focusing myopically on their individual trees (i.e., their respective equities) at the expense of the forest (e.g., the interests of the parties in conflict), the mountain (e.g., U.S. national interests), the ocean (e.g., regional interests), and the planet (e.g., global interests).

The foregoing discussion revealed the ways in which data revealed issues related to *Roles and Missions*. Clearly, these issues relate to both process and substance. First, the absence of mutual understanding regarding roles creates interagency conflict surrounding responsibilities, accountability, and missions. That dynamic unfavorably shapes policy outcomes as the agencies fail to clarify these roles and missions during policy formulation, a problem that carries over into policy implementation. This condition is intensified greatly when actors within the interagency process (1) abrogate the leadership role others perceive they should fulfill, (2) try to assume the roles of others, or (3) attempt to compel others to perform roles and missions they perceive to be the responsibility of another organization. Secondly, the perceived need to protect institutional equities when entering the policy-making process generates (or exacerbates) interagency conflict. In this way, the substantive inputs to policy-making in terms of resource protection adversely affect interagency dynamics. This discussion highlights that this crosscutting theme can hold grave consequences for the interagency process' ability to develop conflict termination policy in

terms of the vision for the desired end state, the conflict termination criteria, and the strategy to achieve conflict termination. The media plays a similar crosscutting role, and is, therefore, the subject of the ensuing discussion.

MEDIA INFLUENCE

Perhaps more than any other theme that emerged from the interviews, the ways in which the media influences both the process and substance of the U.S. government policy machine remain difficult to isolate and cannot, therefore, be segregated neatly into the process-substance and substance-process categories undergirding this qualitative framework. Therefore, arguments can be made for both of these categories based upon the data provided by the informants. The two relationships are segregated artificially here for the purpose of this analysis; bear in mind, however, that the data revealed substantial crosscutting effects with each issue outlined below. The data indicated that the role the media plays in developing the interagency dynamic while concurrently shaping the substantive input to the policy process remains extremely complex and somewhat intangible. In other words, it is difficult to trace through empirically or precisely the influence the media has on interagency dynamics, substantive inputs to the policy process, and the resulting policy outcome. One State Department principal captured the essence of this difficulty, noting that "I do not know at the end of the day how much press/media concerns drive foreign

policy. But I know that it does to some extent—you can feel, see, and sense it.” Yet, the data indicated unquestionably that the media are seen as playing a role in shaping both relationships. One of the most critical roles played by the media in terms of the substance-process relationship is the media’s ability to develop substantive inputs that move the policy process in a particular direction. Specifically, the media plays a crucial role in shaping the substance-process relationship in terms of framing the issue, providing a feedback loop to the Congress, and developing the “move it off the front page” phenomenon. Let us address each in turn.

Issue Framing

Data from informants indicated that interagency actors perceive the media plays a fundamental role in framing the issues both for the decision-maker and the public. According to one Defense principal the media shapes people’s views of the world when they get up in the morning: It is “the drama of the iron curtain crumbling—watching history unfold every morning in the headlines. It creates a preoccupation.” This individual continued:

The media helps frame the question...reminds you that it’s important and everyone is hoping for an improved professional response. Once something is hot, there’s an increased preoccupation with media perceptions.

Another Defense principal identified Washington as a "one-issue town," claiming that "everyone reads the *Early Bird*⁹ and they are all influenced by that." Yet another official, this one from the State Department, said one of the most influential questions is how the issue gets started: "Who writes the *Foreign Affairs* article?" Others remarked that decision-makers and the Congress get much of their information from the media, perhaps on a broader scale than from internal intelligence sources.¹⁰

Congressional Connections

Some media reports include the views of Washington notables (e.g., Richard Haass and Susan Woodward), reflecting the views of respected Think Tanks as well. Once the views of these personalities gain currency with the media and the public, they provide the Congress a baseline for calling expert witnesses during

⁹ The *Early Bird* is a publication prepared by the American Forces Information Service (AFIS/OASD-PA). Circulated daily (and now available on the Internet), its purpose is "to bring to the attention of key personnel news items of interest in their official capacities. It is not intended to substitute for newspapers and periodicals as a means of keeping informed about the meaning and impact of news developments" (AFIS/OASD-PA 1998, 1). This publication (which averages 28 pages) is a compilation of foreign-policy relevant articles from the major news organizations around the world (e.g., *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, *Washington Times*, *International Herald Tribune*, and *London Sunday Times*).

¹⁰ Although unable to authenticate this figure, two State Departmental officials independently reported that State provides almost 50 percent of the U.S. government's intelligence. The difference between State and the remainder of the Intelligence Community is that they take advantage of open sources, a method the other intelligence activities do not employ to the same degree. According to these informants, media reports are one component of this open source approach.

congressional hearings.¹¹ The views of these witnesses help shape the Congress' perspective on national security policy, the funding of troop deployments in particular. As noted in the previous chapter in terms of the process-substance relationship, managing relations with the Congress is of the utmost import for interagency decision-makers. This communication network between the media and the Congress relates to another aspect of the media's influence upon domestic politics in terms of the substance-process relationship – media reporting generates a “move it off the front page” phenomenon within the interagency process.

The “Front-Page” Challenge

The data showed that a perception exists wherein “if it is in the newspaper, it is real.” A State official went so far as to say that “if I had to choose between a brilliant cable or inside story by a 23-year old in the *Washington Post* – if you wanted to enforce the policy, choose the *Washington Post*.”¹² While this

¹¹ While I did not perform a statistical analysis to support this supposition, Dr. Susan Woodward is a participant in this research not because of her publishing record on the Balkans crisis (which is noteworthy on its own merit), but as a result of the number of times the Congress called her to testify regarding U.S. policy in the Balkans. I drew a connection between media reports citing her views and the congressional hearings in which she participated. This same connection can be made, and, I believe, statistically supported, between Dr. Richard Haass' currency in the media and his ability to act as an unofficial advisor to the president on Middle East issues. While certainly not the only reason for Haass' currency, such media exposure does translate into policy influence on some level. This, however, is the subject of another research project and is offered here as an observation and justification for Woodward's selection as a participant in this research.

¹² “Cables” are the U.S. government's (especially the president's and State Department's) primary means of communicating official policy within the U.S. government and abroad.

perspective relates back to the issue of the media driving policy, it also reveals the sense of urgency the policy-makers share for moving issues off the front pages of the nation's most respected, most widely read newspapers. Another State official claimed the media does not drive policy, but admitted that decision-makers consider the media as a factor in every action. He asserted:

The media is certainly one of the factors you take into account every time. You ask, "How is the media going to play it? What sort of criticism will we get...how [do we] handle the criticism?" It does not drive, but is a factor!

Clearly, decision-makers and politicians do not trivialize the magnitude of this substantive factor and its effect on the policy process. One Defense Department principal made the connection between the media, domestic politics, and the Congress by arguing that

The press and public opinion and politics are the ultimate drivers even in international crises because the senior people – the president, vice president, and Cabinet-level members – are politicians so they have got to focus on the realistic political room they have got. If they do not know, they will take a poll and run with it.... The principals say, "What can I sell?"

It is in this manner that the media shapes the policy-making forum through its attempts to define the issues, manage relationships with the Congress, and mold public opinion (indeed, domestic politics in general) regarding the nature of the

crisis and the most appropriate U.S. policy response.¹³ With an understanding of the ways in which the media shapes the substantive inputs to the policy process, it is logical to proceed to the ways in which these substantive inputs influence interagency dynamics and resulting policy outcomes. This process-substance relationship is captured through data revealing concerns about the "CNN factor," the potential for press guidance to drive policy, the use of leaks, and the capacity for "the necessity to manage the media" to deplete the interagency process of critical intellectual, emotional, and psychological capital. Let us begin with the "CNN factor" as it is an extension of the "front-page" challenge.

The CNN Factor

Interview data revealed that decision-makers across the interagency process remain concerned with the effects of the "CNN factor." Simply put, actors within the White House/National Security Council and State Department appreciate the media's ability to shape public opinion and world opinion. Consequently, these

¹³ An entire literature discusses the media's influence in molding public opinion and policy development. For insight into these phenomena and the media's influence on the two cases addressed later in this work see Beamish, Molotch, and Flacks (1995), Carlisle et al. (1990), Chomsky (1991), Coleman (1989), Dandeker (1995), Davison (1974), Dobbs (1995), Ehrlich (1995), Eveland, McLeod, and Signorielli (1995), Foyle (1997), Goren (1980), Gregorian (1980), Iyengar (1991), Iyengar and Simon (1993), Jhally, Lewis, and Morgan (1991), Johnson (1994), Katz et al. (1992), Krosnick and Brannon (1993), Lo (1994), Morrow (1984), OSD (1992), Pan and Kosicki (1994), Parker (1995), Powlick (1990), Said and Harlow (1991), Shaheen et al. (1985), Stallaerts (1995), Tims and Miller (1986), Toth (1992), Wilcken (1995), and Zaller (1991, 1993).

decision-makers remain attuned to the activities of the media.¹⁴ While this issue relates to the substance-process aspects of policy-making, the process-substance conditions emerge in terms of the potential for press guidance to drive policy. One tangible measure of this process-substance relationship manifests itself in the amount of time and the number of people the agencies have involved in developing press "guidance."¹⁵ A State Department principal stated:

Here, within State, [and] at NSC and OSD, the most senior policy formulators spend a lot of time planning for public affairs. Jamie Rubin [Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs and State Department Spokesman] is Albright's closest policy advisor — Steinberg and Berger [Deputy APNSA and APNSA, respectively] spend a lot of time talking with Rubin about public affairs.

A National Security Council official echoed that perspective by saying, "You can issue a very important policy pronouncement, but if it gets no attention, it doesn't really matter — press guidance does become policy." Another State principal scoffed, "press guidance is called long-range planning." A Defense official remarked, "If you're always in a crisis and always worried about CNN and the *Washington Post*, you're never able to get out of that dilemma." The

¹⁴ It is interesting to note that the comments related to press guidance influencing policy emanated primarily from the National Security Council and the State Department — the Defense Department informants made no mention of this connection. By Department, the ratio of overall references to the media was: White House/NSC, 50.0 percent; State Department, 50.0 percent; Defense Department, 23.3 percent; and, CIA, 66.7 percent.

¹⁵ Although unable to make concrete comparisons across agencies, it is important to recognize that the State Department's Office of Press Relations utilizes 10 people who spend an average of 200 hours per 5-day work week *before 1200* (i.e., noon) developing press-related guidance for the "1230" press briefing. Activities *after* the 1230 press briefing vary, but much of these people's day is consumed by efforts to respond to media inquiries generated at this 1230 briefing.

media's capacity to garner attention to the degree that it does from the policy-makers adversely affects interagency relations and inhibits effective interagency dialogue. For example, a State official reported that standard practice at the NSC had been to brief the media's perspective on an issue before engaging in an interagency discussion of the matter. Following that practice, "during the first [Frank] Carlucci-led NSC meeting, the person got up to brief the media's reporting first. He said, 'No, that comes at the end of the meeting, not the beginning.'" Unlike his predecessor, Carlucci would not let the media drive the interagency process and the policy it produced. Another way in which media relations affect interagency dynamics is through the "use of leaks."

Leaks with Intent

The qualitative data indicated that leaks emanate from *two sources* — protestors and champions — but for *one purpose* — to shape the decision-making process in terms of both interagency dynamics and substantive policy outcomes. The previous chapter highlighted that actors across the government agree that the interagency process makes decisions via a negotiating process that strives for consensus decisions. The data argued that this consensus approach then becomes the critical component in implementation. However, increasingly the U.S. government is experiencing media leaks by anonymous actors (i.e., the protestors) who disagree with the policy. A National Security Council principal

supported this proposition by stating, "look at the press — those who have been stymied go to the press to attack those who stymied them." One high-ranking Defense official noted that leaks reflect organizational culture and leadership as well:

If the people do not like the policy, they will leak it. [Secretary of Defense] Perry had no leaks — he respected their views and the people respected him. It all starts with the leadership qualities of the [people] at the top.

A National Security Council deputy claimed the process occurs in this fashion:

"What happens is, if people do not agree they call Mike at the *New York Times* — 'Mike, can you believe what they are trying to get me to do?'" In both of these instances, the source of the leak is an interagency actor who disagrees with the policy and therefore attempts to use the media to shape the public's and, perhaps, congressional perspectives of the crisis and the nature of the U.S. government's most appropriate response. These actors *intend* to fragment the policy process and create interagency conflict in hopes of gaining greater support for their position, a position that remains contradictory to that of espoused U.S. government policy (and hence, outside the interagency's shared images). A Defense principal remarked that the media shapes interagency dynamics further because "friction between personalities is driven by the press — it's easier to talk 'win-lose' than about the issues." This dynamic has additional adverse consequences as the attention given to managing this aspect of interagency

dynamics depletes the process of critical intellectual and emotional capital. Such depletion “zaps the psychological energy of everyone,” in the words of one Defense principal, intimating that this prevents innovative thinking as well. In this manner, decision-makers purposefully use leaks to shape the interagency dynamic and, therefore, the substantive outcome of that process. The second source likewise intends to use leaks to shape the interagency process, but for a different purpose.

Halperin (Halperin et al. 1974) contends that most leaks emanate from the White House. Data supported that supposition, noting that most leaks are in fact “official leaks with intent.” These “leaks with intent” occur for two reasons: First, to shape proactively the image of the crisis and the U.S. government’s corresponding policy and second, to signal or communicate with allies and adversaries. A State principal noted the reason for the first is very simple:

If there are leaks not provided as the official guidance, I do not know about them: Official leaks are “leaks with intent.” The purpose of giving someone an exclusive [is to] help *you* shape *their* story — they’re not going to have an opportunity to do a lot of checking around.... There is a re-emphasis on dealing with key media before the story is written — a move to make ourselves more available to media officials.

While this practice shapes the interagency dynamic, its purpose is to likewise signal allies and adversaries regarding the U.S. government’s intentions. During the Persian Gulf War, for example, decision-makers used the press extensively.

One National Security Council principal noted that "CNN was very instrumental — used to signal Hussein, the Iraqis, and the allies — we were very open about that." A State Department deputy echoed this perspective, noting that "the press guidance elements of policy are central as they shape the U.S. and the international view. There has to be a very direct connection between press guidance and policy." From this perspective, the data demonstrated that those who agree with the policy position (i.e., the champions) use leaks to shape the public's understanding of the crisis and the nature of the U.S. response while communicating U.S. resolve to people both at home and abroad.

Collectively, analysis of the qualitative data leads me to conclude that the media does play an important role in shaping both the substance-process and process-substance relationships that shape the emergent themes. The substance-process relationships appeared through those issues wherein the media frames the issues, provides feedback to the Congress, and develops the "move it off the front page" phenomenon. The process-substance relationships emerged from those issues related to interagency dynamics in terms of the level of attention given to press guidance, the CNN factor, the "use of leaks," and the media's ability to exacerbate friction between decision-makers while depleting the interagency process of critical intellectual and psychological energy. Referring again to the "Interactive Model" used throughout this qualitative interview data analysis and replicated here as figure 12.3, we can begin to see the ways in which




Figure 12.3. Interactive Model of Macro and Micro Themes

these themes interrelate as they build upon one another and exacerbate the "Level of Interagency Conflict over (a) desired end state, (b) termination criteria, and (c) strategy."

INTERIM SUMMARY: CROSSCUTTING EFFECTS

Data from informants in interviews revealed that *ambiguity surrounding roles and missions* and the impact of *media influence* shape not merely the substance of policy but also the process of policy-making. Together, these emergent themes influence the development of interagency dynamics and the substantive inputs into the policy process. When placed along side the *contextual elements* and *dynamic themes*, these *crosscutting effects* tend to amplify interagency conflict over the development of termination policy. The case analyses that follow (chapter 13) demonstrate the ways in which these *dynamic themes*, *contextual elements*, and *crosscutting effects* shaped termination policy development for the Persian Gulf War and Bosnia Crisis.

CHAPTER 13

INFLUENCES ON TERMINATION POLICY IN THE
PERSIAN GULF AND BOSNIA

OVERVIEW

This research began as an inquiry into the effects of interagency conflict on the development of termination policy. Toward this end, chapter 7 explored interagency dynamics through a quantitative analysis that examined hypotheses concerning relationships among six core factors. An extension of this analysis provided the basis for classifying the data from interviews of knowledgeable informants for subsequent qualitative analysis (see chapter 8) which demonstrated the ways in which *dynamic themes affect interagency dynamics as well as the substantive inputs of policy-making* (see chapter 10), the ways in which *contextual elements framing the policy process shape interagency dynamics* (see chapter 11), and the *crosscutting effects* of themes that shape the *dynamic themes* in concert with *contextual elements* (see chapter 12). This chapter integrates these analyses by presenting the findings regarding *Termination Policy* in terms of four themes which have emerged from both analyses: crisis analysis, end state vision,

termination criteria, and the development of termination strategy. To contextualize these findings within a real-world interagency process, this chapter traces the effects of interagency conflict on the policy processes of the Persian Gulf War and the Bosnia crisis along the lines of these four themes.¹

TERMINATION POLICY: DEVELOPING THE ENDGAME

It is more than coincidental that popular discourse refers to the vision of the desired end state as the "endgame."² Such terminology intimates an underlying perspective regarding the bureaucratic political process and is, therefore, an implicit extension of the "game" metaphor used to describe Allison's Bureaucratic Politics Model of decision-making. Previous analysis of the *dynamic themes* and *contextual elements* framing the policy process illustrated that the players in this game see different "faces of the issue" concerning a particular crisis. These dissimilar perspectives are shaped by leadership, decision-making as negotiation, domestic politics, strategic vision and planning processes, and institutional equities. Together, these five factors determine the face of the issue

¹ By design, this work does not provide the historical contexts for these two cases. For a list of background, historical, and analytical references on these two cases, see Appendix F, Case-Specific Literature: The Persian Gulf and Bosnia.

² At the time of this writing, NATO began bombing Yugoslavia in an effort to "degrade" the Serbs' capacity to continue their ethnic cleansing campaign against the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. The media continually referred to the desired end state of this bombing activity by asking U.S. government officials, "What is the endgame?" A concept adapted from the game of chess (Sutherland and Lommer 1968), the international relations literature cites this concept of endgame as well; see, for example, Cimbala (1987, 1995), Cohen (1988), Croft (1994), Hubbard (1998), Rampy (1992), Rohde (1997), and Talbott (1979).

each agency perceives as most important, while shaping analytical perspectives to minimize the uncomfortable effects of cognitive dissonance (see chapter 2). Data reflected the influence of this “face of the issue” component on policy development. As a result of both the qualitative and quantitative findings, crisis analysis emerged as the most critical aspect of *Termination Policy* because it has a major effect on the remaining three policy components—the desired end state, termination criteria, and strategy as conceptualized at the outset of the research (see figure 13.1, “Basic Conceptual Framework”).

Crisis Analysis

The original conceptualization of termination policy introduced three elements—vision for the desired end state, conflict termination criteria, and termination strategy. As a separate entity, crisis analysis was *not* one of those elements. Analysis of qualitative data from interviews revealed, however, that crisis analysis must be included in the development of the three remaining components since it provides the foundational perspective around which the others are framed. Data also connected crisis analysis with leadership by demonstrating that the absence of strategic vision *coupled with* the lack of an integrated planning process empowers decision-makers to develop perspectives on crises that remain bound by disparate worldviews. Dissimilar conceptions of




Figure 13.1. Basic Conceptual Framework

roles and missions (i.e., theirs and others') and the need to protect institutional equities constrain further these perspectives. Let us briefly examine the implications of each.

In the first instance, the absence of a strategic vision enables decision-makers to frame crises differently as a consequence of dissimilar organizational cultures and competing institutional equities. A product of asymmetric worldviews, dissimilar shared images regarding ideology and philosophical perspectives concerning the use of force prompt agencies to ascribe different meaning to crises. The State Department tends to view crises as part of the continually evolving international landscape. Accordingly, State remains process-oriented in its approach to analysis. Defense, on the other hand, tends to view crises as situations with beginning and ending points. Defense's views are therefore substance-oriented and tend to fractionate crises into distinct phases where milestones must be chronologically (or serially) achieved before proceeding to the next phase—that is, it is a linear process with clear turning points (see also Druckman 1983, 1986; Druckman, Husbands, and Johnston 1991). Magnified within an interagency process that lacks an integrated planning mechanism, these differences permit worldviews to dominate crisis analysis as the absence of structure generates considerable latitude for interpretation.

Decision-makers generally fail to recognize the extent to which worldviews affect conflict dynamics and their respective analytical processes. Accordingly,

the U.S. government endeavors to superimpose its individualistic perspective onto others when dealing with both interest- and value-laden issues. Such an ethnocentric approach lacks cultural appreciation and impels U.S. leaders to promote "good guy/bad guy" stereotypes regarding adversaries.³ Demonization of the enemy negates decision-makers' ability to look at the conflict en toto for fear of becoming an apologist for those whose practices contributed to the actual crisis, yet whom the U.S. government feels compelled to support.⁴ It likewise creates an environment wherein concerns about face-saving prevent leaders from engaging in a more collaborative approach (Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim 1994). Hence, the conclusion that a groupthink phenomenon develops during crisis analysis, one made evident by decision-makers' unwillingness to examine more rigorously the underlying causes and conditions of conflict.⁵ One State deputy characterized this unwillingness by saying,

Part of the process is that no agency [or] person wants to express a view that gets them put outside the system. In terms of "bad

³ This process is not uniquely American, but occurs across all cultures. The inference here, however, is the particular effect it has on U.S. policy-making.

⁴ This practice holds import for termination strategy development as well, the implications of which are discussed further in an upcoming section.

⁵ The literature on groupthink has expanded in recent years. For an overview of this phenomenon and its relationship to group dynamics and conflict resolution, see Brockner (1992), Cusimano (1993), Hirokawa and Johnston (1989), Janis (1989), Kameda and Sugimori (1993), Leff (1981), McCauley (1989), Merton (1989), and Neck and Manz (1994).

guys/good guys"...if you raise those issues, you find yourself outside the shared images.⁶

This fear of being outside the shared images of one's agency further distorts national interest definition and the framing of intervention criteria.

The most critical aspect concerning the presence or absence of shared images for crisis analysis materializes in the answer to the question: "When does a conflict start?" The response to this inquiry rests in part with the perceptions decision-makers attach to their roles in crisis intervention, roles that are defined partially by institutional equities. A State deputy contended, "different Departments have different views on what a crisis is — that's related to self-interest. In part, the interagency conflict is over the definition of the crisis — which is directly tied to their self-interests." Let us briefly look at the effects of ambiguities of roles and missions and the defense of institutional equities to explore their relationship with crisis analysis.

In addition to the effects of role ambiguity highlighted earlier, this problem manifests itself further in the absence of an integrated analytical mechanism. Because no one agency controls or "owns" an entire crisis response effort, the

⁶ Although beyond the scope of this research in an empirical sense, this crisis analysis process is complicated further within a multinational environment wherein each actor shares part but not all of the images that frame the crisis as well as only portions of the goals that shape the multinational response. As an example, a State principal noted that in Bosnia the "Europeans looked at separate divisions and the Americans wanted to produce a multi-ethnic society."

dearth of cross-fertilization results in interagency misconceptions of core competencies. One National Security Council principal asserted that

To try to figure out [how] to make a...complex civil emergency operation work is a [heck] of a puzzle...no one understands the whole puzzle and everyone comes at it from a different perspective.

This insulated effort circumscribes crisis analysis as these mutually exclusive analyses lack a "systems approach" that capitalizes upon the core competencies each agency brings to bear upon the problem. Because no interagency mechanism exists to conduct long-term forecasting, agencies independently engage in crisis analysis after eruption (e.g., humanitarian crises). One State principal noted:

So much depends on individuals that it isn't the process at fault—it's the failure to utilize the process in decision-making, a failure to look in advance at what are likely to be future challenges. All too often we wait for a crisis to erupt before developing a policy: You never know how it might erupt.

Lower-level analysts and decision-makers push these independent post-facto perspectives upward to the highest levels whereby the principals attempt to synthesize fragmented images of the "puzzle." This approach fails because the principals remain reluctant to get involved with the details of the planning process (e.g., identifying contingency operation funding sources). Such inaction pushes the fundamental progenitors of interagency conflict back down the

interagency hierarchy where decision-makers dogmatically protect their respective equities.

Discussed throughout the earlier analysis, perceptions regarding the need to protect institutional equities play a central role in developing "competitive" interagency tactics when perceptions of self-interest are "high" (see figure 7.7, *Level of Open Debate*). Additionally, the quantitative analysis revealed that when an Agency's *Perceived Penalty for Failure* ranked "high," that Department's *Interagency Behavior* tended to be "competitive" (see figure 7.9, *Organizational Communication*). The qualitative analysis demonstrated that at the interagency's lower-levels agency members perceive that failure to protect institutional equities equates to professional failure. The desire to avoid this failure (and its penalty, see figure 7.9) generates competitive interagency tactics. Further, divergent conceptions of time (coupled with the fact that the general lack of time is an incredible process constraint) exacerbate this perceived need to protect institutional equities, prompting agencies to frame national interests and intervention criteria independent of other's input, and therefore, differently.

Contending views regarding interest- versus value-laden national interests and intervention criteria intensify interagency conflict as these agencies promote differing assessments regarding the definition of conflict and the utility of armed intervention. The data revealed that such analysis results in a tendency to exaggerate or overestimate operational requirements in order to protect

institutional equities and delay action. The data indicated further that the operating procedures of the National Security Council intensify these differences *if* it responds to congressional pressure and media influence *rather* than taking action based upon principled guidance from the White House. Together, these factors (i.e., dissimilar worldviews, asymmetric conceptions of roles and missions, and the need to protect institutional equities) create a narrow analytical approach that compels decision-makers to focus on tactical rather than strategic issues. This approach emerged as the most crucial flaw related to crisis analysis as the nature of this analysis, occurring in the initial stages of the policy process, shapes the remaining elements of termination policy.

Ultimately, because decision-makers focus on tactical-level issues approaches to crisis analysis tend to analyze the nodes of the system, failing to recognize the value of the relationships across nodes that make the system one entity.⁷ This tactical focus restricts the interagency's ability to evaluate the underlying causes and conditions of the crisis, thereby negating its ability to develop a policy that

⁷ A "node" is one critical component of a system. Acting against this critical component will affect the system, but it may not change the nature of the system on the strategic level. To bring about systemic change, the system must be affected beyond the independent nodes or the nodes must be affected in an integrated fashion to bring about the desired result. For example, the crisis in the Balkans is comprised of several "nodes" that synergistically form a "system." Geographically, Bosnia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Kosovo, Albania, Serbia, etc., represent independent nodes. Together, these nodes form the "Balkan system." Nodes can take many forms—political, economic, military, social, and so on. Affecting a particular node in isolation from the others cannot, in most instances, bring about systemic change. Hence, in the Balkans generally, and with regard to the current Kosovo crisis in particular, focusing upon President Milosevic's actions in isolation from the activities of the Kosovar Liberation Army will most likely fall short of affecting systemic change.

can achieve long-term termination of the conflict as a step toward sustainable conflict resolution. Data supported these findings for both cases examined here, illustrating as well how two distinct presidential decision-making styles can both lead the interagency toward the same tactically-focused conclusion.

Case Examples: Crisis Analysis

The Persian Gulf and Bosnia crises transpired during two different presidential administrations that exercised distinct decision-making styles—that is, the Bush Presidency was a decision-taking administration; the Clinton Presidency, a consensus-building administration.⁸ Despite these differences in style, both administrations focused on critical nodes of the conflict system rather than the system as a whole. The decision-making style distinction is relevant for the remainder of this analysis since it relates to the leader's development of strategic vision and the assumption that leaders who provide strategic vision are able to fulfill policy mandates because an integrated planning process supports implementation of that strategic vision. However, the analysis generated the conclusion that neither administration promoted an effective interagency dynamic and each, therefore, repressed integrated planning.

⁸ This work recognizes that the Bosnia crisis did not manifest in 1993 when President Clinton took office. However, since this research analyzes the effects of interagency conflict on conflict termination policy development, beginning this analysis with the Bush administration is of little utility since the data indicated that the interagency process became energized surrounding this crisis only *after* Clinton took office.

The Persian Gulf

In this case, the "Gang of Eight," or, as Bush and Scowcroft labeled it, the "core group," developed policy and made all decisions in a practical sense (Bush and Scowcroft 1998, 42-43).⁹ The data indicated that these eight principals shared a common worldview — one wherein the *realist* paradigm dominated their philosophies regarding the use of force. Inherent in this *realist* approach is the notion that the territorial boundaries of sovereign nations remain inviolable. Aggression against such borders, irrespective of the provocative acts of one or more parties, "will not stand" (ibid., 333; see also Brown 1997) and must be rebuked by "all necessary means" (Bush 1990). The maintenance of international borders remained a high priority for this administration, one that the president successfully communicated to the American public as a vital national interest, in part by demonizing Saddam Hussein.¹⁰ In consultation with his core group, the president acted decisively, but perhaps too commandingly as his leadership and

⁹ This "core group" included Dan Quayle (vice president), James Baker (Secretary of State), Richard Cheney (Secretary of Defense), Brent Scowcroft (APNSA), Lawrence Eagleburger (Deputy Secretary of State), Robert Gates (Deputy APNSA and, later, Director of Central Intelligence), and John Sununu (White House Chief of Staff); see Bush and Scowcroft (1998). Most officials generally identify Colin Powell (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) as the "eighth" member of the "Gang of Eight."

¹⁰ During the period 1990-1991, President Bush made at least 51 public references to the "Gulf war" and 175 to "Saddam" and "war." By doing so, the president kept the issue in the forefront of the American consciousness and created a sense of connection with the public. Likewise, Bush made 11 public references to Saddam Hussein and Hitler during this period. This information originated from *The George Bush Presidential Library* online: <http://www.csdl.tamu.edu/bushlibrary/library/research/research.html>. For a discussion of demonization and its effects in this case, see Said and Harlow (1991) and Toth (1992).

decision-making styles prevented the interagency process from undertaking a thorough analysis of the crisis and debating the issues.

The president's decisive leadership enhanced implementation at the operational and tactical levels, yet the absence of integrated interagency planning truncated the crisis analysis process, excluding regional and issue-specific experts and producing a policy outcome framed by four "strategic objectives"¹¹ that could *only* return the conflict to a status quo antebellum because they failed to address the underlying causes and conditions of conflict. Consequently, the crisis analysis process did not consider the broader conflict spectrum, including the Kuwaiti's provocative actions against Iraq that Hussein purportedly interpreted as an economic act of war (Salinger and Laurent 1991). Such oversight ensured any acceptable termination of the immediate crisis would be one-sided. The shared images of these top advisors and the president prevented them from acknowledging these other issues in the conflict because their *realist* worldview demanded an immediate response to Hussein's aggressive, "unprovoked invasion"¹² of Kuwait. One State Department principal

¹¹ "Strategic objectives" is offset here since it can be argued that the four objectives were *primarily* regional in nature, thereby equating to operational objectives, not strategic objectives. For the Persian Gulf War, the four stated U.S. national policy objectives were: (1) "Immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait"; (2) "Restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government"; (3) "Security and stability of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf"; and (4) "Safety and protection of the lives of American citizens abroad" (OSD 1992, 19).

¹² A majority of the congressional documents of the period characterizes the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in this manner. The Congress took its lead, perhaps, from the president's State of the Union Address, January 29, 1991, where he labeled Iraq's action as an "unprovoked invasion" (Bush 1991).

characterized the issue of crisis analysis as it related to termination policy development in this manner:

Once the shooting started it was too late to get meaningful input from expert levels of the bureaucracy into non-technical decisions being made at the highest level, such as conflict termination. I think that the president would have been well-advised to seek agency views on conflict termination involving various battlefield scenarios. Without being in any way bound by those views reflecting greater expertise than what could be available among the handful of top advisors, this would have given the president the benefit of ideas that might have aided him in forming his own decisions.... In fact, on some key decisions involving termination, I suspect that the only people involved in discussing the matter were the president, Scowcroft, Cheney, and Powell.... At various times during the period from the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait until the cessation of hostilities and the cease-fire talks at Safwan, efforts by the Bureau of Near East Affairs (NEA) and Political Military Affairs (PM) to interject ideas about the "endgame" or conflict termination, or even guidelines for General Schwarzkopf at the Safwan cease-fire talks, were rebuffed.

In the end, decisive leadership did develop a strategic vision for prosecuting the war, but not sustaining a peace. Because the "core group" prevented the interagency process from defining, describing, and framing the crisis through the eyes of substantive experts, the decision-makers' failed to develop and evaluate options that could address strategic, rather than tactical, issues. It is clear that conceptions of roles and missions further debilitated the interagency's integrated development of policy for this crisis. When Hussein made clear that he was willing to wage war with the U.S. (and the international coalition), the "core group" overwhelmingly emphasized the military course of action, thereby

diminishing its ability to integrate diplomatic, economic, and military options into an overall policy. In this manner these leaders, propelled by shared images regarding the use of force,¹³ constrained crisis analysis and option generation (see also Rast 1998). The core group managed the initial analytical effort for the Bosnia crisis (1990-1993) much in the same manner as it had for the Persian Gulf.

The Bosnia Crisis

While the Bush administration remained embroiled in the Iraq crisis, the Balkans began to implode. The analytical process used to frame action in the Gulf produced a policy of abstinence concerning the Bosnia crisis. The words of a National Security Council principal described this analytical process:

We applied the process we had to Bosnia, the same as Iraq, but came to a different conclusion than the Clinton administration. Starting with U.S. national interests, other than humanitarian, we found interests to be marginal unless it spread to Kosovo and Macedonia. We looked at the conflict in Bosnia and whether the application of U.S./NATO force was an appropriate way to try to deal with the conflict. We determined it could not be done at a cost which the American people would be willing to pay and at a cost commensurate with the benefits. And, could we get our forces back out? We could not ensure the last two questions in the affirmative, so we did not go in.

¹³ Many outside this research have argued that the military's institutional equity of demonstrating its combat effectiveness compelled the Defense Department to promote going to war with Iraq (see, for example, Gordon and Trainor 1995). Throughout the research, however, informants across government reported that General Powell (and Secretary Baker) remained hesitant to use force, arguing instead that economic sanctions needed more time. Powell's objection is noted in Bush and Scowcroft's (1998) memoirs as well as his own (Powell and Persico 1995).

Although the Bush administration concluded that intervention was not in the best interests of the U.S.,¹⁴ the Clinton administration reached a quite different conclusion, but not immediately. The factors discussed above (i.e., absence of strategic vision, lack of an integrated planning process, disparate worldviews, differing conceptions of roles and missions, and competing institutional equities) similarly influenced the analytical process it employed as it took office in 1993. As a result of interagency conflict, these factors delayed intervention until 1995.

According to one National Security Council principal, Scowcroft's and Eagleburger's experiences in the former Yugoslavia overshadowed the interagency's analysis of that crisis.¹⁵ As a result of their influence, agencies continued to frame the crisis in Bosnia as a "case of a relatively artificial country breaking apart and we had little interest outside humanitarian." Secretary of State Baker characterized the situation by saying the U.S. "didn't have a dog in this fight" (Baker 1995; Christopher 1998; Zimmerman 1996). Although leadership physically changed in January 1993, this change affected the political

¹⁴ For a published account reflecting the perspectives of Bush, Cheney, and Powell see Woodward (1995); see also Christopher (1998).

¹⁵ This principal said, "They were tainted with their experiences in Yugoslavia in the late '50s and early '60s. Their view was Bosnia would light up like a Christmas tree (the 1991 to 1992 situation). They feared spillover and misread the situation—it would not spillover into Europe but would be contained. Powell was irrelevant to that—the political forces were reluctant because Eagleburger and Scowcroft (State and White House) had their heels dug in." David Gompert, a senior National Security Council member during the Bush administration, characterized the Bush administration as being "divided and stumped" in its approach to Bosnia (Gompert 1996, 134). However, the data analyzed here indicate that Scowcroft's and Eagleburger's perspectives ensured a status quo policy approach.

appointees, not the career bureaucrats and military officials who continued to share the Scowcroft-Eagleburger image of "Bosnia imploding." Further, worldview gaps expanded between State and Defense as General Powell held steadfastly to the previous administration's analysis whilst his peers across government increasingly urged that the U.S. take action in light of intensified media pressure. Presidential leadership also exacerbated this cleavage, since the incoming administration had campaigned (and won) upon a domestic platform refocusing attention onto internal issues at the expense of foreign affairs. In this sense, the strategic vision of the Clinton administration proved externally myopic as it turned a blind eye on the events in the former Yugoslavia in order to secure its domestic platform.¹⁶ The Bosnia crisis worsened in the absence of strategic vision,¹⁷ an absence that perpetuated the "deep division within the new

¹⁶ Ambassador Richard Holbrooke critiques the Clinton administration for this ambivalent approach and apparent trade-off, noting that the president's preeminent foreign policy campaign issue (1992) was Bosnia. However, the administration failed to act until the galvanizing events involving genocide in mid-1995 (Holbrooke 1998).

¹⁷ For illustrative purposes, one perspective regarding a "strategic vision" for the Bosnia crisis might taken the form of ending the conflict while establishing the mechanisms to resolve interparty conflict for the short-, mid-, and long-term. This approach would include developing confidence building measures (Macintosh 1986) in terms of the security/military, political, economic, and social environments. This strategic vision is far different from the ideas surrounding "preventing spillover" and "containment," perspectives that drove U.S. policy in the Balkans. This broader geo-political approach would require decision-makers to analyze the crisis through a systems approach that identified those political, economic, military, and social factors requiring transformation toward resolving the conflict. This approach could envisage bringing Bosnia back into the international community as a continuing partner for economic prosperity and continued peace in Europe. This vision would necessitate the development of a larger framework for a sustainable peace and would then lend itself to an operational end state vision to achieve the broader strategic vision. Note, however, that such an envisaging process requires decision-makers (and analysts) to focus their vision through the real-world constraints that affect one's ability to intervene in these crises. As such,

team" (Holbrooke 1998). The lack of an integrated planning approach amplified this void.

At the beginning of the executive transition, decision-makers faced an added factor that shaped interagency planning. The data indicated that the new principals (and those replaced two and three layers down within each agency) engaged in competitive behavior in an effort to "get the president's ear."¹⁸ These behaviors further restricted the planning process as these principals unconsciously closed-off communication channels in an effort to control their respective bureaucracies. In the absence of preexisting personal relationships, communication and planning became isolated further. This isolation intensified Defense's perceptions that State wanted to embroil the military in another "quagmire."¹⁹ Here again, the need to protect institutional equities²⁰ magnified the disparate worldviews and philosophies regarding the use of force, ensuring

this example is offered here merely to clarify the meaning of strategic vision and remains overly simplistic in its development.

¹⁸ Holbrooke notes that "nothing generates more heat in the government than the question of who is chosen to participate in important meetings" (Holbrooke 1998, 5).

¹⁹ Susan Woodward maintains that post-facto analyses regarding unwillingness to use force (until 1995) reserve the harshest criticism for "UN generals on the ground (particularly those in command in Sarajevo) and for defense establishments (particularly the Pentagon) for obstructing military engagement for fear of falling into a quagmire and of losing soldiers' lives." She continues by asserting, "the reluctance to use military force therefore remained a cover for major disagreements among the major powers about their objectives in the Balkan peninsula and their continuing absence of a policy toward the conflict itself. This has been transparently clear when decisions *were* made to use military force, such as air power [*sic*] to defend safe areas, because the use was reactive, crisis-driven, motivated almost by pique at Bosnian Serb defiance" (Woodward 1995, 377).

gridlock within the administration until the media reported the atrocities that “remind[ed] the world that international conventions and moral law were being violated and demand[ed] that the major powers take decisive military action” (Woodward 1995, 273). Data revealed that these media reports further reinforced disparate agency worldviews as the State Department identified the Serbs as the aggressors and Defense took a more balanced view by insisting that all parties in conflict shouldered some level of responsibility. This fissure became especially influential in the creation of different end state visions.

Exacerbated by a change in leadership in 1993, the analytical process that framed the crisis in Bosnia shared the same basic deficiencies as that of the Persian Gulf. However, the problem with leadership in this instance was not that it commanded *too strong* a role, but rather, that it failed to establish the tone for the administration and allowed the interagency decision-makers to drift for over two years.

During this drifting process, tension across the interagency actors intensified, leading to the development of a flawed intervention process. In effect, the Dayton Peace Accords produced an *interagency* termination policy in name only – the military and civilian components of that intervention remained separated, again demonstrating that the absence of an integrated planning

²⁰ See again Druckman and Green (1995) for the theory of interplay between interests and values where intensified conflict of interest serves to polarize the parties on ideologies or values.

process enables agencies to develop courses of action based upon disparate worldviews and the protection of their institutional equities.²¹ In this case, the protection of those equities and inflexibility regarding roles and missions – on the part of all agencies – led to the development of two mutually exclusive, serially connected courses of action (i.e., the military Implementation Force [IFOR] and the civilian implementation missions). In the final analysis, these problems ensured the approach used by the interagency decision-makers to analyze the conflict would focus on the independent nodes of the Bosnia crisis, not the “Balkans” as a system so that affecting one component could leverage another to move the system toward a comprehensive desired end state. However, this supposition presumes that the administration had, in fact, articulated such a desired end state, a topic that is the subject of a later section of this chapter.

Summary: Crisis Analysis

These approaches to crisis analysis give rise to two recurring defects revealed clearly in the two cases – one related to information exchange; the other, to strategic vision. First, decision-makers continue(d) to exclude expert participation (i.e., people with crisis-specific knowledge) in both the crisis

²¹ This has been a long-term problem: Are the senior State Department personnel or admirals and generals in charge? For a discussion of this phenomenon, see Challener (1973).

analysis and decision-making processes. While the latter is understandable, mistakes pertaining to the former ensure decision-makers initially frame crises with limited information, prompting them to make decisions based upon possibly flawed assumptions and incongruous worldviews. Yet, the problem goes beyond absence of accurate expert knowledge. *Asymmetric* knowledge of conditions on ground reinforces a groupthink dynamic because information is not shared across or within agencies (with the experts). One Defense principal characterized the problem in this way:

There are immense amounts of ignorance being shared because information is not shared. You go to the PC or the DC meetings — the Deputy Secretary/Undersecretary — these folks do not have all the information in their heads because they are the top folks. It is terrible how ignorant the process is because it is top-down in these committees/groups and they do not have time to get, or to know, all the facts and the right people are not there with the information.

This lack of information inhibits the principals' and deputies' capacity to develop policy as decision-makers decontextualize crises to fit their understanding in light of their prior experience (i.e., Tversky and Kahneman's availability heuristic dominates; see chapter 2). Skewed perspectives are magnified by perceptions of interagency relations that perpetuate negative stereotypes (see figure 7.7). These stereotypes produce competitive dynamics that reinforce misconceptions of roles and missions and drive the policy process toward a lowest common denominator, the use of force in a tactical role.

Tactical perspectives impel analysts and decision-makers to focus on critical nodes of a conflict system while hampering the development and articulation of a strategic vision that promotes a clearly defined desired end state. In this manner, decision-makers truncate their "backwards planning" process from the very beginning: The lack of integration across the interagency process generates an analytical approach based upon flawed assumptions and narrow perspectives regarding opportunities upon which the intervenors could capitalize. These missed opportunities manifest themselves by generating limited visions for the desired end state.

Desired End State

The foregoing dimensions of crisis analysis cannot be viewed in isolation from the process wherein decision-makers construct their vision for the desired end state.²² The factors highlighted above, along with their limitations, carry over into the development of this vision as perspectives concerning the nature of the

²² Recall from chapter 1, this work defines the "end state" by extending the U.S. military's Joint Doctrine definition to include social factors. Specifically, *Joint Pub 3-07: Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War* (JCS 1995, GL-3), defines the *end state* as "What the National Command Authorities want the situation to be when operations conclude—both military operations, as well as those where the military is in support of other instruments of national power." Note that this work expands the definition to include the political, economic, military, and social conditions that exist in the post-hostilities period. Decision-makers and planners must make each explicit to ensure they consider these factors throughout the policy-development process. For a review of this concept of "end state," see Abt (1988), Allotey (1995), Anderson (1997), Bair (1995), Bin Sultan (1995), Congress (1991), House (1991a, 1991b, 1992a, 1992b), JCS (1995), JWC (1995), Last (1995), Schwarzkopf and Petre (1992), and Senate (1991).

crisis influence views regarding the post-intervention destination.²³ Data revealed that the development of this vision occurs through a political process of decision-making as negotiation, one that remains intensely political at the highest levels and one that is channeled by anticipated roles, personalities, and institutional equities. One high-ranking government official noted:

The problem is that the definition of the end state is a political process. You cannot, almost by definition, define it without going through the messiness of the political process.... Defining the [desired] end state...cannot be done absent what you have to do to get there: Agencies will always measure against what has to be done to get there. When you layer upon that personal factors — egos, power — it is difficult. People tentatively have a stake in this sort of situation. Then there are the distractions, the lack of consistent attention, [and] so many other things going on.

Layered upon this political process is the tactical vision problem, an issue exacerbated by dissimilar organizational cultures and a lack of integrated planning. A Defense principal acknowledged the tendency of his Department to think tactically concerning the end state by saying,

In our discussions in the Tank, we did not give a lot of attention to clearly defining conflict [termination] in the context in which you're looking at it. Someone would say "What are we trying to do?," but I can't remember us talking a lot about "If he takes this action,

²³ Bertram Spector captures the essence of this relationship by saying, "The way a dispute is framed can constrain the options for resolution. If the parties view the conflict in nationalist, ethnic, or ideological terms, escalation of the dispute and recourse to violence may be inevitable. Definitions that delimit the meaning of the conflict to simplistic stereotypes, that villainize the adversary, that place total blame on the other party, and that emotionalize the conflict often promote early impasse and give way to conflicts that appear impervious to negotiation or mediation. The principals become inflexible. Bosnia, Somalia, and Rwanda are some recent examples of such conflicts" (Spector 1995, 82).

then...." Our discussions were almost more tactical than strategic in this sense.

It is important to recall that these agencies do not feel Defense should establish the end state vision since it is not the lead agent for policy development (see figure 8.16). However, because the interagency process fails to debate the issues, compare analytical approaches, and integrate planning mechanisms, the perception generally held within Defense is that no other agency is developing this vision and it must address these issues to protect its institutional equities. If the National Security Council and State Department *are* developing this vision, the data indicated that they are not communicating that vision through the interagency process. One Defense principal contended,

My Department's ability to influence [end state vision] is not good – within the Department, there's a fair capability to create conflict termination and exit strategies. Defense has a high strategy development capability, but the Department's ability to influence [end state vision] is not good. You rarely see the State Department or NSC Staff working the desired end state. In other words, "What's the end state you want to occur?" and work backwards from there – that rarely occurs in State or NSC.

Qualitative data from the selected interviews indicated that for the National Security Council and State Department the definition of an end state does not hold the same significance as it does for Defense, thus highlighting a significant culture fissure. One National Security Council principal noted:

End state is a military planner's term of art. Every time we have a discussion within the interagency that rests on nomenclature that

one segment has grown up with, we have problems. End state was a key one. [We] avoid words like control, strategy – we had to methodically strip out the nomenclature and substance.... Avoiding proprietary nomenclature can be really important to hammering-out an end state or a tentative strategy.

This difference in significance is magnified by decision-makers' prior experiences, experiences that prompt Defense officials and others who served during the Vietnam War to push the interagency toward a clear definition of the desired end state. A Defense principal captured the essence of this perception:

The most important question is absolutely the end state. I point to Vietnam and ask (1) "What is the political end state you expect to see?," (2) "What does the military situation have to do to [achieve] number one?," and, (3) "Can we do it?" In Vietnam, we never thought through the political end state—can you do it? If we tried to do the same thing in Somalia, we would still be there. The development of the end state is bottom-up instead of top-down.

The answers to these three questions are not apparent immediately if one hopes to achieve systemic change as a result of armed intervention. They require intense debate by individuals who can collectively see the entire "puzzle" through their institutional perspectives, but can simultaneously put aside their institutional equities when developing policy. However, failure to address these questions can lead to the application of force with unanticipated negative effects, thereby worsening the conflict between adversaries.²⁴ The lethality of force

²⁴ At the time of this writing, the NATO air campaign against Yugoslavia is entering its tenth day. The media continues to report that the air strikes are exacerbating the refugee situation as "about 164,000 ethnic Albanians have been expelled from Kosovo by government forces" and are fleeing into the neighboring countries of Albania, Macedonia, and Montenegro (UNHCR 1999, A22).

demands that the interagency process and its decision-makers address these issues *before* force employment. The data revealed that development of the end state cannot be "bottom-up" wherein tactical realities dictate strategic vision "in the moment." Yet, the absence of such a top-down vision intensifies Defense's need to define an exit strategy as a critical component of intervention strategy (see also Gilpin 1997). Defining exit strategy *first*, especially in terms of a timeline, again promotes a lowest common denominator solution wherein the U.S. government employs forces with no clear vision for their role in achieving a satisfactory termination according to clearly defined, prior criteria. Before proceeding to this discussion of criteria, let us examine these findings in terms of the Persian Gulf and Bosnia cases.

Case Examples: End State Vision

Similar to the discussion of crisis analysis, the issues concerning end state vision materialized differently in these two cases. Let us begin with the Persian Gulf.

The Persian Gulf War

The qualitative data analysis revealed that the decision-makers framed no strategic end state for the Persian Gulf War beyond a return to the status quo

Included in answering these three questions (as part of recursive crisis analysis) is the anticipation of the effects of aerial bombardment. Clearly, decision-makers failed to anticipate the magnitude of this undesired effect as this refugee migration is destabilizing the entire region.

antebellum.²⁵ One Defense deputy noted, "in the Persian Gulf War, our intention was to repulse the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait...talking about getting at a modern-day Hitler." A CIA official shared this perspective by asserting,

I don't think they had an end state. Originally, [it was a] cease-fire, end of conflict. The problem is the immediate end state for the war was fairly clear, but [there was] no clear policy after that. Keeping Saddam Hussein in his box was not an end state—sanctions are not a policy, they're a policy tool.

A Defense principal likewise reflected this perspective:

I do not think we had political objectives.... The political objectives were to kick Iraq out of Kuwait—that was it. There was no consideration for conflict termination—"Where do you want to be politically in 20 years?," "What are the strategic decisions for this part of a world?"—None of that was considered!

²⁵ For illustrative purposes, as an extension of a broader strategic vision one "potential" end state vision for the Iraq-Kuwait crisis might have included the reintegration of Iraq into the regional power-base, beyond a mere counterbalance to Iran (see, for example, Brzezinski and Scowcroft 1997). Such political integration would have necessitated the resolution of long-standing differences between Iraq and Kuwait (e.g., territorial boundaries and ownership of the Rumaila oil fields). This political issue extends to the economic vision as well, noting that the reintegration of Iraq into the world economy would serve as one method to dampen the tension between Iraq and Kuwait. Relatedly, OPEC and the international community could open additional markets for the Iraqis as an avenue to help them recover their financial losses sustained as a result of the Iran-Iraq War. These political and economic "carrots" could be used to entice Iraq to halt its military expansion. In turn, as a good faith gesture, Iraq could be convinced to shift the funds spent on military expansion to domestic social programs, rebuilding the infrastructure of the country and bolstering public support for the Hussein regime. Admittedly, this end state vision may seem implausible given the events of the last 20 years—both before the Gulf War and in its aftermath—in terms of Hussein's treatment of his populace. However, the important aspect of developing this vision is identifying the conditions of conflict through a systems approach to crisis analysis. This approach would provide the specifics for the strategic vision, and therefore, the end state vision that addresses the political, economic, military, and social conditions required to establish a sustainable peace. This approach differs greatly from the "containment" vision used to frame the four "strategic" objectives proffered during the Gulf War, objectives that focused on Hussein as a node within the system, rather than the overall system itself.

The evidence for these views emerged at the time of the cease-fire. Because agencies responded independently to the crisis in terms of their respective core competencies, decision-makers created a phased approach toward achieving the desired end state, one framed only in terms of the four limited political objectives identified as U.S. policy objectives.²⁶ However, the leaders introduced no integrated political, economic, *and social* objectives until after the cease-fire when the military recognized it would have to assist in the post-conflict humanitarian effort (including continuing to fly sorties as an aerial cap to prevent Iraqi aircraft, save helicopters, from flying in the northern and southern no-fly zones). The military initially provided support for humanitarian aid and civil affairs functions. The data revealed that the military was prepared neither psychologically nor materially to do so, thus illuminating an omission in planning that emerged because the planning process failed to integrate diplomacy and warfighting.

In effect, the decision-makers in this case developed a limited strategic vision through a process that ensured that the military would hand the situation "back" to the Ambassador and Country Team once a cease-fire occurred. This hand-over resulted from the absence of an integrated interagency planning mechanism that

²⁶ Again, these four objectives were: (1) "Immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait"; (2) "Restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government"; (3) "Security and stability of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf"; and (4) "Safety and protection of the lives of American citizens abroad" (OSD 1992, 19).

could debate the issues and compare various analyses of the crisis. Such a process could have anticipated these needs from the outset of the conflict, especially since U.S. public rhetoric attempted to assure the Iraqi populace that the U.S. waged war against Hussein as their rogue leader, not against them. The logic of this approach did manifest itself in the identification and selection of military targeting objectives (Mann 1995; Reynolds 1995), yet there was no recursive linkage back to the political objectives to create a comprehensive approach.

The Bosnia Crisis

In August 1995, the nature of the humanitarian crisis in Bosnia brought together the two disparate worldviews related to armed intervention. Those mobilized by value-laden interests accentuated media reports of the massacres in Srebrenica and market place bombing in Sarajevo. At the same time, those mobilized by interest-laden interests stressed the damaged credibility of NATO.²⁷ Prior to this point, however, the president did not create an image (i.e., a definition of task, a purpose, or an end state vision) around which the public could coalesce. The ongoing congressional power struggle with the Executive Branch further complicated the development of an end state vision as the CJCS

²⁷ Secretary of State Warren Christopher pushed issues of NATO credibility in February 1993, but to no avail. In his own words, "this rhetoric proved to be well ahead of our policy" (Christopher 1998, 345).

did not want to use troops on the ground — the Pentagon had the support of the Congress (and knew it).²⁸ In conjunction with this dynamic, the disparate views around this question of end state held by State and Defense paralyzed the policy process. A CIA official noted,

The humanitarian factor also applied to Bosnia. During the deliberations State was in the forefront of those who thought we should bomb — the Pentagon was very reluctant. DoD's main concerns were (a) what are we going to bomb and (b) once you start, what's the end state?

The agencies framed their answers to the second question in terms of their worldviews and the assumptions their ideologies made salient. Although an extremely long quotation, the words of one Defense official captured the nature of this fissure:

State assumed Milosevic would go away. We saw him as the linchpin — State thought student protests would be effective and also thought we'd take on a broader role with war criminals and we'd remove Milosevic and Mladic. We left them in place. Our vision of the end state was to come up with the right lines on the map and balance the power through the "Train and Equip" plan written here without much input from the State Department. It was trotted out and State saw it and said, "Holy cow, we thought you were going to put the Bosniacs in power and pull Milosevic out." They (State) did all the negotiation with Bosnia and we did all the negotiation with the other side. We ended up with State seeing

²⁸ Holbrooke reports that Vice President Gore was very aware of this connection, and that on November 22, 1995, in a meeting at the White House Gore said: "'I want to make an important practical point regarding the JCS and the Pentagon,' he said, looking directly at the Defense representatives in the room. 'I've had lots of conversations with the Congress. They have told me that our military representatives on the Hill usually leave their audience more comfortable than when they arrived. I'm not saying they are trying to undercut our policy, but they are losing us votes up there'" (Holbrooke 1998, 316).

Milosevic as a threat—their vision was so different from ours and they didn't see it. We had a balance of power whereas State thought we'd come to the aid of those abused. We now have a situation where you have two entities instead of one. We were dealing with Milosevic—he's got the guns. So we balanced the power out and State assumed there would be an imbalance of power they could come in and negotiate. I think Holbrooke's view was to end the fighting—we do a lot of those simplistic things. Holbrooke's view was "How do I stop this war?" The State Department was more Pollyannaish—[their] focus was on future trade, etc. State takes a very simplistic view—"Everyone will see the situation through our lenses. Because the U.S. is there, everyone will work cooperatively with one another." I don't think State recognized that they are political entities, not ethnic entities. Holbrooke was a realist—[he] balanced the power. State's view was Bosnia would be part of "engagement and enlargement" and then we'll move out.

The result of this cleavage for Bosnia was that once decision-makers decided to introduce forces into the conflict, they did so with no clear vision of any desired end state. The data reflected that the absence of this vision prompted these decision-makers to agree on an "end date," *in place of an end state*, as an effort to "sell" troop deployment domestically, to both the public and the Congress. A State Department deputy contended,

People say they're trying to create a desired end state, but we can't do it—the actors have to. We are good at short-term stopping the fighting: The biggest difficulty is to make political decisions to act. The media and Congress—Congress tends to be "quick in and out." The media is looking for failure...good news is not reportable.

A National Security Council principal claimed the interagency did not establish a desire end state for Bosnia, but did frame termination criteria in the form of "benchmarks." This official claimed:

We do not talk about end states, we talk about "benchmarks." We came up with 8 or 10 benchmarks for Bosnia. For example, when the militaries of the three have a structural transparency such as the "cross-observation" exercises that took place before the [Berlin] Wall came down. If you satisfy most of the criteria for most of the benchmarks, you do not need a military force on the ground. We fleshed this out with a "cheat sheet" from the guys at State to run with the details.²⁹

The implied end state here reflects operational, indeed tactical, thinking: "you do not need a military force on the ground." This recollection also demonstrates that the planning process remained isolated as the National Security Council worked with only one agency, the State Department, to develop the plan. Concurrently, the Defense Department developed a different end state vision that remained isolated from the interagency process, one that it later "sold" to U.S. civilian decision-makers *after* it had been adopted by the North Atlantic Council. With reference to the IFOR mission, the military plan directing this effort noted that the terms of the Peace Agreement would play a large role in defining the political end state. Further, it highlighted the diplomatic-military fissure by stating that NATO's mission was not directly linked to the end state. It did, however, outline

²⁹ In this case, the "cheat sheet" refers to the verbiage needed to ensure higher-ranking State Department officials would "buy" the proposal and adopt it as their own.

four possible conditions that, when achieved, *could be deemed an end state* in Bosnia-Herzegovina. These conditions included the: (1) parties' adherence to the military requirements of the Peace Agreement (especially the absence of violations or unauthorized military activities; (2) parties' demonstration of a commitment to continued negotiations to resolve differences; (3) the creation of civil structures to assume responsibility and monitor compliance with the Peace Agreement; and (4) the establishment of conditions for ongoing nation-building activities. This proposed vision did attempt to establish the destination for the intervention, but one that remained only tactically-focused because of the absence of an integrated planning mechanism.

Summary: Desired End State

These two cases illustrate that the dearth of innovative thinking surrounding the development of a vision for the desired end state is the product of a non-integrated planning mechanism that attempts to synthesize separate crisis analyses only at the highest levels of decision-making. These structural cleavages create interagency conflict that further prevents useful interagency debate. Because the process remains focused on tactical-level issues, one of the primary concerns becomes the development of an exit strategy, irrespective of the underlying conditions on the ground between the parties in conflict. Therefore,

termination criteria, when developed, may or may not be connected with any vision for the desired end state.

Termination Criteria

Perhaps more than any other emergent theme, the development of termination criteria for the conflict reflected the decision-maker's reliance upon the same cost-benefit mentality that undergirds Rational Choice Theory. Qualitative data from the informants interviewed revealed that when considering armed intervention worldviews, institutional equities, and domestic politics shape definitions of national interest, intervention criteria, and ultimately, termination criteria. One Defense principal noted:

Our entry is not usually declared with a clear view of how we're going to get out. In the Gulf War, I don't think people had a clear sense of exit strategy, Bosnia is hands-off, [and] in Somalia we went in with a set of laudable objectives. Outside of "feel good criteria," we didn't look at all the possible outcomes and regional developments.

It is this perception that the termination criteria tend to reflect "feel good criteria" as a product of dissimilar worldviews, defense of institutional equities, and responses to domestic politics that drives the development of termination criteria to their most basic and tactically-focused level, ultimately pushing for

force withdrawal irrespective of changes in the basic conflict.³⁰ When the previous chapter discussed relationships across these factors, data indicated that domestic politics and media influence play a particularly important role in framing these termination criteria.

The power struggle between the Congress and the Executive Branch injects irreconcilable images into the process of developing termination criteria. On the one hand, the Congress wants to flex its muscle concerning the use of U.S. force abroad (e.g., via the War Powers Resolution). On the other, the Congress must reflect the desires of the populace it represents. This latter factor is usually expressed through pressure to bring the troops home as quickly as possible. In conjunction with the former, the Congress pushes the president as Commander-in-Chief to express termination criteria in terms of ending U.S. participation, criteria that do not necessarily relate to ending the conflict itself. A deputy-level State Department official characterized this congressional pressure by saying,

Congress starts by saying "stop the slaughter and get it off the front pages," but then they say "stop spending money and bring the troops home." We are in for six months...and then Congress says bring the troops home. Congress pushes to get in, then blows a whistle to get out much more quickly.

³⁰ This simultaneously creates the fissure between the Washington decision-makers and the field commander or ambassador who feel Washington is out of touch with the realities of the context on the ground. For another perspective, see Allotey (1995), HERO (1982), and Toth (1991).

The media reports this congressional pressure in partisan ways, thereby exacerbating interagency conflict regarding the best form of intervention and the definition of termination criteria. Relatedly, in their effort to frame the issues, the media tends to stimulate the idea that the U.S. must act as part of its moral obligation as the world's sole remaining superpower.

Media images push the limits of policy development by stressing the "should" do something part of policy well before critical analysis is performed to determine what armed intervention "can" do. The data did not indicate that informants felt that the media should not perform this role, as they did help frame the issues. Rather, informants contended that this pressure demands that the principals lead the interagency process in vetting all possible courses of action, their most likely results, and their relationship to termination criteria development.³¹ In this sense, the capacity of the media to influence policy exacerbates congressional pressures to define termination criteria largely in terms of exit strategies.

Together, these factors frame termination criteria in terms of measurable milestones, but ones that take the parties to the *point of a cease-fire*, but not beyond. This focus upon the cease-fire as the preeminent termination criterion

³¹ Intensifying aerial bombardment in Yugoslavia did not separate the leader from the people; conversely, it drove them to his side, enhancing the political will of the government and its capacity to intensify ethnic cleansing. It appears that these decision-makers failed to appreciate that armed intervention polarizes populations — there can be no neutrals once intervention occurs (Dobbs 1995).

perpetuates a cleavage in the interagency process and intensifies conflict between disparate worldviews. This interagency dispute promotes a fissure between the political and military objectives that "establish the nature of the conflict" (Warden 1989, 109). In essence, Defense defines its role as bringing about the cease-fire through the application of overwhelming force. Once achieved, the salience of institutional equities and roles and missions debates comes to the fore as Defense perceives its role as one of warfighting, not nation-building. Defense views these post-conflict civil affairs activities as State Department (including USAID) responsibilities.³² This further reflects the military's "get in, do it, get out" mentality, a perspective that remains tied to strategy and the development of a "course of action." Before proceeding to the discussion of strategy, let us examine the development of termination criteria in the two historical cases.

³² The military civil affairs capability that does exist is part of USACAPOC (U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command), not the warfighting military structure. The active Army provides "only 4 percent of the U.S. Army's Civil Affairs resources. The remaining 96 percent come from other units in the reserve component" (USACAPOC 1999). As a result, warfighters have not incorporated civil affairs units into planning and execution as they are outside the combatant's primary mission and expertise. This practice is changing quite rapidly, however, as the military perceives that bolstering this civil affairs capacity as a separate entity in the Reserve Force Component is a means to protect its warfighting core competencies by preventing multi-role taskings. It is also an outgrowth of the realization that these separate civil affairs activities (e.g., those performed nongovernmental organizations as well as the Army Reserve Civil Affairs units) require a coordinating function to fulfill their missions effectively.

Case Examples: Termination Criteria

The Persian Gulf War

It is clear that the Bush administration developed termination criteria (i.e., the four strategic objectives for U.S. involvement that became the UN objectives for the Gulf War) in pursuit of a limited end state: Decision-makers developed policy to reestablish the status quo antebellum. This policy contained the added objective of maintaining regional stability by impairing Hussein's ability to act aggressively, but not damaging his military to the point where it could no longer act as a counterbalance to Iran.³³ These five criteria focused on establishing the conditions to produce a cease-fire, yet not terminating the Iraq-Kuwait/Iraq-Coalition conflict in a real sense since they failed to address the underlying conflict issues or create innovative solutions to move the parties beyond those issues. In this sense, these five termination criteria became the end state. These termination criteria could be fulfilled only through a strategy of conflict containment, an approach that similarly characterizes the Bosnia crisis.

The Bosnia Crisis

The absence of an end state vision necessarily makes the identification of conflict termination criteria problematic since agencies cannot be assured that

³³ Again, crisis analysis played a crucial role in this since many, Scowcroft in particular, viewed Iraq as an effective counterbalance to Iran (Bush and Scowcroft 1998).

their actions will help them arrive at their desired destination if that destination has not been determined, agreed, or communicated. The foregoing reference to the IFOR plan did intimate, however, that one possible end state could be achieved by securing the four elements it proposed.³⁴ Outside that proposal, however, no clearly articulated interagency termination criteria existed. The absence of such criteria led one Defense deputy to remark, "the interagency's primary interest in Bosnia was to contain it from spreading — [that's] the reason we went to Macedonia."

The insertion of these forces and IFOR did bring about a cease-fire and prevent international spillover, but the conflict continued as it moved to other venues (e.g., the Kosovo-Yugoslav crisis). A National Security Council principal captured this by saying,

We go too far if we think conflict termination [i.e., cease-fire] is the end state — we're still there. We got the shooting to stop in October 1995, [but] we have expended enormous resources and energy. We must leave in place the mechanisms to prevent further flare-ups.

The development of these mechanisms to prevent further flare-ups must be included in any strategy that employs specific courses of action to achieve clear termination criteria as a step toward achieving a desired end state. As such,

³⁴ Recall again that these conditions included the: (1) parties' adherence to the military requirements of the Peace Agreement (especially the absence of violations or unauthorized military activities; (2) parties' demonstration of a commitment to continued negotiations to resolve differences; (3) the creation of civil structures to assume responsibility and monitor compliance with the Peace Agreement; and (4) the establishment of conditions for ongoing nation-building activities.

strategy development is the final component of conflict termination policy: It is discussed as the final topic of this chapter.

Summary: Termination Criteria

In both the cases reviewed, decision-makers failed to acknowledge the relationship between termination criteria and the political objectives that shape the vision of the desired end state. As a result of this disjuncture, termination criteria took the form of goals that emerged from a decision-making process wherein the experts were excluded and those with the least situation-specific knowledge³⁵ made decisions based upon incomplete assessments and limited crisis analysis. The product of a tactical-level perspective, termination criteria provide benchmarks for activities that produce temporary cease-fires, but failed to address the underlying conflict issues.³⁶ Therefore, these actions fail to induce systemic, lasting change. The data from the cases illuminated an interrelated pattern: Crisis analyses frame desired end states which, in turn, lead to the identification of termination criteria. In turn, these criteria influence the development of the strategy to achieve conflict termination, the substance of the final emergent theme. The words of a Defense principal integrate the findings

³⁵ One informant did note that the principal could in fact be "the expert," but claimed this is extremely rare. From this individual's perspective, the top leaders usually have little specific knowledge of any particular crisis. The data revealed his perspective remained consistent across the government.

presented thus far by establishing a relationship between interagency conflict and the development of termination criteria:

Interdepartmental conflict makes it harder to agree on what conflict termination criteria are because what often a negotiation process signals is that they did not agree on policy outcomes. You get selection of "mushy" criteria that each side interprets prospectively in their own way — no one wants to push the discussion and get a tentative handshake. You'll not really be pressed by events — we see this in Bosnia... we don't have any idea whatsoever as to what the end state looks like. The main criterion is to get through the next decision period. Now there is an expectation that this could not go on forever, but we have not agreed on what we're going to do — the problem is not going to go away.

Hence, the ideas reflected herein provide an appropriate segue into the final emergent theme that addresses how the U.S. government is going to do what it intends to do, that of termination strategy and, ultimately, course of action development.

Termination Strategy

The widest interagency fissure emerged when considering the relationship between the three themes discussed above and the development of strategy to achieve the desired result. Deciding *how* to achieve your end state in terms of definitive courses of action is the point at which the three previously discussed themes converge. The data revealed that decision-makers often agree that

³⁶ Terrence Hopmann and Daniel Druckman (1981) make the same arguments concerning Henry Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy in the Middle East.

something should be done on the macro level, but developing consensus regarding the form that action will take proves more difficult. Interagency conflict emanates from dissimilar organizational cultures and mutually exclusive planning processes that enable perceptions of institutional equities and roles and missions to polarize decision-makers as they develop intervention and termination strategy. The influence of domestic politics magnifies these difficulties as it further constrains strategic options. Beginning with organizational culture, this discussion reviews each of these factors to demonstrate their influence on termination strategy development.³⁷

The qualitative data analysis indicated that dissimilar organizational cultures influence the development of termination strategy by shaping the nature of interagency communications. Disparate organizational cultures arrest innovative thinking and perpetuate stereotypes that exacerbate misunderstanding and truncate debate regarding course of action development. The friction between non-uniformed conceptions regarding civilian control of the military and the warfighter's perspective regarding civilian control hampers interagency communication as military officials want civilian leaders to establish the strategic

³⁷ The literature linking strategy to conflict termination is expanding the classics (see, for example, Allotey 1995; Cimbala 1986, 1987, 1992; Cimbala and Dunn 1987; Clausewitz 1976; Coser 1961; Dornan et al. 1978; Dunn 1987; Engelbrecht 1992; George, 1993; Gilpin 1997; House 1990; Kahn 1968; Kecskemeti 1964, 1970; Lademan 1988; Pinette 1994; Rast 1999; Rios 1993; Sullivan 1993; Summers 1986; Toth 1978; US Army War College 1997).

vision for intervention (i.e., the end state vision and termination criteria), but leave the development of operational strategy in the hands of the warfighter.³⁸ This approach is reflected in the maxim, "Never tell people how to do things. Tell them what to do and they will surprise you with their ingenuity." This perspective captures the essence of the military's view of leadership (i.e., civilian control of the military), a view that is not shared universally across the decision-makers and one that amplifies planning fissures as conceptions of roles and missions prompt agencies to exclude others from the development of strategy. Further, when leaders do not demand that interagency actors collaborate when developing courses of action, this planning fissure widens much in the same manner as the independent crisis analysis processes discussed previously. As a result, the interagency process fails to produce an integrated approach for termination strategy.

Because each agency develops its own approach, the interagency process fails to employ synergistically all of its instruments of power (i.e., diplomatic, economic, and military) in the creation of termination strategy. These independent approaches rely instead upon the phased or serial development of

³⁸ As one example, throughout the research process individuals within Defense remarked that prior to the appointment of William Cohen as Secretary of Defense, the three-star (uniformed) Director of Operations (J-3) signed troop deployment orders *upon the direction of* the Secretary of Defense. Currently, Secretary Cohen personally signs all deployment orders. Uniformed personnel perceive this as micro-management and this leadership style creates friction between OSD civilians and Joint Staff military officials.

strategy that artificially separates diplomatic and military courses of action. Hence, a "virtual handoff" occurs once the president decides to employ the military (i.e., the diplomat passes responsibility for the crisis to the warfighter).³⁹ The net result is that decision-makers collectively fail to capitalize on potential opportunities because their perceived need to protect institutional equities (both functional and resource-based) closes these windows. For example, warfighting is seen as Defense's role, not State's. Likewise, the conduct of diplomacy dictates that military officials do not negotiate on behalf of the U.S. government. Consequently, the absence of an integrated interagency planning mechanism produces a strategy aimed at creating a temporary cease-fire but not sustainable conflict termination: No bridge spans these mutually exclusive conceptions of roles and missions. Domestic political concerns amplify the importance of developing a strategy to achieve a cease-fire while inhibiting the development of courses of action that move toward sustainable conflict termination.

Domestic politics relating to the "American way of war" play a significant role in perpetuating the termination strategy gap as the U.S. remains unwilling to accept casualties, relies upon overwhelming force to exert its will on its adversaries quickly and decisively (i.e., the Powell Doctrine; see also Snow and

³⁹ According to the informants in this research, this "handoff" remained pronounced during the Persian Gulf War as Secretary Baker faded into the background once the war started. He re-emerged to play a more visible diplomatic role only after the cease-fire.

Drew 1994; Weigley 1973), and prompts leaders to demonize the enemy as a means to mobilize public support. In the first instance, this unwillingness to accept casualties drives the process to develop an *exit strategy* as its first order of business.⁴⁰ The development of this exit strategy presupposes the existence of an "end date." In this manner, decision-makers develop strategy with a focus on getting out, not with a vision toward creating the conditions that will bring about sustainable conflict termination. In order to "get out," this strategy must stop the fighting decisively through the application of overwhelming force.

The use of overwhelming force creates difficulties for the development of termination strategy since not all conflicts can be resolved through its application. Overwhelming force has the potential to end conflict by creating a "conflict pause," but because force alone cannot resolve conflict that pause may be a temporary measure. One Defense principal characterized this by saying,

The rule there is that if conflicts are to be resolved and an enduring agreement produced, then all the factions to the agreement must believe that what results is better than not having an agreement. They must somehow believe they benefit more from the agreement than fighting, or, it will come up again. Clearly, those conditions did not exist in the Bosnia Peace Agreement or Kosovo either. You

⁴⁰ A Defense official provided an example of this concerning Haiti: "The military is more concerned about getting out. Haiti is a perfect example because we haven't figured out the strategy to get out. [We] need to establish a constabulary force. We've been trying to get out but the administration says to stay there for interagency plug-in." This Defense official did not define one of the military's roles as "interagency plug-in."

can't get conflict resolution — you can get a cessation of hostilities through the threat of force, but you can't get conflict resolution.⁴¹

Obviously, undertones of the cost-benefit approach underlie this perspective.

However, what is important here is the recognition that *force by itself cannot bring about conflict resolution* which, by definition, implies permanent termination.

Perhaps it is this growing recognition that generates the third theme related to termination strategy, that of demonizing the enemy.

The practice of demonizing the enemy to mobilize popular domestic support for military action abroad has a long history.⁴² The nature of this demonization is changing, however, as increasingly governments purportedly take military actions against rogue leaders, not the civilian populace (see, for example, Tanter 1998). Portraying a myopic view of an enemy channels public perspective, both domestic and international, making it easier to “sell” military intervention at home and abroad. It is important to note that this demonization process can be captured in a sound bite or a bumper sticker, thereby perpetuating negative images of the adversarial leader, not the innocent people who strive to survive under his (or her) “tyrannical rule.” Yet, this demonization process limits the decision-maker's ability to develop an effective strategy as the need to use power

⁴¹ At the time of this writing, the ongoing crisis in Kosovo demonstrates that the threat, and indeed application, of force *does not* bring about conflict termination in all cases.

⁴² For a satirical presentation of such ideas, see *A Cartoon History of United States Foreign Policy, 1776-1976* (Foreign Policy Association and Moynihan 1975).

and coercion against a "demonized other" comes to dominate views framing all courses of action. The salience of this power projection need drives strategy toward a constant state of escalation and results in the application of overwhelming force. However, overwhelming force cannot bring about sustainable termination short of extermination (Seabury and Codevilla 1989). A National Security Council principal contended the demonization of Saddam Hussein during the Persian Gulf War as one of the United States' "greatest mistakes." A Defense principal echoed this perspective:

From a public relations perspective, you create a situation where you can no longer deal with the enemy in a rational fashion—like Castro—you can only deal with him through third parties. The only exception to this was Nixon to China. I believe that one of the only near-term ways out of the Iraq situation is to help redefine Saddam Hussein—don't make him a hero, but change the perception.

The emphasis here on self-limiting one's ability to "deal with the enemy in a rational fashion" implies that such actions limit course of action development and create public expectations that negate the decision-maker's ability to reverse course. Such boundaries further constrain the strategist's capacity to consider all possible options when framing courses of action toward conflict termination. For exemplary purposes, let us briefly examine the ways in which these factors manifest in the two cases. Noting that the three previous sections addressed several of these themes (e.g., dissimilar organizational cultures, institutional equities, and roles and missions) and because their effects carry over into

strategy development, this application focuses specifically upon the connection between strategy and mutually exclusive planning processes as this linkage serves as the bridge between the desired destination and the vehicle used to get there.

Case Examples: Termination Strategy

The Persian Gulf War

The military planners for the air campaign understood that neither the president nor the American public would accept large numbers of casualties.⁴³ This recognition generated an implicit end state vision, one that struggled to ensure the Iraqi people would not harbor hatred for the U.S. as a result of a massive aerial bombing campaign that killed civilians and irreparably damaged their way of life. According to the data, this condition prompted the development of an integrated air campaign that judiciously selected targets with that implicit end state in mind. However, the data revealed that the Defense Department developed this strategy directly with the National Security Council and the president with very little input from State. In the perceptions of one State deputy, this strategy, coupled with the public relations effort to drive a wedge between the populace and the leader while demonizing Hussein, enabled Bush

⁴³ In an interview with *Frontline*, Richard Haass recounts a meeting wherein President Bush seemed concerned as much with Iraqi casualties as he was with those for the coalition (Frontline 1998).

to pronounce the coalition would "go in, liberate Kuwait, and that was it." He went on to say that "George Bush would make the decision." This rhetoric constrained innovative thinking and the development of other options. As one National Security Council principal noted:

We looked at [conflict termination] before the bombing started. We did not have unanimity however. Before the bombing started, before congressional approval, it was a debate about whether or not there should be a conflict. In this case, State and JCS would have preferred a resolution short of conflict—Iraq be induced to withdraw without military action. [Cheney and Scowcroft] (and the president, although he kept quiet) thought that such an outcome would have been a disaster for the U.S. We had gotten ourselves into a position where there had to be a conflict. If Iraq had withdrawn too quickly, he still had 100,000 troops on the border and we would have lost strategically and long-term.

Getting themselves "into a position where there had to be a conflict," the president and APNSA turned to Cheney and Powell to develop the strategy to eject Hussein from Kuwait. The data indicated that the development of this strategy flowed primarily between these four decision-makers and the military planners (including the CINC) to the virtual exclusion of the diplomatic actors. Again, because the crisis analysis process had excluded experts, these same leaders also excluded non-military experts from strategy development.⁴⁴ Because the administration did not define clearly the type of post-war peace it sought in

⁴⁴ A notable exception to this practice did occur on the Defense side as Checkmate (the Pentagon's offline think tank under the direction of Colonel John Warden) brought in outsiders from different disciplines and businesses around the world to discuss targeting effects. However, Defense made no effort to incorporate State as an "agency" in this process.

terms of an end state, the four political objectives served as the de facto termination criteria.⁴⁵ Yet, translating these objectives from the political arena to the operational warfighting environment highlighted the disconnect between diplomacy and warfare as the cease-fire ensued.

The policy-makers' failure to bridge this gap created the subsequent impression once the war was over that the termination strategy (and indeed, the war itself) left the situation in the Gulf unfinished. The most visible aspect of this "unfinished business" concerned the extent to which the administration demonized Hussein, yet "allowed" him to remain in power. While other examples exist, this emerged as a poignant reminder that "the decisions on ending the war also highlighted the failure to keep political and military objectives in synch" (Gordon and Trainor 1995, 477). The data indicated that one possible reason for this disconnect was the handoff that occurred through the phased approach of the military's role becoming dominant when diplomacy "failed" and then diminishing upon cease-fire. Although the term "exit strategy" was not commonplace in 1991, the data revealed that the military commanders felt they had fulfilled their role and it was time to pass the post-hostilities effort to the non-uniformed agencies. These agencies had not been involved with

⁴⁵ These four objectives were: (1) "Immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait"; (2) "Restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government"; (3) "Security and stability of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf"; and (4) "Safety and protection of the lives of American citizens abroad" (OSD 1992, 19).

combat planning and were ill-prepared for the challenge ahead. The development and implementation of this termination strategy, then, remained in the hands of a few individuals (i.e., the core group), the same individuals who prosecuted the war effort but remained unequipped to prepare for the peace that followed. Consequently, this case stands as an example wherein the serial development of strategy artificially separated diplomatic and warfighting courses of action. The evidence for this rests with the fact that nearly 10 years after the cease-fire, the U.S. and some of its coalition partners remain embroiled in an oscillating pattern of air strikes to "put Hussein back in his box" as he oversteps the boundaries demarcated by the U.S. and UN. The U.S. remains similarly engaged in the Balkans nearly four years after the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords.

The Bosnia Crisis

Identifying the termination strategy for the Bosnia crisis as it relates to a desired end state proves difficult as it remains unclear what precise end state was envisaged when the decision-makers formulated policy between 1993 and 1995 (i.e., the Dayton Peace Accords). Relatedly, the absence of a clear end state ensured termination criteria would remain ambiguous. This ambiguity affected strategy development as well, as the Implementation Force (and now, Stabilization Force) seemed to be "muddling through." One component of that

strategy did emerge clearly, however, as the policy-makers established a timeline that drove strategy. Discussed earlier, this timeline produced an exit strategy that remained tied to a 12-month date. The data indicated that Defense insisted on establishing an exit strategy because it felt the administration had not articulated an end state that would ensure it could eventually bring the troops home. One Defense principal noted that "DoD was forced to go to this because in the interagency there was not much discussion on exit strategy. This forced a little bit of discipline into it." A National Security Council principal offered an additional rationale for the end date:

After Dayton, people thought there had to be a deadline. I don't think people were lying, but they were not being intellectually rigorous. But it was in the campaign period, so the administration avoided having public debates—that reluctance to "front-burner" Bosnia impeded a rational policy process. [In] the consensus-driven system you get rational work, but it's much harder and [you] have to deal with dysfunctional behaviors—it takes greater effort.

The reference to domestic politics (namely, the administration's "reluctance to 'front-burner' Bosnia") is important here since the data indicated that the *decision-makers recognized beforehand that one year would prove insufficient*. At the same time, however, they suspected they could not gain public and congressional support for anything longer (see also Holbrooke 1998). A National Security Council principal remarked,

The real end state we are after will only be achieved 5, 10, 20 years after the military presence that is there to support the

political/civilian implementation process. Until this civilian implementation can carry on by more conventional means (i.e., without the presence of three NATO divisions on the ground), we'll use a whole combination of traditional, nonmilitary means not to have NATO troops on the ground. We're talking about a transitional presence — How do you know when the job is done?

For reasons previously discussed, the military developed a strategy to induce a cease-fire which would create the environment for the civilian agencies (governmental and non-governmental) to improve the humanitarian situation. Defense's organizational culture and conceptions of roles and missions restrained the military's willingness to consider other missions (e.g., pursuit of war criminals) that may have expedited the civilian implementation of the Peace Accords. The lack of leadership and absence of strategic vision from the administration provided no alternatives for strategy development, leaving the military to, in the words of one government official, "craft an end state for itself." Again, this gap between the diplomatic and military missions became visible, as did the chasm between a strategy to induce a cease-fire and one to create the conditions for a sustainable peace.

Summary: Termination Strategy

Although in both cases decision-makers agreed that U.S. intervention was needed to stop the bloodshed and to protect national interests, securing agreement regarding the nature of that intervention proved more difficult. Dissimilar organizational cultures promoted non-integrated planning processes

that enabled agencies to frame strategies for conflict termination independently and in ways that protected their institutional equities as defined by their roles and missions. Concerns regarding domestic politics restricted strategy development as decision-makers used public opinion and the Congress to leverage others' views on the use of force. In the end, this generated a strategy that sought to bring about what should be termed *war termination in the form of a cease-fire*, but failed to move beyond that *point in time* to the development of *conflict termination policy as the bridge toward sustainable peace*. The attainment of a cease-fire through the application of overwhelming force then became the de facto policy outcome.

SYNERGISTIC EFFECTS: IMPACT ON POLICY OUTCOMES

To make clear the findings to this point, let me capture the essence of the effects of interagency conflict on conflict termination policy development through a brief synopsis. Once reiterated, the final discussion interprets the effects of these findings.

1. Dissimilar organizational images regarding the appropriate use of force create different meaning for/of a crisis and lead to greater interagency conflict that hampers termination policy development as it stifles interagency communication.

2. Decision-makers fail to recognize the ways in which their respective worldviews (i.e., political ideologies and philosophies regarding the use of force) shape their analytical processes, prompting leaders to demonize the enemy as they artificially dichotomize the nature of the crisis into "good guy/bad guy" frames.
3. Decision-makers frame the nature of crisis in terms of their roles in crisis intervention, roles that are defined by institutional equities. Role ambiguity and the absence of an integrated planning mechanism amplify the need to protect institutional equities.
4. The absence of strategic vision and the lack of an integrated planning approach lead decision-makers to focus on parts of the system (i.e., nodes), but not the system as a whole. This approach expands the gap between diplomats and warfighters as they fail to understand each other's core competencies and fail to maximize the effects of their integration.
5. Because decision-makers focus on tactical-level issues, analytical processes examine the nodes of the system (i.e., independent parts of the broader conflict system) thereby restricting the interagency's ability to evaluate the underlying causes and conditions of conflict and negating its ability to develop policy toward a sustainable solution.
6. Leaders who establish organizational cultures that limit innovative thinking and create perceptions that the inability to protect equities

equates to professional failure (for which, the penalty is high) exacerbate the tendency to protect institutional equities. This generates conflict at the interagency working group level.

7. The operating procedures of the National Security Council intensify interagency conflict when it responds to media or congressional pressures *rather* than acting upon principled guidance from the White House.
8. The development of end state vision is a political process of "decision-making by negotiation" and is channeled by anticipated roles, personalities, and institutional equities.
9. Agencies across the U.S. government evaluate the importance of a desired end state vision differently, generating a "least common denominator" policy and leading to the development of "exit strategies" as a means to ensure force withdrawal irrespective of the longer-term implications of armed intervention.
10. Domestic politics and media influence play a crucial role in framing termination criteria: Public opinion demands a "bloodless war"; the Congress manipulates funding to control foreign policy; and, the media appeals to the emotional side of everyone, pushing the government to "do something" before an adequate analysis is conducted.
11. Together, these factors exacerbate interagency conflict and frame termination criteria in terms related to the cessation of hostilities,

measurable milestones, and exit strategies, but not the conditions required for sustainable conflict termination as defined throughout this work.

12. In the absence of an articulated strategic vision, disparate organizational cultures and prior experience shape termination strategy via their capacity to arrest innovative thinking, stifle interagency communication, and truncate analytical debate.
13. Agencies develop independent analyses, end state visions, criteria, and strategies for conflict termination—the top-level leaders attempt to synthesize these perspectives, yet these decision-makers have the least expertise with the conflict's contextual specifics.

Together, these findings ensure that interagency conflict—working at all levels of the process but in a very pronounced fashion at the initial levels, that is, the interagency working group level—negates the U.S. government's capacity to develop termination policy with a focus on thorough crisis analysis, an unambiguous desired end state, termination criteria that indicate the achievement of a long-term solution, and the development of an agreed and realistic strategy to achieve such a solution. The agencies' preoccupation with their respective equities creates a dynamic wherein agencies develop strategy that commits their respective resources *only* at the margins of intervention in practical terms. This continual reservation impedes the U.S. government's ability

to analyze the crisis critically and thoroughly so that there can be developed courses of action that are appropriate for the context of the specific conflict, an integrated strategy that could potentially transform the underlying causes and conditions giving rise to conflict, and move the parties toward sustainable conflict termination in the post-intervention environment. Rather, salience is given to those bureaucratic factors that remain most pronounced within the interagency process—each respective agency's institutional equities, both functional and resource-based. Conflict termination policy, therefore, is usually framed simply to terminate open hostilities, as has been illustrated by the cases addressed in this study, *but little concerted effort is applied toward developing a policy approach addressing the broader issues of the conflict itself.* The *Realpolitik* paradigm acts as a constraint on this entire process since the U.S. government seems to be most concerned with reestablishing territorial boundaries and "legitimate" governments while ignoring the conditions that precipitated the violence. This omission remains pronounced in our dealings with both Iraq (i.e., Saddam Hussein) and Yugoslavia (i.e., Slobodan Milosevic).

The development of conflict termination policy for complex contingencies is the process that should ideally merge diplomacy and warfighting. Yet, *the nature of the gap between diplomats and warfighters ensures the interagency process develops policy to bring about war termination in the form of a cease-fire, but fails to achieve conflict termination in the form of a sustainable peace.* Because policy is developed

through a process of "decision-making by negotiation," defects in leadership, strategic vision, dissimilar organizational cultures, disparate worldviews, the need to protect institutional equities, and the absence of an integrated interagency planning mechanism to conduct ongoing crisis analysis and option generation magnify this gap. Efforts to demonize the enemy further constrain innovative thinking and thwart strategy development. Relatedly, the need to save face to enhance future credibility leads to conflict escalation and the application of overwhelming force for limited objectives, objectives that can merely return the crisis to the status quo antebellum rather than establish the conditions for a better state of peace. In assessing the Bosnia crisis, a State Department principal best captured the nature of this gap by saying, "It may be politically impossible to do the right things."

Ultimately, faulty analyses of the crisis results from intense interagency conflict that generates an inability to create an agreed (and achievable) vision of a desired end state. This, in turn, promotes an inability to agree upon or establish clear criteria for terminating the conflict. By extension, the absence of unambiguous termination criteria impedes the development of an effective strategy for termination, save as bringing about an end to the fighting.

CHAPTER 14

IMPLICATIONS: TOWARD A REALISTIC MODEL OF CONFLICT
TERMINATION POLICY DEVELOPMENT

OVERVIEW

The analysis presented through this work advanced a more accurate conception of U.S. government conflict termination policy development, concluding that policy outcomes generated through the interagency process create the conditions for cease-fire (i.e., war termination), but cannot create the environment to transform this cease-fire into a sustainable peace. This chapter summarizes the analysis by addressing the three interrogatives framing this research (which are laid out clearly in chapter 1 and helpfully reiterated as appropriate throughout this chapter).¹ First, it presents the process and substance relationships to identify the factors that create, generate, or exacerbate interagency conflict. It then argues that Allison's Bureaucratic Politics Model

¹ The three research questions were: (1) What factors exacerbate, intensify, or create interagency conflict within the U.S. government during the development of conflict termination policy?; (2) How does "decision-making by negotiation" shape policy choices within the U.S. government crisis policy-making arena?; and, (3) In what ways does interagency conflict influence the U.S. government's capacity to develop conflict termination policy for international conflicts?

remains durable nearly 30 years after its inception by demonstrating that the U.S. government decision-makers produce decisions through a process of interagency negotiation. It supports this finding by showing that the identification of the decision-makers, the construction of the rules of the game, and the generation of policy alternatives reflect that collective choice is made through a process of negotiated consensus-building, not Rational Choice Theory's utility-maximization approach. To address the third research question, this analysis demonstrated the ways in which interagency conflict influences the U.S. government's capacity to develop conflict termination policy for international conflicts. This analysis contextualizes these findings within a real-world policy setting through its findings about the Persian Gulf and Bosnian cases. In doing so, it illuminates the effect that the policy-makers' crisis analysis processes, vision for the desired end state, termination criteria selection, and termination strategy development had upon conflict termination in the Persian Gulf and Bosnia. Synthesizing these findings, the chapter concludes by generating a framework for future research, a framework that identifies sources of interagency conflict that leaders can eliminate in an attempt to close the gap between diplomats and warfighters to create the integrated planning process required to envisage policy outcomes capable of achieving more than cease-fire. Let us begin with the interagency process itself by reviewing the sources of conflict.

THE INTERAGENCY PROCESS: SYNTHESIZING PROCESS & SUBSTANCE

This research focused on the development of interagency conflict and its influence on the U.S. government's creation of conflict termination policy. Using complementary quantitative and qualitative approaches, the research explored interagency relations to identify factors that exacerbate, intensify, or create interagency conflict within the U.S. government during the development of termination policy.² The discussion that follows reiterates those findings (as presented in chapters 7-13) by addressing the models supported through the quantitative analysis (i.e., the signed digraph models), and then discussing the qualitative emergent themes.

Sources of Interagency Conflict

The quantitative analysis revealed that interagency conflict mainly emanates from (1) perceptions regarding others' interagency behaviors, (2) leadership style (in general), (3) intradepartmental leadership style's relationship to crisis analysis and interagency communication, and (4) perceptions regarding one's own and other's abilities to influence policy-making as a consequence of relationships with members of the National Security Council System. Let us begin with perceptions of others' interagency behaviors.

Interagency dynamics become competitive when actors perceive that departmental relations at the time of crisis definition are hostile or when an agency perceives other agencies have a high level of self-interest regarding the crisis (see figure 7.1).³ Similarly, when agencies perceive that others act competitively, they respond reciprocally with similar competitive behaviors (see figure 7.4).⁴ This behavioral dynamic deteriorates further as those agencies that believe they possess a limited ability to influence policy tend to act competitively in an effort to protect their equities. As a result of these perceptions acting in concert with one another, these competitive behaviors in conjunction with the hierarchical structuration of the interagency process itself constrain open debate and therefore lead to less effective development of termination policy. The nature of the public debate and interagency communication also reflect leadership styles and decision-making approaches.

Leaders who manage their agencies autocratically establish rigid patterns of communication and perceptions of high penalties for failure (see figure 7.3).

² The first research question framed this inquiry: What factors exacerbate, intensify, or create interagency conflict within the U.S. government during the development of conflict termination policy? Chapters 6-12 provide the exploration and analysis for this question.

³ Since this research question explores interagency conflict in terms of negative behaviors, the discussion that follows addresses negative competitive behaviors, not positive collaborative behaviors. In light of the conceptual framework undergirding these signed digraphs, reflecting upon the signed digraphs themselves will provide the counter-arguments to those presented here.

⁴ This finding comports with the literature discussing reciprocity and "tit for tat" behaviors (see, for example, Boyle and Lawler 1991; Folger, Poole, and Stutman 1993; Kondo 1990; Kumagai and Straus 1983; Larson 1988; Osgood 1980; Roloff 1987; Roloff and Campion 1985; Patchen 1995; Schneider 1985; Westphal and Zajac 1997).

Across the hierarchically structured organizations that limit communication, actors interact competitively as they attempt to protect their institutional equities and operate within the parameters established by their respective principals. These factors establish conceptions of risk for these actors by (1) analyzing estimates of success, (2) examining perspectives regarding which agency should serve as the lead agent for policy development, (3) assessing the crisis' "fit" with national interests, (4) determining the agency's priority for the crisis, and (5) exploring the agency's prior experience with similar cases. The quantitative data analysis revealed no statistically significant relationships across these dimensions of *Crisis Definition*, making it irrelevant in terms of creating interagency conflict as a separate core factor.⁵ Rather, risk is framed in bureaucratic terms related to stepping outside the shared images of the organization and promoting policy that does not parallel that of the principal. Leaders' decision-making styles also play a role in developing interagency conflict as these styles shape agency decision-making profiles.

Originally conceptualized as agency's decision-making style, the data revealed it would be more appropriate to consider this core factor in terms of intradepartmental leadership style's relationship to (1) crisis analysis and (2) innovative solution generation. As part of this factor, decision-making

⁵ Note: The core factor represented in the original figure 7.5 subsumes some of these indicators—see figure 14.1 at the end of this chapter.

preferences for mid- and upper-level executives must take into account the role decision-making styles (e.g., directive or consensus-building) play in developing interagency conflict. The case analyses indicated that a more autocratic decision-taking approach by a chief executive stifled interagency conflict as this leadership style limited interagency debate, but did so in a way that circumscribed integrated planning. Alternatively, the more participative, consensus-building decision style, also by a chief executive, exacerbated interagency conflict in the absence of strategic leadership as actors felt the need to protect their institutional equities and became polarized as a result. In this manner, the crisis analysis portion of this core factor must include perceptions of risk in terms of threats to institutional equities (both functional and resource-based) and shared images. Relatedly, because the qualitative data revealed their importance, this modified core factor must include estimates of success and perceptions of prior experience for future investigation. As an added dimension, relationships between an individual's ability and willingness to propose innovative solutions should be analyzed in light of the individual's personal relationship with the principals. Given the structure of the interagency process, relationships with the National Security Council Staff seemed paramount.

Perceptions regarding one's own and others' abilities to influence policy shaped agency perceptions regarding the National Security Council's role in the policy-making process. Together with perceptions of other's interagency tactics

and an emergent theme involving personal relationships and networks, it is logical to conclude that those enjoying personal relationships with National Security Council members discount the salience of the formal process and rely instead upon their networks to influence policy development. In this manner, the National Security Council System remains the focal point for policy development, playing more than a coordinating role as this agency controls information flow and personal access to the president as the ultimate arbiter of interagency disputes.

These findings illuminate the factors that create or intensify interagency conflict among the decision-makers within the national security policy-making process. Alone they are noteworthy: In conjunction with the qualitative findings, they provide a basis for suggesting means of minimizing interagency conflict. Let us briefly review these qualitative findings regarding process-substance and substance-process relationships.

Dynamic Themes and Interagency Dynamics: Leadership, Decision-Making as Negotiation, and Domestic Politics

The analysis of the qualitative data revealed that three emergent themes characterized ways in which interagency dynamics shaped the substance of the policy process. These three process-substance themes are leadership, decision-making as negotiation, and domestic politics. In the first instance, leadership plays a critical role in two ways—(1) by establishing strategic vision and (2) by

defining the rules of the game. Leaders, such as the president and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, establish the vision for U.S. foreign and security policy and thereby set the tone for interagency relations. When the Executive articulates a strategic vision, decision-makers experience less interagency conflict because the principals align their positions with the president's and tend not to tolerate excursions beyond the shared images they promote. This practice establishes one "rule of the game" for interagency dynamics. However, leaders establish rules of the game in another manner as well through their adaptation and use of decision-making styles.

The decision-making styles examined reveal that both decision-taking and consensus-based approaches fail to energize the interagency process. However, the first style hampers the development of interagency conflict as a small group of in-group advisors makes all decisions.⁶ This establishes the rules of the game as a practice wherein lower-level actors continually pass issues upward and remain reluctant to make decisions at their level. In contrast, the second style does generate interagency conflict as individuals attempt to promote their agencies (and themselves) in the eyes of the president. Coupled with the absence of an articulated strategic vision, this style establishes the rules of the game as a "free for all" wherein the "strength of personality" (e.g., Richard Holbrooke,

⁶ Some interagency conflict can be positive as it educates other decision-makers regarding core competencies and option feasibility.

Madeleine Albright, Colin Powell) tends to overwhelm the institutionalized aspects of the policy process.

These competing personalities also reflect dissimilar organizational cultures and disparate worldviews (especially in terms of ideology and philosophy regarding the use of force). They channel communication to meet their needs in terms of influencing policy outcomes to protect institutional equities (and for some, to enhance their egos) while simultaneously limiting debate and stifling innovative thinking. In the final analysis, breakthroughs in policy development emanate from personal relationships and networks that existed before crisis inception. These personal relationships come to the fore in an environment where actors make decisions through a process they frame as a negotiation.

The research revealed that U.S. government officials make decisions regarding national security policy through a process of interagency negotiation that occurs at three levels—principals, deputies, and the interagency working group—and across multiple agencies—the White House, the National Security Council, the State Department, the Defense Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, and assorted others who play lesser roles. The personal relationships that exist across members of these agencies shape the nature of an individual's access and the magnitude of the influence this access has upon policy outcomes that emerge as political resultants of the negotiation process. Personal relationships are not alone in influencing this process-substance relationship:

Domestic politics plays a crucial role through its capacity to shape the nature of interagency relationships.

Domestic politics shapes interagency dynamics through its ability to mobilize public opinion and the Congress. The top decision-makers in the interagency process are politicians—either publicly elected or political appointees who secure their posts through political networks. These individuals remain concerned with public opinion polls as a measure of their performance and an indicator of future political possibilities. These individuals also recognize the relationship between the public, especially if dissatisfied, and the Congress.

A dissatisfied public can mobilize the Congress to oppose presidential policies through both (1) media pressure (i.e., congressional appearances denouncing the administration's policy) and (2) budgetary controls (i.e., withholding funding for force deployments). This congressional pressure increasingly takes the form of intensified partisan politics that compel the administration to water-down policy approaches in an effort to secure commitment across competing parties with competing worldviews. It is important to recognize that the Congress (and its staff) is not an actor in the sense of being an official participant in the interagency process. Yet, the influence it has in driving interagency dynamics and creating interagency conflict cannot be underestimated. This same precaution holds for the ambiguity of roles and missions and the media's influence, factors that bridge the gap between the

dynamic themes (i.e., issues exacerbating interagency conflict) and *contextual elements* (i.e., factors that shape interagency dynamics via the *dynamic themes*).

Crosscutting Effects: Roles and Missions & Media Influence

While the data revealed that roles and missions appear to be well-defined in theory, in reality, the practice of making policy includes a great deal of ambiguity as well as policy-making structure that includes "purposeful interagency conflict." In the first instance, role ambiguity results from functional overlap and lines of responsibility that are not defined clearly. This problem is complicated by a resistance on the part of the Defense Department to performing roles it considers outside its core competencies in the face of increasing pressure from the State Department for Defense to get more involved in such missions. Finally, roles and missions are blurred further as the National Security Council takes on a role beyond that of policy coordinator while simultaneously abdicating its responsibility for overseeing policy implementation. In this capacity, it performs more of the State Department's traditional foreign policy development role. Together, these factors create confusion regarding "who's in charge" and which agencies remain responsible for specific aspects of the policy process. Such ambiguity creates interagency conflict regarding the process-substance aspects of policy-making. Roles and missions likewise affect the substance-process

elements of policy-making, particularly with regard to the structure of the interagency process.

The interagency process induces decision-makers at the lower levels to frame their roles in terms of protecting institutional equities. Hence, the substantive inputs to policy-making negatively impact interagency dynamics since these decision-makers hold their assets in reserve when others believe they should employ them to bring about the end of the crisis. This "purposeful interagency conflict" combines with role ambiguity to increase interagency conflict. Media influence plays a similar crosscutting role as it affects both process-substance and substance-process relationships.

The media shape interagency dynamics through their ability to influence the substantive inputs to the policy process by bolstering the images surrounding the public's and decision-maker's understanding of the conflict and creating sentiment that the U.S. must act. It bolsters these images by framing the issues, providing a feedback loop to the Congress, and developing the "move it off the front page" phenomenon. The media likewise shape the process-substance aspects of policy-making as interagency conflict emanates from the decision-maker's concern with the media's ability to shape the substantive inputs to the policy process. These concerns include the "CNN factor," the capacity for press guidance to drive policy, the "use of leaks," and the ability of "the necessity to

manage the media" factor to deplete the interagency process of its critical intellectual, emotional, and psychological capital.

These issues regarding roles and missions and media influence play a prominent role in shaping interagency dynamics in conjunction with the substantive inputs to the policy process. In this manner, these themes bridge the gap between interagency dynamics and these substantive inputs, the topic of the next section.

Contextual Elements: "Strategic Vision and Planning Processes" and "Institutional Equities"

The data demonstrated that the substance (e.g., assumptions, worldviews, prior experience, core competencies) each decision-maker brings to the interagency negotiation shapes the nature of interagency conflict and the policy outcome of that interaction. These substantive inputs emerged in the form of strategic vision and planning processes and institutional equities. Together with the previous themes, these substance-process relationships help frame the entire interagency dynamic. A brief review makes this connection apparent.

Those engaged in crisis action planning believe they possess a great ability to influence policy outcomes, while those engaged in strategic planning believe their influence remained limited. These feelings result from the lack of strategic vision that characterizes U.S. foreign policy, one that equates success with crisis management. This void manifests itself in the absence of political vision,

dissimilar interagency shared images, and a tactical focus that dominates the policy process. Political vision serves as the coalescing goal around which decision-makers unite. The absence of such a goal empowers disparate worldviews and role ambiguity to promote divergent perspectives regarding both national interests and the utility of armed intervention. The result of dissimilar shared images, these fissures dominate perspectives regarding crisis analysis and course of action development. This incongruence leads decision-makers to focus on the more visible, easier to address issues, generating a tactical-level focus as opposed to the creation of a strategic vision to address the larger conflict issues. The lack of an integrated planning mechanism facilitates this tactical focus.

The absence of an integrated planning mechanism enables perspectives concerning agencies' core competencies to frame national interests and intervention criteria, perspectives that are simultaneously shaped by incongruent worldviews regarding the utility of armed intervention for crisis management. Since these decision-makers have difficulty communicating with one another, and even greater difficulty understanding one another's perspectives, this chasm thwarts their ability to debate the issues openly in a manner that encourages the development of innovative solutions. As a result of limited, incomplete information exchange, the independent planning approaches push ideas to the highest levels of policy development where those least knowledgeable with the

contextual specifics synthesize discordant analyses that focus on mutually exclusive aspects of the crisis.

In the end, the vacuum related to strategic vision and the independent planning approaches of each agency implicitly establish criteria for professional success in terms of that agency's capacity to respond to crises. One of the salient criteria for success is the decision-maker's ability to protect institutional equities.

Defined as any asset that adds value to or is the defining characteristic of an agency, the perceived need to protect institutional equities creates interagency conflict as agencies remain willing to commit their resources only at the margins of conflict intervention (i.e., they are involved, but not committed to creating the conditions for sustainable peace). Resources include the tangible assets an agency possesses in concert with its functional expertise. In this manner, institutional equities include personnel and budgets together with functional expertise framed by perceptions of risk and accountability, as informed by prior experience. The need to protect the former, while minimizing the latter in light of this prior experience, creates conflict across agencies as they attempt to define the crisis and determine the roles they are willing to play during intervention.

Summary: Factors Creating Interagency Conflict

Before interpreting these findings, let me briefly summarize them here.

1. Interagency conflict mainly emanates from (a) perceptions regarding others' interagency behaviors, (b) leadership style (in general), (c) intradepartmental leadership style's relationship to crisis analysis and interagency communication, and (d) perceptions regarding one's own and other's abilities to influence policy-making as a consequence of relationships with members of the National Security Council System.
2. Leaders who manage autocratically establish rigid patterns of communication and perceptions of high penalties for failure prompting actors to interact competitively to protect institutional equities, especially in the absence of a broader strategic vision set forth by the president.
3. Competitive behaviors within the hierarchically structured interagency process constrain open debate and lead to less effective policy development.
4. Leaders and their decision-making styles play a crucial role in developing organizational culture, specifically the approaches to crisis analysis, intra- and interagency communication, and innovative solution generation.

5. Perceptions regarding one's own and other's abilities to influence policy shape agency perceptions regarding the National Security Council's facilitation of policy-making.
6. The National Security Council System is the focal point for policy development—it plays more than a coordinating role since it controls information exchange and access to the president.
7. Leaders establish strategic vision and define the "rules of the game" for the interagency process, thereby setting the tone for interagency dynamics.
8. In the absence of an articulated strategic vision, personalities overwhelm the institutional process—competing personalities reflect dissimilar organizational cultures and disparate worldviews (i.e., political ideology and philosophy regarding the use of force).
9. Breakthroughs in policy development emanate from pre-existing personal relationships and networks across decision-makers, relationships that shape access to senior policy-makers and the nature of one's influence upon policy outcomes.
10. Decision-makers make group choices through a process of interagency negotiation.
11. Domestic politics shapes interagency dynamics through its ability to mobilize public opinion and the Congress.

12. Role ambiguity resulting from mission overlap and ill-defined lines of responsibility generates greater interagency conflict.
13. The media shapes interagency dynamics through its capacity to frame conflict issues, provide feedback to the Congress, develop a "move it off the front page" phenomenon, the "CNN factor," the capacity for press guidance to drive policy, the "use of leaks," and the ability of the "necessity to manage the media" factor to deplete the interagency process of its critical intellectual, emotional, and psychological capital.
14. The lack of strategic vision leads decision-makers to measure success in terms of crisis management. Consequently, those engaged in crisis action planning believe they possess a great ability to influence policy outcomes; those engaged in strategic vision believe they have limited influence.
15. Political vision is the goal around which decision-makers coalesce. In its absence, worldviews and role ambiguity promote divergent perspectives of national interests and the utility of armed intervention.
16. Dissimilar shared images create fissures regarding crisis analysis and strategy development, leading decision-makers to focus on the more visible, easier to address issues — this generates a tactical-level focus, a problem exacerbated by the absence of an integrated planning mechanism.

17. In the absence of an integrated planning mechanism, perspectives on core competencies frame national interests and intervention criteria in divergent ways based upon incongruent worldviews – this cleavage thwarts the interagency's ability to debate the issues in a manner that encourages innovative solutions.
18. Limited and incomplete information exchange in concert with independent planning approaches ensures those least knowledgeable with the contextual specifics of any crisis synthesize discordant analyses that focus on mutually exclusive aspects of the crisis.
19. The perceived need to protect institutional equities creates interagency conflict as agencies are willing to commit their resources only at the margins of conflict intervention.

Together, these complementary analyses demonstrated that perceptions play a crucial role in creating and exacerbating interagency conflict. These perceptions regarding others' competitive behaviors and perceptions of self-interest amplify stereotypes perpetuated by dissimilar organizational cultures and disparate worldviews. In the absence of an articulated strategic vision, nonintegrated planning processes advance the protection of institutional equities within an environment in which the ambiguity that surrounds roles and missions shapes the interagency negotiation designed to produce a policy outcome. The media

influences this decision process, as do perceptions regarding domestic politics. In the end, *leaders must set the tone for the decision-making process*. They must do so by ensuring national security decision-makers focus on the problem under consideration, not the enhancement of their respective agencies' political currency within the bureaucratic arena. This realization provides an appropriate segue into the second issue this research explored, that of the ways in which decision-making by negotiation shapes policy choices within this bureaucratic arena.

DECISION-MAKING BY NEGOTIATION: THE DURABILITY OF ALLISON'S MODEL

The study has revealed that U.S. government decision-makers do formulate conflict termination policy through a process of interagency negotiation that is strongly influenced by the factors just discussed.⁷ This conclusion confirms the potency of Allison's work almost 30 years after he developed his ideas regarding the Bureaucratic Politics Model of decision-making (see chapter 4). Before addressing the effects of decision-making by negotiation in the last section of this chapter, it is necessary to illustrate his work's durability by briefly reviewing the

⁷ This discussion addresses research question number 2: How does "decision-making by negotiation" shape policy choices within the U.S. government crisis policy-making arena? For a more in-depth review of the process-substance factors shaping this decision-making process in terms of leadership, decision-making as negotiation, and domestic politics, see chapter 10. Similarly, chapters 11 and 12 provide a broader discussion of the remaining substance-process factors — strategic vision and planning processes, institutional equities, roles and missions, and media influence.

ways in which this negotiation identifies the players and establishes the boundaries for the dynamic process. After doing so, this segment integrates the findings relating process to outcomes by addressing policy alternatives at the end of this section and through the third research question⁸ in the ensuing section. First, however, let us reconsider the players and the process through Allison's model.

Identifying the Players & Establishing Rules of the Game

In contravention to the expectations of Rational Choice Theory that demand the "right people be in the right place at the right time," this research has revealed that the development of conflict termination policy does not occur through a process wherein decision-makers act as a unitary actor. The nature of the policy process dictates that they rarely know their goals, possess limited and incomplete information, experience cognitive limitations, remain bound by resource constraints, and lack the capacity to quantify alternatives. During real-world national security policy-making efforts, the "right people" are determined initially by the interagency process' three-tiered structure (i.e., principals, deputies, and interagency working group actors), and, more importantly, personal relationships and personality determine the influence these official

⁸ The third research question is: In what ways does interagency conflict influence the U.S. government's capacity to develop conflict termination policy for international conflicts?

actors have within the policy process. These individuals come together to create a group that acts as a "less than rational actor" if judged according to the Rational Actor Model of decision-making. The structure of the decision-making process, the "stands" these decision-makers take, and the power each exerts within the interagency process all indicate their inability to act as a unitary actor.

In the case of termination policy, the structure of the interagency process does establish what Allison describes as an "action-channel" that pre-selects official players according to three hierarchical levels and thereby determines these actors' points of entry into the decision-making process. Firstly, the principals serve at the highest level and are directly responsible to the statutory members of the National Security Council.⁹ Secondly, the deputies comprising the next tier serve as the "heavy lifters" to refine and present options to the principals. Finally, the interagency working group serves as the lowest level and is composed of agency representatives who frame the issues and perform the preliminary analyses for the deputies. In addition to this "action-channel," quasi-official actors influence these decision-makers, particularly the principals, through their respective advisory capacities.

⁹ Recall that the Principals Committee includes two of the four statutory members of the National Security Council — the Secretaries of State and Defense — with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and Director of Central Intelligence serving in their statutory advisory capacities. The membership then expands via presidential prerogative, with the president and vice president serving as the final two statutory members of the National Security Council.

Policy Alternatives

This study of the making of policy regarding the termination of intervention provided evidence supporting Allison's precept that decision-makers do not make choices as posited by a Rational Actor Model based upon cost-benefit utility maximization. Rather, the interagency negotiating process produces "political resultants." Decision-makers make choices in the face of collective value dissensus and through a process of social interaction wherein organizational cultures shape the choices. Together, these influences generate incongruous reference points and asymmetric perceptions of risk which, in turn, produce dissimilar preference orderings. These dissimilar preference orderings create the "impression" that these decision-makers develop policy through a process of negotiation.¹⁰ Let us discuss each issue in turn, beginning with a review of the effect of collective value dissensus.

The subjectivity of values produces goals that represent the desires and needs of the principal, and hence, by extension, the agency. These desires and needs reflect disparate worldviews in the case of termination policy particularly regarding the use of force for crisis management. These differences produce

¹⁰ The decision to use armed forces in Bosnia as part of a NATO Implementation Force reflects this approach. Here, State and Defense officials interacted within a policy-making environment wherein these two agencies defined the crisis in very different ways based upon their dissimilar reference points and perceptions of risk (especially to troops on the ground in the case of Defense). Ultimately, the process of "negotiation" used to develop the policy generated an "end date" rather than a "desired end state," an outcome that parallels Allison's "political resultant."

dissimilar interpretations concerning the nature of the crisis, framing it in terms of disparate interest- or value-laden issues. As this research demonstrated, divergent conceptions of the same problem within a group decision-making environment create interagency conflict over crisis analysis, end state vision, termination criteria, and termination strategy. Through a negotiation process, the group makes decisions that remain highly dependent upon intra- and interagency interaction.

A product of process structure, the principals, deputies, and interagency working group members remain interdependent actors within the decision-making process. This research highlighted the differences in organizational culture that exacerbate unproductive interaction as the actors perpetuate negative stereotypes and misconceptions of core competencies (e.g., State tends to perceive Defense to be overly rigid and inflexible; Defense tends to perceive State as disorganized and less knowledgeable regarding the effects of the use of force). In this manner, organizational culture ordains the pattern for interaction across agencies by establishing organizational climate, shaping communication, and truncating innovative thinking. As the findings indicated, interaction extends beyond the formal interagency decision-making process to its environment, including relationships with the public, the media, and the Congress. In conjunction with collective value dissensus, these relationships help define the issues for decision-makers by establishing their reference points (i.e.,

Tversky and Kahneman's anchoring points), shaping their conceptions of risk, and prioritizing their preference orderings.

The study has argued that theoretically the act of framing a situation, both consciously and unconsciously, establishes the starting point for all decision-making activities. Findings demonstrated that this theoretical proposition appears to be correct—defining the nature of a crisis remains the most crucial step in conflict termination policy development. The research demonstrated that crisis definition is influenced by differing reference points, perspectives that are shaped by these decision-makers' conceptions of risk. Simply put, the decision-makers do treat gains and losses differently. Defense tends to overvalue anticipated losses (i.e., in terms of its institutional equities) relative to the comparable gains that others forecast as the most likely outcome of armed intervention. Taken in conjunction with increased doubt regarding intervention outcomes, Defense orders its preferences to minimize anticipated risk.

Conversely, State and the National Security Council order their preferences to maximize potential gains. In the final analysis, the previously cited defects surrounding the interagency process prevent decision-makers from integrating multiple frames into a group utility function. Instead, the decision-makers' utility functions that reflect institutionally defined reference points, perceptions of risk, and preference orderings remain salient. These dissimilar factors apply an institutionally-based form of Rational Choice Theory as agencies frame these

three factors based upon "where they sit" within the policy and intervention processes. In light of these differences, the decision-makers interviewed through this research contended they use a negotiating process to build consensus toward a policy decision. The form of "negotiation" they reference, however, fails to parallel traditional conceptions of negotiation and bargaining.¹¹

Returning to the original definition set forth in chapter 1,¹² the crucial difference between a classic negotiation and the interagency policy-making process is that the policy process does not involve the exchange of offers. Rather, actors explain their positions to other decision-makers via a posturing process employed to establish a policy position. As one interagency participant noted, decision-makers "deploy their positions" within an environment characterized by little debate and virtually no "give and take." While some measure of bargaining does take place, the data indicated that these decision-makers did not

¹¹ The literature on organizational and international bargaining and negotiation continues to enhance our understanding of the dynamics that characterize these social exchange processes (see, for example, Bacharach and Lawler 1980, 1986; Beriker and Druckman 1996; Bilmes 1994; Boyle and Lawler 1991; Breslin and Rubin 1993; Cohen 1981; Cross 1978; Druckman 1966, 1983, 1986, 1994, 1995; Druckman, Broome, and Korper 1988; Druckman and Green 1995; Druckman and Hopmann 1989; Druckman, Husbands, and Johnston 1991; Druckman and Mahoney 1977; Dupont 1996; Elgstrom 1990; Friedman and Jacka 1975; Gerhart 1976; Hopmann 1995; Jervis 1992; Keen and Morton 1978; Keenan and Carnevale 1989; Kramer, Pommerenke, and Newton 1993; Larson 1988; Levy 1997, 1993; Morley 1992; Morley, Webb, and Stephenson 1988; Nicholson 1991; Nutt 1981; Polzer 1996; Pruitt 1981, 1991; Pruitt and Carnevale 1993; Roth 1991; Rubin and Zartman 1995; Scanzoni and Godwin 1990; Thompson, Peterson, and Brodt 1996; Tolbert 1991; Wall 1985; Walton and McKersie 1965; Zartman 1977, 1991).

¹² That is, negotiation can be seen as "a form of conflict behavior" or a process "seeking to resolve the divergence of interest by means of some form of interaction (typically the verbal exchange of offers) between parties" (Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim 1994, 256).

"trade" equities in a bargaining fashion. Instead, they agree to alter the commitment of their equities (e.g., increase troop deployment levels) with little or no expectation of a reciprocal move regarding other's equities. Through several iterations, the decision-makers reach a consensus decision (i.e., a middle ground option—usually suboptimal in the form of a "least common denominator) to take to the president. When the interagency process fails to reach consensus, the ultimate responsibility for foreign and security policy rests with the president. In this manner, one individual can overturn any measure of negotiation that has taken place. While the potential for this to occur remains low, especially if the agencies reach consensus on some of the issues, the ability for one individual make decisions by fiat ensures that while interagency decision-makers view the policy process as a form of negotiation, it is in fact not a negotiation in the classic sense, but is a social interaction designed to build consensus toward policy decisions. In this sense, this research supports Zartman's (1977) ideas regarding "negotiation as a joint decision-making process."

Summary: Players, Process, and Policy Alternatives

The method by which the players become actors within the interagency process concerned with termination policy ensures that influence results from personal relationships and personalities, not expertise on the issues involved.

While these personal relationships provide some actors with greater influence within the process, the structure of the interagency process ensures departmental representation at all policy-making levels. However, their respective institutional affiliations and the "action-channels" through which they gain entry largely predetermine the stands these decision-makers take on issues. In this manner, decision-makers reflect their respective organizational cultures as they attempt to protect their institutional equities. For many, the protection of institutional equities becomes the superordinate objective. Within an environment characterized by increasing risk and uncertainty, the protection of these equities creates interagency conflict as decision-makers frame national interests according to disparate worldviews and competing ideologies shaped by divergent perspectives on the employment of force. This collective value dissensus is expressed most clearly during an interagency negotiation process that attempts to reconcile dissimilar reference points, perceptions of asymmetric risk, and incongruent preference orderings.

In combination, these factors ensure that decision-makers make collective choices through a negotiating process not describable as following the tenets of Rational Choice Theory, but rather those of the Bureaucratic Politics Model. This necessitates the development of policy through a consensus-based approach that generates political resultants rather than collective utility-maximizing outcomes. The nature of these negotiated outcomes is the subject of the next section.

POLICY OUTCOMES: INTERAGENCY CONFLICT
LEADS TO WAR TERMINATION

The nature of the gap between diplomacy and warfighting ensures the interagency process develops policy to bring about *war termination* in the form of a cease-fire, but fails to achieve *conflict termination* in the form of a sustainable peace. This policy outcome eventuates from interagency conflict that emanates from defects in leadership, the absence of strategic vision, dissimilar organization cultures, disparate worldviews (i.e., political ideologies and philosophies regarding the use of force), and the absence of an integrated interagency planning mechanism to conduct ongoing crisis analysis and option generation. Together, these factors impede the effective development of crisis analysis, end state vision, termination criteria, and termination strategy.¹³ Let us review each in turn.

Noted earlier in the discussion of reference points, crisis analysis remains the most crucial aspect of policy development. Because decision-makers lack strategic vision and focus on tactical-level issues, policy tends to address parts of the conflict system (i.e., the nodes – Bosnia), but not the problems engulfing the system as a whole (i.e., “the Balkans”). Further, because the interagency process

¹³ This discussion applies to research question number 3: In what ways does interagency conflict influence the U.S. government’s capacity to develop conflict termination policy for international conflicts? Chapter 13 provides the discussion and analysis of this question, particularly as it applies to termination policy development for the Persian Gulf and Bosnia.

lacks an integrated planning mechanism and because decision-makers exclude issue-specific experts from crisis analysis processes, decision-makers fail to address the underlying causes and conditions of conflict, promoting instead a temporary solution to the immediate crisis in the form of a cease-fire. This problem is exacerbated further by the effects of interagency conflict on envisaging the end state.

The ways in which decision-makers frame crises hold great import for the development of the desired end state. By extension, this analysis frames the end state vision. The "nature of the crisis" determines goals regarding the post-intervention environment. Again, the tactical focus employed by the decision-makers causes them to frame the end state largely in terms of containing the conflict to prevent spillover. This tactical focus likewise negates the decision-maker's ability to envisage the integration of the diplomatic, economic, military, and social instruments of power in a fashion to bring about long-term systemic change. Such a perspective promotes the development of conflict termination criteria that establish goals in terms of simply ending the fighting.

The focus on inducing or forcing a cease-fire prevents the decision-makers from recognizing the relationship between termination criteria and the political objectives that shape the end state vision. Consequently, the clarity of a cease-fire (in terms of organized hostilities) overshadows the development of other "less assessable" termination criteria (e.g., "elections" as a political criterion). In

conjunction with self-limited crisis analysis and the absence of an agreed desired end state, over-reliance upon a cease-fire as a verifiable criterion prompts decision-makers to frame the remaining termination criteria in ways that fail to induce necessary systemic change, but may bring about temporary improvements in a tactical sense. By extension, these factors act in concert to produce an intervention and termination strategy that employs courses of action aimed at ending the physical violence, but stopping short of achieving positive systemic change toward sustainable peace.

History credits Yogi Berra with the aphorism, "If you don't know where you want to go, any road will take you there." The truthfulness of this axiom applies in its entirety to termination strategy development. Even though decision-makers may agree that something should be done, their inability to define the destination ensures that termination strategy development becomes an exercise in driving without a map (i.e., termination criteria) toward an unspecified location (i.e., end state) as a product of an incomplete conception of what needs to be done (i.e., crisis analysis). The inability to articulate those three elements of conflict termination policy produces an environment wherein development of the fourth, termination strategy, defaults to the lowest common denominator — the use of force to induce a cease-fire through creating a hurting stalemate. In the final analysis, the absence of an integrated interagency planning mechanism can only produce a strategy aimed at creating this temporary cease-fire — war

termination – but not sustainable conflict termination. As the two cases analyzed herein illustrate, *the application of force cannot terminate conflict for the long-term.*

Domestic politics magnifies this problem as the American public remains unwilling to accept casualties. Further, the perceived need to demonize the enemy to mobilize public support prompts decision-makers to develop strategies that promote conflict escalation through the application of overwhelming force so they can sustain domestic (and international) support for their actions. Coupled with the need to save face, this dynamic ensures decision-makers become more psychologically entrapped as they frame prior expenditures of “blood and treasure” as investments toward future success.¹⁴

Working synergistically, these boundaries constrain the decision-maker’s capacity to consider alternative courses of action, making the use of force to bring about a cease-fire the most implementable option irrespective of both short- and long-term consequences of that strategy.

IMPROVING CONFLICT TERMINATION POLICY DEVELOPMENT

The most critical aspect of conflict termination policy development relates to the nature of the process-substance and substance-process relationships highlighted throughout this analysis. Simply put, leaders must make their *first*

¹⁴ For a rich literature on “entrapment,” see Brockner (1992), Brockner and Rubin (1985), Brockner, Shaw, and Rubin (1979), Kameda and Sugimori (1993), Mitchell (1991), Rubin et al. (1980), Staw (1976, 1981), Staw and Ross (1987), Teger (1980), and Wittman (1979).

priority that of ensuring the interagency process (1) is allowed to work and (2) does work. The cases analyzed herein demonstrate that the leaders truncated the interagency process—Bush did not allow it to work and Clinton did not ensure that it did work. Hence, through their actions neither leader energized the interagency process. While personal relationships can never and should never prevent outside experts and other influential individuals from gaining access to the principals and the president, leaders must make every effort to balance this outside influence by providing access to those who have an institutional role to play in policy development, and in crisis analysis particularly. This is the first step in “allowing” the process to work; the second requires more vision on the part of the leader.

Leaders need to establish the strategic vision for U.S. foreign and security policy, and hence, the interagency process. This vision must be crafted with great care, considering domestic politics, the international context, and U.S. national interests. In the absence of such vision from the highest levels, the agencies will competitively interact in an effort to protect their institutional equities and enhance their political currency. Leaders must be aware of this tendency and must not tolerate such behaviors. This connects with the second aspect of leadership—the idea that leaders must ensure the interagency process *does work* as intended.

The responsibility for educating agencies regarding others' core competencies and limitations rests with the leaders of these agencies and the president. Only through immersion in the realities that each independent agency faces can decision-makers diminish the negative stereotypes they have for one another while narrowing the gaps between dissimilar organizational cultures. Closing those gaps will help diminish the harmful effects of interagency conflict as an impediment to policy development while promoting innovative and integrated crisis analysis and strategy development. Through constructive debate, the interagency process will be empowered to develop conflict termination policy toward sustainable peace.

ENVISAGING A MORE USEFUL MODEL

The realities of group decision-making emphasize that the U.S. government does not behave as a unitary actor when developing policy. These different decision-makers make choices through a bureaucratic negotiation process that provides these actors a means of protecting their institutional equities. Driven by disparate conceptions of strategic vision and non-integrated planning processes, leadership and domestic politics play a crucial role in framing conflict termination policy. Interagency conflict influences this policy in myriad ways, not the least of which is the development of policy incapable of bringing about a sustainable peace. This said, a new framework for understanding the effects of

interagency conflict on conflict termination policy development is warranted. This model (see figure 14.1) provides a framework from which it should be possible to derive estimates of the likelihood and degree of interagency conflict. Through future empirical investigation, ideas generated from this improved framework could provide the basis for broadening the decision-maker's understanding of the sources and the likely detrimental effects of interagency conflict. Analysis will identify specific areas for process improvement. Such improvements could generate conflict termination policy addressing the crisis on the ground, as opposed to its current tendency to address the dynamics within the interagency process itself. Let us briefly outline this improved model.

Figure 14.1 reflects the integrated findings, interpretations, and conclusions generated through this multi-method research. Note that it has six "improved" core factors: *Leadership Style*, *Crisis Analysis*, *Interagency Behaviors*, *Strategic Vision and Planning Processes*, *Policy-Making Approach*, and *NSC's Role in Policy-Making*. Using a hypothetico-deductive approach, researchers can use discriminate analysis to generate beta weights for the indicators within each core factor and estimates for each factor can be derived to determine the *Level of Interagency (i.e., intraparty) Conflict* surrounding policy development. As a heuristic model, researchers can develop operational hypotheses using these core factors (and their respective indicators) to explore myriad conceptions of interagency




Figure 14.1. Level of Interagency (i.e., intraparty) Conflict

(and hence, intraparty) conflict. In this manner, this model has utility beyond the U.S. policy-making process as it addresses the organizational dynamics that affect all forms of group decision-making, irrespective of organizational setting or issue specificity. Let us now survey the model to provide a brief explanation for its enhanced structure.

Leadership emerged as the most crucial factor affecting interagency dynamics and conflict termination policy development (see chapter 10). Consequently, it serves as the cornerstone of this model. Originally conceived of in terms dimensions from *Organizational Communication* (figure 5.5) and *Agency's Decision-Making Profile* (figure 5.7), this core factor excludes those dimensions the quantitative and qualitative analyses indicated remained inconsequential (e.g., ideology and educational background) while incorporating dimensions that relate to a leader's ability to develop the agency's organizational culture, especially as it relates to intra- and interagency communication. In this manner, a few of the original indicators were retained (i.e., penalty for failure, mission/goals, leadership style, decision-making style, departmental structure, and Department's interagency behavior). This new conception of *Leadership* likewise includes dimensions related to communication and risk (i.e., communication and debate, innovative thinking, reliance upon personal relationships, and estimates of risk for failure to protect institutional equities; see chapters 10 and 11). In this manner, this enhanced core factor addresses the

leader's role in developing interagency dynamics. These dimensions of *Leadership* frame approaches to *Crisis Analysis*; hence, it becomes the second most influential core factor.

Crisis Analysis serves as the second baseline factor of the model since this research revealed that it is a critical factor in crisis framing and developing a strategy to terminate and resolve conflict (see chapter 13). This enhanced approach to *Crisis Analysis* includes some of the original dimensions related to *Perceptions of Risk for Self* (as originally conceptualized via figure 5.4; i.e., prior experience and estimate of success), but looks beyond those dimensions related to a consideration of the ways in which agencies conduct crisis analysis (i.e., depth of problem analysis, reliance upon others, willingness and ability to propose innovative solutions) and the factors that directly affect their crisis framing process (i.e., shared images, comprehension of core competencies, institutional equities, domestic politics, and media influence; see chapters 10 through 12). Together, *Leadership* and *Crisis Analysis* provide the lens through which agencies focus their *Policy-Making Approach*.

Because this research operationalized two of the four statistically significant relationships supported by the data in the inverse direction, and because the qualitative data revealed that stereotypes play a crucial role in developing interagency behaviors, *Policy-Making Approach* as a core factor remains unchanged in the enhanced model. What becomes important in the new

conceptualization however, is its proximity to *NSC's Role in Policy-Making*. The estimates derived for *Policy-Making Approach* can be used in conjunction with those for *Interagency Behaviors* to establish an estimate for *NSC's Role*.

Consequently, *Interagency Behaviors* emerges as the third baseline core factor.

The quantitative findings generated the conclusion that perceptions of other's self-interest (figure 7.1) and conflict orientation (figure 7.1) remained salient factors in developing departmental relations in terms of interagency tactics. Emergent findings from the qualitative analysis revealed that the protection of institutional equities and media influence likewise play a role in shaping interagency dynamics (see chapters 10 through 12). Hence, taken in concert with the estimate for *Policy-Making Approach*, the indicators framing *Interagency Behaviors* account for interagency conflict within the policy process leading to the coordinating role played by the National Security Council System. Note that this model implies a linear conception of the interagency process "leading to" the apex of the interagency process wherein the NSC Staff becomes involved. Obviously, this is not the case in reality as the NSC Staff remains involved throughout the policy process. Yet, figure 14.1 presents these core factors in this way for two reasons. First, this approach provides a method to operationalize parsimoniously the core factors for future research beyond a heuristic technique. Second, construction of the framework in this manner illuminates the pivotal role the NSC Staff plays in interagency dynamics (i.e., generating, managing, and

mitigating interagency conflict; see chapter 12) and policy outcomes (i.e., through its policy coordination and oversight role on behalf of the Executive Office of the President). Based upon this perspective, let us now discuss the *NSC's Role*.

As with *Policy-Making Approach*, the quantitative findings revealed that this research conceptualized two of the three statistically significant relationships related to *NSC's Role* in the inverse direction (see figure 7.6). Therefore, this enhanced core factor retains those dimensions (i.e., perceptions regarding own ability to influence NSC and perceptions regarding the impact of other's informal access upon policy). The qualitative findings necessitated expansion of this core factor to include perceptions regarding (1) information exchange, (2) access to the president, and (3) influence of personal relationships in gaining access to the NSC Staff and NSC (see chapters 10 through 12). Through these added dimensions, an estimate for *NSC's Role* addresses the perception issues related to *Interagency Behaviors* and policy process influence. These dimensions, together with those related to *Strategic Vision and Planning Processes*, determine the *Level of Interagency (i.e., intraparty) Conflict* surrounding the development of conflict termination policy. A new core factor that emerged through the qualitative analysis, it serves as the final baseline factor in the model.

Through the qualitative analysis, *Strategic Vision and Planning Processes* emerged as the most important *contextual element* (see chapter 11). The quantitative data revealed that conceptions of "strategic" versus "crisis action

response" planning foci likewise shaped an agency's beliefs regarding its ability to influence policy outcomes (see figure 7.4). As a result, this core factor includes planning focus in conjunction with those dimensions the qualitative analysis revealed as crucial to the development of strategic vision and planning processes. These dimensions are: political vision, shared images, roles and missions ambiguity, core competency framing, national interest and intervention criteria definition, and worldview perspectives—that is, political ideology and philosophy regarding the use of force (see chapter 11).

In the final analysis, the "Level of Interagency (i.e., intraparty) Conflict" framework (figure 14.1) integrates the most salient quantitative and qualitative findings that emerged as a result of this multi-method research designed to test hypotheses while providing an avenue for emergent themes to enrich our understanding of the effects of interagency conflict on conflict termination policy development. Through this framework, researchers and analysts can identify those factors that hamper policy development and implementation, irrespective of organizational setting or issue context. After all, while this research used U.S. government decision-makers as its unit of analysis, those individuals who comprise the interagency process necessarily reflect the attitudes, beliefs, and perceptions that individuals would reflect during any group decision-making process. Only future empirical research across multiple group decision-making

contexts can validate the utility of this bureaucratic model of conflict termination policy.

CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

This study has developed a more accurate model of conflict termination policy development. It has explored the relationship between the bureaucratic decision-making process (i.e., decision-making as negotiation), the U.S. policy-making process (i.e., the interagency process), and conflict termination policy. In doing so, it has also attempted to bridge the gap between bureaucratic politics, decision theory, and conflict termination as a step toward conflict resolution.

In the final analysis, the research found that the nature of the gap between diplomats and warfighters dominates an interagency process likely to produce a policy bringing about *war termination* in the form of a cease-fire. However, it almost inevitably fails to achieve *conflict termination* in the form of sustainable peace. This outcome results largely from interagency conflict that emanates from five key factors: (1) defects in leadership, (2) the absence of strategic vision, (3) dissimilar organization cultures, (4) disparate worldviews (i.e., divergent political ideologies and philosophies regarding the use of force), and (5) the absence of an integrated interagency planning mechanism to conduct ongoing crisis analysis and option generation. Working synergistically and in complex ways, these factors impede the effective development of crisis analysis, desired

end state vision, termination criteria, and termination strategy. Consequently, this approach ensures that conflict termination — viewed simply as a clear cessation of hostilities — cannot serve *alone* as the first step toward conflict resolution. A cease-fire creates only a temporary pause, not the cessation of organized violence for the long-term. This finding holds import for future research which must explore further factors that create or intensify interagency conflict and methods by which such conflict can itself be resolved. Only then can decision-makers develop conflict termination policy that addresses the underlying causes and conditions of conflict. Such progress can then help the parties in conflict move toward a self-sustaining peace.

APPENDIX A

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

The author remains indebted to everyone who selflessly shared his or her time and expertise. These are the people whose perspectives shaped this work: Absent these professionals, this research would have proven impossible. Through this abridged biographical overview, I have located their expertise within the context of the research. Note: Each individual gave explicit permission to include his or her name and biographic information. Institutional affiliations are listed for identification purposes only — the views contained herein do not reflect the official positions of these institutions; rather, these views reflect the individual perspectives of each participant.

- | | |
|----------------------|---|
| Morton I. Abramowitz | Advisor, The Rambouillet Talks, (1999); Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations (1998-) and The Century Foundation (1998-); President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (1997); Acting President of the International Crisis Group (1997); U.S. Ambassador to Turkey (1989-1991); Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research, U.S. Department of State (1985-1989); U.S. Ambassador to the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Negotiations in Vienna (1983-1984); U.S. Ambassador to Thailand (1978-1981); Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Inter-American, East-Asian, and Pacific Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense (1974-1978) |
| Graham T. Allison | Douglas Dillon Professor of Government and Director, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University (1995-); Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy and Plans, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense (1993-1994) |

Esther D. Brimmer	Senior Associate, Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict (1995-); Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, U.S. Department of State (1993-1995); Foreign Affairs and Defense Analyst, Democratic Study Group, U.S. House of Representatives (1991-1993)
George B. Brown III	Chief of Staff, Marine Corps Base, Quantico, U.S. Department of Defense (1995-); Emergency Action Officer, Counterterrorism Branch, Special Operations Division, Operations Division, The Joint Staff, U.S. Department of Defense (1988-1991)
Keirn C. Brown	Director, European Affairs, National Security Council; Military Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; U.S. Representative for the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), United States European Command, Belgium
Michael P. C. Carns	President and Executive Director, Center for International Political Economy; Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Department of Defense (1991-1994); Director, The Joint Staff, U.S. Department of Defense (1989-1991)
George W. Casey, Jr.	Deputy Director for Politico-Military Affairs, J-5, The Joint Staff, U.S. Department of Defense (1997-); Congressional Program Coordinator, Office of the Chief of Legislative Liaison (1988-1989)
Richard B. Cheney	Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense (1989-1993)
David S. C. Chu	Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Analysis and Evaluation, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense (1988-1993)
Vern Clark	Director, The Joint Staff, U.S. Department of Defense (1998-); Director of Operations, The Joint Staff, U.S. Department of Defense (1997-1998); Director, The Joint Staff Crisis Action Team, U.S. Department of Defense (1990-1991)

- Maria J. E. Copson-Niecko Balkan Analyst, INR/EUR, U.S. Department of State (1998-); Senior Policy Advisor, Office of the Under Secretary for Policy, Bosnia Task Force, U.S. Department of Defense (1995-1997)
- Jock Covey Distinguished Visiting Fellow, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University (1998-); Special Assistant to the President for Implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords, National Security Council, The White House (1997-1998); Deputy High Representative, Office of the High Representative, Sarajevo (1995-1997)
- Barry W. Craigen Chief, Systems Sustainment Branch, United States Air Force (1998-); Chief, Senior Officer Management, Air Force/REPS, U.S. Department of Defense (1994-1997)
- Ivo Daalder Visiting Fellow, Foreign Policy Studies Program, The Brookings Institution; Director, European Affairs, National Security Council (1995-1996)
- William C. Danvers Washington Representative for the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (1997-1999); Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and Senior Director for Legislative Affairs for the National Security Council, The White House (1994-1997); Senior Advisor to Strobe Talbott, Ambassador-at-Large and Senior Advisor to the Secretary of State for the new Independent States, U.S. Department of State (1993-1994); Legislative Assistant, U.S. Senate (1989-1993)
- Richard G. Davis United States Air Force Historian (1980-)

- William K. Davis Deputy Head of Center for Public Affairs, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Washington Center (1998-); Legislative Management Officer and Senior Advisor, Bureau of Legislative Affairs, U.S. Department of State (1998); Director/ Acting Senior Director for Legislative Affairs, National Security Council, The White House (1995-1997)
- Terry Deibel Professor of National Strategy, Department of National Security Policy, National War College, National Defense University (1978-)
- J. Nicholas Dowling Director for European Affairs, National Security Council, The White House (1996-1998); Staff Officer for Bosnian Issues, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense (1993-1996)
- Nancy Bearg Dyke Executive Director, International Peace and Security Program, The Aspen Institute (1995-); Director of International Programs and Public Diplomacy, National Security Council, The White House (1998-1993); Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs, National Security Council, The White House 1981-1982); Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Manpower and Personnel, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense (1979-1981); Program and Budget Analyst, Congressional Budget Office (1975-1977); Research Assistant and Professional Staff Member, Senate Armed Services Committee (1971-1975)
- Lawrence S. Eagleburger Senior Foreign Policy Advisor, Baker, Donelson, Bearman & Caldwell (1993-); Secretary of State, U.S. Department of State (1992-1993); Deputy Secretary of State, U.S. Department of State (1989-1992)
- Robert W. Farrand Supervisor of Brcko, Bosnia-Herzegovina; Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu

Joseph N. Flanz	Senior Intelligence Officer, Office of the Under Secretary for Policy, Bosnia Task Force, U.S. Department of Defense (1997-); Senior Intelligence Officer, Defense Intelligence Agency (1992-1997)
Michele A. Flourney	Distinguished Research Professor, National Defense University (1998-); Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense (1993-1998)
Ronald R. Fogleman	Chief of Staff, Headquarters United States Air Force, U.S. Department of Defense (1994-1997); CINCUSTRANSCOM, Commander, Air Mobility Command (1992-1994); Commander, 7 th Air Force, Deputy Command in Chief, United Nations Command; Deputy Commander, U.S. Forces Korea; and Commander, Republic of Korea/U.S. Air Component Command, Combined Forces Command (1990-1992)
James H. Fraser	Senior Political/Military Advisor, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (1998-), U.S. Department of Defense; SFOR Headquarters, United Nations Stabilization Force, Zagreb, Croatia (1997)
Chas. W. Freeman, Jr.	Chairman, Projects International, Inc. (1995-); Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense (1993-1994); U.S. Ambassador to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (1989-1992); Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, African Affairs, U.S. Department of State (1986-1989)

- Peter W. Galbraith United States Ambassador to the Republic of Croatia (1993-1998); Co-Mediator and Architect of the Basic Agreement on Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Sirmium – the Erdut Agreement (1995); Co-Chairman, Croatia Peace Negotiations (1994-1995); Member, U.S. Negotiating Team for Bosnia-Herzegovina Peace Negotiations – the Dayton Negotiations (1995); Senior Advisor, Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Near East and South Asia and the Foreign Relations Authorizations Legislation), United States Congress (1979-1993)
- Robert L. Gallucci Dean, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service (1996-); Special Assistant to the President and Ambassador at Large, U.S. Department of State (1994-1998); Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State (1992-1994); Deputy Executive Chairman of the UN Special Commission overseeing the disarmament of Iraq (1991-1992)
- Georgie Anne Geyer Syndicated Columnist, *Universal Press Syndicate* (1981-)
- Raffi Gregorian Executive Assistant and Senior Advisor to the U.S. Special Representative for Military Stabilization in the Balkans, U.S. Department of State (1998-)
- Stephen Grummon Director, Office of Near East and South Asian Affairs, INR, U.S. Department of State; Policy Planning Staff, U.S. Department of State (1991)
- Rick Gutwald Assistant Deputy Director, Pol-Mil Affairs (Europe/ Africa), J-5, The Joint Staff, U.S. Department of Defense
- Michael J. Habib Professor, Political Science and Elements of National Power, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University; Director, Eastern European and Yugoslav Affairs, U.S. Department of State (1991-1993)

Morton H. Halperin	Director, Policy Planning Staff, U.S. Department of State (1998-); Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations (1996-1998); Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Democracy, National Security Council, The White House (1994-1996); Consultant to the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Democracy and Peacekeeping, U.S. Department of Defense (1993)
Bernard E. Harvey	Strategic Air Campaign Planner, U.S. Department of Defense (1990-1991)
John C. Harvey, Jr.	Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense (1998-)
Mark A. Haselton	Strategic Planner, J-5, The Joint Staff, U.S. Department of Defense (1995-)
Leonard R. Hawley	Director, Multilateral Affairs, National Security Council, The White House (1997-)
Donald F. Herr	Senior Research Fellow, Institute for National Strategic Studies (1998-); Office of NATO Policy, Office of Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense
Jane E. Holl	Executive Director, Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Carnegie Corporation of New York (1994-); Director for European Affairs, National Security Council, The White House (1991-1994)
Fred Charles Iklé	Distinguished Scholar, Center for Strategic and International Studies (1988-); Under Secretary of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense (1980-1988); Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (1973-1977)

Karl Jackson	Professor and Director of Southeast Asian Studies, The School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University (1995-); Senior Fellow for International Affairs, Hudson Institute (1993-1995); Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs (1991-1992); Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Asia, National Security Council, The White House (1989-1991); Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia and Pacific, U.S. Department of Defense (1986-1989)
Charles J. Jefferson	Senior Policy Advisor, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Office of International Security and Peacekeeping, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State (1998-); Director, Office of Political-Military Analysis, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S. Department of State (1987-1995)
David E. Jeremiah	Partner and President, Technology Strategies & Alliances Corporation (1994-); Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Department of Defense (1990-1994)
George Joulwan	Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe/Commander in Chief, United States European Command, Belgium (1993-1997)
Greg Kaufmann	Chief of Staff, Office of Secretary of Defense Balkan Task Force (1997-)
James M. Keagle	Professor, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University (1997-); Senior Strategist, Office of the Secretary of Defense Inter-American Region, U.S. Department of Defense (1996-1997); Acting Director, Office of the Secretary of Defense Bosnia Task Force, U.S. Department of Defense (1994-1996)

Zalmay Khalilzad	Program Director, Strategy and Doctrine Program, Project AIR FORCE, RAND (1994-); Assistant Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Planning, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense (1990-1993)
Robert M. Kimmitt	Partner, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering (1998-); U.S. Ambassador to Germany (1991-1993); Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, U.S. Department of State (1989-1991)
L. Erik Kjonnerod	Senior Fellow and Chief of the Politico-Military Branch, War Gaming and Simulation Center, National Defense University
Jacques Paul Klein	Principal Deputy High Representative, Office of the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina, The Hague (1997-)
Susan J. Koch	Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Threat Reduction Policy, U.S. Department of Defense (1993-); Assistant Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency for Strategic and Nuclear Affairs (1990-1991)
Franklin D. Kramer	Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense (1996-); Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense (1996)
Philip G. Laidlaw	Bosnia Desk Officer, U.S. Department of State (1998-); Political/Military Affairs Officer, Office of European Political and Security Affairs, U.S. Department of State (1997-1998)
Ellen Laipson	Vice Chairman, National Intelligence Council (1997-); Special Assistant to the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations; National Security Council, the White House (1993-1995); National Intelligence Officer, Near East and South Asian Affairs, Central Intelligence Agency (1990-1993)

Anthony Lake	Distinguished Professor in the Practice of Diplomacy, The School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University (1997-); Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, National Security Council, The White House (1993-1997)
J. Michael Lekson	Deputy to the Special Representative of the President and the Secretary of State for Implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords, U.S. Department of State (1998-); Deputy Chief of the United States Mission to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (1995-1998); Director for Strategic Affairs of European Security and Political Affairs (1991-1993)
Jan M. Lodal	Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense (1994-1998)
Thomas K. Longstreth	Deputy Under Secretary for Readiness, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense (1998-); Director, Bosnia Task Force, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense (1995-1997); Strategic Planner, The Joint Staff, U.S. Department of Defense (1990-1993)
James W. Lucas	Professor of National Security Policy, National War College and Defense Intelligence Agency Executive Representative to the National Defense University, National Defense University (1996-)
David L. Mack	Vice President, The Middle East Institute; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs, U.S. Department of State (1990-1993); Ambassador to the United Arab Emirates, U.S. Department of State (1986)
Ronald A. Marks	Special Assistant to the Associate Director of Central Intelligence for Military Support, Central Intelligence Agency
M. Lee McClenny	Director, Press Office, U.S. Department of State (1998-)

Bernd "Bear" McConnell	Director, Bosnia Task Force, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, U.S. Department of Defense (1996-1999); Director, Humanitarian Assistance to the Former Yugoslavia, U.S. Department of Defense (1992-1993)
Suzanne M. McCormick	Political Analyst, Office of Near East and South Asia, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, U.S. Department of State
Steven E. Meyer	Professor of Political Science, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University; Chief, Director of Central Intelligence Balkan Task Force, Central Intelligence Agency (1995-1997)
Mark E. Miller	Chief, Director of Central Intelligence Balkan Task Force, Central Intelligence Agency (1997-)
T. Michael Moseley	Deputy Director Politico-Military Affairs for Asia/Pacific and Middle East, The Joint Staff, U.S. Department of Defense (1997-)
John T. Nelsen II	Chief, Strategy Division, J-5, The Joint Staff, U.S. Department of Defense (1996-)
David A. Nelson	Executive Assistant to the Director, Strategic Plans and Policy, The Joint Staff, U.S. Department of Defense (1998-); Technology Transfer Planner, Weapons Technology Control Division, Deputy Directorate for International Negotiations, Director for Strategic Plans and Policy (J-5), The Joint Staff, U.S. Department of Defense (1996-1998)
Joseph S. Nye, Jr.	Dean, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University (1995-); Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense (1994-1995)

Robert B. Oakley	Director, Public Security Project and Distinguished Visiting Fellow, the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University; Assistant to Vice President for Middle East and South Asia; National Security Council Staff; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia Affairs; Special Envoy to Somalia; Ambassador to Pakistan, U.S. Department of State (1988)
Roberts Owen	Presiding Arbitrator for the Brcko Arbitral Tribunal, Bosnia-Herzegovina (1996-1999); Arbitrator, Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995-); Senior Advisor to the Secretary of State for the Former Yugoslavia (Member of and Legal Advisor to the Holbrooke Negotiating Team; 1995)
James Pardew, Jr.	Special Representative for Kosovo Implementation and Military Stabilization in the Balkans, U.S. Department of State (1996-)
Robert H. Pelletreau	Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State (1994-1997); Ambassador to Egypt and Member, U.S. delegation to the Madrid Middle East Peace Conference (1991)
David Petraeus	Executive Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (1997-)
Kenneth M. Pollack	Senior Research Professor, Institute for national Strategic Studies, National Defense University (1998-); Persian Gulf Military Analyst, Central Intelligence Agency and Directorate of Near East and South Asian Affairs, National Security Council
Roman Popadiuk	Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy Press Secretary for Foreign Affairs, The White House (1989-1992)
Diane T. Putney	United States Air Force Historian (1989-)

Steven R. Rader	Senior Analyst, Strategy and Policy Analysis Division, Science Applications International Corporation (1994 -); Coordinator, SHAPE Crisis Response Group, NATO (1992-1994)
George E. Rector, Jr.	Head, Interagency Policy Branch, Policy Division (J-5), The Joint Staff, U.S. Department of Defense (1997-)
John Scott Redd	Director, Strategic Plans and Policy, The Joint Staff, U.S. Department of Defense (1996-1998); Commander, Fifth Fleet, U.S. Central Command (1994-1996); Assistant to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense (1989-1991)
Jeffrey C. Remington	Chief, J-5 Policy Division, U.S. Department of Defense (1998-)
Julie M. Reside	Deputy Director, Press Office, U.S. Department of State (1997-)
Condoleeza Rice	Provost, Stanford University (1993-); Director/Senior Director, Soviet and East European Affairs and Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, National Security Council, The White House (1989-1991); International Affairs Fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations and Special Assistant to the Director of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Joint Staff, U.S. Department of Defense (1986)
Edward A. Rice, Jr.	Deputy Executive Secretary, National Security Council (1997-)
Anne C. Richard	Deputy Chief Financial Officer, The Peace Corps (1997-); Senior Advisor, Secretary's Office of Resources, Plans, and Policy and Advisor, Deputy Secretary's Office of Policy and Resources, U.S. Department of State (1990-1997); Budget Examiner, Office of Management and Budget, Executive Office of the President, The White House (1986-1990)

Stephen S. Rosenfeld	Deputy Editorial Page Editor and Columnist, <i>The Washington Post</i> (1962-)
Richard Saunders	Deputy National Security Advisor, Office of the Vice President, The White House (1997-); Office of the Vice President, The White House (1993-1996)
Kori Schake	Senior Research Professor, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University (1998-); Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Requirements (1994-1995)
Yvonne E. Schilz	Strategic Planner, J-5, The Joint Staff, U.S. Department of Defense (1996-)
Norman Schindler	Executive Assistant to the Deputy Director for Central Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency (1997-); Chief, Director for Central Intelligence Interagency Balkan Task Force (1994-1997)
Gregory L. Schulte	Special Assistant to the President and Director for Implementation of the Dayton Accords, National Security Council, The White House (1998-); Director, Crisis Management and Operations and Director, Bosnia Task Force, NATO International Staff, Brussels, Belgium (1992-1998)
Aric Schwan	Public Affairs Advisor, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, U.S. Department of State (1997-)
H. Norman Schwarzkopf	Commander in Chief, United States Central Command, U.S. Department of Defense (1988-1991)
Brent Scowcroft	Founder and President, The Forum for International Policy (1994-); Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, National Security Council, The White House (1989-1992)

Stuart M. Seldowitz	Staff member, Office of the Special Representative of the President and Secretary of State for Implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords, U.S. Department of State (1997-); Action Officer for the Crisis in the Former Yugoslavia, U.S. Mission to the United Nations (1991)
Sarah Sewall	Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance, U.S. Department of Defense (1993-1996)
John M. Shalikashvili	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Department of Defense (1993-1997); Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers Europe/Commander in Chief, United States European Command, Belgium (1992-1993); Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Joint Staff, U.S. Department of Defense (1991-1992)
John A. Shaud	Executive Director, Air Force Association, Washington, DC (1995-); Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (1988-1991)
Michael A. Sheehan	Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State (1998); Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, U.S. Department of State (1997-1998); Director of International Organizations and Peacekeeping, National Security Council, The White House (1995-1997); Director of Political Military Affairs and Special Counselor to Ambassador Madeleine Albright, U.S. Mission to the United Nations (1993-1995); Director for International Programs, National Security Council, The White House (1989-1993)

Robert F. Simmons, Jr.	Senior Advisor to the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, the 1999 NATO Summit, and European Nuclear, Arms Control, and Non-proliferation Issues, U.S. Department of State (1998-); Deputy Director, Office of Regional Political and Security Issues, Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, U.S. Department of State (1995-1998); Deputy Political Advisor, U.S. Mission to NATO and U.S. Representative to the NATO Political Committee, U.S. Department of State (1989-1993)
Charles R. Snyder	Director, Office of African Regional Affairs, African Affairs Bureau, U.S. Department of State (1995-); National Intelligence Officer for Africa, U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (1992-1995)
Greg Steele	Executive Assistant, Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, The Joint Staff, U.S. Department of Defense (1997-)
James W. Swigert	Director, Office of North Central European Affairs, U.S. Department of State (1998-)
Charles Thompson	Chief, Politico-Military Affairs Division (Middle East), U.S. Department of Defense
Wayne Thompson	Persian Gulf War "Checkmate" Planning Cell Historian, U.S. Department of Defense (1989-1990); United States Air Force Historian (1975-)
Gwenyth E. Todd	Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs (1997-); Special Assistant to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense (1996-1997)
Alan E. Van Egmond	Senior Policy Advisor, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Balkan Task Force, U.S. Department of Defense (1996-)

Roderick K. von Lipsey	Director, Defense Policy, National Security Council, The White House (1997-); Aide to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Joint Staff, U.S. Department of Defense (1991-1993)
Peter K. Walsh	J-2 Deputy Chief, Director of Central Intelligence Interagency Balkan Task Force (1998-)
John Warden	Strategic Air Campaign Planner, U.S. Department of Defense (1990-1991)
Edward L. Warner III	Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense (1993-)
Kenneth C. Westbrook	Deputy Chief, DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force (1998-)
Alan G. Whittaker	Professor of Political Science, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University (1990-); Intelligence Officer, Office of the Director for Central Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency (1983-1990)
Thomas J. Wilson III	Chief, Pacific Command Division, Current Operations Directorate, The Joint Staff, U.S. Department of Defense (1998-)
Richard H. Witherspoon	Senior Analyst, Strategy and Policy Analysis Division, Science Applications International Corporation (1995 -); Chief, SHAPE Liaison Office, U.S. Department of Defense (1992-1995); Army Member, Chairman's Staff Group, The Joint Staff, U.S. Department of Defense (1990-1992)
Paul Wolfowitz	Dean, The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University (1994-); Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Office of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense (1989-1993); U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Indonesia (1986-1989); Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State (1982-1986)

- Susan L. Woodward Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution (1990-);
Professorial Lecturer, School for Advanced
International Studies, Johns Hopkins University
(1997-1999); Head, Analysis and Assessment Unit,
Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary
General, United Nations Protection Forces, Zagreb,
Croatia (1994)
- Judith S. Yaphe Officer-in-Residence, Center for the Study of
Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency (1997-);
Senior Analyst, Near East and South Asian Analysis
(1993-1995); Senior Analyst, Persian Gulf Division,
Central Intelligence Agency (1989-1995)
- Warren Zimmermann Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Professor in the
Practice of International Diplomacy, School of
International and Public Affairs, Columbia
University (1997-); Director, Bureau of Refugee
Programs, U.S. Department of State (1992-1994);
Ambassador to Yugoslavia, U.S. Department of State
(1989-1992)

APPENDIX B

Interview Schedule (Survey)

(GMU/ICAR – Vicki J. Rast)

The purpose of this questionnaire is twofold: First, it will significantly augment the data collection effort of this research; secondly, it serves to orient you toward the nature of this research as you reflect upon the questions contained herein. Please answer each question:

- 1) as if you were located within a **crisis policy-making context** (as opposed to daily policy-making situations) and
- 2) by responding based upon a **51+% criterion** (i.e., "most often occurs").

I will aggregate your responses with those provided by others to create an "*ideal type*" for each category under study. These ideal types are general ways of categorizing responses that avoid gradations of difference we know exist in reality. Once aggregated, these data will create a profile for an agency/Department's ideal type.

If you have any questions, please ask them before beginning this questionnaire. However, should you need clarification on any particular item, please feel free to ask for more information.

Instructions:

- ☐ Please **circle the correct BOLD response** or **complete the blank** as appropriate.
- ☐ **NOTE:**
- ☐ "**DEPARTMENT**" refers to your EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT (i.e., Department of State, Department of Defense, National Security Council, etc.)
- ☐ "**AGENCY**" refers to your sub-unit within the Department (i.e., Office of South-Central European Affairs, J-5, etc.)

My Department is _____; agency, _____.

- 1) When involved in a crisis policy-making process, I feel that:
 - a) other agencies tend to act **collaboratively/competitively**.
 1. Collaboratively
 2. It Depends
 3. Competitively
 - b) other agencies' level of self-interest tends to be **low/high**.
 1. Low
 2. It Depends
 3. High
 - c) at the time of crisis eruption, Departments interact in **hostile/collaborative** ways.
 1. Hostile
 2. It Depends
 3. Collaborative
 - d) the level of open debate is generally **high/low**.
 1. High
 2. It Depends
 3. Low
 - e) as the crisis progresses, the level of open debate: **increases/remains constant/decreases**.
 1. Increases
 2. Remains Constant
 3. Decreases
 4. It Depends
- 2) My agency **does/does not** prioritize a crisis based upon a set of criteria.
 1. Does
 2. It Depends
 3. Does Not
 - b) If criteria are used, what are the three most relevant criteria in a generic sense?
 - (1) _____
 - (2) _____
 - (3) _____

- 3) Roughly speaking, my agency feels it should serve as the "lead" agent for crisis policy development _____ percent of the time:
a) **Less than 25%** b) **25-50%** c) **51-75%** d) **76-100%**
1. Less than 25%
2. 25-50 %
3. 51-75 %
4. 76-100%
5. Never (not our role)
- 4) My agency's experience with crises such as the Persian Gulf, Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia tends to be **broad/limited**.
1. Broad
2. It Depends
3. Limited
- 5) My agency **does/does not** factor in "perception of risk for self" when engaged in the policy-making process.
1. Does
2. It Depends
3. Does Not
- 6) When dealing with other agencies during the crisis policy-making process my Department tends to act **collaboratively/competitively**.
1. Collaboratively
2. It Depends
3. Competitively
- 7) Daily, my Department operates within a **hierarchical/flattened** structure.
1. Hierarchical
2. Other
3. Flattened
- 8) During crises, my Department operates within a **hierarchical/flattened** structure.
1. Hierarchical
2. Other
3. Flattened
- 9) My Department's mission is generally focused on **prevention/defense**.
1. Prevention
2. Defense
3. Both

- 10) My Department's leadership style tends to be **participative/autocratic**.
1. Participative
 2. It Depends
 3. Autocratic
- 11) My Department's political ideology tends to be **Realist/Idealist**.
1. Realist
 2. Mix of both
 3. Idealist
- 12) People within my agency perceive the "penalty for failure" as being **high/low**.
1. High
 2. It Depends
 3. Low
- 13) During times of crisis policy development my Department's communication patterns tend to be **rigid/flexible**.
1. Rigid
 2. It Depends
 3. Flexible
- 14) My Department employs an **open** (i.e., system utilizes multiple feedback loops)/**closed** (i.e., system presses forward with little feedback) policy process.
1. Open
 2. It Depends
 3. Closed
- 15) Of the Departments with which I interact most frequently on crisis policy matters, the
- a) most **collaborative** are: _____.
 - b) most **competitive** are: _____.

- 16) I would characterize my Department's ability to influence conflict termination policy along the following three dimensions (see a, b, and c below) as:
- a) Creating a vision for the *desired end state*: **favorable/unfavorable**.
 - 1. Favorable
 - 2. Unfavorable
 - 3. It Depends
 - b) Identifying, refining, and selecting *conflict termination criteria*: **favorable/unfavorable**.
 - 1. Favorable
 - 2. Unfavorable
 - 3. It Depends
 - c) Developing the *strategy* to achieve conflict termination: **favorable/unfavorable**.
 - 1. Favorable
 - 2. Unfavorable
 - 3. It Depends
- 17) My Department has a **high/low** feeling of accountability for crisis policy-making.
- 1. High
 - 2. It Depends
 - 3. Low
- 18) My Department's policy process is predominantly focused on **strategic planning/crisis action response**.
- 1. Strategic Planning
 - 2. Crisis Action Response
 - 3. Both
- 19) When immersed in the interagency process, my Department tends to interact **collaboratively/competitively** with other Departments.
- 1. Collaboratively
 - 2. It Depends
 - 3. Competitively
- 20) In general, I am able to conduct **deep/shallow** crisis analyses.
- 1. Deep
 - 2. It Depends
 - 3. Shallow

21) I would characterize my level of analysis for crisis situations (such as the Persian Gulf, Rwanda, Somalia, and Bosnia) as **deep/shallow**.

1. Deep
2. It Depends
3. Shallow

22) I rely upon others for a majority of the crisis analysis _____ percentage of the time: a) **Less than 25%** b) **25-50%** c) **51-75%** d) **76-100%**

1. Less than 25%
2. 25-50%
3. 51-75 %
4. 76-100 %

23) I would characterize my ability to propose innovative solutions as **limited/extensive**.

1. Limited
2. It Depends
3. Extensive

24) I would characterize my experience with the US bureaucracy as **limited/extensive**;

1. Limited
2. It Depends
3. Extensive

24a) Length of service approximates to _____ years.

1. 0-10 years
2. 11-20 years
3. 21-30 years
4. More than 30 years

25) I would describe my Department's internal decision-making style as **participative/autocratic**.

1. Participative
2. It Depends
3. Autocratic

26) People within my Department exhibit a willingness to promote new ways of thinking about complex problems _____ percentage of the time:

a) **Less than 25%** b) **25-50%** c) **51-75%** d) **76-100%**

1. Less than 25%
2. 25-50%
3. 51-75%
4. 76-100%

27) My Department explores innovative ideas _____ percentage of the time:

a) **Less than 25%** b) **25-50%** c) **51-75%** d) **76-100%**

1. Less than 25%
2. 25-50%
3. 51-75%
4. 76-100%

28) I would describe my Department's formal ability to gain access to the NSC as **high/low**.

1. High
2. It Depends
3. Low

29) I feel that other agencies' informal access to NSC members has a **favorable/unfavorable** impact on crisis policy development.

1. Favorable
2. It Depends
3. Unfavorable

30) My Department has a **great/limited** ability to influence the NSC.

1. Great
2. It Depends
3. Limited

31) During the crisis policy-making process, the NSC's operating procedures **facilitate/impede** the development of conflict termination policy.

1. Facilitate
2. It Depends
3. Impede

32) I believe certain agencies are **often/rarely** "privileged" in their access to the NSC during crisis policy-making.

1. Often
2. It Depends
3. Rarely

In addition to the above questionnaire items, the research coded the following demographic classifications for each informant:

A) Executive Department:

1. White House/National Security Council
2. State Department
3. Defense Department
4. CIA
5. Congress
6. Think Tank
7. Media
8. Other

B) Level within the Interagency Process:

1. PC
2. DC
3. IWG
4. N/A

C) Level/Position with Agency's Hierarchy:

1. Executive
2. Middle Management
3. Staff Member

D) Educational Background:

1. Technical/Engineering Sciences
2. Humanities/Social Sciences

E) Status within Agency:

1. Political Appointee
2. Career Professional

F) Case:

1. Persian Gulf War (1990-1991)
2. Bosnia Crisis (1993-1995)
3. Interagency Experience (1996-1998)
4. Other (N/A)

APPENDIX C

SURVEY DATA

	o_bhvr	o_selfn	d_intera	open_deb	od_prog	criteria	ldagent	aexper	riskself	deptacts	dstruct	dstrcris	dmsn
1	3.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	4.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00
2	1.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
3	1.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	2.00	3.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.00
4	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.00
5	2.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	4.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
6	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
7	1.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	3.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.00
8	3.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	2.00
9	1.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	4.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
10	3.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	2.00
11	3.00	3.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	4.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.00
12	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	2.00
13	1.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.00
14	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
15	2.00	3.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	3.00		1.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
16		3.00	3.00	3.00	2.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00		1.00	3.00	2.00
17	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.00
18	3.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	2.00
19	1.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	5.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	1.00
20	1.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	4.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	2.00	3.00	2.00
21	2.00	3.00	2.00	1.00	4.00	3.00		1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.00
22	2.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	4.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00

	dldrstyl	dideol	pntyfail	comcris	polproc	ctpdcs	ctpcic	ctpstnat	daccty	plngfoc	iabehav	lvlanal	analcris
1	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
2	3.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
3	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	3.00	3.00
4	1.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
5	3.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
6	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	2.00	3.00	1.00	1.00
7	3.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	2.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	3.00	3.00
8	2.00	2.00	1.00	3.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	2.00	2.00	3.00	2.00
9	3.00		3.00	3.00		1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	2.00	1.00		1.00
10	3.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	3.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
11	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	3.00	3.00
12	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
13	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	3.00	3.00
14	1.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
15	2.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	2.00	
16	1.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.00		1.00	1.00
17	3.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
18	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00
19	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	3.00	3.00
20	1.00	3.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
21	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
22	1.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	3.00	1.00

	majanal	innovsol	burexper	lgithserv	ddmstyle	newthkg	explinn	nscacss	impctoia	influnsc	nscproc	privaccs
1	1.00	3.00	2.00	4.00	2.00	3.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	
2	3.00	3.00	2.00	3.00	3.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00
3	3.00	3.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	3.00
4	2.00	1.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00
5	4.00	3.00	2.00	4.00	3.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	1.00
6	1.00	3.00	2.00	2.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	1.00
7	3.00	1.00	2.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.00		1.00
8	3.00	3.00	2.00	1.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	3.00	2.00	2.00	1.00
9	2.00	3.00	2.00	4.00	1.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	3.00			1.00
10	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	4.00	4.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	1.00
11	3.00	3.00	2.00	1.00	3.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	2.00	3.00	3.00
12	3.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	4.00	4.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
13	4.00	3.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	3.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00
14	2.00	3.00		2.00	1.00	4.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
15	2.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	1.00		1.00	1.00	2.00
16	2.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	3.00	2.00			3.00			1.00
17	3.00	3.00	2.00	2.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00
18	2.00	3.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	3.00	2.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	3.00	1.00
19	4.00	3.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	4.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00
20	1.00	3.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
21	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
22	3.00	3.00	2.00	3.00	1.00	3.00	2.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	3.00	1.00

	dept	lv_la	lv_ems	educbkgd	profstat	case_pba
1	2.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	2.00	2.00
2	3.00	3.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	1.00
3	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
4	3.00	2.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	2.00
5	3.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	2.00	2.00
6	3.00	3.00	3.00	2.00	2.00	3.00
7	3.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	3.00
8	3.00	2.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	2.00
9	2.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	2.00	2.00
10	3.00	3.00	3.00	2.00	2.00	3.00
11	3.00	3.00	3.00	2.00	2.00	3.00
12	3.00	3.00	3.00	2.00	2.00	3.00
13	3.00	2.00	3.00	2.00	2.00	3.00
14	3.00	3.00	3.00	2.00	2.00	2.00
15	2.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	2.00	2.00
16	3.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	2.00	2.00
17	3.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	2.00	1.00
18	3.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	2.00	2.00
19	4.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	3.00
20	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	2.00
21	3.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00
22	3.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00

	o_bhvr	o_selfn	d_intera	open_deb	od_prog	criteria	ldagent	aexper	riskself	deptacts	dstruct	dstrcris	dmsn
23	2.00	3.00	2.00	1.00	4.00	3.00	4.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	3.00
24	1.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	4.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
25	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00		1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00
26	2.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	5.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
27	3.00	3.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	2.00
28	1.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
29	1.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	5.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	1.00
30	1.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
31	2.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	5.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.00
32	1.00	1.00	2.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	1.00
33	3.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00
34	1.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
35	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	3.00	1.00
36	2.00	3.00	3.00	1.00		3.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00
37	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
38	2.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	5.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	1.00
39	2.00	2.00	3.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	5.00	3.00	2.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00
40	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	2.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.00
41	1.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	2.00
42		3.00	3.00	3.00	2.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.00
43	1.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	4.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	
44	2.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	3.00	3.00	

	dldrstyl	dideol	pntyfail	comcris	polproc	ctpdcs	ctptct	ctptstrat	daccty	plngfoc	labehav	lvlanal	analcris
23	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	3.00
24	1.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
25	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
26	1.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
27	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	3.00	2.00	3.00	3.00	3.00
28	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	3.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
29	1.00	1.00	2.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
30	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
31	1.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
32	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	3.00
33	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
34	3.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	3.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	3.00
35	2.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
36	1.00	3.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
37	1.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	2.00	3.00	3.00	1.00
38	1.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	3.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
39	1.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	3.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
40	3.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
41	3.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
42	3.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	3.00	3.00
43	3.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	3.00	3.00
44	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	1.00

	majanal	innovsol	burexper	lgthserv	ddmstyle	newthkg	explinn	nscacccs	impctoain	influnsc	nscproc	privaccs
23	3.00	3.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	4.00	4.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00
24	3.00	3.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00
25		3.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	4.00	4.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00
26	2.00	3.00	2.00	3.00	1.00	4.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
27	1.00	3.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00
28	3.00	3.00	2.00	2.00	3.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00
29	1.00	3.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	4.00	4.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
30	1.00	3.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	1.00
31	2.00	1.00	2.00	3.00	1.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
32	3.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	4.00	3.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	3.00	3.00
33	3.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	3.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	3.00	1.00
34	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	3.00
35	2.00	3.00	2.00	3.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
36	3.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	3.00
37	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	1.00
38	4.00	3.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	4.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	3.00
39	2.00	3.00	2.00	2.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00
40	1.00	3.00	2.00	2.00	3.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00
41	2.00	3.00	2.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00
42	4.00	3.00	2.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	1.00
43	4.00	3.00	2.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
44	2.00	3.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.00		1.00

	dept	lv_la	lv_ems	educbkgd	profstat	case_pba
23	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	3.00
24	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	2.00	3.00
25	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.00
26	4.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	2.00	3.00
27	3.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	3.00
28	4.00	2.00	1.00	2.00	2.00	3.00
29	4.00	2.00	1.00	2.00	2.00	2.00
30	4.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	1.00
31	4.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	1.00
32	3.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	3.00
33	3.00	2.00	1.00	2.00	2.00	2.00
34	3.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	2.00	3.00
35	3.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	2.00	3.00
36	2.00	3.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00
37	2.00	2.00	1.00	2.00	2.00	3.00
38	4.00	2.00	1.00	2.00	2.00	2.00
39	4.00	2.00	1.00	2.00	2.00	2.00
40	3.00	2.00	1.00	2.00	2.00	2.00
41	3.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	2.00	2.00
42	3.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	3.00
43	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	2.00	3.00
44	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	2.00	3.00

	o_bhvr	o_selfin	d_intera	open_deb	od_prog	criteria	ldagent	aexper	riskself	deplacts	dstruct	dstrcris	dmsn
45	3.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	4.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	3.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	2.00
46	2.00	3.00	2.00	3.00	4.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00
47	1.00	3.00	3.00	2.00	2.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	1.00
48	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	4.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
49	3.00	3.00	2.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	2.00
50	1.00	1.00	3.00	2.00	4.00	3.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	1.00
51	1.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	4.00	3.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	2.00
52	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.00
53	3.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	2.00
54	2.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	4.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	3.00	1.00	2.00
55	2.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	5.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
56	2.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	4.00	3.00	4.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	2.00
57	3.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.00
58	2.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	2.00
59		3.00		1.00	1.00	1.00	4.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	2.00
60	2.00	2.00	3.00	2.00	3.00	3.00		1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	2.00
61	3.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	3.00	2.00
62	2.00	3.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	2.00	1.00	3.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	2.00
63	3.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	3.00	1.00
64	1.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
65	1.00	3.00	3.00	2.00	1.00	3.00	4.00	1.00	3.00	2.00	1.00	3.00	2.00
66	2.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	3.00	1.00

	dldrstyl	dideol	pntyfail	comcris	polproc	ctpdcs	ctpcic	ctpstnat	daccy	phngfoc	iabehav	lvlanal	analcris
45	1.00	2.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	2.00			1.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
46	1.00	2.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	2.00	1.00
47	1.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
48	3.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
49	3.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	3.00	3.00	3.00
50	1.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	3.00
51	3.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
52	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
53	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
54	1.00	2.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	2.00	3.00	1.00
55	2.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
56	3.00	3.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	3.00	1.00	1.00
57	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	3.00	3.00
58	1.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	3.00	3.00
59	2.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	1.00
60	2.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
61	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00
62	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	2.00	1.00	1.00
63	3.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00
64	1.00	3.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
65	1.00	2.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
66	1.00	3.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	2.00	2.00	3.00	3.00

	majanal	innovsol	burexper	lgthserv	ddmstyle	newthkg	explrinn	nscacss	impctoin	influnsc	nscproc	privaccs
45	1.00	3.00	2.00	3.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
46	2.00	3.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	2.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	2.00	3.00
47	4.00	3.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
48	2.00	1.00	2.00	3.00	3.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
49	4.00	1.00	2.00	2.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
50	4.00	3.00	2.00	3.00	1.00	3.00	2.00	1.00		3.00	1.00	1.00
51	3.00	3.00	2.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
52	2.00	3.00	2.00	3.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
53	2.00	3.00	2.00	3.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00
54	3.00	3.00	2.00	3.00	2.00	4.00	4.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
55	4.00	3.00	2.00	3.00	2.00	4.00	4.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
56	4.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	2.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
57	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	1.00		1.00	1.00	
58	2.00	3.00	2.00	3.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	3.00
59	2.00	3.00	2.00	2.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00
60	3.00	3.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
61	2.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	3.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
62	2.00	3.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.00		1.00
63	4.00	1.00	2.00	3.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	3.00	1.00
64	1.00	3.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00
65	1.00	3.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	3.00	2.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	3.00	2.00
66	4.00	1.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	3.00	2.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	1.00

	dept	lv_la	lv_ems	educbkgd	profstat	case_pba
45	2.00	1.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00
46	2.00	3.00	3.00	2.00	2.00	2.00
47	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	2.00	3.00
48	2.00	2.00	1.00	2.00	2.00	1.00
49	3.00	1.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00
50	8.00	3.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	1.00
51	2.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	2.00	2.00
52	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	2.00	1.00
53	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	2.00	2.00
54	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	2.00	2.00
55	4.00	2.00	1.00	2.00	2.00	2.00
56	2.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	2.00
57	3.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	3.00
58	3.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	3.00
59	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00
60	1.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	2.00	3.00
61	3.00	3.00	3.00	2.00	2.00	1.00
62	3.00	2.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	1.00
63	3.00	2.00	3.00	2.00	2.00	3.00
64	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	2.00	1.00
65	2.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	2.00
66	2.00	3.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	2.00

	o_bhvr	o_selfin	d_intera	open_deb	od_prog	criteria	ldagent	aexper	riskself	deptacts	dsstruct	dsctcris	dmsn
67	2.00	3.00	2.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	2.00
68	2.00	2.00	3.00	1.00	3.00	3.00	4.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	2.00	3.00
69	2.00	3.00	3.00	1.00	2.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00

	majanal	innovsol	burexper	lgthserv	ddmstyle	newthkg	explrnn	nscacacs	impctoIn	influnsc	nscproc	privaccs
67	4.00	1.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	2.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	3.00
68	3.00	3.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	4.00	4.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
69	2.00	3.00	2.00	3.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	3.00	1.00	1.00	3.00

	dept	lv_la	lv_ems	educbkgd	profstat	case_pba
67	1.00	1.00	3.00	2.00	2.00	3.00
68	1.00	1.00	2.00	2.00	1.00	3.00
69	3.00	1.00	1.00	2.00	2.00	1.00

APPENDIX D

SPEARMAN RANK-ORDER CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS

(TWO-TAILED)

Correlations

	Other Agencies Act (F5.3/S1a)	Other's Self-Interest Level (F5.3/S1b)	Departments Interact (F5.3/S1c)	Open Debate Generally (F5.3/S1d)
Spearman's rho	1.000	.334**	-.254*	.086
Correlation Coefficient				
Sig. (2-tailed)		.006	.040	.492
N	66	66	66	66
Other's Self-Interest Level (F5.3/S1b)	.334**	1.000	-.032	-.041
Correlation Coefficient				
Sig. (2-tailed)	.006		.795	.736
N	66	69	68	69
Departments Interact (F5.3/S1c)	-.254*	-.032	1.000	-.053
Correlation Coefficient				
Sig. (2-tailed)	.040	.795		.670
N	66	68	68	68
Open Debate Generally (F5.3/S1d)	.086	-.041	-.053	1.000
Correlation Coefficient				
Sig. (2-tailed)	.492	.736	.670	
N	66	69	68	69
Open Debate as Crisis Progresses (F5.3/S1e)	.140	.190	-.026	-.141
Correlation Coefficient				
Sig. (2-tailed)	.267	.121	.833	.253
N	65	68	67	68
Criteria set (F5.4/S2)	-.017	.177	-.112	.167
Correlation Coefficient				
Sig. (2-tailed)	.892	.145	.364	.171
N	66	69	68	69
Lead Agent_self (F5.4/S3)	-.091	-.033	-.050	-.111
Correlation Coefficient				
Sig. (2-tailed)	.481	.796	.696	.378
N	62	65	64	65
Agency's Experience (F5.4/S4)	-.104	-.078	.129	.099
Correlation Coefficient				
Sig. (2-tailed)	.407	.526	.296	.419
N	66	69	68	69
Perception risk for self (F5.4/S5)	.117	.153	.139	.064
Correlation Coefficient				
Sig. (2-tailed)	.350	.209	.258	.601
N	66	69	68	69

Correlations

Spearman's rho	Department acts (F5.5/S6)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	Other Agencies Act (F5.3/S1a)	Other's Self-Interest Level (F5.3/S1b)	Departments Interact (F5.3/S1c)	Open Debate Generally (F5.3/S1d)
			.333**	.141	-.144	.032
			.006	.252	.245	.793
			66	68	67	68
	Dept Structure_daily (F5.5/S7)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.001	-.063	.004	-.125
			.992	.608	.976	.304
			66	69	68	69
	Dept Structure_Crisis (F5.5/S8)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.026	.091	.145	-.019
			.837	.459	.237	.875
			66	69	68	69
	Dept Mission (F5.5/S9)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.237	.116	-.272*	.006
			.060	.348	.027	.959
			64	67	66	67
	Dept Ldr Style (F5.5/S10)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.103	.145	-.036	.131
			.411	.234	.772	.282
			66	69	68	69
	Dept Political Ideology (F5.5/S11)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.034	.182	.118	.118
			.786	.137	.340	.337
			65	68	67	68
	Penalty for failure (F5.5/S12)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.254*	-.061	.269*	.010
			.040	.617	.027	.936
			66	69	68	69
	Comm in crisis (F5.5/S13*)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.256*	-.197	.220	.017
			.038	.105	.071	.892
			66	69	68	69
	Policy process o/c (F5.6/S14)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.002	.063	-.131	.348**
			.986	.612	.290	.004
			65	68	67	68

Correlations

Spearman's rho	Desired End State (F0/S16a)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	Other Agencies Act (F5.3/S1a)	Other's Self-Interest Level (F5.3/S1b)	Departments Interact (F5.3/S1c)	Open Debate Generally (F5.3/S1d)
			-.044	-.099	-.108	.096
			.725	.417	.382	.431
			66	69	68	69
	Termination Criteria (F0/S16b)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.151	.037	-.032	.291*
			.230	.765	.797	.016
			65	68	67	68
	Termination Strategy (F0/S16c)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.173	.048	.004	.172
			.169	.697	.973	.161
			65	68	67	68
	Dept Accountability (F5.6/S17)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.075	.047	.037	-.048
			.549	.701	.767	.698
			66	69	68	69
	Planning Focus (F5.6/S18)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.182	.132	-.177	-.146
			.143	.278	.148	.230
			66	69	68	69
	IA Behavior_Depts (F5.6/S19*)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.481**	.267*	-.097	.061
			.000	.027	.434	.623
			66	68	67	68
	Level of Analysis (F5.7/S20)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.073	.194	-.156	.177
			.565	.113	.208	.149
			65	68	67	68
	Analysis for Crises (F5.7/S21)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.001	.160	-.227	.062
			.993	.192	.064	.617
			65	68	67	68
	Maj crisis analysis (F5.7/S22)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.072	-.024	-.017	.031
			.568	.849	.891	.802
			65	68	67	68

Correlations

Spearman's rho	Innov soln ability (F5.7/S23)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	Other Agencies Act (F5.3/S1a)	Other's Self-Interest Level (F5.3/S1b)	Departments Interact (F5.3/S1c)	Open Debate Generally (F5.3/S1d)
			-.182	-.125	.071	-.081
			.143	.305	.567	.506
			66	69	68	69
	Bureaucratic Experience (F5.7/S24)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.172	-.168	.000	.036
			.171	.171	.998	.770
			65	68	67	68
	Length of service (F5.7/S24a)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.188	-.073	.214	-.173
			.131	.550	.079	.156
			66	69	68	69
	Dept dec-mkg style (F5.5/S25)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.125	.092	-.073	.160
			.316	.450	.555	.190
			66	69	68	69
	New Thinking (F5.7/S26)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.033	-.320**	.011	-.176
			.790	.007	.929	.147
			66	69	68	69
	Dept explores innovation (F5.7/S27*)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.098	-.314**	-.060	-.122
			.432	.009	.627	.320
			66	68	67	68
	NSC Access (F5.8/S28)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.170	.065	.066	-.075
			.172	.601	.598	.542
			66	68	67	68
	Impact of O's Informal Access (F5.8/S29)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.284*	.126	-.073	.263*
			.024	.313	.563	.033
			63	66	65	66
	Dept influence on NSC (F5.6_5.8/S30)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.148	.035	-.009	.257*
			.240	.776	.944	.036
			65	67	66	67

Correlations

		Open Debate as Crisis Progresses (F5.3/S1e)	Criteria set (F5.4/S2)	Lead Agent self (F5.4/S3)	Agency's Experience (F5.4/S4)
Spearman's rho	Other Agencies Act (F5.3/S1a)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.140 .892 66	-.091 .481 62	-.104 .407 66
	Other's Self-Interest Level (F5.3/S1b)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.190 .121 68	-.033 .796 65	-.078 .526 69
	Departments Interact (F5.3/S1c)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.026 .833 67	-.112 .364 68	.129 .296 68
Open Debate Generally (F5.3/S1d)		Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.141 .253 68	.167 .171 69	.099 .419 69
	Open Debate as Crisis Progresses (F5.3/S1e)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	1.000 .006 68	.327** .006 68	-.011 .928 68
	Criteria set (F5.4/S2)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.327** .006 68	1.000 .006 69	.006 .961 69
Lead Agent_self (F5.4/S3)		Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.083 .516 64	1.000 .546 65	-.166 .186 65
	Agency's Experience (F5.4/S4)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.011 .928 68	-.166 .186 65	1.000 .081 69
	Perception risk for self (F5.4/S5)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.058 .639 68	.123 .330 65	.509 69

Correlations

Spearman's rho	Open Debate as Crisis Progresses (F5.3/S1e)	Criteria set (F5.4/S2)	Lead Agent self (F5.4/S3)	Agency's Experience (F5.4/S4)
Department acts (F5.5/S6)	.114	.009	-.063	.023
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.359	.940	.849
	N	67	68	68
Dept Structure_daily (F5.5/S7)	.106	-.116	.162	.041
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.389	.198	.740
	N	68	69	69
Dept Structure_Crisis (F5.5/S8)	.121	.090	.084	.183
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.326	.506	.133
	N	68	65	69
Dept Mission (F5.5/S9)	.142	.140	-.029	.010
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.254	.824	.938
	N	66	67	67
Dept Ldr Style (F5.5/S10)	.212	.055	-.198	-.196
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.082	.651	.106
	N	68	69	69
Dept Political Ideology (F5.5/S11)	.238	.192	.086	.213
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.053	.501	.081
	N	67	68	68
Penalty for failure (F5.5/S12)	-.092	-.111	.231	.105
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.456	.365	.391
	N	68	69	69
Comm in crisis (F5.5/S13*)	.084	.047	.135	.025
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.495	.704	.836
	N	68	69	69
Policy process o/c (F5.6/S14)	.074	.193	-.192	-.132
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.554	.115	.282
	N	67	68	68

Correlations

Spearman's rho	Desired End State (F0/S16a)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	Open Debate as Crisis Progresses (F5.3/S1e)	Criteria set (F5.4/S2)	Lead Agent self (F5.4/S3)	Agency's Experience (F5.4/S4)
	Termination Criteria (F0/S16b)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.172 .162 68	-.089 .465 69	-.223 .074 65	-.142 .244 69
	Termination Strategy (F0/S16c)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.025 .838 67	-.035 .780 68	-.155 .220 64	.054 .659 68
	Dept Accountability (F5.6/S17)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.036 .771 67	-.089 .472 68	-.181 .153 64	.013 .919 68
	Planning Focus (F5.6/S18)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.041 .743 68	-.112 .358 69	-.029 .817 65	.158 .194 69
	IA Behavior_Depts (F5.6/S19*)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.038 .760 68	.070 .567 69	.204 .103 65	-.122 .317 69
	Level of Analysis (F5.7/S20)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.143 .247 67	.079 .524 68	-.199 .115 64	.013 .919 68
	Analysis for Crises (F5.7/S21)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.124 .316 67	.201 .101 68	-.161 .204 64	.227 .062 68
	Maj crisis analysis (F5.7/S22)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.052 .676 67	.109 .378 68	-.278* .025 65	.304* .012 68
			.087 .484 67	.187 .126 68	-.070 .577 65	.204 .095 68

Correlations

		Open Debate as Crisis Progresses (F5.3/S1e)	Criteria set (F5.4/S2)	Lead Agent self (F5.4/S3)	Agency's Experience (F5.4/S4)
Spearman's rho	Innov soln ability (F5.7/S23)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.102 .404 69	.147 .243 65	-.152 .213 69
	Bureaucratic Experience (F5.7/S24)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.005 .968 68	.182 .151 64	.009 .944 68
	Length of service (F5.7/S24a)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.013 .918 68	.089 .479 65	-.040 .742 69
	Dept dec-mkg style (F5.5/S25)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.164 .181 68	.011 .932 65	-.105 .390 69
	New Thinking (F5.7/S26)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.063 .608 68	.283* .022 65	.029 .811 69
	Dept explores innovation (F5.7/S27*)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.056 .653 67	.232 .065 64	.029 .815 68
	NSC Access (F5.8/S28)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.104 .404 67	.126 .307 68	-.048 .699 68
	Impact of O's Informal Access (F5.8/S29)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.023 .856 65	-.206 .106 63	.176 .157 66
	Dept influence on NSC (F5.6_5.8/S30)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.180 .148 66	-.336** .007 63	-.016 .895 67

Correlations

		Open Debate as Crisis Progresses (F5.3/S1e)	Criteria set (F5.4/S2)	Lead self Agent (F5.4/S3)	Agency's Experience (F5.4/S4)	
Spearman's rho	NSC Procedures (F5.8/S31*)	Correlation Coefficient	.029	-.185	-.129	
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.821	.157	.309	
		N	64	60	64	
	Privileged access NSC (F5.8/S32)	Correlation Coefficient	-.202	-.033	-.001	.000
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.105	.789	.993	1.000
		N	66	67	63	67
	Level within Interagency (F5.7/B)	Correlation Coefficient	-.105	-.057	-.214	.226
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.395	.641	.087	.062
		N	68	69	65	69
	Level/Position within A's Hierarchy (F5.7/C)	Correlation Coefficient	.003	.014	-.260*	.182
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.978	.907	.036	.134
		N	68	69	65	69
Educational Background (F5.7/D)	Correlation Coefficient	-.090	-.125	.130	-.046	
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.467	.306	.303	.710	
	N	68	69	65	69	
Status w/in Agency (F5.7/E)	Correlation Coefficient	-.064	-.253*	.034	-.064	
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.602	.036	.787	.599	
	N	68	69	65	69	

Correlations

Spearman's rho	Other Agencies Act (F5.3/S1a)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	Perception risk for self (F5.4/S5)	Department acts (F5.5/S6)	Dept Structure daily (F5.5/S7)
			.117 .350 66	.333** .006 66	-.001 .992 66
	Other's Self-Interest Level (F5.3/S1b)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.153 .209 69	.141 .252 68	-.063 .608 69
	Departments Interact (F5.3/S1c)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.139 .258 68	-.144 .245 67	.004 .976 68
	Open Debate Generally (F5.3/S1d)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.064 .601 69	.032 .793 68	-.125 .304 69
	Open Debate as Crisis Progresses (F5.3/S1e)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.058 .639 68	.114 .359 67	.106 .389 68
	Criteria set (F5.4/S2)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.203 .095 69	.009 .940 68	-.116 .341 69
	Lead Agent_self (F5.4/S3)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.123 .330 65	-.063 .620 64	.162 .198 65
	Agency's Experience (F5.4/S4)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.081 .509 69	.023 .849 68	.041 .740 69
	Perception risk for self (F5.4/S5)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	1.000 69	-.112 .364 68	-.123 .313 69

Correlations

Spearman's rho	Department acts (F5.5/S6)	Perception risk for self (F5.4/S5)	Department acts (F5.5/S6)	Dept Structure daily (F5.5/S7)
	Correlation Coefficient	-.112	1.000	-.254*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.364		.037
	N	68	68	68
	Dept Structure_daily (F5.5/S7)	Correlation Coefficient	-.123	1.000
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.313	
		N	69	69
	Dept Structure_Crisis (F5.5/S8)	Correlation Coefficient	-.010	.519**
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.934	.000
		N	69	69
	Dept Mission (F5.5/S9)	Correlation Coefficient	.036	.006
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.771	.964
		N	67	67
	Dept Ldr Style (F5.5/S10)	Correlation Coefficient	-.130	-.301*
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.289	.012
		N	69	69
	Dept Political Ideology (F5.5/S11)	Correlation Coefficient	.031	-.093
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.801	.450
		N	68	68
	Penalty for failure (F5.5/S12)	Correlation Coefficient	.212	.123
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.080	.316
		N	69	69
	Comm in crisis (F5.5/S13*)	Correlation Coefficient	-.052	.099
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.950	.417
		N	69	69
	Policy process o/c (F5.6/S14)	Correlation Coefficient	.005	-.361*
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.965	.003
		N	68	68

Correlations

Spearman's rho	Desired End State (F0/S16a)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	Perception risk for self (F5.4/S5)	Department acts (F5.5/S6)	Dept Structure daily (F5.5/S7)
	Termination Criteria (F0/S16b)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.181 .137 69	-.021 .865 68	-.113 .357 69
	Termination Strategy (F0/S16c)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.063 .612 68	.053 .671 67	-.023 .852 68
	Dept Accountability (F5.6/S17)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.033 .788 68	.138 .267 67	.061 .623 68
	Planning Focus (F5.6/S18)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.041 .737 69	.046 .711 68	.107 .382 69
	IA Behavior_Depts (F5.6/S19*)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.168 .169 69	.175 .153 68	.067 .584 69
	Level of Analysis (F5.7/S20)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.077 .532 68	.769** .000 68	-.156 .203 68
	Analysis for Crises (F5.7/S21)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.104 .400 68	.113 .362 67	.084 .497 68
	Maj crisis analysis (F5.7/S22)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.113 .360 68	-.012 .922 67	.085 .491 68
			-.061 .619 68	.014 .913 67	.147 .230 68

Correlations

Spearman's rho	Innov sojn ability (F5.7/S23)	Perception risk for self (F5.4/S5)	Department acts (F5.5/S6)	Dept Structure daily (F5.5/S7)
	Correlation Coefficient	.045	-.179	.103
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.711	.145	.401
	N	69	68	69
	Bureaucratic Experience (F5.7/S24)	Correlation Coefficient	.062	.105
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.619	.395
		N	67	68
	Length of service (F5.7/S24a)	Correlation Coefficient	-.142	-.168
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.249	.167
		N	68	69
	Dept dec-mkg style (F5.5/S25)	Correlation Coefficient	.039	-.215
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.752	.076
		N	68	69
	New Thinking (F5.7/S26)	Correlation Coefficient	-.167	.442**
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.174	.000
		N	68	69
	Dept explores innovation (F5.7/S27*)	Correlation Coefficient	-.167	.348**
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.173	.004
		N	68	68
	NSC Access (F5.8/S28)	Correlation Coefficient	-.078	-.073
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.529	.553
		N	68	68
	Impact of O's Informal Access (F5.8/S29)	Correlation Coefficient	.504**	-.248**
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.044
		N	65	66
	Dept influence on NSC (F5.6_5.8/S30)	Correlation Coefficient	.171	-.185
		Sig. (2-tailed)	.166	.134
		N	67	67

Correlations

Spearman's rho		Perception risk for self (F5.4/S5)	Department acts (F5.5/S6)	Dept Structure daily (F5.5/S7)
NSC Procedures (F5.8/S31*)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.090 .478 64	.072 .571 64	-.095 .457 64
Privileged access NSC (F5.8/S32)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.005 .965 67	-.210 .091 66	.128 .303 67
Level within Interagency (F5.7/B)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.052 .673 69	.004 .975 68	-.209 .084 69
Level/Position within A's Hierarchy (F5.7/C)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.086 .483 69	.048 .696 68	-.195 .108 69
Educational Background (F5.7/D)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.238* .049 69	-.022 .856 68	.076 .537 69
Status w/in Agency (F5.7/E)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.119 .330 69	-.178 .146 68	.079 .521 69

Correlations

Spearman's rho	Other Agencies Act (F5.3/S1a)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	Dept Structure Crisis (F5.5/S8)	Dept Mission (F5.5/S9)	Dept Ldr Style (F5.5/S10)	Dept Political Ideology (F5.5/S11)
			.026 .837 66	.237 .060 64	.103 .411 66	-.034 .786 65
	Other's Self-Interest Level (F5.3/S1b)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.091 .459 69	.116 .348 67	.145 .234 69	.182 .137 68
	Departments Interact (F5.3/S1c)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.145 .237 68	-.272* .027 66	-.036 .772 68	.118 .340 67
	Open Debate Generally (F5.3/S1d)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.019 .875 69	.006 .959 67	.131 .282 69	.118 .337 68
	Open Debate as Crisis Progresses (F5.3/S1e)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.121 .326 68	.142 .254 66	.212 .082 68	.238 .053 67
	Criteria set (F5.4/S2)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.090 .462 69	.140 .259 67	.055 .651 69	.192 .117 68
	Lead Agent_self (F5.4/S3)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.084 .506 65	-.029 .824 63	-.198 .114 65	.086 .501 64
	Agency's Experience (F5.4/S4)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.183 .133 69	.010 .938 67	-.196 .106 69	.213 .081 68
	Perception risk for self (F5.4/S5)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.010 .934 69	.036 .771 67	-.130 .289 69	.031 .801 68

Correlations

Spearman's rho	Department acts (F5.5/S6)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	Dept Structure Crisis (F5.5/S8)	Dept Mission (F5.5/S9)	Dept Ldr Style (F5.5/S10)	Dept Political Ideology (F5.5/S11)
			-.115 .350 68	.081 .517 66	.104 .397 68	.186 .132 67
	Dept Structure_daily (F5.5/S7)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.519** .000 69	.006 .964 67	-.301* .012 69	-.093 .450 68
	Dept Structure_Crisis (F5.5/S8)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	1.000 69	-.084 .500 67	-.280* .020 69	.111 .368 68
	Dept Mission (F5.5/S9)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.084 .500 67	1.000 .502 67	-.084 .502 67	.122 .330 66
	Dept Ldr Style (F5.5/S10)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.280* .020 69	-.084 .502 67	1.000 .143 68	-.180 .143 68
	Dept Political Ideology (F5.5/S11)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.111 .368 68	.122 .330 66	-.180 .143 68	1.000 .000 68
	Penalty for failure (F5.5/S12)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.074 .544 69	-.301* .013 67	-.317** .008 69	-.086 .484 68
	Comm in crisis (F5.5/S13*)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.089 .467 69	-.040 .746 67	-.312** .009 69	.033 .791 68
	Policy process o/c (F5.6/S14)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.377** .002 68	.069 .584 66	.497** .000 68	.142 .247 68

Correlations

		Dept Structure Crisis (F5.5/S8)	Dept Mission (F5.5/S9)	Dept Ldr Style (F5.5/S10)	Dept Political Ideology (F5.5/S11)
Spearman's rho	Innov sojn ability (F5.7/S23)	.033	.053	-.125	.035
	Correlation Coefficient				
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.790	.669	.306	.774
	N	69	67	69	68
	Bureaucratic Experience (F5.7/S24)				
	Correlation Coefficient	.089	.055	.047	.059
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.469	.660	.706	.638
	N	68	66	68	67
	Length of service (F5.7/S24a)				
	Correlation Coefficient	-.058	-.170	.184	-.189
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.634	.168	.130	.124
	N	69	67	69	68
	Dept dec-mkg style (F5.5/S25)				
	Correlation Coefficient	-.379**	-.050	.548**	.041
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.001	.691	.000	.742
	N	69	67	69	68
	New Thinking (F5.7/S26)				
	Correlation Coefficient	.372**	-.060	-.423**	-.061
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.002	.629	.000	.623
	N	69	67	69	68
	Dept explores innovation (F5.7/S27*)				
	Correlation Coefficient	.189	.138	-.356**	-.030
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.122	.270	.003	.807
	N	68	66	68	67
	NSC Access (F5.8/S28)				
	Correlation Coefficient	.158	-.132	.162	-.063
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.197	.292	.186	.613
	N	68	66	68	67
	Impact of O's Informal Access (F5.8/S29)				
	Correlation Coefficient	-.005	-.062	.097	.041
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.968	.628	.436	.744
	N	66	64	66	65
	Dept influence on NSC (F5.6_5.8/S30)				
	Correlation Coefficient	-.160	-.134	.207	.074
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.197	.287	.093	.553
	N	67	65	67	67

Correlations

Spearman's rho		Dept Structure Crisis (F5.5/S8)	Dept Mission (F5.5/S9)	Dept Ldr Style (F5.5/S10)	Dept Political Ideology (F5.5/S11)
		Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N
NSC Procedures (F5.8/S31*)	NSC Procedures (F5.8/S31*)	-.013 .921 64	-.154 .227 63	.267* .033 64	-.128 .314 64
	Privileged access NSC (F5.8/S32)	.070 .573 67	.081 .519 65	-.126 .310 67	-.025 .840 66
	Level within Interagency (F5.7/B)	-.030 .804 69	-.171 .168 67	.131 .283 69	.149 .225 68
	Level/Position within A's Hierarchy (F5.7/C)	.069 .571 69	.137 .269 67	.082 .503 69	.121 .327 68
	Educational Background (F5.7/D)	-.062 .613 69	-.274* .025 67	-.036 .768 69	.024 .847 68
Status w/in Agency (F5.7/E)	Status w/in Agency (F5.7/E)	.021 .866 69	-.330** .006 67	.196 .106 69	-.278* .022 68

Correlations

Spearman's rho		Penalty for failure (F5.5/S12)	Comm in crisis (F5.5/S13*)	Policy process o/c (F5.6/S14)	Desired End State (F0/S16a)
Other Agencies Act (F5.3/S1a)	Correlation Coefficient	-.254*	-.256*	-.002	-.044
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.040	.038	.986	.725
	N	66	66	65	66
Other's Self-Interest Level (F5.3/S1b)	Correlation Coefficient	-.061	-.197	.063	-.099
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.617	.105	.612	.417
	N	69	69	68	69
Departments Interact (F5.3/S1c)	Correlation Coefficient	.269*	.220	-.131	-.108
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.027	.071	.290	.382
	N	68	68	67	68
Open Debate Generally (F5.3/S1d)	Correlation Coefficient	.010	.017	.348**	.096
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.936	.892	.004	.431
	N	69	69	68	69
Open Debate as Crisis Progresses (F5.3/S1e)	Correlation Coefficient	-.092	.084	.074	-.172
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.456	.495	.554	.162
	N	68	68	67	68
Criteria set (F5.4/S2)	Correlation Coefficient	-.111	.047	.193	-.089
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.365	.704	.115	.465
	N	69	69	68	69
Lead Agent_self (F5.4/S3)	Correlation Coefficient	.231	.135	-.192	-.223
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.064	.283	.128	.074
	N	65	65	64	65
Agency's Experience (F5.4/S4)	Correlation Coefficient	.105	.025	-.132	-.142
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.391	.836	.282	.244
	N	69	69	68	69
Perception risk for self (F5.4/S5)	Correlation Coefficient	.212	.008	.005	-.181
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.080	.950	.965	.137
	N	69	69	68	69

Correlations

Spearman's rho	Department acts (F5.5/S6)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	Penalty for failure (F5.5/S12)	Comm in crisis (F5.5/S13*)	Policy process o/c (F5.6/S14)	Desired End State (F0/S16a)
			-.249*	-.052	.100	-.021
			.040	.673	.421	.865
			68	68	67	68
	Dept Structure_daily (F5.5/S7)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.123	.099	-.361**	-.113
			.316	.417	.003	.357
			69	69	68	69
	Dept Structure_Crisis (F5.5/S8)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.074	.089	-.377**	-.253*
			.544	.467	.002	.036
			69	69	68	69
	Dept Mission (F5.5/S9)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.301*	-.040	.069	-.115
			.013	.746	.584	.355
			67	67	66	67
	Dept Ldr Style (F5.5/S10)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.317**	-.312**	.497**	.278*
			.008	.009	.000	.021
			69	69	68	69
	Dept Political Ideology (F5.5/S11)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.086	.033	.142	-.042
			.484	.791	.247	.732
			68	68	68	68
	Penalty for failure (F5.5/S12)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	1.000	.192	-.159	-.290*
			.	.115	.194	.016
			69	69	68	69
	Comm in crisis (F5.5/S13*)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.192	1.000	-.224	-.261*
			.115	.	.066	.030
			69	69	68	69
	Policy process o/c (F5.6/S14)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.159	-.224	1.000	.341*
			.194	.066	.	.004
			68	68	68	68

Correlations

Spearman's rho	Desired End State (F0/S16a)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	Penalty for failure (F5.5/S12)	Comm in crisis (F5.5/S13*)	Policy process o/c (F5.6/S14)	Desired End State (F0/S16a)
			-.290*	-.261*	.341**	1.000
			.016	.030	.004	
			69	69	68	69
	Termination Criteria (F0/S16b)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.228	-.281*	.073	.500**
			.061	.020	.558	.000
			68	68	67	68
	Termination Strategy (F0/S16c)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.056	-.028	.081	.354**
			.652	.819	.512	.003
			68	68	67	68
	Dept Accountability (F5.6/S17)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.164	-.050	-.042	.130
			.178	.683	.737	.287
			69	69	68	69
	Planning Focus (F5.6/S18)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.258*	-.181	-.119	.026
			.032	.137	.333	.834
			69	69	68	69
	IA Behavior_Depts (F5.6/S19*)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.225	-.233	.216	-.026
			.064	.056	.080	.835
			68	68	67	68
	Level of Analysis (F5.7/S20)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.011	-.106	.136	-.077
			.930	.391	.269	.533
			68	68	68	68
	Analysis for Crises (F5.7/S21)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.105	-.262*	.161	.013
			.394	.031	.193	.916
			68	68	67	68
	Maj crisis analysis (F5.7/S22)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.005	.003	-.007	-.175
			.967	.980	.954	.154
			68	68	67	68

Correlations

Spearman's rho	Innov soim ability (F5.7/S23)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	Penalty for failure (F5.5/S12)	Comm in crisis (F5.5/S13*)	Policy process o/c (F5.6/S14)	Desired End State (F0/S16a)
			.060	.147	-.055	.019
			.625	.229	.655	.875
			69	69	68	69
	Bureaucratic Experience (F5.7/S24)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.103	.014	.132	.008
			.404	.908	.288	.946
			68	68	67	68
	Length of service (F5.7/S24a)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.192	.192	-.069	.005
			.115	.114	.577	.967
			69	69	68	69
	Dept dec-mkg style (F5.5/S25)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.230	-.200	.543**	.156
			.057	.100	.000	.199
			69	69	68	69
	New Thinking (F5.7/S26)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.066	.161	-.364**	-.033
			.588	.187	.002	.790
			69	69	68	69
	Dept explores innovation (F5.7/S27*)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.036	.168	-.265*	.054
			.772	.172	.030	.664
			68	68	67	68
	NSC Access (F5.8/S28)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.076	-.228	-.083	-.070
			.539	.062	.506	.569
			68	68	67	68
	Impact of O's Informal Access (F5.8/S29)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.004	.004	.164	-.111
			.973	.972	.192	.375
			66	66	65	66
	Dept influence on NSC (F5.6_5.8/S30)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.125	-.070	.387**	.144
			.315	.576	.001	.244
			67	67	67	67

Correlations

Spearman's rho		Penalty for failure (F5.5/S12)	Comm in crisis (F5.5/S13*)	Policy process o/c (F5.6/S14)	Desired End State (F0/S16a)
NSC Procedures (F5.8/S31*)	Correlation Coefficient	-.074	-.096	.280*	.331*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.564	.449	.025	.008
Privileged access NSC (F5.8/S32)	N	64	64	64	64
	Correlation Coefficient	.007	-.173	.014	.000
Level within Interagency (F5.7/B)	Sig. (2-tailed)	.958	.161	.909	.998
	N	67	67	66	67
Level/Position within A's Hierarchy (F5.7/C)	Correlation Coefficient	.002	-.125	.150	.129
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.988	.305	.221	.290
Educational Background (F5.7/D)	N	69	69	68	69
	Correlation Coefficient	-.147	-.170	.138	.094
Status w/in Agency (F5.7/E)	Sig. (2-tailed)	.227	.163	.261	.440
	N	69	69	68	69
	Correlation Coefficient	.013	-.046	-.222	-.019
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.918	.707	.069	.880
	N	69	69	68	69
	Correlation Coefficient	.170	-.025	.042	.026
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.161	.836	.737	.831
	N	69	69	68	69

Correlations

Spearman's rho	Termination Criteria (F0/S16b)	Termination Strategy (F0/16c)	Dept Accountability (F5.6/S17)	Planning Focus (F5.6/S18)
Other Agencies Act (F5.3/S1a)	.151	.173	-.075	.182
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.169	.549	.143
	N	65	66	66
Other's Self-Interest Level (F5.3/S1b)	.037	.048	.047	.132
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.697	.701	.278
	N	68	69	69
Departments Interact (F5.3/S1c)	-.032	.004	.037	-.177
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.797	.767	.148
	N	67	68	68
Open Debate Generally (F5.3/S1d)	.291*	.172	-.048	-.146
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.016	.698	.230
	N	68	69	69
Open Debate as Crisis Progresses (F5.3/S1e)	.025	.036	.041	.038
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.838	.743	.760
	N	67	68	68
Criteria set (F5.4/S2)	-.035	-.089	-.112	.070
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.780	.358	.567
	N	68	69	69
Lead Agent_self (F5.4/S3)	-.155	-.181	-.029	.204
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.220	.817	.103
	N	64	65	65
Agency's Experience (F5.4/S4)	.054	.013	.158	-.122
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.659	.194	.317
	N	68	69	69
Perception risk for self (F5.4/S5)	-.063	.033	.041	-.168
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.612	.737	.169
	N	68	69	69

Correlations

Spearman's rho	Termination Criteria (F0/S16b)	Termination Strategy (F0/16c)	Dept Accountability (F5.6/S17)	Planning Focus (F5.6/S18)
Department acts (F5.5/S6)	.053	.138	.046	.175
Correlation Coefficient				
Sig. (2-tailed)	.671	.267	.711	.153
N	67	67	68	68
Dept Structure_daily (F5.5/S7)	-.023	.061	.107	.067
Correlation Coefficient				
Sig. (2-tailed)	.852	.623	.382	.584
N	68	68	69	69
Dept Structure_Crisis (F5.5/S8)	-.031	-.110	-.020	-.048
Correlation Coefficient				
Sig. (2-tailed)	.801	.372	.871	.695
N	68	68	69	69
Dept Mission (F5.5/S9)	-.123	-.177	-.108	.181
Correlation Coefficient				
Sig. (2-tailed)	.324	.155	.385	.143
N	66	66	67	67
Dept Ldr Style (F5.5/S10)	.208	.133	.155	-.007
Correlation Coefficient				
Sig. (2-tailed)	.088	.281	.204	.955
N	68	68	69	69
Dept Political Ideology (F5.5/S11)	.164	.064	-.025	-.059
Correlation Coefficient				
Sig. (2-tailed)	.185	.607	.841	.631
N	67	67	68	68
Penalty for failure (F5.5/S12)	-.228	-.056	.164	-.258*
Correlation Coefficient				
Sig. (2-tailed)	.061	.652	.178	.032
N	68	68	69	69
Comm in crisis (F5.5/S13*)	-.281*	-.028	-.050	-.181
Correlation Coefficient				
Sig. (2-tailed)	.020	.819	.683	.137
N	68	68	69	69
Policy process o/c (F5.6/S14)	.073	.081	-.042	-.119
Correlation Coefficient				
Sig. (2-tailed)	.558	.512	.737	.333
N	67	67	68	68

Correlations

Spearman's rho	Desired End State (F0/S16a)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	Termination Criteria (F0/S16b)	Termination Strategy (F0/16c)	Dept Accountability (F5.6/S17)	Planning Focus (F5.6/S18)
			.500** .000 68	.354** .003 68	.130 .287 69	.026 .834 69
	Termination Criteria (F0/S16b)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	1.000 .000 68	.485** .000 68	.143 .243 68	.025 .840 68
	Termination Strategy (F0/16c)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.485** .000 68	1.000 .000 68	.325** .007 68	-.119 .332 68
	Dept Accountability (F5.6/S17)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.143 .243 68	.325** .007 68	1.000 .000 69	-.052 .669 69
	Planning Focus (F5.6/S18)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.025 .840 68	-.119 .332 68	-.052 .669 69	1.000 .000 69
	IA Behavior_Depts (F5.6/S19*)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.171 .167 67	.266* .030 67	-.029 .815 68	.051 .680 68
	Level of Analysis (F5.7/S20)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.085 .496 67	-.011 .929 67	-.132 .282 68	.033 .786 68
	Analysis for Crises (F5.7/S21)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.046 .711 67	-.020 .870 67	-.093 .452 68	-.077 .535 68
	Maj crisis analysis (F5.7/S22)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.066 .598 67	-.009 .941 67	-.022 .858 68	-.189 .122 68

Correlations

Spearman's rho	Innov soln ability (F5.7/S23)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	Termination Criteria (F0/S16b)	Termination Strategy (F0/16c)	Dept Accountability (F5.6/S17)	Planning Focus (F5.6/S18)
			-.093	-.063	.248*	.001
			.453	.607	.040	.996
			68	68	69	69
	Bureaucratic Experience (F5.7/S24)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.000	.094	.035	-.066
			.999	.448	.778	.592
			67	67	68	68
	Length of service (F5.7/S24a)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.134	-.113	.150	-.221
			.274	.360	.219	.068
			68	68	69	69
	Dept dec-mkg style (F5.5/S25)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.123	.165	-.041	.071
			.319	.179	.739	.562
			68	68	69	69
	New Thinking (F5.7/S26)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.032	-.229	-.112	.015
			.795	.061	.362	.899
			68	68	69	69
	Dept explores innovation (F5.7/S27*)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.040	-.185	-.137	.175
			.747	.133	.264	.153
			67	67	68	68
	NSC Access (F5.8/S28)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.210	-.094	-.054	.196
			.088	.450	.664	.110
			67	67	68	68
	Impact of O's Informal Access (F5.8/S29)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.027	.117	-.080	.001
			.832	.354	.521	.993
			65	65	66	66
	Dept influence on NSC (F5.6_5.8/S30)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.226	.344**	.163	-.270*
			.068	.005	.189	.027
			66	66	67	67

Correlations

Spearman's rho		Termination Criteria (F0/S16b)	Termination Strategy (F0/16c)	Dept Accountability (F5.6/S17)	Planning Focus (F5.6/S18)
NSC Procedures (F5.8/S31*)	Correlation Coefficient	.220	.392**	.156	-.218
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.083	.002	.217	.083
	N	63	63	64	64
Privileged access NSC (F5.8/S32)	Correlation Coefficient	-.133	-.129	.126	-.130
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.288	.301	.310	.295
	N	66	66	67	67
Level within Interagency (F5.7/B)	Correlation Coefficient	.287*	.347**	.011	-.093
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.018	.004	.929	.448
	N	68	68	69	69
Level/Position within A's Hierarchy (F5.7/C)	Correlation Coefficient	.147	.012	-.199	-.173
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.232	.925	.101	.155
	N	68	68	69	69
Educational Background (F5.7/D)	Correlation Coefficient	.130	.253*	.190	.117
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.292	.037	.119	.336
	N	68	68	69	69
Status w/in Agency (F5.7/E)	Correlation Coefficient	-.100	-.075	-.046	-.208
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.415	.543	.710	.087
	N	68	68	69	69

Correlations

Spearman's rho	Other Agencies Act (F5.3/S1a)	IA Behavior Depts (F5.6/S19*)	Level of Analysis (F5.7/S20)	Analysis for Crises (F5.7/S21)	Maj crisis analysis (F5.7/S22)
Correlation Coefficient		.481**	.073	-.001	-.072
Sig. (2-tailed)		.000	.565	.993	.568
N		66	65	65	65
Other's Self-Interest Level (F5.3/S1b)		.267*	.194	.160	-.024
Correlation Coefficient		.027	.113	.192	.849
Sig. (2-tailed)		.68	.68	.68	.68
N					
Departments Interact (F5.3/S1c)		-.097	-.156	-.227	-.017
Correlation Coefficient		.434	.208	.064	.891
Sig. (2-tailed)		.67	.67	.67	.67
N					
Open Debate Generally (F5.3/S1d)		.061	.177	.062	.031
Correlation Coefficient		.623	.149	.617	.802
Sig. (2-tailed)		.68	.68	.68	.68
N					
Open Debate as Crisis Progresses (F5.3/S1e)		.143	.124	.052	.087
Correlation Coefficient		.247	.316	.676	.484
Sig. (2-tailed)		.67	.67	.67	.67
N					
Criteria set (F5.4/S2)		.079	.201	.109	.187
Correlation Coefficient		.524	.101	.378	.126
Sig. (2-tailed)		.68	.68	.68	.68
N					
Lead Agent_self (F5.4/S3)		-.199	-.161	-.278*	-.070
Correlation Coefficient		.115	.204	.025	.577
Sig. (2-tailed)		.64	.64	.65	.65
N					
Agency's Experience (F5.4/S4)		.013	.227	.304*	.204
Correlation Coefficient		.919	.062	.012	.095
Sig. (2-tailed)		.68	.68	.68	.68
N					
Perception risk for self (F5.4/S5)		-.077	-.104	-.113	-.061
Correlation Coefficient		.532	.400	.360	.619
Sig. (2-tailed)		.68	.68	.68	.68
N					

Correlations

Spearman's rho	Department acts (F5.5/S6)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	IA Behavior Depts (F5.6/S19*)	Level of Analysis (F5.7/S20)	Analysis for Crises (F5.7/S21)	Maj crisis analysis (F5.7/S22)
			.769** .000 68	.113 .362 67	-.012 .922 67	.014 .913 67
	Dept Structure_daily (F5.5/S7)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.156 .203 68	.084 .497 68	.085 .491 68	.147 .230 68
	Dept Structure_Crisis (F5.5/S8)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.100 .416 68	-.012 .920 68	.046 .709 68	.066 .595 68
	Dept Mission (F5.5/S9)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.093 .457 66	.156 .210 66	.173 .164 66	-.084 .502 66
	Dept Ldr Style (F5.5/S10)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.139 .257 68	-.011 .932 68	.071 .567 68	.077 .535 68
	Dept Political Ideology (F5.5/S11)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.138 .266 67	.027 .825 68	-.024 .848 67	.040 .750 67
	Penalty for failure (F5.5/S12)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.225 .064 68	.011 .930 68	-.105 .394 68	.005 .967 68
	Comm in crisis (F5.5/S13*)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.233 .056 68	-.106 .391 68	-.262* .031 68	.003 .980 68
	Policy process o/c (F5.6/S14)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.216 .080 67	.136 .269 68	.161 .193 67	-.007 .954 67

Correlations

Spearman's rho	Innov soln ability (F5.7/S23)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	IA Behavior Depts (F5.6/S19*)	Level of Analysis (F5.7/S20)	Analysis for Crises (F5.7/S21)	Maj crisis analysis (F5.7/S22)
			-.243*	-.199	-.281*	-.186
			.046	.104	.020	.128
			68	68	68	68
	Bureaucratic Experience (F5.7/S24)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.085	-.159	-.098	.079
			.496	.198	.430	.526
			67	67	67	67
	Length of service (F5.7/S24a)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.195	-.066	-.101	.015
			.111	.595	.412	.901
			68	68	68	68
	Dept dec-mkg style (F5.5/S25)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.177	-.083	-.109	.108
			.150	.500	.376	.380
			68	68	68	68
	New Thinking (F5.7/S26)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.274*	-.005	-.042	.062
			.024	.967	.736	.618
			68	68	68	68
	Dept explores innovation (F5.7/S27*)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.302*	.026	-.052	-.070
			.012	.836	.675	.576
			68	67	67	67
	NSC Access (F5.8/S28)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.062	-.094	-.077	-.178
			.617	.451	.534	.149
			68	67	67	67
	Impact of O's Informal Access (F5.8/S29)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.422**	.328**	.267*	.134
			.000	.008	.030	.286
			65	65	66	65
	Dept influence on NSC (F5.6_5.8/S30)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.284*	.184	.143	.011
			.020	.136	.252	.928
			67	67	66	66

Correlations

Spearman's rho	NSC Procedures (F5.8/S31*)		IA Behavior Depts (F5.6/S19*)	Level of Analysis (F5.7/S20)	Analysis for Crises (F5.7/S21)	Maj crisis analysis (F5.7/S22)
	Correlation Coefficient	Sig. (2-tailed) N				
Privileged access NSC (F5.8/S32)	Correlation Coefficient		.163	.131	.055	.011
	Sig. (2-tailed) N		.198	.301	.667	.929
Level within Interagency (F5.7/B)	Correlation Coefficient		.64	.64	.63	.63
	Sig. (2-tailed) N		-.209	.090	.214	-.091
Level/Position within A's Hierarchy (F5.7/C)	Correlation Coefficient		.091	.473	.085	.465
	Sig. (2-tailed) N		.66	.66	.66	.66
Educational Background (F5.7/D)	Correlation Coefficient		.165	.051	.071	-.012
	Sig. (2-tailed) N		.178	.677	.562	.920
Status w/in Agency (F5.7/E)	Correlation Coefficient		.68	.68	.68	.68
	Sig. (2-tailed) N		.170	.150	.260*	.035
	Correlation Coefficient		.166	.222	.032	.776
	Sig. (2-tailed) N		.68	.68	.68	.68
	Correlation Coefficient		-.012	-.016	-.087	.042
	Sig. (2-tailed) N		.923	.899	.478	.736
	Correlation Coefficient		.68	.68	.68	.68
	Sig. (2-tailed) N		-.171	-.016	.003	-.024
	Correlation Coefficient		.163	.895	.982	.845
	Sig. (2-tailed) N		.68	.68	.68	.68

Correlations

Spearman's rho	Other Agencies Act (F5.3/S1a)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	Innov soln ability (F5.7/S23)	Bureaucratic Experience (F5.7/S24)	Length of service (F5.7/S24a)	Dept dec-mkg style (F5.5/S25)
			-.182 .143 66	-.172 .171 65	-.188 .131 66	.125 .316 66
	Other's Self-Interest Level (F5.3/S1b)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.125 .305 69	-.168 .171 68	-.073 .550 69	.092 .450 69
	Departments Interact (F5.3/S1c)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.071 .567 68	.000 .998 67	.214 .079 68	-.073 .555 68
	Open Debate Generally (F5.3/S1d)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.081 .506 69	.036 .770 68	-.173 .156 69	.160 .190 69
	Open Debate as Crisis Progresses (F5.3/S1e)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.065 .600 68	.016 .901 67	-.013 .918 68	.164 .181 68
	Criteria set (F5.4/S2)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.102 .404 69	-.005 .968 68	-.094 .444 69	.107 .383 69
	Lead Agent_self (F5.4/S3)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.147 .243 65	.182 .151 64	.089 .479 65	.011 .932 65
	Agency's Experience (F5.4/S4)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.152 .213 69	.009 .944 68	-.040 .742 69	-.105 .390 69
	Perception risk for self (F5.4/S5)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.045 .711 69	-.029 .813 68	.088 .471 69	-.046 .706 69

Correlations

Spearman's rho	Department acts (F5.5/S6)	Innov soln ability (F5.7/S23)	Bureaucratic Experience (F5.7/S24)	Length of service (F5.7/S24a)	Dept dec-mkg style (F5.5/S25)
	Correlation Coefficient				
	Sig. (2-tailed)				
	N				
	Dept Structure_daily (F5.5/S7)				
	Correlation Coefficient				
	Sig. (2-tailed)				
	N				
	Dept Structure_Crisis (F5.5/S8)				
	Correlation Coefficient				
	Sig. (2-tailed)				
	N				
	Dept Mission (F5.5/S9)				
	Correlation Coefficient				
	Sig. (2-tailed)				
	N				
	Dept Ldr Style (F5.5/S10)				
	Correlation Coefficient				
	Sig. (2-tailed)				
	N				
	Dept Political Ideology (F5.5/S11)				
	Correlation Coefficient				
	Sig. (2-tailed)				
	N				
	Penalty for failure (F5.5/S12)				
	Correlation Coefficient				
	Sig. (2-tailed)				
	N				
	Comm in crisis (F5.5/S13*)				
	Correlation Coefficient				
	Sig. (2-tailed)				
	N				
	Policy process o/c (F5.6/S14)				
	Correlation Coefficient				
	Sig. (2-tailed)				
	N				

Correlations

Spearman's rho	Desired End State (F0/S16a)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	Innov soln ability (F5.7/S23)	Bureaucratic Experience (F5.7/S24)	Length of service (F5.7/S24a)	Dept dec-mkg style (F5.5/S25)
			.019	.008	.005	.156
			.875	.946	.967	.199
			69	68	69	69
	Termination Criteria (F0/S16b)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.093	.000	-.134	.123
			.453	.999	.274	.319
			68	67	68	68
	Termination Strategy (F0/S16c)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.063	.094	-.113	.165
			.607	.448	.360	.179
			68	67	68	68
	Dept Accountability (F5.6/S17)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.248*	.035	.150	-.041
			.040	.778	.219	.739
			69	68	69	69
	Planning Focus (F5.6/S18)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.001	-.066	-.221	.071
			.996	.592	.068	.562
			69	68	69	69
	IA Behavior_Depts (F5.6/S19*)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.243*	.085	-.195	.177
			.046	.496	.111	.150
			68	67	68	68
	Level of Analysis (F5.7/S20)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.199	-.159	-.066	-.083
			.104	.198	.595	.500
			68	67	68	68
	Analysis for Crises (F5.7/S21)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.281*	-.098	-.101	-.109
			.020	.430	.412	.376
			68	67	68	68
	Maj crisis analysis (F5.7/S22)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.186	.079	.015	.108
			.128	.526	.901	.380
			68	67	68	68

Correlations

Spearman's rho	Innov soln ability (F5.7/S23)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	Innov soln ability (F5.7/S23)	Bureaucratic Experience (F5.7/S24)	Length of service (F5.7/S24a)	Dept dec-mkg style (F5.5/S25)
			1.000	.263*	.168	-.054
			69	.030	.168	.657
				68	69	69
Bureaucratic Experience (F5.7/S24)		Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.263*	1.000	.184	.133
			.030		.133	.279
			68	68	68	68
Length of service (F5.7/S24a)		Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.168	.184	1.000	-.058
			.168	.133		.638
			69	68	69	69
Dept dec-mkg style (F5.5/S25)		Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.054	.133	-.058	1.000
			.657	.279	.638	
			69	68	69	69
New Thinking (F5.7/S26)		Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.137	-.180	-.029	-.315**
			.262	.142	.814	.008
			69	68	69	69
Dept explores innovation (F5.7/S27*)		Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.126	-.220	-.125	-.232
			.307	.073	.311	.057
			68	67	68	68
NSC Access (F5.8/S28)		Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.070	.048	.213	.106
			.569	.697	.081	.388
			68	67	68	68
Impact of O's Informal Access (F5.8/S29)		Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.293*	.208	-.112	.009
			.017	.096	.370	.945
			66	65	66	66
Dept influence on NSC (F5.6_5.8/S30)		Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.083	-.087	-.010	.006
			.504	.490	.936	.961
			67	66	67	67

Correlations

Spearman's rho	NSC Procedures (F5.8/S31*)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	Innov soln ability (F5.7/S23)	Bureaucratic Experience (F5.7/S24)	Length of service (F5.7/S24a)	Dept dec-mkg style (F5.5/S25)
			.068 .593 64	-.152 .233 63	-.040 .756 64	.125 .326 64
	Privileged access NSC (F5.8/S32)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.095 .447 67	-.051 .682 66	-.134 .279 67	-.119 .338 67
	Level within Interagency (F5.7/B)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.193 .112 69	-.220 .072 68	-.160 .188 69	.161 .186 69
	Level/Position within A's Hierarchy (F5.7/C)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.233 .054 69	-.208 .089 68	-.103 .401 69	-.054 .657 69
	Educational Background (F5.7/D)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.062 .610 69	-.133 .281 68	-.005 .966 69	-.047 .702 69
	Status w/in Agency (F5.7/E)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.055 .652 69	-.138 .263 68	.240* .047 69	.134 .273 69

Correlations

Spearman's rho	Other Agencies Act (F5.3/S1a)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	New Thinking (F5.7/S26)	Dept explores innovation (F5.7/S27*)	NSC Access (F5.8/S28)	Impact of O's Informal Access (F5.8/S29)
			-.033	-.098	.170	.284*
			.790	.432	.172	.024
			66	66	66	63
	Other's Self-Interest Level (F5.3/S1b)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.320**	-.314**	.065	.126
			.007	.009	.601	.313
			69	68	68	66
	Departments Interact (F5.3/S1c)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.011	-.060	.066	-.073
			.929	.627	.598	.563
			68	67	67	65
	Open Debate Generally (F5.3/S1d)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.176	-.122	-.075	.263*
			.147	.320	.542	.033
			69	68	68	66
	Open Debate as Crisis Progresses (F5.3/S1e)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.063	-.056	.104	.023
			.608	.653	.404	.856
			68	67	67	65
	Criteria set (F5.4/S2)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.021	-.072	.126	.025
			.867	.559	.307	.841
			69	68	68	66
	Lead Agent_self (F5.4/S3)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.283*	.232	.126	-.206
			.022	.065	.320	.106
			65	64	64	63
	Agency's Experience (F5.4/S4)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.029	.029	-.048	.176
			.811	.815	.699	.157
			69	68	68	66
	Perception risk for self (F5.4/S5)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.068	-.134	.136	.193
			.576	.275	.268	.120
			69	68	68	66

Correlations

Spearman's rho	Department acts (F5.5/S6)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	New Thinking (F5.7/S26)	Dept explores innovation (F5.7/S27*)	NSC Access (F5.8/S28)	Impact of O's Informal Access (F5.8/S29)
			-.167 .174 68	-.167 .173 68	-.078 .529 68	.504** .000 65
	Dept Structure_daily (F5.5/S7)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.442** .000 69	.348** .004 68	-.073 .553 68	-.248* .044 66
	Dept Structure_Crisis (F5.5/S8)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.372** .002 69	.189 .122 68	.158 .197 68	-.005 .968 66
	Dept Mission (F5.5/S9)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.060 .629 67	.138 .270 66	-.132 .292 66	-.062 .628 64
	Dept Ldr Style (F5.5/S10)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.423** .000 69	-.356** .003 68	.162 .186 68	.097 .436 66
	Dept Political Ideology (F5.5/S11)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.061 .623 68	-.030 .807 67	-.063 .613 67	.041 .744 65
	Penalty for failure (F5.5/S12)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.066 .588 69	.036 .772 68	-.076 .539 68	.004 .973 66
	Comm in crisis (F5.5/S13*)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.161 .187 69	.168 .172 68	-.228 .062 68	.004 .972 66
	Policy process o/c (F5.6/S14)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.364** .002 68	-.265* .030 67	-.083 .506 67	.164 .192 65

Correlations

Spearman's rho		New Thinking (F5.7/S26)	Dept explores innovation (F5.7/S27*)	NSC Access (F5.8/S28)	Impact of O's Informal Access (F5.8/S29)
Desired End State (F0/S16a)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.033 .790 69	.054 .664 68	-.070 .569 68	-.111 .375 66
Termination Criteria (F0/S16b)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.032 .795 68	-.040 .747 67	.210 .088 67	.027 .832 65
Termination Strategy (F0/S16c)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.229 .061 68	-.185 .133 67	-.094 .450 67	.117 .354 65
Dept Accountability (F5.6/S17)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.112 .362 69	-.137 .264 68	-.054 .664 68	-.080 .521 66
Planning Focus (F5.6/S18)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.015 .899 69	.175 .153 68	.196 .110 68	.001 .993 66
IA Behavior_Depts (F5.6/S19*)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.274* .024 68	-.302* .012 68	-.062 .617 68	.422** .000 65
Level of Analysis (F5.7/S20)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.005 .967 68	.026 .836 67	-.094 .451 67	.328** .008 65
Analysis for Crises (F5.7/S21)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.042 .736 68	-.052 .675 67	-.077 .534 67	.267** .030 66
Maj crisis analysis (F5.7/S22)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.062 .618 68	-.070 .576 67	-.178 .149 67	.134 .286 65

Correlations

Spearman's rho	Innov soln ability (F5.7/S23)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	New Thinking (F5.7/S26)	Dept explores innovation (F5.7/S27*)	NSC Access (F5.8/S28)	Impact of O's Informal Access (F5.8/S29)
			.137	.126	.070	-.293*
			.262	.307	.569	.017
			69	68	68	66
	Bureaucratic Experience (F5.7/S24)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.180	-.220	.048	.208
			.142	.073	.697	.096
			68	67	67	65
	Length of service (F5.7/S24a)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.029	-.125	.213	-.112
			.814	.311	.081	.370
			69	68	68	66
	Dept dec-mkg style (F5.5/S25)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.315**	-.232	.106	.009
			.008	.057	.388	.945
			69	68	68	66
	New Thinking (F5.7/S26)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	1.000	.789**	.049	-.235
				.000	.692	.058
			69	68	68	66
	Dept explores Innovation (F5.7/S27*)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.789**	1.000	-.176	-.354**
			.000	.	.151	.004
			68	68	68	65
	NSC Access (F5.8/S28)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.049	-.176	1.000	-.094
			.692	.151	.	.457
			68	68	68	65
	Impact of O's Informal Access (F5.8/S29)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.235	-.354**	-.094	1.000
			.058	.004	.457	.
			66	65	65	66
	Dept influence on NSC (F5.6_5.8/S30)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.342**	-.335**	-.071	.254*
			.005	.006	.567	.043
			67	67	67	64

Correlations

Spearman's rho		New Thinking (F5.7/S26)	Dept explores innovation (F5.7/S27*)	NSC Access (F5.8/S28)	Impact of O's Informal Access (F5.8/S29)
NSC Procedures (F5.8/S31*)	Correlation Coefficient	-.178	-.287*	-.100	.253*
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.160	.022	.434	.049
Privileged access NSC (F5.8/S32)	N	64	64	64	61
	Correlation Coefficient	.051	.062	.	-.029
Level within Interagency (F5.7/B)	Sig. (2-tailed)	.683	.622	.	.821
	N	67	66	66	65
Level/Position within A's Hierarchy (F5.7/C)	Correlation Coefficient	-.120	-.032	-.146	.147
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.326	.795	.235	.240
Educational Background (F5.7/D)	N	69	68	68	66
	Correlation Coefficient	-.022	-.012	-.119	.160
Status w/in Agency (F5.7/E)	Sig. (2-tailed)	.859	.925	.332	.200
	N	69	68	68	66
Status w/in Agency (F5.7/E)	Correlation Coefficient	-.171	-.237	.051	-.126
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.160	.052	.681	.314
Status w/in Agency (F5.7/E)	N	69	68	68	66
	Correlation Coefficient	.052	.100	.051	-.104
Status w/in Agency (F5.7/E)	Sig. (2-tailed)	.671	.419	.681	.407
	N	69	68	68	66

Correlations

Spearman's rho	Other Agencies Act (F5.3/S1a)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	Dept influence on NSC (F5.6_5.8/S30)	NSC Procedures (F5.8/S31*)	Privileged access NSC (F5.8/S32)	Level within Interagency (F5.7/B)
			.148 .240 65	.165 .200 62	-.001 .995 64	.113 .368 66
	Other's Self-Interest Level (F5.3/S1b)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.035 .776 67	.187 .139 64	.039 .757 67	-.065 .595 69
	Departments Interact (F5.3/S1c)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.009 .944 66	.058 .651 63	-.353** .004 66	.038 .757 68
	Open Debate Generally (F5.3/S1d)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.257* .036 67	.403** .001 64	-.044 .722 67	.319** .007 69
	Open Debate as Crisis Progresses (F5.3/S1e)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.180 .148 66	-.129 .314 63	-.202 .105 66	-.105 .395 68
	Criteria set (F5.4/S2)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.045 .719 67	.029 .821 64	-.033 .789 67	-.057 .641 69
	Lead Agent_self (F5.4/S3)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.336** .007 63	-.185 .157 60	-.001 .993 63	-.214 .087 65
	Agency's Experience (F5.4/S4)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.016 .895 67	-.129 .309 64	.000 1.000 67	.226 .062 69
	Perception risk for self (F5.4/S5)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.023 .852 67	.090 .478 64	.005 .965 67	-.052 .673 69

Correlations

Spearman's rho	Department acts (F5.5/S6)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	Dept influence on NSC (F5.6_5.8/S30)	NSC Procedures (F5.8/S31*)	Privileged access NSC (F5.8/S32)	Level within Interagency (F5.7/B)
			.171	.072	-.210	.004
			.166	.571	.091	.975
			67	64	66	68
	Dept Structure_daily (F5.5/S7)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.185	-.095	.128	-.209
			.134	.457	.303	.084
			67	64	67	69
	Dept Structure_Crisis (F5.5/S8)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.160	-.013	.070	-.030
			.197	.921	.573	.804
			67	64	67	69
	Dept Mission (F5.5/S9)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.134	-.154	.081	-.171
			.287	.227	.519	.168
			65	63	65	67
	Dept Ldr Style (F5.5/S10)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.207	.267*	-.126	.131
			.093	.033	.310	.283
			67	64	67	69
	Dept Political Ideology (F5.5/S11)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.074	-.128	-.025	.149
			.553	.314	.840	.225
			67	64	66	68
	Penalty for failure (F5.5/S12)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.125	-.074	.007	.002
			.315	.564	.958	.988
			67	64	67	69
	Comm in crisis (F5.5/S13*)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.070	-.096	-.173	-.125
			.576	.449	.161	.305
			67	64	67	69
	Policy process o/c (F5.6/S14)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.387**	.280*	.014	.150
			.001	.025	.909	.221
			67	64	66	68

Correlations

Spearman's rho	Desired End State (F0/S16a)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	Dept influence on NSC (F5.6_5.8/S30)	NSC Procedures (F5.8/S31*)	Privileged access NSC (F5.8/S32)	Level within Interagency (F5.7/B)
	Termination Criteria (F0/S16b)	.226 Sig. (2-tailed) N	.144 .244 67	.331** .008 64	.000 .998 67	.129 .290 69
	Termination Strategy (F0/S16c)	.344** Sig. (2-tailed) N	.226 .068 66	.220 .083 63	-.133 .288 66	.287* .018 68
	Dept Accountability (F5.6/S17)	.163 Sig. (2-tailed) N	.344** .005 66	.392** .002 63	-.129 .301 66	.347** .004 68
	Planning Focus (F5.6/S18)	-.270* Sig. (2-tailed) N	.183 .189 67	.156 .217 64	.126 .310 67	.011 .929 69
	IA Behavior_Depts (F5.6/S19*)	.284* Sig. (2-tailed) N	.027 67	-.218 .083 64	-.130 .295 67	-.093 .448 69
	Level of Analysis (F5.7/S20)	.184 Sig. (2-tailed) N	.284* .020 67	.163 .198 64	-.209 .091 66	.165 .178 68
	Analysis for Crises (F5.7/S21)	.143 Sig. (2-tailed) N	.184 .136 67	.131 .301 64	.090 .473 66	.051 .677 68
	Maj crisis analysis (F5.7/S22)	.011 Sig. (2-tailed) N	.143 .252 66	.055 .667 63	.214 .085 66	.071 .562 68
			.011 .928 66	.011 .929 63	-.091 .465 66	-.012 .920 68

Correlations

Spearman's rho	Innov soln ability (F5.7/S23)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	Dept influence on NSC (F5.6_5.8/S30)	NSC Procedures (F5.8/S31*)	Privileged access NSC (F5.8/S32)	Level within Interagency (F5.7/B)
			-.083 .504 67	.068 .593 64	.095 .447 67	-.193 .112 69
	Bureaucratic Experience (F5.7/S24)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.087 .490 66	-.152 .233 63	-.051 .682 66	-.220 .072 68
	Length of service (F5.7/S24a)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.010 .936 67	-.040 .756 64	-.134 .279 67	-.160 .188 69
	Dept dec-mkg style (F5.5/S25)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.006 .961 67	.125 .326 64	-.119 .338 67	.161 .186 69
	New Thinking (F5.7/S26)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.342** .005 67	-.178 .160 64	.051 .683 67	-.120 .326 69
	Dept explores innovation (F5.7/S27*)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.335** .006 67	-.287* .022 64	.062 .622 66	-.032 .795 68
	NSC Access (F5.8/S28)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.071 .567 67	-.100 .434 64	.	-.146 .235 68
	Impact of O's Informal Access (F5.8/S29)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.254* .043 64	.253* .049 61	-.029 .821 65	.147 .240 66
	Dept influence on NSC (F5.6_5.8/S30)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	1.000 .67	.410** .001 64	-.075 .553 65	.340** .005 67

Correlations

Spearman's rho	NSC Procedures (F5.8/S31*)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	Dept influence on NSC (F5.6, 5.8/S30)	NSC Procedures (F5.8/S31*)	Privileged access NSC (F5.8/S32)	Level within Interagency (F5.7/B)
			.410**	1.000	.000	.401**
			.001	.	.998	.001
			64	64	62	64
	Privileged access NSC (F5.8/S32)		-.075	.000	1.000	-.075
			.553	.998	.	.545
			65	62	67	67
	Level within Interagency (F5.7/B)		.340**	.401**	-.075	1.000
			.005	.001	.545	.
			67	64	67	69
	Level/Position within A's Hierarchy (F5.7/C)		.245*	.304*	-.043	.640**
			.046	.015	.730	.000
			67	64	67	69
	Educational Background (F5.7/D)		.141	.067	-.243*	.085
			.255	.601	.048	.489
			67	64	67	69
	Status w/in Agency (F5.7/E)		-.037	.165	.028	.120
			.766	.193	.822	.328
			67	64	67	69

Correlations

Spearman's rho		Level/Position within A's Hierarchy (F5.7/C)	Educational Background (F5.7/D)	Status w/in Agency (F5.7/E)
Other Agencies Act (F5.3/S1a)	Correlation Coefficient	.162	.136	.078
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.194	.276	.533
	N	66	66	66
	Other's Self-Interest Level (F5.3/S1b)	.015	.075	.078
	Correlation Coefficient	.904	.542	.526
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.69	.69	.69
	N	69	69	69
	Departments Interact (F5.3/S1c)	.025	-.037	.096
	Correlation Coefficient	.838	.767	.434
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.68	.68	.68
	N	68	68	68
	Open Debate Generally (F5.3/S1d)	.263*	.090	.094
Open Debate as Crisis Progresses (F5.3/S1e)	Correlation Coefficient	.029	.462	.444
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.69	.69	.69
	N	69	69	69
	Open Debate as Crisis Progresses (F5.3/S1e)	.003	-.090	-.064
	Correlation Coefficient	.978	.467	.602
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.68	.68	.68
	N	68	68	68
	Criteria set (F5.4/S2)	.014	-.125	-.253*
	Correlation Coefficient	.907	.306	.036
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.69	.69	.69
	N	69	69	69
	Lead Agent_self (F5.4/S3)	-.260*	.130	.034
Agency's Experience (F5.4/S4)	Correlation Coefficient	.036	.303	.787
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.65	.65	.65
	N	65	65	65
	Agency's Experience (F5.4/S4)	.182	-.046	-.064
	Correlation Coefficient	.134	.710	.599
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.69	.69	.69
	N	69	69	69
	Perception risk for self (F5.4/S5)	-.086	-.238*	-.119
	Correlation Coefficient	.483	.049	.330
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.69	.69	.69
	N	69	69	69

Correlations

Spearman's rho	Level/Position within A's Hierarchy (F5.7/C)	Educational Background (F5.7/D)	Status w/in Agency (F5.7/E)
Department acts (F5.5/S6)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.048 .696 68	-.178 .146 68
Dept Structure_daily (F5.5/S7)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.195 .108 69	.079 .521 69
Dept Structure_Crisis (F5.5/S8)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.069 .571 69	.021 .866 69
Dept Mission (F5.5/S9)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.137 .269 67	-.330** .006 67
Dept Ldr Style (F5.5/S10)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.082 .503 69	.196 .106 69
Dept Political Ideology (F5.5/S11)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.121 .327 68	-.278* .022 68
Penalty for failure (F5.5/S12)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.147 .227 69	.170 .161 69
Comm in crisis (F5.5/S13*)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.170 .163 69	-.025 .836 69
Policy process o/c (F5.6/S14)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.138 .261 68	.042 .737 68

Correlations

Spearman's rho		Level/Position within A's Hierarchy (F5.7/C)	Educational Background (F5.7/D)	Status w/in Agency (F5.7/E)
	Desired End State (F0/S16a)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.094 .440 69	.026 .831 69
	Termination Criteria (F0/S16b)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.147 .232 68	-.100 .415 68
	Termination Strategy (F0/S16c)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.012 .925 68	-.075 .543 68
	Dept Accountability (F5.6/S17)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.199 .101 69	-.046 .710 69
	Planning Focus (F5.6/S18)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	-.173 .155 69	-.208 .087 69
	IA Behavior_Depts (F5.6/S19*)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.170 .166 68	-.171 .163 68
	Level of Analysis (F5.7/S20)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.150 .222 68	-.016 .895 68
	Analysis for Crises (F5.7/S21)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.260* .032 68	.003 .982 68
	Maj crisis analysis (F5.7/S22)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	.035 .776 68	-.024 .845 68

Correlations

Spearman's rho	Innov soia ability (F5.7/S23)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N	Level/Position within A's Hierarchy (F5.7/C)	Educational Background (F5.7/D)	Status w/in Agency (F5.7/E)
	Bureaucratic Experience (F5.7/S24)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N			
	Length of service (F5.7/S24a)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N			
	Dept dec-mkg style (F5.5/S25)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N			
	New Thinking (F5.7/S26)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N			
	Dept explores innovation (F5.7/S27*)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N			
	NSC Access (F5.8/S28)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N			
	Impact of O's Informal Access (F5.8/S29)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N			
	Dept influence on NSC (F5.6_5.8/S30)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (2-tailed) N			

Correlations

Spearman's rho		Level/Position within A's Hierarchy (F5.7/C)	Educational Background (F5.7/D)	Status w/in Agency (F5.7/E)
NSC Procedures (F5.8/S31*)	Correlation Coefficient	.304*	.067	.165
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.015	.601	.193
Privileged access NSC (F5.8/S32)	N	64	64	64
	Correlation Coefficient	-.043	-.243*	.028
Level within Interagency (F5.7/B)	Sig. (2-tailed)	.730	.048	.822
	N	67	67	67
Level/Position within A's Hierarchy (F5.7/C)	Correlation Coefficient	.640**	.085	.120
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.000	.489	.328
Educational Background (F5.7/D)	N	69	69	69
	Correlation Coefficient	1.000	-.018	.207
Status w/in Agency (F5.7/E)	Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.880	.088
	N	69	69	69
NSC Procedures (F5.8/S31*)	Correlation Coefficient	-.018	1.000	.158
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.880	.	.194
Privileged access NSC (F5.8/S32)	N	69	69	69
	Correlation Coefficient	.207	.158	1.000
Level within Interagency (F5.7/B)	Sig. (2-tailed)	.088	.194	.
	N	69	69	69

** . Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).

* . Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).

APPENDIX E

SPEARMAN RANK-ORDER CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS

(ONE-TAILED)

Correlations

Spearman's rho	Other Agencies Act (F5.3/S1a)	Other's Agencies Act (F5.3/S1a)	Other's Self-Interest Level (F5.3/S1b)	Departments Interact (F5.3/S1c)	Open Debate Generally (F5.3/S1d)
Correlation Coefficient	1.000	.334**			
Sig. (1-tailed)		.003			
N	66	66			
Other's Self-Interest Level (F5.3/S1b)	.334**		1.000		
Correlation Coefficient	.003				
Sig. (1-tailed)					
N	66	69			
Departments Interact (F5.3/S1c)	-.254*	-.032	-.032	1.000	
Correlation Coefficient	.020	.398			
Sig. (1-tailed)					
N	66	68			
Open Debate Generally (F5.3/S1d)	.086	-.041	-.041	-.053	1.000
Correlation Coefficient	.246	.368	.368	.335	
Sig. (1-tailed)					
N	66	69	68	68	68
Open Debate as Crisis Progresses (F5.3/S1e)	.140	.190	.190	-.026	-.141
Correlation Coefficient	.133	.061	.061	.417	.126
Sig. (1-tailed)					
N	65	68	68	67	68
Criteria set (F5.4/S2)	-.017	.177	.177	-.112	.167
Correlation Coefficient	.446	.073	.073	.182	.086
Sig. (1-tailed)					
N	66	69	69	68	69
Lead Agent_self (F5.4/S3)	-.091	-.033	-.033	-.050	-.111
Correlation Coefficient	.241	.398	.398	.348	.189
Sig. (1-tailed)					
N	62	65	65	64	65
Agency's Experience (F5.4/S4)	-.104	-.078	-.078	.129	.099
Correlation Coefficient	.203	.263	.263	.148	.210
Sig. (1-tailed)					
N	66	69	69	68	69
Perception risk for self (F5.4/S5)	.117	.153	.153	.139	.064
Correlation Coefficient	.175	.104	.104	.129	.301
Sig. (1-tailed)					
N	66	69	69	68	69

Correlations

Spearman's rho	Department acts (F5.5/S6)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	Other Agencies Act (F5.3/S1a)	Other's Self-Interest Level (F5.3/S1b)	Departments Interact (F5.3/S1c)	Open Debate Generally (F5.3/S1d)
			.333**	.141	-.144	.032
			.003	.126	.122	.396
			66	68	67	68
	Dept Structure_daily (F5.5/S7)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.001	-.063	.004	-.125
			.496	.304	.488	.152
			66	69	68	69
	Dept Structure_Crisis (F5.5/S8)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.026	.091	.145	-.019
			.418	.229	.118	.438
			66	69	68	69
	Dept Mission (F5.5/S9)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.237*	.116	-.272*	.006
			.030	.174	.014	.479
			64	67	66	67
	Dept Ldr Style (F5.5/S10)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.103	.145	-.036	.131
			.205	.117	.386	.141
			66	69	68	69
	Dept Political Ideology (F5.5/S11)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.034	.182	.118	.118
			.393	.069	.170	.168
			65	68	67	68
	Penalty for failure (F5.5/S12)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.254*	-.061	.269*	.010
			.020	.308	.013	.468
			66	69	68	69
	Comm in crisis (F5.5/S13*)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.256*	-.197	.220*	.017
			.019	.052	.036	.446
			66	69	68	69
	Policy process o/c (F5.6/S14)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.002	.063	-.131	.348**
			.493	.306	.145	.002
			65	68	67	68

Correlations

Spearman's rho	Desired End State (F0/S16a)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	Other Agencies Act (F5.3/S1a)	Other's Self-Interest Level (F5.3/S1b)	Departments Interact (F5.3/S1c)	Open Debate Generally (F5.3/S1d)
			-.044	-.099	-.108	.096
			.362	.209	.191	.215
			66	69	68	69
	Termination Criteria (F0/S16b)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.151	.037	-.032	.291*
			.115	.382	.399	.008
			65	68	67	68
	Termination Strategy (F0/S16c)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.173	.048	.004	.172
			.085	.349	.487	.080
			65	68	67	68
	Dept Accountability (F5.6/S17)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.075	.047	.037	-.048
			.275	.351	.384	.349
			66	69	68	69
	Planning Focus (F5.6/S18)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.182	.132	-.177	-.146
			.071	.139	.074	.115
			66	69	68	69
	IA Behavior_Depts (F5.6/S19*)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.481**	.267*	-.097	.061
			.000	.014	.217	.312
			66	68	67	68
	Level of Analysis (F5.7/S20)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.073	.194	-.156	.177
			.282	.056	.104	.075
			65	68	67	68
	Analysis for Crises (F5.7/S21)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.001	.160	-.227*	.062
			.497	.096	.032	.309
			65	68	67	68
	Maj crisis analysis (F5.7/S22)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.072	-.024	-.017	.031
			.284	.425	.446	.401
			65	68	67	68

Correlations

Spearman's rho	Innov soln ability (F5.7/S23)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	Other Agencies Act (F5.3/S1a)	Other's Self-Interest Level (F5.3/S1b)	Departments Interact (F5.3/S1c)	Open Debate Generally (F5.3/S1d)
			-.182 .071 66	-.125 .152 69	.071 .283 68	-.081 .253 69
	Bureaucratic Experience (F5.7/S24)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.172 .085 65	-.168 .085 68	.000 .499 67	.036 .385 68
	Length of service (F5.7/S24a)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.188 .066 66	-.073 .275 69	.214* .040 68	-.173 .078 69
	Dept dec-mkg style (F5.5/S25)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.125 .158 66	.092 .225 69	-.073 .278 68	.160 .095 69
	New Thinking (F5.7/S26)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.033 .395 66	-.320** .004 69	.011 .464 68	-.176 .074 69
	Dept explores innovation (F5.7/S27*)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.098 .216 66	-.314** .005 68	-.060 .313 67	-.122 .160 68
	NSC Access (F5.8/S28)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.170 .086 66	.065 .300 68	.066 .299 67	-.075 .271 68
	Impact of O's Informal Access (F5.8/S29)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.284* .012 63	.126 .156 66	-.073 .282 65	.263* .017 66
	Dept influence on NSC (F5.6_5.8/S30)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.148 .120 65	.035 .388 67	-.009 .472 66	.257* .018 67

Correlations

Spearman's rho		Other's					Open	
		Agencies Act (F5.3/S1a)	Self-Interest Level (F5.3/S1b)	Departments Interact (F5.3/S1c)	Debate Generally (F5.3/S1d)			
NSC Procedures (F5.8/S31*)	Correlation Coefficient	.165	.187	.058	.403**			
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.100	.070	.325	.000			
	N	62	64	63	64			
Privileged access NSC (F5.8/S32)	Correlation Coefficient	-.001	.039	-.353**	-.044			
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.497	.378	.002	.361			
	N	64	67	66	67			
Level within Interagency (F5.7/B)	Correlation Coefficient	.113	-.065	.038	.319**			
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.184	.297	.379	.004			
	N	66	69	68	69			
Level/Position within A's Hierarchy (F5.7/C)	Correlation Coefficient	.162	.015	.025	.263*			
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.097	.452	.419	.014			
	N	66	69	68	69			
Educational Background (F5.7/D)	Correlation Coefficient	.136	.075	-.037	.090			
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.138	.271	.384	.231			
	N	66	69	68	69			
Status w/in Agency (F5.7/E)	Correlation Coefficient	.078	.078	.096	.094			
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.267	.263	.217	.222			
	N	66	69	68	69			

Correlations

		Open Debate as Crisis Progresses (F5.3/S1e)	Criteria set (F5.4/S2)	Lead Agent_self (F5.4/S3)	Agency's Experience (F5.4/S4)
Spearman's rho	Other Agencies Act (F5.3/S1a)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.140 .446 66	-.091 .241 62	-.104 .203 66
	Other's Self-Interest Level (F5.3/S1b)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.190 .061 68	-.033 .398 65	-.078 .263 69
	Departments Interact (F5.3/S1c)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.026 .417 67	-.112 .182 68	.129 .148 68
	Open Debate Generally (F5.3/S1d)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.141 .126 68	.167 .086 69	.099 .210 69
	Open Debate as Crisis Progresses (F5.3/S1e)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	1.000 .68 68	.327** .003 68	-.011 .464 68
	Criteria set (F5.4/S2)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.327** .003 68	1.000 .273 69	.006 .481 69
	Lead Agent_self (F5.4/S3)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.083 .258 64	1.000 .093 65	-.166 .093 65
	Agency's Experience (F5.4/S4)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.011 .464 68	-.166 .093 65	1.000 .093 69
	Perception risk for self (F5.4/S5)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.058 .320 68	.203* .047 69	.081 .254 69

Correlations

Spearman's rho	Open Debate as Crisis Progresses (F5.3/S1e)	Criteria set (F5.4/S2)	Lead Agent self (F5.4/S3)	Agency's Experience (F5.4/S4)
Department acts (F5.5/S6)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.009 .470 68	-.063 .310 64	.023 .425 68
Dept Structure_daily (F5.5/S7)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.116 .170 69	.162 .099 65	.041 .370 69
Dept Structure_Crisis (F5.5/S8)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.090 .231 69	.084 .253 65	.183 .067 69
Dept Mission (F5.5/S9)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.140 .129 67	-.029 .412 63	.010 .469 67
Dept Ldr Style (F5.5/S10)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.055 .325 69	-.198 .057 65	-.196 .053 69
Dept Political Ideology (F5.5/S11)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.192 .059 68	.086 .250 64	.213* .040 68
Penalty for failure (F5.5/S12)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.111 .182 69	.231* .032 65	.105 .195 69
Comm in crisis (F5.5/S13*)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.047 .352 69	.135 .142 65	.025 .418 69
Policy process o/c (F5.6/S14)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.193 .057 68	-.192 .064 64	-.132 .141 68

Correlations

Spearman's rho		Open Debate as Crisis Progresses (F5.3/S1e)	Criteria set (F5.4/S2)	Lead Agent self (F5.4/S3)	Agency's Experience (F5.4/S4)
Desired End State (F0/S16a)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.172 .081 68	-.089 .233 69	-.223* .037 65	-.142 .122 69
Termination Criteria (F0/S16b)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.025 .419 67	-.035 .390 68	-.155 .110 64	.054 .329 68
Termination Strategy (F0/S16c)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.036 .385 67	-.089 .236 68	-.181 .077 64	.013 .460 68
Dept Accountability (F5.6/S17)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.041 .371 68	-.112 .179 69	-.029 .409 65	.158 .097 69
Planning Focus (F5.6/S18)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.038 .380 68	.070 .283 69	.204 .052 65	-.122 .159 69
IA Behavior_Depts (F5.6/S19*)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.143 .123 67	.079 .262 68	-.199 .058 64	.013 .460 68
Level of Analysis (F5.7/S20)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.124 .158 67	.201 .050 68	-.161 .102 64	.227* .031 68
Analysis for Crises (F5.7/S21)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.052 .338 67	.109 .189 68	-.278* .013 65	.304** .006 68
Maj crisis analysis (F5.7/S22)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.087 .242 67	.187 .063 68	-.070 .289 65	.204* .047 68

Correlations

Spearman's rho	Innov soln ability (F5.7/S23)	Correlation Coefficient	Open Debate as Crisis Progresses (F5.3/S1e)	Criteria set (F5.4/S2)	Lead Agent_self (F5.4/S3)	Agency's Experience (F5.4/S4)
		Correlation Coefficient				
		Sig. (1-tailed)				
		N				
	Bureaucratic Experience (F5.7/S24)	Correlation Coefficient				
		Sig. (1-tailed)				
		N				
	Length of service (F5.7/S24a)	Correlation Coefficient				
		Sig. (1-tailed)				
		N				
	Dept dec-mkg style (F5.5/S25)	Correlation Coefficient				
		Sig. (1-tailed)				
		N				
	New Thinking (F5.7/S26)	Correlation Coefficient				
		Sig. (1-tailed)				
		N				
	Dept explores innovation (F5.7/S27*)	Correlation Coefficient				
		Sig. (1-tailed)				
		N				
	NSC Access ([F5.8/S28)	Correlation Coefficient				
		Sig. (1-tailed)				
		N				
	Impact of O's Informal Access (F5.8/S29)	Correlation Coefficient				
		Sig. (1-tailed)				
		N				
	Dept influence on NSC (F5.6_5.8/S30)	Correlation Coefficient				
		Sig. (1-tailed)				
		N				

Correlations

Spearman's rho		Open Debate as Crisis Progresses (F5.3/S1e)	Criteria set (F5.4/S2)	Lead Agent, self (F5.4/S3)	Agency's Experience (F5.4/S4)
	NSC Procedures (F5.8/S31*)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.029 .411 64	-.185 .078 60	-.129 .154 64
	Privileged access NSC (F5.8/S32)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.033 .394 67	-.001 .497 63	.000 .500 67
	Level within Interagency (F5.7/B)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.057 .320 69	-.214* .043 65	.226* .031 69
	Level/Position within A's Hierarchy (F5.7/C)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.014 .453 69	-.260* .018 65	.182 .067 69
	Educational Background (F5.7/D)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.125 .153 69	.130 .151 65	-.046 .355 69
	Status w/in Agency (F5.7/E)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.253* .018 69	.034 .393 65	-.064 .300 69

Correlations

Spearman's rho		Perception risk for self (F5.4/S5)	Department acts (F5.5/S6)	Dept Structure daily (F5.5/S7)
Other Agencies Act (F5.3/S1a)	Correlation Coefficient	.117	.333**	-.001
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.175	.003	.496
Other's Self-Interest Level (F5.3/S1b)	N	66	66	66
	Correlation Coefficient	.153	.141	-.063
Departments Interact (F5.3/S1c)	Sig. (1-tailed)	.104	.126	.304
	N	69	68	69
Open Debate Generally (F5.3/S1d)	Correlation Coefficient	.139	-.144	.004
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.129	.122	.488
Open Debate as Crisis Progresses (F5.3/S1e)	N	68	67	68
	Correlation Coefficient	.064	.032	-.125
Criteria set (F5.4/S2)	Sig. (1-tailed)	.301	.396	.152
	N	69	68	69
Lead Agent_self (F5.4/S3)	Correlation Coefficient	.058	.114	.106
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.320	.179	.195
Agency's Experience (F5.4/S4)	N	68	67	68
	Correlation Coefficient	.203*	.009	-.116
Perception risk for self (F5.4/S5)	Sig. (1-tailed)	.047	.470	.170
	N	69	68	69
Other Agencies Act (F5.3/S1a)	Correlation Coefficient	.123	-.063	.162
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.165	.310	.099
Other's Self-Interest Level (F5.3/S1b)	N	65	64	65
	Correlation Coefficient	.081	.023	.041
Departments Interact (F5.3/S1c)	Sig. (1-tailed)	.254	.425	.370
	N	69	68	69
Open Debate Generally (F5.3/S1d)	Correlation Coefficient	1.000	-.112	-.123
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.	.182	.156
Open Debate as Crisis Progresses (F5.3/S1e)	N	69	68	69
	Correlation Coefficient			

Correlations

Spearman's rho	Department acts (F5.5/S6)	Perception risk for self (F5.4/S5)	Department acts (F5.5/S6)	Dept Structure daily (F5.5/S7)
	Correlation Coefficient	-.112	1.000	-.254*
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.182		.018
	N	68	68	68
	Dept Structure_daily (F5.5/S7)	Correlation Coefficient	-.123	1.000
		Sig. (1-tailed)	.156	
		N	69	69
	Dept Structure_Crisis (F5.5/S8)	Correlation Coefficient	-.010	.519*
		Sig. (1-tailed)	.467	.000
		N	69	69
	Dept Mission (F5.5/S9)	Correlation Coefficient	.036	.006
		Sig. (1-tailed)	.385	.482
		N	67	67
	Dept Ldr Style (F5.5/S10)	Correlation Coefficient	-.130	-.301*
		Sig. (1-tailed)	.144	.006
		N	69	69
	Dept Political Ideology (F5.5/S11)	Correlation Coefficient	.031	-.093
		Sig. (1-tailed)	.400	.225
		N	68	68
	Penalty for failure (F5.5/S12)	Correlation Coefficient	.212*	.123
		Sig. (1-tailed)	.040	.158
		N	69	69
	Comm in crisis (F5.5/S13*)	Correlation Coefficient	.008	.099
		Sig. (1-tailed)	.475	.208
		N	69	69
	Policy process o/c (F5.6/S14)	Correlation Coefficient	.005	-.361*
		Sig. (1-tailed)	.482	.001
		N	68	68

Correlations

Spearman's rho	Desired End State (F0/S16a)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	Perception risk for self (F5.4/S5)	Department acts (F5.5/S6)	Dept Structure daily (F5.5/S7)
			-.181 .069 69	-.021 .433 68	-.113 .179 69
	Termination Criteria (F0/S16b)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.063 .306 68	.053 .335 67	-.023 .426 68
	Termination Strategy (F0/S16c)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.033 .394 68	.138 .133 67	.061 .312 68
	Dept Accountability (F5.6/S17)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.041 .368 69	.046 .356 68	.107 .191 69
	Planning Focus (F5.6/S18)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.168 .084 69	.175 .077 68	.067 .292 69
	IA Behavior_Depts (F5.6/S19*)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.077 .266 68	.769** .000 68	-.156 .101 68
	Level of Analysis (F5.7/S20)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.104 .200 68	.113 .181 67	.084 .249 68
	Analysis for Crises (F5.7/S21)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.113 .180 68	-.012 .461 67	.085 .246 68
	Maj crisis analysis (F5.7/S22)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.061 .309 68	.014 .456 67	.147 .115 68

Correlations

Spearman's rho	Innov soln ability (F5.7/S23)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	Perception risk for self (F5.4/S5)	Department acts (F5.5/S6)	Dept Structure daily (F5.5/S7)
			.045	-.179	.103
			.355	.073	.201
			69	68	69
	Bureaucratic Experience (F5.7/S24)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.029	.062	.105
			.407	.310	.197
			68	67	68
	Length of service (F5.7/S24a)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.088	-.142	-.168
			.235	.124	.083
			69	68	69
	Dept dec-mkg style (F5.5/S25)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.046	.039	-.215*
			.353	.376	.038
			69	68	69
	New Thinking (F5.7/S26)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.068	-.167	.442**
			.288	.087	.000
			69	68	69
	Dept explores innovation (F5.7/S27*)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.134	-.167	.348**
			.138	.086	.002
			68	68	68
	NSC Access (F5.8/S28)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.136	-.078	-.073
			.134	.264	.277
			68	68	68
	Impact of O's Informal Access (F5.8/S29)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.193	.504**	-.248*
			.060	.000	.022
			66	65	66
	Dept influence on NSC (F5.6_5.8/S30)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.023	.171	-.185
			.426	.083	.067
			67	67	67

Correlations

Spearman's rho		Perception risk for self (F5.4/S5)	Department acts (F5.5/S6)	Dept Structure, daily (F5.5/S7)
NSC Procedures (F5.8/S31*)	Correlation Coefficient	.090	.072	-.095
	Sig. (1-tailed) N	.239 64	.285 64	.229 64
Privileged access NSC (F5.8/S32)	Correlation Coefficient	.005	-.210*	.128
	Sig. (1-tailed) N	.483 67	.045 66	.151 67
Level within Interagency (F5.7/B)	Correlation Coefficient	-.052	.004	-.209*
	Sig. (1-tailed) N	.336 69	.488 68	.042 69
Level/Position within A's Hierarchy (F5.7/C)	Correlation Coefficient	-.086	.048	-.195
	Sig. (1-tailed) N	.242 69	.348 68	.054 69
Educational Background (F5.7/D)	Correlation Coefficient	-.238*	-.022	.076
	Sig. (1-tailed) N	.025 69	.428 68	.268 69
Status w/in Agency (F5.7/E)	Correlation Coefficient	-.119	-.178	.079
	Sig. (1-tailed) N	.165 69	.073 68	.260 69

Correlations

Spearman's rho	Other Agencies Act (F5.3/S1a)	Dept Structure Crisis (F5.5/S8)	Dept Mission (F5.5/S9)	Dept Ldr Style (F5.5/S10)	Dept Political Ideology (F5.5/S11)
Correlation Coefficient		.026	.237*	.103	-.034
Sig. (1-tailed)		.418	.030	.205	.393
N		66	64	66	65
Other's Self-Interest Level (F5.3/S1b)		.091	.116	.145	.182
Correlation Coefficient		.229	.174	.117	.069
Sig. (1-tailed)		.69	.67	.69	.68
N					
Departments Interact (F5.3/S1c)		.145	-.272*	-.036	.118
Correlation Coefficient		.118	.014	.386	.170
Sig. (1-tailed)		.68	.66	.68	.67
N					
Open Debate Generally (F5.3/S1d)		-.019	.006	.131	.118
Correlation Coefficient		.438	.479	.141	.168
Sig. (1-tailed)		.69	.67	.69	.68
N					
Open Debate as Crisis Progresses (F5.3/S1e)		.121	.142	.212*	.238*
Correlation Coefficient		.163	.127	.041	.026
Sig. (1-tailed)		.68	.66	.68	.67
N					
Criteria set (F5.4/S2)		.090	.140	.055	.192
Correlation Coefficient		.231	.129	.325	.059
Sig. (1-tailed)		.69	.67	.69	.68
N					
Lead Agent_self (F5.4/S3)		.084	-.029	-.198	.086
Correlation Coefficient		.253	.412	.057	.250
Sig. (1-tailed)		.65	.63	.65	.64
N					
Agency's Experience (F5.4/S4)		.183	.010	-.196	.213*
Correlation Coefficient		.067	.469	.053	.040
Sig. (1-tailed)		.69	.67	.69	.68
N					
Perception risk for self (F5.4/S5)		-.010	.036	-.130	.031
Correlation Coefficient		.467	.385	.144	.400
Sig. (1-tailed)		.69	.67	.69	.68
N					

Correlations

Spearman's rho	Department acts (F5.5/S6)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	Dept Structure Crisis (F5.5/S8)	Dept Mission (F5.5/S9)	Dept Ldr Style (F5.5/S10)	Dept Political Ideology (F5.5/S11)
			-.115 .175 68	.081 .258 66	.104 .198 68	.186 .066 67
	Dept Structure_daily (F5.5/S7)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.519** .000 69	.006 .482 67	-.301** .006 69	-.093 .225 68
	Dept Structure_Crisis (F5.5/S8)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	1.000 69	-.084 .250 67	-.280** .010 69	.111 .184 68
	Dept Mission (F5.5/S9)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.084 .250 67	1.000 67	-.084 .251 67	.122 .165 66
	Dept Ldr Style (F5.5/S10)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.280** .010 69	-.084 .251 67	1.000 69	-.180 .071 68
	Dept Political Ideology (F5.5/S11)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.111 .184 68	.122 .165 66	-.180 .071 68	1.000 68
	Penalty for failure (F5.5/S12)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.074 .272 69	-.301** .007 67	-.317** .004 69	-.086 .242 68
	Comm in crisis (F5.5/S13*)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.089 .233 69	-.040 .373 67	-.312** .005 69	.033 .396 68
	Policy process o/c (F5.6/S14)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.377** .001 68	.069 .292 66	.497** .000 68	.142 .124 68

Correlations

Spearman's rho	Desired End State (F0/S16a)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	Dept Structure Crisis (F5.5/S8)	Dept Mission (F5.5/S9)	Dept Ldr Style (F5.5/S10)	Dept Political Ideology (F5.5/S11)
			-.253*	-.115	.278*	-.042
			.018	.178	.010	.366
			69	67	69	68
	Termination Criteria (F0/S16b)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.031	-.123	.208*	.164
			.400	.162	.044	.093
			68	66	68	67
	Termination Strategy (F0/S16c)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.110	-.177	.133	.064
			.186	.078	.141	.303
			68	66	68	67
	Dept Accountability (F5.6/S17)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.020	-.108	.155	-.025
			.436	.193	.102	.420
			69	67	69	68
	Planning Focus (F5.6/S18)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.048	.181	-.007	-.059
			.348	.071	.478	.315
			69	67	69	68
	IA Behavior_Depts (F5.6/S19*)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.100	.093	.139	.138
			.208	.228	.129	.133
			68	66	68	67
	Level of Analysis (F5.7/S20)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.012	.156	-.011	.027
			.460	.105	.466	.413
			68	66	68	68
	Analysis for Crises (F5.7/S21)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.046	.173	.071	-.024
			.355	.082	.283	.424
			68	66	68	67
	Maj crisis analysis (F5.7/S22)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.066	-.084	.077	.040
			.297	.251	.268	.375
			68	66	68	67

Correlations

Spearman's rho	Innov soln ability (F5.7/S23)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	Dept Structure Crisis (F5.5/S8)	Dept Mission (F5.5/S9)	Dept Ldr Style (F5.5/S10)	Dept Political Ideology (F5.5/S11)
			.033 .395 69	.053 .334 67	-.125 .153 69	.035 .387 68
	Bureaucratic Experience (F5.7/S24)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.089 .235 68	.055 .330 66	.047 .353 68	.059 .319 67
	Length of service (F5.7/S24a)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.058 .317 69	-.170 .084 67	.184 .065 69	-.189 .062 68
	Dept dec-mkg style (F5.5/S25)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.379** .001 69	-.050 .345 67	.548** .000 69	.041 .371 68
	New Thinking (F5.7/S26)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.372** .001 69	-.060 .315 67	-.423** .000 69	-.061 .311 68
	Dept explores innovation (F5.7/S27*)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.189 .061 68	.138 .135 66	-.356** .001 68	-.030 .403 67
	NSC Access (F5.8/S28)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.158 .099 68	-.132 .146 66	.162 .093 68	-.063 .307 67
	Impact of O's Informal Access (F5.8/S29)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.005 .484 66	-.062 .314 64	.097 .218 66	.041 .372 65
	Dept influence on NSC (F5.6_5.8/S30)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.160 .099 67	-.134 .143 65	.207* .046 67	.074 .277 67

Correlations

Spearman's rho		Dept Structure Crisis (F5.5/S8)	Dept Mission (F5.5/S9)	Dept Ldr Style (F5.5/S10)	Dept Political Ideology (F5.5/S11)
		Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N
NSC Procedures (F5.8/S31*)	Privileged access NSC (F5.8/S32)	.070 .286 67	.081 .260 65	-.126 .155 67	-.128 .157 64
	Level within Interagency (F5.7/B)	-.030 .402 69	-.171 .084 67	.131 .141 69	.149 .112 68
	Level/Position within A's Hierarchy (F5.7/C)	.069 .286 69	.137 .135 67	.082 .251 69	.121 .163 68
	Educational Background (F5.7/D)	-.062 .306 69	-.274* .012 67	-.036 .384 69	.024 .423 68
Status w/in Agency (F5.7/E)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.021 .433 69	-.330** .003 67	.196 .053 69	-.278* .011 68

Correlations

Spearman's rho	Other Agencies Act (F5.3/S1a)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	Penalty for failure (F5.5/S12)	Comm in crisis (F5.5/S13*)	Policy process o/c (F5.6/S14)	Desired End State (F0/S16a)
			-.254*	-.256*	-.002	-.044
			.020	.019	.493	.362
			66	66	65	66
	Other's Self-Interest Level (F5.3/S1b)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.061	-.197	.063	-.099
			.308	.052	.306	.209
			69	69	68	69
	Departments Interact (F5.3/S1c)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.269*	.220*	-.131	-.108
			.013	.036	.145	.191
			68	68	67	68
	Open Debate Generally (F5.3/S1d)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.010	.017	.348**	.096
			.468	.446	.002	.215
			69	69	68	69
	Open Debate as Crisis Progresses (F5.3/S1e)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.092	.084	.074	-.172
			.228	.247	.277	.081
			68	68	67	68
	Criteria set (F5.4/S2)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.111	.047	.193	-.089
			.182	.352	.057	.233
			69	69	68	69
	Lead Agent_self (F5.4/S3)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.231*	.135	-.192	-.223*
			.032	.142	.064	.037
			65	65	64	65
	Agency's Experience (F5.4/S4)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.105	.025	-.132	-.142
			.195	.418	.141	.122
			69	69	68	69
	Perception risk for self (F5.4/S5)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.212*	.008	.005	-.181
			.040	.475	.482	.069
			69	69	68	69

Correlations

Spearman's rho	Department acts (F5.5/S6)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	Penalty for failure (F5.5/S12)	Comm in crisis (F5.5/S13*)	Policy process o/c (F5.6/S14)	Desired End State (F0/S16a)
			-.249*	-.052	.100	-.021
			.020	.337	.211	.433
			68	68	67	68
	Dept Structure_daily (F5.5/S7)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.123	.099	-.361**	-.113
			.158	.208	.001	.179
			69	69	68	69
	Dept Structure_Crisis (F5.5/S8)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.074	.089	-.377**	-.253*
			.272	.233	.001	.018
			69	69	68	69
	Dept Mission (F5.5/S9)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.301**	-.040	.069	-.115
			.007	.373	.292	.178
			67	67	66	67
	Dept Ldr Style (F5.5/S10)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.317**	-.312**	.497**	.278*
			.004	.005	.000	.010
			69	69	68	69
	Dept Political Ideology (F5.5/S11)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.086	.033	.142	-.042
			.242	.396	.124	.366
			68	68	68	68
	Penalty for failure (F5.5/S12)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	1.000	.192	-.159	-.290**
				.057	.097	.008
			69	69	68	69
	Comm in crisis (F5.5/S13*)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.192	1.000	-.224*	-.261*
			.057		.033	.015
			69	69	68	69
	Policy process o/c (F5.6/S14)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.159	-.224*	1.000	.341**
			.097	.033		.002
			68	68	68	68

Correlations

Spearman's rho	Desired End State (F0/S16a)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	Penalty for failure (F5.5/S12)	Comm in crisis (F5.5/S13*)	Policy process o/c (F5.6/S14)	Desired End State (F0/S16a)
			-.290** .008 69	-.261* .015 69	.341** .002 68	1.000 .
	Termination Criteria (F0/S16b)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.228* .031 68	-.281* .010 68	.073 .279 67	.500** .000 68
	Termination Strategy (F0/16c)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.056 .326 68	-.028 .409 68	.081 .256 67	.354** .002 68
	Dept Accountability (F5.6/S17)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.164 .089 69	-.050 .341 69	-.042 .368 68	.130 .144 69
	Planning Focus (F5.6/S18)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.258* .016 69	-.181 .068 69	-.119 .166 68	.026 .417 69
	IA Behavior_Depts (F5.6/S19*)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.225* .032 68	-.233* .028 68	.216* .040 67	-.026 .417 68
	Level of Analysis (F5.7/S20)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.011 .465 68	-.106 .195 68	.136 .135 68	-.077 .267 68
	Analysis for Crises (F5.7/S21)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.105 .197 68	-.262* .016 68	.161 .097 67	.013 .458 68
	Maj crisis analysis (F5.7/S22)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.005 .483 68	.003 .490 68	-.007 .477 67	-.175 .077 68

Correlations

		Penalty for failure (F5.5/S12)	Comm in crisis (F5.5/S13*)	Policy process o/c (F5.6/S14)	Desired End State (F0/S16a)
Spearman's rho	Innov soln ability (F5.7/S23)	.060	.147	-.055	.019
	Sig. (1-tailed) N	.313 69	.115 69	.327 68	.438 69
Bureaucratic Experience (F5.7/S24)	Correlation Coefficient	.103	.014	.132	.008
	Sig. (1-tailed) N	.202 68	.454 68	.144 67	.473 68
Length of service (F5.7/S24a)	Correlation Coefficient	.192	.192	-.069	.005
	Sig. (1-tailed) N	.057 69	.057 69	.289 68	.483 69
Dept dec-mkg style (F5.5/S25)	Correlation Coefficient	-.230*	-.200*	.543**	.156
	Sig. (1-tailed) N	.029 69	.050 69	.000 68	.100 69
New Thinking (F5.7/S26)	Correlation Coefficient	.066	.161	-.364**	-.033
	Sig. (1-tailed) N	.294 69	.094 69	.001 68	.395 69
Dept explores innovation (F5.7/S27*)	Correlation Coefficient	.036	.168	-.265*	.054
	Sig. (1-tailed) N	.386 68	.086 68	.015 67	.332 68
NSC Access (F5.8/S28)	Correlation Coefficient	-.076	-.228*	-.083	-.070
	Sig. (1-tailed) N	.269 68	.031 68	.253 67	.285 68
Impact of O's Informal Access (F5.8/S29)	Correlation Coefficient	.004	.004	.164	-.111
	Sig. (1-tailed) N	.486 66	.486 66	.096 65	.187 66
Dept influence on NSC (F5.6_5.8/S30)	Correlation Coefficient	.125	-.070	.387**	.144
	Sig. (1-tailed) N	.157 67	.288 67	.001 67	.122 67

Correlations

Spearman's rho		Penalty for failure (F5.5/S12)	Comm in crisis (F5.5/S13*)	Policy process o/c (F5.6/S14)	Desired End State (F0/S16a)
NSC Procedures (F5.8/S31*)	Correlation Coefficient	-.074	-.096	.280*	.331*
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.282	.225	.013	.004
	N	64	64	64	64
Privileged access NSC (F5.8/S32)	Correlation Coefficient	.007	-.173	.014	.000
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.479	.080	.454	.499
	N	67	67	66	67
Level within Interagency (F5.7/B)	Correlation Coefficient	.002	-.125	.150	.129
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.494	.153	.111	.145
	N	69	69	68	69
Level/Position within A's Hierarchy (F5.7/C)	Correlation Coefficient	-.147	-.170	.138	.094
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.114	.082	.130	.220
	N	69	69	68	69
Educational Background (F5.7/D)	Correlation Coefficient	.013	-.046	-.222*	-.019
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.459	.354	.034	.440
	N	69	69	68	69
Status w/in Agency (F5.7/E)	Correlation Coefficient	.170	-.025	.042	.026
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.081	.418	.368	.415
	N	69	69	68	69

Correlations

Spearman's rho		Termination Criteria (F0/S16b)	Termination Strategy (F0/16c)	Dept Accountability (F5.6/S17)	Planning Focus (F5.6/S18)
Other Agencies Act (F5.3/S1a)	Correlation Coefficient	.151	.173	-.075	.182
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.115	.085	.275	.071
Other's Self-Interest Level (F5.3/S1b)	N	65	65	66	66
	Correlation Coefficient	.037	.048	.047	.132
Departments Interact (F5.3/S1c)	Sig. (1-tailed)	.382	.349	.351	.139
	N	68	68	69	69
Open Debate Generally (F5.3/S1d)	Correlation Coefficient	-.032	.004	.037	-.177
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.399	.487	.384	.074
Open Debate as Crisis Progresses (F5.3/S1e)	N	67	67	68	68
	Correlation Coefficient	.291**	.172	-.048	-.146
Criteria set (F5.4/S2)	Sig. (1-tailed)	.008	.080	.349	.115
	N	68	68	69	69
Lead Agent_self (F5.4/S3)	Correlation Coefficient	.025	.036	.041	.038
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.419	.385	.371	.380
Agency's Experience (F5.4/S4)	N	67	67	68	68
	Correlation Coefficient	-.035	-.089	-.112	.070
Perception risk for self (F5.4/S5)	Sig. (1-tailed)	.390	.236	.179	.283
	N	68	68	69	69
Other Agencies Act (F5.3/S1a)	Correlation Coefficient	-.155	-.181	-.029	.204
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.110	.077	.409	.052
Other's Self-Interest Level (F5.3/S1b)	N	64	64	65	65
	Correlation Coefficient	.054	.013	.158	-.122
Departments Interact (F5.3/S1c)	Sig. (1-tailed)	.329	.460	.097	.159
	N	68	68	69	69
Open Debate Generally (F5.3/S1d)	Correlation Coefficient	-.063	.033	.041	-.168
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.306	.394	.368	.084
Open Debate as Crisis Progresses (F5.3/S1e)	N	68	68	69	69
	Correlation Coefficient				

Correlations

Spearman's rho	Termination Criteria (F0/S16b)	Termination Strategy (F0/16c)	Dept Accountability (F5.6/S17)	Planning Focus (F5.6/S18)
Department acts (F5.5/S6)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.138 .133 67	.046 .356 68	.175 .077 68
Dept Structure_daily (F5.5/S7)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.061 .312 68	.107 .191 69	.067 .292 69
Dept Structure_Crisis (F5.5/S8)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.031 .400 68	-.110 .186 68	-.048 .348 69
Dept Mission (F5.5/S9)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.123 .162 66	-.177 .078 66	.181 .071 67
Dept Ldr Style (F5.5/S10)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.208* .044 68	.133 .141 68	-.007 .478 69
Dept Political Ideology (F5.5/S11)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.164 .093 67	.064 .303 67	-.059 .315 68
Penalty for failure (F5.5/S12)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.228* .031 68	-.056 .326 68	-.258* .016 69
Comm in crisis (F5.5/S13*)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.281* .010 68	-.028 .409 68	-.181 .068 69
Policy process o/c (F5.6/S14)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.073 .279 67	-.042 .368 67	-.119 .166 68

Correlations

Spearman's rho	Desired End State (F0/S16a)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	Termination Criteria (F0/S16b)	Termination Strategy (F0/16c)	Dept Accountability (F5.6/S17)	Planning Focus (F5.6/S18)
			.500** .000 68	.354** .002 68	.130 .144 69	.026 .417 69
	Termination Criteria (F0/S16b)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	1.000 68	.485** .000 68	.143 .122 68	.025 .420 68
	Termination Strategy (F0/16c)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.485** .000 68	1.000 68	.325** .003 68	-.119 .166 68
	Dept Accountability (F5.6/S17)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.143 .122 68	.325** .003 68	1.000 69	-.052 .334 69
	Planning Focus (F5.6/S18)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.025 .420 68	-.119 .166 68	-.052 .334 69	1.000 69
	IA Behavior_Depts (F5.6/S19*)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.171 .083 67	.266* .015 67	-.029 .408 68	.051 .340 68
	Level of Analysis (F5.7/S20)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.085 .248 67	-.011 .464 67	-.132 .141 68	.033 .393 68
	Analysis for Crises (F5.7/S21)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.046 .355 67	-.020 .435 67	-.093 .226 68	-.077 .267 68
	Maj crisis analysis (F5.7/S22)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.066 .299 67	-.009 .471 67	-.022 .429 68	-.189 .061 68

Correlations

		Termination Criteria (F0/S16b)	Termination Strategy (F0/16c)	Dept Accountability (F5.6/S17)	Planning Focus (F5.6/S18)
Spearman's rho	Innov soln ability (F5.7/S23)	Correlation Coefficient			
	Sig. (1-tailed)				
	N				
Bureaucratic Experience (F5.7/S24)	Correlation Coefficient				
	Sig. (1-tailed)				
	N				
Length of service (F5.7/S24a)	Correlation Coefficient				
	Sig. (1-tailed)				
	N				
Dept dec-mkg style (F5.5/S25)	Correlation Coefficient				
	Sig. (1-tailed)				
	N				
New Thinking (F5.7/S26)	Correlation Coefficient				
	Sig. (1-tailed)				
	N				
Dept explores innovation (F5.7/S27*)	Correlation Coefficient				
	Sig. (1-tailed)				
	N				
NSC Access (F5.8/S28)	Correlation Coefficient				
	Sig. (1-tailed)				
	N				
Impact of O's Informal Access (F5.8/S29)	Correlation Coefficient				
	Sig. (1-tailed)				
	N				
Dept influence on NSC (F5.6_5.8/S30)	Correlation Coefficient				
	Sig. (1-tailed)				
	N				

Correlations

Spearman's rho		Termination Criteria (F0/S16b)	Termination Strategy (F0/16c)	Dept Accountability (F5.6/S17)	Planning Focus (F5.6/S18)
	NSC Procedures (F5.8/S31*)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.220* .042 63	.392** .001 63	-.218* .042 64
	Privileged access NSC (F5.8/S32)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.133 .144 66	-.129 .151 66	-.130 .148 67
	Level within Interagency (F5.7/B)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.287** .009 68	.347** .002 68	-.093 .224 69
	Level/Position within A's Hierarchy (F5.7/C)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.147 .116 68	.012 .463 68	-.173 .077 69
	Educational Background (F5.7/D)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.130 .146 68	.253* .019 68	.117 .168 69
	Status w/in Agency (F5.7/E)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.100 .208 68	-.075 .271 68	-.208* .044 69

Correlations

Spearman's rho	Other Agencies Act (F5.3/S1a)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	IA Behavior Depts (F5.6/S19*)	Level of Analysis (F5.7/S20)	Analysis for Crisis (F5.7/S21)	Maj crisis analysis (F5.7/S22)
			.481** .000 66	.073 .282 65	-.001 .497 65	-.072 .284 65
	Other's Self-Interest Level (F5.3/S1b)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.267* .014 68	.194 .056 68	.160 .096 68	-.024 .425 68
	Departments Interact (F5.3/S1c)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.097 .217 67	-.156 .104 67	-.227* .032 67	-.017 .446 67
	Open Debate Generally (F5.3/S1d)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.061 .312 68	.177 .075 68	.062 .309 68	.031 .401 68
	Open Debate as Crisis Progresses (F5.3/S1e)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.143 .123 67	.124 .158 67	.052 .338 67	.087 .242 67
	Criteria set (F5.4/S2)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.079 .262 68	.201 .050 68	.109 .189 68	.187 .063 68
	Lead Agent_self (F5.4/S3)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.199 .058 64	-.161 .102 64	-.278* .013 65	-.070 .289 65
	Agency's Experience (F5.4/S4)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.013 .460 68	.227* .031 68	.304** .006 68	.204* .047 68
	Perception risk for self (F5.4/S5)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.077 .266 68	-.104 .200 68	-.113 .180 68	-.061 .309 68

Correlations

Spearman's rho	Department acts (F5.5/S6)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	IA Behavior Depts (F5.6/S19*)	Level of Analysis (F5.7/S20)	Analysis for Crises (F5.7/S21)	Maj crisis analysis (F5.7/S22)
			.769** .000 68	.113 .181 67	-.012 .461 67	.014 .456 67
	Dept Structure_daily (F5.5/S7)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.156 .101 68	.084 .249 68	.085 .246 68	.147 .115 68
	Dept Structure_Crisis (F5.5/S8)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.100 .208 68	-.012 .460 68	.046 .355 68	.066 .297 68
	Dept Mission (F5.5/S9)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.093 .228 66	.156 .105 66	.173 .082 66	-.084 .251 66
	Dept Ldr Style (F5.5/S10)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.139 .129 68	-.011 .466 68	.071 .283 68	.077 .268 68
	Dept Political Ideology (F5.5/S11)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.138 .133 67	.027 .413 68	-.024 .424 67	.040 .375 67
	Penalty for failure (F5.5/S12)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.225* .032 68	.011 .465 68	-.105 .197 68	.005 .483 68
	Comm in crisis (F5.5/S13*)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.233* .028 68	-.106 .195 68	-.262* .016 68	.003 .490 68
	Policy process o/c (F5.6/S14)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.216* .040 67	.136 .135 68	.161 .097 67	-.007 .477 67

Correlations

Spearman's rho	Desired End State (F0/S16a)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	IA Behavior_Depts (F5.6/S19*)	Level of Analysis (F5.7/S20)	Analysis for Crises (F5.7/S21)	Maj crisis analysis (F5.7/S22)
			-.026 .417 68	-.077 .267 68	.013 .458 68	-.175 .077 68
	Termination Criteria (F0/S16b)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.171 .083 67	-.085 .248 67	-.046 .355 67	-.066 .299 67
	Termination Strategy (F0/S16c)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.266* .015 67	-.011 .464 67	-.020 .435 67	-.009 .471 67
	Dept Accountability (F5.6/S17)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.029 .408 68	-.132 .141 68	-.093 .226 68	-.022 .429 68
	Planning Focus (F5.6/S18)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.051 .340 68	.033 .393 68	-.077 .267 68	-.189 .061 68
	IA Behavior_Depts (F5.6/S19*)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	1.000 1.000 68	.208* .046 67	.071 .283 67	.061 .311 67
	Level of Analysis (F5.7/S20)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.208* .046 67	1.000 1.000 68	.816** .000 67	.308** .006 67
	Analysis for Crises (F5.7/S21)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.071 .283 67	.816** .000 67	1.000 1.000 68	.333** .003 67
	Maj crisis analysis (F5.7/S22)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.061 .311 67	.308** .006 67	.333** .003 67	1.000 1.000 68

Correlations

Spearman's rho	Innov soia ability (F5.7/S23)	IA Behavior Depts (F5.6/S19*)	Level of Analysis (F5.7/S20)	Analysis for Crises (F5.7/S21)	Maj crisis analysis (F5.7/S22)
	Correlation Coefficient	-.243*	-.199	-.281*	-.186
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.023	.052	.010	.064
	N	68	68	68	68
	Bureaucratic Experience (F5.7/S24)	.085	-.159	-.098	.079
	Correlation Coefficient	.248	.099	.215	.263
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.67	.67	.67	.67
	N				
	Length of service (F5.7/S24a)	-.195	-.066	-.101	.015
	Correlation Coefficient	.056	.297	.206	.450
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.68	.68	.68	.68
	N				
	Dept dec-mkg style (F5.5/S25)	.177	-.083	-.109	.108
	Correlation Coefficient	.075	.250	.188	.190
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.68	.68	.68	.68
	N				
	New Thinking (F5.7/S26)	-.274*	-.005	-.042	.062
	Correlation Coefficient	.012	.483	.368	.309
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.68	.68	.68	.68
	N				
	Dept explores innovation (F5.7/S27*)	-.302**	.026	-.052	-.070
	Correlation Coefficient	.006	.418	.338	.288
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.68	.67	.67	.67
	N				
	NSC Access (F5.8/S28)	-.062	-.094	-.077	-.178
	Correlation Coefficient	.308	.226	.267	.075
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.68	.67	.67	.67
	N				
	Impact of O's Informal Access (F5.8/S29)	.422**	.328**	.267*	.134
	Correlation Coefficient	.000	.004	.015	.143
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.65	.65	.66	.65
	N				
	Dept influence on NSC (F5.6_5.8/S30)	.284**	.184	.143	.011
	Correlation Coefficient	.010	.068	.126	.464
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.67	.67	.66	.66
	N				

Correlations

Spearman's rho		IA Behavior Depts (F5.6/S19*)	Level of Analysis (F5.7/S20)	Analysis for Crises (F5.7/S21)	Maj crisis analysis (F5.7/S22)
NSC Procedures (F5.8/S31*)	Correlation Coefficient	.163	.131	.055	.011
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.099	.150	.334	.465
Privileged access NSC (F5.8/S32)	N	64	64	63	63
	Correlation Coefficient	-.209*	.090	.214*	-.091
Level within Interagency (F5.7/B)	Sig. (1-tailed)	.046	.236	.042	.233
	N	66	66	66	66
Level/Position within A's Hierarchy (F5.7/C)	Correlation Coefficient	.165	.051	.071	-.012
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.089	.338	.281	.460
Educational Background (F5.7/D)	N	68	68	68	68
	Correlation Coefficient	.170	.150	.260*	.035
Status w/in Agency (F5.7/E)	Sig. (1-tailed)	.083	.111	.016	.388
	N	68	68	68	68
	Correlation Coefficient	-.012	-.016	-.087	.042
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.461	.450	.239	.368
	N	68	68	68	68
	Correlation Coefficient	-.171	-.016	.003	-.024
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.082	.448	.491	.423
	N	68	68	68	68

Correlations

Spearman's rho	Other Agencies Act (F5.3/S1a)	Innov soln ability (F5.7/S23)	Bureaucratic Experience (F5.7/S24)	Length of service (F5.7/S24a)	Dept dec-mkg style (F5.5/S25)
	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.182 .071 66	-.172 .085 65	-.188 .066 66	.125 .158 66
	Other's Self-Interest Level (F5.3/S1b)	-.125 .152 69	-.168 .085 68	-.073 .275 69	.092 .225 69
	Departments Interact (F5.3/S1c)	.071 .283 68	.000 .499 67	.214* .040 68	-.073 .278 68
	Open Debate Generally (F5.3/S1d)	-.081 .253 69	.036 .385 68	-.173 .078 69	.160 .095 69
	Open Debate as Crisis Progresses (F5.3/S1e)	-.065 .300 68	.016 .450 67	-.013 .459 68	.164 .091 68
	Criteria set (F5.4/S2)	.102 .202 69	-.005 .484 68	-.094 .222 69	.107 .192 69
	Lead Agent_self (F5.4/S3)	.147 .121 65	.182 .075 64	.089 .239 65	.011 .466 65
	Agency's Experience (F5.4/S4)	-.152 .106 69	.009 .472 68	-.040 .371 69	-.105 .195 69
	Perception risk for self (F5.4/S5)	.045 .355 69	-.029 .407 68	.088 .235 69	-.046 .353 69

Correlations

Spearman's rho	Department acts (F5.5/S6)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	Innov soln ability (F5.7/S23)	Bureaucratic Experience (F5.7/S24)	Length of service (F5.7/S24a)	Dept dec-mkg style (F5.5/S25)
			-.179 .073 68	.062 .310 67	-.142 .124 68	.039 .376 68
	Dept Structure_daily (F5.5/S7)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.103 .201 69	.105 .197 68	-.168 .083 69	-.215* .038 69
	Dept Structure_Crisis (F5.5/S8)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.033 .395 69	.089 .235 68	-.058 .317 69	-.379** .001 69
	Dept Mission (F5.5/S9)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.053 .334 67	.055 .330 66	-.170 .084 67	-.050 .345 67
	Dept Ldr Style (F5.5/S10)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.125 .153 69	.047 .353 68	.184 .065 69	.548** .000 69
	Dept Political Ideology (F5.5/S11)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.035 .387 68	.059 .319 67	-.189 .062 68	.041 .371 68
	Penalty for failure (F5.5/S12)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.060 .313 69	.103 .202 68	.192 .057 69	-.230* .029 69
	Comm in crisis (F5.5/S13*)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.147 .115 69	.014 .454 68	.192 .057 69	-.200* .050 69
	Policy process o/c (F5.6/S14)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.055 .327 68	.132 .144 67	-.069 .289 68	.543** .000 68

Correlations

Spearman's rho	Desired End State (F0/S16a)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	Innov soln ability (F5.7/S23)	Bureaucratic Experience (F5.7/S24)	Length of service (F5.7/S24a)	Dept dec-mkg style (F5.5/S25)
	Termination Criteria (F0/S16b)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.019 .438 69	.008 .473 68	.005 .483 69	.156 .100 69
	Termination Strategy (F0/S16c)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.093 .226 68	.000 .500 67	-.134 .137 68	.123 .159 68
	Dept Accountability (F5.6/S17)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.063 .304 68	.094 .224 67	-.113 .180 68	.165 .089 68
	Planning Focus (F5.6/S18)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.248* .020 69	.035 .389 68	.150 .110 69	-.041 .369 69
	IA Behavior_Depts (F5.6/S19*)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.001 .498 69	-.066 .296 68	-.221* .034 69	.071 .281 69
	Level of Analysis (F5.7/S20)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.243* .023 68	.085 .248 67	-.195 .056 68	.177 .075 68
	Analysis for Crises (F5.7/S21)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.199 .052 68	-.159 .099 67	-.066 .297 68	-.083 .250 68
	Maj crisis analysis (F5.7/S22)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.281* .010 68	-.098 .215 67	-.101 .206 68	-.109 .188 68
			-.186 .064 68	.079 .263 67	.015 .450 68	.108 .190 68

Correlations

Spearman's rho		Innov soln ability (F5.7/S23)	Bureaucratic Experience (F5.7/S24)	Length of service (F5.7/S24a)	Dept dec-mkg style (F5.5/S25)
NSC Procedures (F5.8/S31*)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.068 .297 64	-.152 .116 63	-.040 .378 64	.125 .163 64
Privileged access NSC (F5.8/S32)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.095 .223 67	-.051 .341 66	-.134 .140 67	-.119 .169 67
Level within Interagency (F5.7/B)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.193 .056 69	-.220* .036 68	-.160 .094 69	.161 .093 69
Level/Position within A's Hierarchy (F5.7/C)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.233* .027 69	-.208* .044 68	-.103 .201 69	-.054 .328 69
Educational Background (F5.7/D)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.062 .305 69	-.133 .141 68	-.005 .483 69	-.047 .351 69
Status w/in Agency (F5.7/E)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.055 .326 69	-.138 .131 68	.240* .024 69	.134 .136 69

Correlations

Spearman's rho		New Thinking (F5.7/S26)	Dept explores innovation (F5.7/S27*)	NSC Access (F5.8/S28)	Impact of O's Informal Access (F5.8/S29)
Other Agencies Act (F5.3/S1a)	Correlation Coefficient	-.033	-.098	.170	.284*
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.395	.216	.086	.012
Other's Self-Interest Level (F5.3/S1b)	N	66	66	66	63
	Correlation Coefficient	-.320**	-.314**	.065	.126
Departments Interact (F5.3/S1c)	Sig. (1-tailed)	.004	.005	.300	.156
	N	69	68	68	66
Open Debate Generally (F5.3/S1d)	Correlation Coefficient	.011	-.060	.066	-.073
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.464	.313	.299	.282
Open Debate as Crisis Progresses (F5.3/S1e)	N	68	67	67	65
	Correlation Coefficient	-.176	-.122	-.075	.263*
Criteria set (F5.4/S2)	Sig. (1-tailed)	.074	.160	.271	.017
	N	69	68	68	66
Lead Agent_self (F5.4/S3)	Correlation Coefficient	-.063	-.056	.104	.023
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.304	.327	.202	.428
Agency's Experience (F5.4/S4)	N	68	67	67	65
	Correlation Coefficient	-.021	-.072	.126	.025
Perception risk for self (F5.4/S5)	Sig. (1-tailed)	.433	.279	.153	.421
	N	69	68	68	66
Other's Self-Interest Level (F5.3/S1b)	Correlation Coefficient	.283*	.232*	.126	-.206
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.011	.033	.160	.053
Open Debate as Crisis Progresses (F5.3/S1e)	N	65	64	64	63
	Correlation Coefficient	.029	.029	-.048	.176
Criteria set (F5.4/S2)	Sig. (1-tailed)	.406	.407	.350	.079
	N	69	68	68	66
Lead Agent_self (F5.4/S3)	Correlation Coefficient	.068	-.134	.136	.193
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.288	.138	.134	.060
Agency's Experience (F5.4/S4)	N	69	68	68	66
	Correlation Coefficient	-.033	-.033	.160	.053
Perception risk for self (F5.4/S5)	Sig. (1-tailed)	.406	.407	.350	.079
	N	69	68	68	66

Correlations

Spearman's rho	Department acts (F5.5/S6)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	New Thinking (F5.7/S26)	Dept explores innovation (F5.7/S27*)	NSC Access (F5.8/S28)	Impact of O's Informal Access (F5.8/S29)
			-.167	-.167	-.078	.504*
			.087	.086	.264	.000
			68	68	68	65
	Dept Structure_daily (F5.5/S7)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.442**	.348**	-.073	-.248*
			.000	.002	.277	.022
			69	68	68	66
	Dept Structure_Crisis (F5.5/S8)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.372**	.189	.158	-.005
			.001	.061	.099	.484
			69	68	68	66
	Dept Mission (F5.5/S9)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.060	.138	-.132	-.062
			.315	.135	.146	.314
			67	66	66	64
	Dept Ldr Style (F5.5/S10)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.423**	-.356**	.162	.097
			.000	.001	.093	.218
			69	68	68	66
	Dept Political Ideology (F5.5/S11)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.061	-.030	-.063	.041
			.311	.403	.307	.372
			68	67	67	65
	Penalty for failure (F5.5/S12)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.066	.036	-.076	.004
			.294	.386	.269	.486
			69	68	68	66
	Comm in crisis (F5.5/S13*)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.161	.168	-.228*	.004
			.094	.086	.031	.486
			69	68	68	66
	Policy process o/c (F5.6/S14)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.364**	-.265*	-.083	.164
			.001	.015	.253	.096
			68	67	67	65

Correlations

Spearman's rho	Desired End State (F0/S16a)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	New Thinking (F5.7/S26)	Dept explores innovation (F5.7/S27*)	NSC Access (F5.8/S28)	Impact of O's Informal Access (F5.8/S29)
			-.033	.054	-.070	-.111
			.395	.332	.285	.187
			69	68	68	66
	Termination Criteria (F0/S16b)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.032	-.040	.210*	.027
			.398	.374	.044	.416
			68	67	67	65
	Termination Strategy (F0/S16c)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.229*	-.185	-.094	.117
			.030	.067	.225	.177
			68	67	67	65
	Dept Accountability (F5.6/S17)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.112	-.137	-.054	-.080
			.181	.132	.332	.261
			69	68	68	66
	Planning Focus (F5.6/S18)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.015	.175	.196	.001
			.450	.076	.055	.496
			69	68	68	66
	IA Behavior_Depts (F5.6/S19*)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.274*	-.302**	-.062	.422**
			.012	.006	.308	.000
			68	68	68	65
	Level of Analysis (F5.7/S20)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.005	.026	-.094	.328**
			.483	.418	.226	.004
			68	67	67	65
	Analysis for Crises (F5.7/S21)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.042	-.052	-.077	.267*
			.368	.338	.267	.015
			68	67	67	66
	Maj crisis analysis (F5.7/S22)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.062	-.070	-.178	.134
			.309	.288	.075	.143
			68	67	67	65

Correlations

Spearman's rho	Innov soln ability (F5.7/S23)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	New Thinking (F5.7/S26)	Dept explores innovation (F5.7/S27*)	NSC Access (F5.8/S28)	Impact of O's Informal Access (F5.8/S29)
			.137	.126	.070	-.293**
			.131	.153	.284	.009
			69	68	68	66
	Bureaucratic Experience (F5.7/S24)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.180	-.220*	.048	.208*
			.071	.037	.348	.048
			68	67	67	65
	Length of service (F5.7/S24a)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.029	-.125	.213*	-.112
			.407	.155	.040	.185
			69	68	68	66
	Dept dec-mkg style (F5.5/S25)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.315**	-.232*	.106	.009
			.004	.029	.194	.473
			69	68	68	66
	New Thinking (F5.7/S26)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	1.000	.789**	.049	-.235*
				.000	.346	.029
			69	68	68	66
	Dept explores innovation (F5.7/S27*)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.789**	1.000	-.176	-.354**
			.000		.076	.002
			68	68	68	65
	NSC Access (F5.8/S28)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.049	-.176	1.000	-.094
			.346	.076		.228
			68	68	68	65
	Impact of O's Informal Access (F5.8/S29)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.235*	-.354**	-.094	1.000
			.029	.002	.228	
			66	65	65	66
	Dept influence on NSC (F5.6_5.8/S30)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.342**	-.335**	-.071	.254*
			.002	.003	.283	.022
			67	67	67	64

Correlations

		New Thinking (F5.7/S26)	Dept explores innovation (F5.7/S27*)	NSC Access (F5.8/S28)	Impact of O's Informal Access (F5.8/S29)
Spearman's rho	NSC Procedures (F5.8/S31*)	-.178	-.287*	-.100	.253*
		.080	.011	.217	.025
		64	64	64	61
	Privileged access NSC (F5.8/S32)	.051	.062	.	-.029
		.341	.311	.	.411
		67	66	66	65
	Level within Interagency (F5.7/B)	-.120	-.032	-.146	.147
		.163	.398	.118	.120
		69	68	68	66
	Level/Position within A's Hierarchy (F5.7/C)	-.022	-.012	-.119	.160
		.430	.462	.166	.100
		69	68	68	66
	Educational Background (F5.7/D)	-.171	-.237*	.051	-.126
		.080	.026	.341	.157
		69	68	68	66
	Status w/in Agency (F5.7/E)	.052	.100	.051	-.104
		.336	.209	.341	.204
		69	68	68	66

Correlations

Spearman's rho	Other Agencies Act (F5.3/S1a)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	Dept influence on NSC (F5.6_5.8/S30)	NSC Procedures (F5.8/S31*)	Privileged access NSC (F5.8/S32)	Level within Interagency (F5.7/B)
			.148	.165	-.001	.113
			.120	.100	.497	.184
			.65	.62	.64	.66
	Other's Self-Interest Level (F5.3/S1b)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.035	.187	.039	-.065
			.388	.070	.378	.297
			.67	.64	.67	.69
	Departments Interact (F5.3/S1c)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.009	.058	-.353**	.038
			.472	.325	.002	.379
			.66	.63	.66	.68
	Open Debate Generally (F5.3/S1d)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.257*	.403**	-.044	.319**
			.018	.000	.361	.004
			.67	.64	.67	.69
	Open Debate as Crisis Progresses (F5.3/S1e)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.180	-.129	-.202	-.105
			.074	.157	.052	.198
			.66	.63	.66	.68
	Criteria set (F5.4/S2)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.045	.029	-.033	-.057
			.360	.411	.394	.320
			.67	.64	.67	.69
	Lead Agent_self (F5.4/S3)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.336**	-.185	-.001	-.214*
			.004	.078	.497	.043
			.63	.60	.63	.65
	Agency's Experience (F5.4/S4)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.016	-.129	.000	.226*
			.448	.154	.500	.031
			.67	.64	.67	.69
	Perception risk for self (F5.4/S5)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.023	.090	.005	-.052
			.426	.239	.483	.336
			.67	.64	.67	.69

Correlations

Spearman's rho	Department acts (F5.5/S6)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	Dept influence on NSC (F5.6_5.8/S30)	NSC Procedures (F5.8/S31*)	Privileged access NSC (F5.8/S32)	Level within Interagency (F5.7/B)
	Dept Structure_daily (F5.5/S7)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.171 .083 67	.072 .285 64	-.210* .045 66	.004 .488 68
	Dept Structure_Crisis (F5.5/S8)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.185 .067 67	-.095 .229 64	.128 .151 67	-.209* .042 69
	Dept Mission (F5.5/S9)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.160 .099 67	-.013 .460 64	.070 .286 67	-.030 .402 69
	Dept Ldr Style (F5.5/S10)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.134 .143 65	-.154 .113 63	.081 .260 65	-.171 .084 67
	Dept Political Ideology (F5.5/S11)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.207* .046 67	.267* .016 64	-.126 .155 67	.131 .141 69
	Penalty for failure (F5.5/S12)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.074 .277 67	-.128 .157 64	-.025 .420 66	.149 .112 68
	Comm in crisis (F5.5/S13*)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.125 .157 67	-.074 .282 64	.007 .479 67	.002 .494 69
	Policy process o/c (F5.6/S14)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.070 .288 67	-.096 .225 64	-.173 .080 67	-.125 .153 69
			.387** .001 67	.280* .013 64	.014 .454 66	.150 .111 68

Correlations

Spearman's rho	Desired End State (F0/S16a)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	Dept influence on NSC (F5.6_5.8/S30)	NSC Procedures (F5.8/S31*)	Privileged access NSC (F5.8/S32)	Level within Interagency (F5.7/B)
	Termination Criteria (F0/S16b)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.144 .122 67	.331** .004 64	.000 .499 67	.129 .145 69
	Termination Strategy (F0/S16c)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.226* .034 66	.220* .042 63	-.133 .144 66	.287** .009 68
	Dept Accountability (F5.6/S17)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.344** .002 66	.392** .001 63	-.129 .151 66	.347** .002 68
	Planning Focus (F5.6/S18)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.163 .094 67	.156 .109 64	.126 .155 67	.011 .465 69
	IA Behavior_Depts (F5.6/S19*)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.270* .014 67	-.218* .042 64	-.130 .148 67	-.093 .224 69
	Level of Analysis (F5.7/S20)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.284** .010 67	.163 .099 64	-.209* .046 66	.165 .089 68
	Analysis for Crises (F5.7/S21)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.184 .068 67	.131 .150 64	.090 .236 66	.051 .338 68
	Maj crisis analysis (F5.7/S22)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.143 .126 66	.055 .334 63	.214* .042 66	.071 .281 68
			.011 .464 66	.011 .465 63	-.091 .233 66	-.012 .460 68

Correlations

Spearman's rho	Innov soln ability (F5.7/S23)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	Dept influence on NSC (F5.6_5.8/S30)	NSC Procedures (F5.8/S31*)	Privileged access NSC (F5.8/S32)	Level within Interagency (F5.7/B)
			-.083 .252 67	.068 .297 64	.095 .223 67	-.193 .056 69
	Bureaucratic Experience (F5.7/S24)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.087 .245 66	-.152 .116 63	-.051 .341 66	-.220* .036 68
	Length of service (F5.7/S24a)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.010 .468 67	-.040 .378 64	-.134 .140 67	-.160 .094 69
	Dept dec-mkg style (F5.5/S25)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.006 .481 67	.125 .163 64	-.119 .169 67	.161 .093 69
	New Thinking (F5.7/S26)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.342** .002 67	-.178 .080 64	.051 .341 67	-.120 .163 69
	Dept explores innovation (F5.7/S27*)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.335** .003 67	-.287* .011 64	.062 .311 66	-.032 .398 68
	NSC Access (F5.8/S28)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.071 .283 67	-.100 .217 64	. . 66	-.146 .118 68
	Impact of O's Informal Access (F5.8/S29)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.254* .022 64	.253* .025 61	-.029 .411 65	.147 .120 66
	Dept influence on NSC (F5.6_5.8/S30)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	1.000 . 67	.410** .000 64	-.075 .276 65	.340** .002 67

Correlations

Spearman's rho	NSC Procedures (F5.8/S31*)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	Dept influence on NSC (F5.6, 5.8/S30)	NSC Procedures (F5.8/S31*)	Privileged access NSC (F5.8/S32)	Level within Interagency (F5.7/B)
	Privileged access NSC (F5.8/S32)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.410** .000 64	1.000 64	.000 .499 62	.401** .001 64
	Level within Interagency (F5.7/B)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.075 .276 65	.000 .499 62	1.000 67	-.075 .272 67
	Level/Position within A's Hierarchy (F5.7/C)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.340** .002 67	.401** .001 64	-.075 .272 67	1.000 69
	Educational Background (F5.7/D)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.245* .023 67	.304** .007 64	-.043 .365 67	.640** .000 69
	Status w/in Agency (F5.7/E)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.141 .127 67	.067 .300 64	-.243* .024 67	.085 .245 69
			-.037 .383 67	.165 .097 64	.028 .411 67	.120 .164 69

Correlations

Spearman's rho		Level/Position within A's Hierarchy (F5.7/C)	Educational Background (F5.7/D)	Status w/in Agency (F5.7/E)
Other Agencies Act (F5.3/S1a)	Correlation Coefficient	.162	.136	.078
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.097	.138	.267
	N	66	66	66
	Other's Self-Interest Level (F5.3/S1b)	.015	.075	.078
	Correlation Coefficient	.452	.271	.263
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.69	.69	.69
	N	69	69	69
	Departments Interact (F5.3/S1c)	.025	-.037	.096
	Correlation Coefficient	.419	.384	.217
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.68	.68	.68
	N	68	68	68
	Open Debate Generally (F5.3/S1d)	.263*	.090	.094
Open Debate as Crisis Progresses (F5.3/S1e)	Correlation Coefficient	.014	.231	.222
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.69	.69	.69
	N	69	69	69
	Open Debate as Crisis Progresses (F5.3/S1e)	.003	-.090	-.064
	Correlation Coefficient	.489	.234	.301
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.68	.68	.68
	N	68	68	68
	Criteria set (F5.4/S2)	.014	-.125	-.253*
	Correlation Coefficient	.453	.153	.018
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.69	.69	.69
	N	69	69	69
	Lead Agent_self (F5.4/S3)	-.260*	.130	.034
Agency's Experience (F5.4/S4)	Correlation Coefficient	.018	.151	.393
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.65	.65	.65
	N	65	65	65
	Agency's Experience (F5.4/S4)	.182	-.046	-.064
	Correlation Coefficient	.067	.355	.300
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.69	.69	.69
	N	69	69	69
	Perception risk for self (F5.4/S5)	-.086	-.238*	-.119
	Correlation Coefficient	.242	.025	.165
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.69	.69	.69
	N	69	69	69

Correlations

Spearman's rho		Level/Position within A's Hierarchy (F5.7/C)	Educational Background (F5.7/D)	Status w/in Agency (F5.7/E)
Department acts (F5.5/S6)	Correlation Coefficient	.048	-.022	-.178
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.348	.428	.073
	N	68	68	68
	Dept Structure_daily (F5.5/S7)	-.195	.076	.079
	Correlation Coefficient	.054	.268	.260
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.69	.69	.69
	N			
	Dept Structure_Crisis (F5.5/S8)	.069	-.062	.021
	Correlation Coefficient	.286	.306	.433
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.69	.69	.69
	N			
Dept Mission (F5.5/S9)	Correlation Coefficient	.137	-.274*	-.330**
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.135	.012	.003
	N	67	67	67
	Dept Ldr Style (F5.5/S10)	.082	-.036	.196
	Correlation Coefficient	.251	.384	.053
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.69	.69	.69
	N			
	Dept Political Ideology (F5.5/S11)	.121	.024	-.278*
	Correlation Coefficient	.163	.423	.011
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.68	.68	.68
	N			
Penalty for failure (F5.5/S12)	Correlation Coefficient	-.147	.013	.170
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.114	.459	.081
	N	69	69	69
	Comm in crisis (F5.5/S13*)	-.170	-.046	-.025
	Correlation Coefficient	.082	.354	.418
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.69	.69	.69
	N			
	Policy process o/c (F5.6/S14)	.138	-.222*	.042
	Correlation Coefficient	.130	.034	.368
	Sig. (1-tailed)	.68	.68	.68
	N			

Correlations

Spearman's rho	Desired End State (F0/S16a)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	Level/Position within A's Hierarchy (F5.7/C)	Educational Background (F5.7/D)	Status w/in Agency (F5.7/E)
	Termination Criteria (F0/S16b)	.147 Sig. (1-tailed) N	.094 .220 69	-.019 .440 69	.026 .415 69
	Termination Strategy (F0/S16c)	.130 Sig. (1-tailed) N	.147 .116 68	.130 .146 68	-.100 .208 68
	Dept Accountability (F5.6/S17)	.012 Sig. (1-tailed) N	.012 .463 68	.253* .019 68	-.075 .271 68
	Planning Focus (F5.6/S18)	.190 Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.199 .050 69	.190 .059 69	-.046 .355 69
	TA Behavior_Depts (F5.6/S19*)	.170 Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.173 .077 69	.117 .168 69	-.208* .044 69
	Level of Analysis (F5.7/S20)	.150 Sig. (1-tailed) N	.170 .083 68	-.012 .461 68	-.171 .082 68
	Analysis for Crises (F5.7/S21)	.260* Sig. (1-tailed) N	.150 .111 68	-.016 .450 68	-.016 .448 68
	Maj crisis analysis (F5.7/S22)	.035 Sig. (1-tailed) N	.260* .016 68	-.087 .239 68	.003 .491 68
			.035 .388 68	.042 .368 68	-.024 .423 68

Correlations

Spearman's rho	Innov soln ability (F5.7/S23)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	Level/Position within A's Hierarchy (F5.7/C)	Educational Background (F5.7/D)	Status w/in Agency (F5.7/E)
			-.233*	-.062	.055
			.027	.305	.326
			69	69	69
	Bureaucratic Experience (F5.7/S24)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.208*	-.133	-.138
			.044	.141	.131
			68	68	68
	Length of service (F5.7/S24a)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.103	-.005	.240*
			.201	.483	.024
			69	69	69
	Dept dec-mkg style (F5.5/S25)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.054	-.047	.134
			.328	.351	.136
			69	69	69
	New Thinking (F5.7/S26)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.022	-.171	.052
			.430	.080	.336
			69	69	69
	Dept explores innovation (F5.7/S27*)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.012	-.237*	.100
			.462	.026	.209
			68	68	68
	NSC Access (F5.8/S28)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	-.119	.051	.051
			.166	.341	.341
			68	68	68
	Impact of O's Informal Access (F5.8/S29)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.160	-.126	-.104
			.100	.157	.204
			66	66	66
	Dept influence on NSC (F5.6_5.8/S30)	Correlation Coefficient Sig. (1-tailed) N	.245*	.141	-.037
			.023	.127	.383
			67	67	67

Correlations

Spearman's rho	NSC Procedures (F5.8/S31*)	Correlation Coefficient		Level/Position within A's Hierarchy (F5.7/C)	Educational Background (F5.7/D)	Status w/in Agency (F5.7/E)
		Sig. (1-tailed)	N			
	Privileged access NSC (F5.8/S32)	Correlation Coefficient		.304**	.067	.165
		Sig. (1-tailed)	N	.007	.300	.097
	Level within Interagency (F5.7/B)	Correlation Coefficient		.64	.64	.64
		Sig. (1-tailed)	N	-.043	-.243*	.028
	Level/Position within A's Hierarchy (F5.7/C)	Correlation Coefficient		.365	.024	.411
		Sig. (1-tailed)	N	.67	.67	.67
	Educational Background (F5.7/D)	Correlation Coefficient		.640**	.085	.120
		Sig. (1-tailed)	N	.000	.245	.164
	Status w/in Agency (F5.7/E)	Correlation Coefficient		.69	.69	.69
		Sig. (1-tailed)	N	1.000	-.018	.207*
	NSC Procedures (F5.8/S31*)	Correlation Coefficient		.69	.440	.044
		Sig. (1-tailed)	N	.018	.69	.69
	Level within Interagency (F5.7/B)	Correlation Coefficient		.69	1.000	.158
		Sig. (1-tailed)	N	.440	.69	.097
	Level/Position within A's Hierarchy (F5.7/C)	Correlation Coefficient		.69	.69	.69
		Sig. (1-tailed)	N	.207*	.158	1.000
	Educational Background (F5.7/D)	Correlation Coefficient		.69	.097	.69
		Sig. (1-tailed)	N	.044	.69	.69
	Status w/in Agency (F5.7/E)	Correlation Coefficient		.69	.69	.69
		Sig. (1-tailed)	N	.69	.69	.69

** . Correlation is significant at the .01 level (1-tailed).

* . Correlation is significant at the .05 level (1-tailed).

APPENDIX F

CASE-SPECIFIC LITERATURE: PERSIAN GULF AND BOSNIA

PERSIAN GULF

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CURRICULUM VITAE

Vicki J. Rast was born on May 3, 1966, in New Orleans, Louisiana, and is an American citizen. A 1984 graduate of Chincoteague High School, Chincoteague, Virginia, she earned her Bachelor of Science degree from the United States Air Force Academy in 1988 (with military distinction), and was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in the United States Air Force. She is an F-16 aircraft maintenance officer, and served in the United Arab Emirates during the Persian Gulf War and in Saudi Arabia during Operation Southern Watch. She received her Master in Public Administration degree from Troy State University in 1992, and is currently a Candidate for the Doctor of Public Administration degree with the University of Alabama. A distinguished graduate from the U.S. Air Force Squadron Officer School, she is on faculty with the U.S. Air Force Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Her publications include "Coalitions: The Challenge of Effective Command and Control in Support of the Air Campaign," "National Fragmentation, Ethnicity, and the New World Order," "The Iraq-Kuwait Crisis: Structural Deprivation Leads to Revolution," *Intervention Design in Conflict Analysis and Resolution: Theory, Practice, and Research* (co-editor), and "Conflict Termination in the Persian Gulf War: Policy Failure Sustains Conflict."